Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 2)

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4-24.

Source reliability ratings range from A (Reliable) to F (Cannot Be Judged) as shown in Table 4-2. If

the source is new, they rate the source as F (Cannot Be Judged). An F rating does not necessarily mean the
source is unreliable but that the collection and processing personnel have no previous experience with the
source upon which to base a determination.

Table 4-2. Source reliability

4-25.

Information credibility ratings range from 1 (Confirmed) to 8 (Cannot Be Judged) as shown in

Table 4-3. If the information is new, they rate the content as 8 (Cannot Be Judged). An 8 rating does not
necessarily mean the information is not credible but that the collection and processing personnel have no
means of verifying the information.

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Table 4-3. Information credibility

4-26.

Media source analysis is the systematic comparison and analysis of the content and behavior of

different media sources over time. It is fundamental to media analysis (see Appendix K). Systematic
efforts to identify patterns in differences among media have traditionally yielded rich insights into basic
policy and leadership disputes. Comparison of trends in the content of individual media with shifts in
official policy has suggested that some media, at least more than others, will continue to mirror the
dominant policy line. By establishing a track record for different media that suggests which are vulnerable
to pressure to follow the central policy line, analysts will still have a powerful tool for identifying policy
and recognizing policy shifts.

ANALYZE INFORMATION

4-27.

During analysis, intelligence personnel use a variety of analysis techniques to discern facts,

indicators, patterns, and trends in information and relationships between variables. The techniques apply
inductive or deductive reasoning to understand the meaning of past events and predict future actions. Each
technique is based on facts, observations, or assumptions about the operational environment. Intelligence
personnel are mindful of injecting US or US military cultural bias into their analysis, particularly their
assumptions. FM 33.4 (FM 34-3) and FM 2-01.3 (FM 34-130) provide more information about
intelligence analysis techniques and procedures.

SSOCIATION

ATRIX

4-28.

Intelligence analysts use the association matrix to establish known or suspected associations

between individuals. Direct connections include, for example, face-to-face meetings or confirmed
telephonic conversations. Figure 4-3 provides a one-dimensional view of the relationships and tends to

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focus on the immediate AO. Analysts can use association matrixes to identify those personalities and
associations needing a more in-depth analysis in order to determine the degree of relationship, contacts, or
knowledge between the individuals. The structure of the threat organization is formed as connections
between personalities are made.

Figure 4-3. Example of an association matrix

HARTS

RAPHS

AND

ABLES

4-29.

Intelligence analysts use bar graphs, x/y graphs, pie charts, and tables to depict, identify, and

measure changes in patterns or trends throughout the statistical analysis. Using spreadsheets, researchers
and analysts can integrate and analyze large amounts of data retrieved from secondary sources or collected
through direct observation. Open sources are an important source of data and finished products. Figure 4-
4 is an example of a bar chart retrieved from the World Bank website that depicts changes in mobile phone
access.

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Figure 4-4. Example of a bar graph

NFRASTRUCTURE

VERLAYS

4-30.

Intelligence analysts use infrastructure overlays to identify infrastructure and assets that are critical

or key to military operations and the civilian population. National critical infrastructure and key assets are
the infrastructure and assets vital to a nation’s security, governance, public health and safety, economy, and
public confidence. They include telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas and oil distribution
and storage, water supply systems, banking and finance, transportation, emergency services, industrial
assets, information systems, and continuity of government operations.

4-31.

Critical infrastructure overlays can be useful for identifying protected terrain. Protected terrain

encompasses areas that should not be destroyed, attacked, or occupied, or that have other use restrictions
based on international treaties, rules of engagement, and common sense—such as schools, hospitals, areas
with large amounts of phone or electrical wiring, and buildings with many stories. For example, medical
facilities may be depicted on their own key infrastructure overlay. Medical facilities are generally “no fire”
areas for friendly forces and protected from damage or destruction so that they can continue to take care of
the local population once friendly forces have secured the urban area. Inadequate health care for the local
population can lead to both a negative perception of friendly forces and an uncontrolled increase in disease,
which can affect friendly forces personnel working in the urban environment directly.

4-32.

Like population status overlays, this type of overlay is a group of products rather than a single

product. Figure 4-5 is an example of one type of infrastructure overlay, a logistics sustainability overlay.
In rural areas, a logistics sustainability overlay could depict potable water supplies, farms, orchards,
growing seasons, and other relevant items. In built-up areas, this overlay could depict supermarkets, food
warehouses, pharmacies, hospitals, clinics, and residences of doctors and other key medical personnel.
Key to preparing this overlay is knowledge of infrastructure within the AO; the disposition of military
forces (friendly and enemy) and civilians; their sustainment requirements, and the availability and location
of resources (materiel and personnel) to meet these requirements.

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Figure 4-5. Example of a logistics sustainability overlay

INK

ETWORK

)

IAGRAM

4-33.

Intelligence analysts use the link diagram to identify relationships between organizations,

individuals, events, or other factors deemed significant in any given situation. Link diagrams can depict
C2, financial, and social relationships as networks. In OSINT, the diagram can map the relationship
between the source and the broadcast station or what websites link to a specific homepage. They can help
the analyst determine nodes within networks; status or purpose of nodes; critical nodes or individuals
within the network; and interaction of nodes with external networks. Figure 4-6 is an example of a link
(network) diagram.

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environment, and their success criteria. An in-depth knowledge and understanding of the national,
regional, and local cultures helps the analyst understand the operational environment and the reactions of
the enemy and populace friendly force activities. Table 4-4 is an example of a perception assessment
matrix. There are several means to measure perceptions:

Determine demographic and cultural factors that shape perceptions and reactions.

Identify patterns and indicators from previous expectations and reactions in a society’s history.

Compare reported reactions to determine if they were based on real or perceived conditions.

Monitor editorial and opinion pieces of relevant newspapers for changes in tone or opinion
shifts that can steer or may be reacting to the opinions of a society, organization, or group.

Table 4-4. Example of perception assessment matrix

OPULATION

TATUS

VERLAY

4-35.

Intelligence analysts use the population status overlays to identify points of potential conflict

between segments of a society; bases of support or sustainment for enemy forces; or areas that are neutral
or favorable to US military operations. Based on open source research and updated during operations, the
population overlays depict the characteristics and the disposition of the civilian population within the
operational environment. Figure 4-7 is an example of a population status overlay that depicts the sectors of
the population that are pro-government, anti-government, pro-threat, anti-threat, and uncommitted or
neutral.

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Figure 4-7. Population status overlay

IMELINES OF

ATES

4-36.

Intelligence analysts use timelines to identify key local national holidays, historic events, and

significant cultural and political events (Figure 4-8). Timelines help the analyst anticipate and inform the
unit as to how key sectors of the population might react to given circumstances. These timelines could
include descriptions of population movements or political shifts that are relevant to the operational area.
They could also include a brief historical record of the population or area, highlighting the activities of a
certain population sector. For example, in Bosnia, weddings were often held on Fridays and celebratory
fire was a common occurrence on Friday afternoons and late into the night. Timelines—a list of significant
dates along with relevant information and analysis—seek to provide a context to operational conditions.

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Figure 4-8. Examples of timelines of key dates

INTERPRET INFORMATION

4-37.

Interpretation is an objective mental process based on common sense, life experience, military

knowledge covering both enemy and friendly forces and existing information and intelligence. This mental
process involves the identification of new activity and a postulation regarding the significance of that
activity. The process also results in an understanding of the activity as viewed from the enemy’s or
source’s perspective.

ULTURAL

WARENESS

4-38.

A challenge in the intelligence operations is to interpret foreign military and political objectives,

capabilities, needs, and actions without viewing the research or collected information through the
American cultural lens that injects American cultural bias and preconceived ideas into our analysis.
Instead, analysts need to recognize their cultural bias and attempt to mitigate its effects through cultural
awareness. Cultural awareness enables the analyst to consider the perspective of the enemy, the local
population, or other non-American perspective when planning research, performing analysis, and
interpreting the results of analysis. Quite literally, analysts should ask: “How will the enemy perceive this

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development, and therefore what is he likely to do next?” rather than “How would we (the US) perceive
this development, and how would we respond?” In military lexicon, analysts need to think “red,” not
“blue.”

4-39.

In essence, it is important to consider, if not understand, foreign perception of the US, its armed

forces, and its operations when attempting to determine the enemy’s or civil population’s objectives and
probable actions. Moreover, many other countries, organizations, or potential enemy factions depend on
open sources for their intelligence. Our understanding of what others perceive, therefore, needs to be
derived from the same material. This approach will help avoid costly, mistaken assumptions about the
enemy during mission planning and execution, and its importance is reflected by the Army’s heightened
interest in raising the level of cultural awareness among today’s troops.

NTELLIGENCE

REPARATION OF THE

ATTLEFIELD

4-40.

IPB is a technique for analyzing and interpreting the results of analysis in a specific operational

environment, normally from the enemy’s perspective. It builds on the baseline knowledge and databases
created during research and the development of GMI products such as the operational environment
assessment. The technique supports the development and integration of intelligence during the MDMP.
Applying the IPB technique helps the G2/S2 staff support the commander in applying and protecting his
forces at critical points in time and space in the operational environment. The G2/S2 staff uses IPB to
describe the operational environment in which the unit is operating and the effects of the environment on
the unit’s operations. The IPB technique supports the G2/S2 staff in identifying enemy capabilities,
strengths, weaknesses, probable objectives, and potential COA. IPB also addresses the civil considerations
of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders,
populations, and organizations within an AO on the conduct of military operations.

4-41.

During IPB, it is in the “Determine Threat Courses of Action” step that the analyst interprets the

results of analysis to reach an objective conclusion. The results of this step which drive the MDMP are
valid only if the analyst established a good foundation during the first three steps of the IPB technique.
Given the characteristics of the operational environment, coupled the enemy’s capabilities, what are the
enemy’s likely objectives and the COAs? The analyst develops COA models that depict the available
enemy COAs. The enemy COAs that the analyst develops in this step are the products the G2/S2 staff will
use to portray the enemy in the MDMP and monitor during situation development. The analyst cannot
produce these COAs and effectively predict the enemy COAs, unless he

⎯

Thoroughly considers what the enemy is capable of and what he prefers to do in like situations if
unconstrained by the operational environment.

Identifies the physical limits of the AO and AOI.

Identifies the characteristic of the operational environment that might affect the operation.

Understands the friendly mission throughout the time duration of the operation.

Identifies the opportunities and constraints the operational environment offers to enemy and
friendly forces.

ITUATION

EVELOPMENT

4-42.

Situation development is a technique for producing current intelligence by interpreting the activity or

conditions within a specific operational environment or about a specific subject. The technique depends
upon the products developed during IPB and the continuous monitoring of activities in the unit’s area of
intelligence responsibility (AOIR). The technique helps the G2/S2 staff to provide I&W; confirm enemy
COAs; explain the enemy activity’s relationship to the operational environment and US operations; and
identify information gaps. The current intelligence products developed through the situation development
technique help the unit commander to understand the current enemy situation within the context of the
operational environment. The G2/S2 staff conducts situation development during the preparation for and
execution of the unit’s operations.

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4-43.

The analyst interprets the results of analysis against the predicted enemy COAs, civilian actions, and

friendly situation. Interpretation includes verifying the existence or nonexistence of indicators. The lack
of information relating to specific indicators may signify that the COA is incorrect. The lack of
information or reporting may also point to either an information gap regarding one or more indicators, or to
a deception effort. If the analyst identifies either of these situations then he must consider recommending
adjustments to the ISR effort. Ultimately, the G2/S2 must determine the significance of the enemy and
civilian information as it relates to the following basic questions:

Does the information confirm or deny forecasted COAs?

Does the information confirm or deny predicted objectives?

Does the information identify new COAs and objectives?

Does the information answer the commander’s requirements?

REPORT RESULTS

4-44.

The objective in reporting or presenting information is to provide relevant information to support

planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of operations. Table 4-5 lists the three general methods
that the staff uses to present information and meet its information objective. Digital systems contain
standard report formats, maps, and mapping tools that assist the staff in presenting information in written,
verbal, and graphic form. Audio and video systems like large format displays and teleconferencing
systems enable the use of a combination of the methods in multimedia presentations.

Table 4-5. Reporting methods and products

RITTEN

EPORTS

4-45.

Analysts reports information in accordance with unit SOPs and reporting guidance. Report formats

include standardized reports such as the size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment (SALUTE) report
and specialized intelligence reports such as tactical report (TACREP) or information intelligence report
(IIR). Analysts consider the following guideline when preparing reports:

Timely Information.

Upon recognition, report immediately time-sensitive information such as

warning of hostile action against US and non-US civilians or US, allied, and coalition forces.
Report the information in accordance with reporting guidance including, if authorized, directly
to affected units. Do not delay reports for the sole purpose of assuring the correct format.

Relevant Information.

Reports should contain only relevant information. The information

should answer or contribute to the answering of the IRs in the task or the request. Limiting
reports to relevant information reduces the time and effort spent collecting, organizing, and
transmitting reports. Send only lines of the report that contain new information or changes.

Complete Information.

Reports have prescribed formats to ensure completeness of transmitted

information. The unit SOPs should outline the format for each report. It should also explain
under what conditions to submit each report.

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RAPHIC

ISPLAYS

4-46.

The situation map (SITMAP) is the primary graphic display product within command posts and

operations centers. An effective SITMAP ensures personnel do not get overwhelmed, improves
decisionmaker confidence, and improves presentation of information. Personnel create analog and digital
SITMAPs during the initial steps of the MDMP using existing databases and graphics from higher
headquarters. They update the map with information received and retrieved during the preparation and
execution of operations. Interaction with other staff sections and management of SITMAPs are essential to
maintaining situational awareness and an accurate COP. In OSINT operations, this requires developing
unclassified graphics or overlays that the intelligence staff can exchange with other staff sections, non-
intelligence personnel, and open source collection personnel who normally operate in unclassified
workspaces.

-B

ASED

EPORTS

4-47.

Web-based reporting is an effective technique for disseminating written reports and graphics to

multiple users both within and outside the AO. Through the website, the analysts can collaborate and
provide visibility on the status of RFIs and production tasks. The analysts can also post information to
technical databases that help personnel collect, process, and analyze information from open sources.
Figure 4-9 provides an example of the format of a web-based OSINT report. The metadata accompanying
the report in Figure 4-9 included––

Product Type.

Source Date.

Regions.

Sub-Regions.

Countries.

Topics.

Document Identification.

RESENTATION

UIDELINES

4-48.

The example in Figure 4-9 complies with standard guidelines for producing and reviewing

intelligence reports. Regardless of the type of report and method of presentation, each report should
always have a clear bottom-line message that addresses stated or anticipated intelligence requirements.
The following are additional guidelines for web-based intelligence reports:

Create precise, informative subject line or headline conveying key point of the report.

Convey all key points in summary paragraph; content tracks with summary paragraph.

State clear topic sentences for each key point.

Present evidence clearly with compelling analytic statement; no internal contradictions.

Present information logically with clear transitions between sections and sentences; no inclusion
of extraneous "interesting" information.

Highlight important information, changes, or trend comparison, up front.

Highlight relevant aspects of open source environment to put source message or commentary
into context.

Anticipate reader's questions; note when relevant information is not found or addressed.

Distinguish clearly between analyst's voice and that of open source.

Use sound judgment when choosing sources (use primary sources versus secondary sources)

Use appropriate source citations and dates.

Use source descriptors or explanations about sources (including what is not known about a
source) to put information into context.

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Remain faithful to the citation in its original meaning within context or to its grammar and
syntax.

Provide proper comparisons between events, people, open source treatments.

Use appropriate use of multimedia; no "eye-candy.”

Use active voice whenever possible or appropriate.

Use prescribed formats for margins and font.

Observe prescribed stylistic rules, including transliteration rules.

Review for misspellings or typographical errors and incorrect or awkward English grammar.

Figure 4-9. Example of a web-based open source intelligence report

THER

ONSIDERATIONS

4-49.

Considerations in reporting OSINT include––

Write-to-release; without compromising security, write at the lowest classification level to
facilitate the widest distribution of the intelligence.

Separate paragraphs and paragraph classifications markings to distinguish unclassified OSINT
intelligence in classified reports.

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Chapter 5

Collect and Process Information

5-1.

Distinct from open source research, open source collection consists of the unintrusive collection of

publicly available information in the course of authorized and assigned missions with the intent to use or
retain the information for foreign intelligence or CI purposes. Publicly available information includes, but
is not limited to, foreign language documents, radio and television broadcasts, Internet sites, and public
speaking forums.

5-2.

Collection responds to reconnaissance and surveillance missions levied on intelligence and non-

intelligence organizations through tasks and requests. Focused and synchronized through collection
management, open source collection resources know who, what, when, where, and why to collect publicly
available information and essential metadata (date, time, location, language, frequency, station
identification, newspaper name, author). Essential metadata includes temporal and geospatial data that
enables tracking and visualization of activity, changes in the operational environment, and coverage of
reconnaissance and surveillance resources.

CONDUCT TARGET DEVELOPMENT

5-3.

If not provided in the OPORD, analysis of the task statement identifies the target (information

source), their target systems (media of communications), and reporting guidance (Table 5-1). During
target development, analysts or collectors research the target and target systems to determine the target
components and the elements. They also identify the target characteristics or technical data of each target
element to support synchronization of collection between echelons and subordinate organizations as well
as tasking individual collectors or programming collection systems. In addition, the results of target
research and analysis provide the basis for management of collection assets and criteria for assessing the
effectiveness of collection.

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Table 5-1. Target development

COLLECT INFORMATION

5-4.

Once positioned, C2 personnel task the appropriate collection and processing assets based on their

evaluation and correlation of target characteristics, team capabilities, and team availability.  The tasks and
requests describe the collection objective and reporting guidance.  In addition to reporting guidance, SOPs
describe what information and essential metadata (date, time, location, language, frequency, station
identification, newspaper name, author, meeting chairperson) to retain and report.

5-5.

Essential metadata includes temporal and geospatial data that enables tracking and visualization of

the collected information and metadata in time and space. SOPs also provide instructions on how to
properly label collected information; keep accurate files and logs, and transfer or destroy collected
information and associated records.

5-6.

Collection personnel conduct an initial reconnaissance of the information environment followed by

surveillance of specific targets (Table 5-2). As required, collection personnel forward collected
information to linguists, DOCEX personnel, or other elements for processing. They report time-sensitive
information and other reportable information to control personnel. Control personnel evaluate the
collected and processed information then disseminate the relevant, reportable information in accordance
with the reporting guidance in the task statement or RFI (Figure 5-1). SOPs should provide instructions on

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HVTs and future surveillance missions. Periodically, collection personnel search the AOI to verify the
baseline and locate new sources of information.

5-8.

After their initial reconnaissance, collection personnel begin surveillance of the targets in the

collection task, as well as approved new targets identified during reconnaissance. Each collection task for
surveillance missions includes the SIRs or collection objectives, a priority for collection, timeframe of
expected activity, latest (or earliest) time or event the information is of value, and reporting instructions.
Surveillance missions require collection personnel to detect, identify, and locate the target; monitor and
record the target activity or content; and report the content and characteristics (metadata) of the target.

UBLIC

PEAKING

ORUMS

5-9.

Open source collection personnel use the basic collection procedures described in Table 5-2 to

collect information during public speaking forums (see Table 2-1). In addition, C2 personnel brief and
debrief collection personnel on the event, the speakers, specific information required, and other observed
activity. In permissive or corporative environments, personnel attend conferences, lectures, public
meetings, and working groups with the consent or invitation of the event’s sponsor. Attending these and
similar events are opportunities to build relationships with non-military professionals and their
organizations.

5-10.

In all environments, collection personnel require a thorough understanding of the local culture and

laws to ensure their activities are unintrusive and do not violate local customs or laws. During tactical
operations, open source collectors face situations similar to those of war correspondents and
photojournalists. In those situations, the collector requires situational awareness as well as cultural
awareness since overt monitoring and recording of public speaking forums may lead to––

Modification of speaker’s message.

Expulsion from the event or area.

Denial of access to future events.

Assault on the collector or the collection equipment.

Hostile opinion or actions against US operations and personnel.

UBLIC

OCUMENTS

5-11.

Open source collection personnel use the basic collection procedures described in Table 5-2 to

collect documents (see Table 2-2). Like collecting information at public speaking forums, personnel must
be aware of the local environment and use a collection technique that is unintrusive and appropriate for the
situation. These techniques include but are not limited to––

Copying or photographing documents available in public forums such as town halls, libraries,
and museums.

Finding discarded documents in a public area such as streets, markets, and restrooms.

Photographing documents in public areas such as banners, graffiti, posters, and other large
documents.

Purchasing documents directly from street vendors, newspaper stands, book stores, and
publishers.

Purchasing documents through a third party such as a wholesale distributor or book club.

Receiving documents upon request without charge from the author, conferences, trade fairs,
direct mail advertising.

5-12.

Once collected, the collection personnel tag each document and complete an inventory of a group of

documents. Completing the document tag and inventory establishes accountability and traceability for the
collected documents. The collection personnel should protect the document from damage by placing the
documents in a weatherproof container (box or plastic bag). If a DD Form 2745 (Enemy Prisoner of War

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[EPW] Capture Tag) is not available, record the required data on any piece of paper or other field
expedient method. As a minimum, the collection personnel should record the following information:

Collecting unit identification.

Date and time of collection in date-time group (DTG) format.

Location of collection including 8-digit map coordinates and a detailed description of the
location.

Identity of the person or organization that provided the document.

Summary of the circumstances of collection.

5-13.

If not already completed, collection personnel inventory all collected documents to ensure

accountability. If the document has a tag, the personnel use the information on the tag to complete the
document inventory. They should indicate attempts to process and report information on the inventory.
This prevents unnecessary duplication of effort by document processing personnel. The format for a
document inventory is in accordance with unit SOPs and reporting guidance, but it should contain at least
the following information:

Collecting unit identification.

Collection date, time, and location.

List of documents, by serial number if using DD Form 2745, Part C.

Destination unit identification.

Screening category, if applicable.

Remarks including serial number and DTG of reports based on the documents.

UBLIC

ROADCAST

5-14.

Regional bureaus of the DNI OSC collect, process, and report on international and regional

broadcast networks in accordance with standing and ad hoc open source IRs. Their coverage of
international and regional broadcasts enables deployed Army organizations to use, if necessary, their
tactical assets to collect and process information from local radio and television broadcast targets that are
only accessible from within the AO. Close coordination between the OSC, the JIOCs, the theater-level
Army intelligence centers, and the deployed unit ensure the synchronization of collection and the
dissemination of information from public broadcasts between echelons.

5-15.

During collection operations, there are four primary reconnaissance techniques to search for public

broadcasts (Table 5-3). For best results, collection personnel use these techniques in combination rather
then independently. The selection of the techniques depends on the mission, the number of collection
personnel, and their capabilities. Following the initial reconnaissance, collection personnel begin
surveillance of public broadcast targets. During surveillance, collection personnel detect, identify, and
locate the broadcast signal; monitor and record the broadcast content; and report the content and
characteristics (metadata) of the broadcast. There are four primary surveillance techniques to monitor
broadcasts. As during reconnaissance, collection personnel use the techniques in combination and the
specific techniques depend on the mission, the number of collection assets, and their capabilities.

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Table 5-3. Broadcast reconnaissance and surveillance techniques

NTERNET

ITES

5-16.

Like international and regional broadcasts, the regional bureaus and local collection assets of the

DNI OSC collect, process, and report on international and regional news posted or webcast on Internet
sites. The JIOCs and the theater level Army intelligence centers also search and monitor the Internet for
local, regional, and international news and other information on AOR and associated AOI. These sustained
collection activities and the nature of the Internet enable deployed Army organizations to rely on support
relationships with these external organizations for Internet collection. If the deployed organizations
determine that an organic Internet site collection is necessary then they work closely with the supporting
theater level Joint and Army intelligence centers to deconflict targets, synchronize coverage, and
disseminate information between echelons as well as the OSC.

5-17.

The initial mission of collection personnel is to conduct a reconnaissance of the Internet (Table 5-4).

While broadcast collection is primarily surveillance, reconnaissance missions dominate Internet collection.
The Internet is a dynamic information environment consisting of stationary and moving targets (sites)
containing a mixture of old and new content. Reconnaissance is required to locate new sites and

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information. The reconnaissance or search uses the basic techniques and procedures described in
Appendix F. For OPSEC, a commander of a major subordinate command may approve nonattributable
Internet access to support authorized open source collection activities. The recommended system for
nonattributable access is the Intelink-SBU. A commercial Internet service provider can provide
nonattributable access; however, use of a local provider comes with its own OPSEC risks.

PROCESS INFORMATION

5-18.

If required, collection personnel or a separate processing element transforms collected information

into a form suitable for analysis. The degree that the tactical level sites process the collected information
depends on the site’s resources and its mission. When the requirements exceed organic and attached
processing capabilities, the unit can request support from the NGIC’s Reach Language Support Program or
the National Media Exploitation Center (NMEC).

5-19.

The majority of document processing involves digitizing, transcribing, and translating non-English

graphics, recordings, and textual documents into English text format. Language capability is therefore
essential to processing non-English language documents. In addition, language-based processing activities
require procedures and management to ensure transcripts and translations are timely, accurate, complete,
and free of bias.

5-20.

At the tactical level, processing personnel may not possess the assets for digital media extraction;

computer forensics; voice recognition and identification; comparative analysis of video content; and
cryptanalysis. The skills, knowledge, and equipment for specialized processing are available at
Intelligence Community organizations. Units can request support from DIA, NGIC, CIA, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other Intelligence Community organizations to use specialized
techniques and procedures to extract additional information from the collected audio and video
information. Application of specialized processing techniques and procedures may require the
classification of the processed information and restriction of its distribution.

IGITIZE

NFORMATION

5-21.

If not already in a digital format, processing personnel create a digital record of documents by

scanning or taking a digital photograph. Personnel must annotate or otherwise include all the information
about the document with digitized documents to ensure document accountability and traceability.
Specifically, SOPs should provide instructions on how to properly label processed information, keep
accurate files and logs, and transfer or destroy processed information and associated records. Digitization
enables the dissemination of the document to external database (for example, HARMONY) and
organizations where linguists such as those in the NMEC, the Army’s Reach Language Support Program,
and the Joint Reserve Intelligence Center-Leavenworth can transcribe and translate the document.
Digitization also enables the use machine translation tools to screen documents for key words, names, and
phrases as well as to provide a rough translation or gist of the document.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Chapter 5

5-10

FMI 2-22.9

5 December 2006

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

RANSCRIBE AND

RANSLATE

NFORMATION

5-23.

Transcription and translation capabilities are essential to processing non-English publicly available

information. Military, government civilian, and contract linguists must possess source language and, for
translators, English language skills and subject matter knowledge commensurate with the materiel they are
processing. In addition, language-based processing activities require procedures to ensure transcripts and
translations are accurate, complete, and free of bias.

Transcription.

A transcript is a verbatim, native language rendering of the information in an

audio or video recording. Both listening and writing proficiency in the source language are
essential for an accurate transcript. A transcript is extremely important when the English
language skills of the processing personnel are inadequate for authoritative, direct translation
from audio or video into English text. During processing, the linguist transcribes all information
in the recording into a standardized format. The transcript, particularly of video files, includes
descriptions of the activity, background, and conditions that the transcriber hears in the audio
and observes in the video.

Translation.

A translation, unlike a transcript, is not verbatim but an approximation of the

literal and implied meaning of the written language. Bilingual competence is a prerequisite for
creating any translation. The linguist must be able to read and comprehend the source language,
write comprehensibly in English, and choose the equivalent expression in English that both fully
conveys and best matches the meaning intended in the source language. During processing, a
linguist creates an extract, a summary, or a full translation of the original document or transcript.
The linguist provides an extract or summary when time and resources are insufficient for a full
translation or the content does not meet reporting criteria. A full translation requires the linguist
to translate all information into a standardized format.

5-24.

Processing personnel transcribe audio and video recordings from media storage devices into text

format. For processing of non-English recordings, transcription is extremely important when the English
language skills of the processing personnel are inadequate for authoritative, direct translation into English.
The transcriber uses native font or transliteration to represent the spoken language in the recording. The
transcript, particularly of video files, includes descriptions of the activity, setting, and conditions that the
transcriber hears in the audio and observes in the video.

5-25.

During transcription, a linguist provides either an extract or a full translation of the original audio or

video recording. The linguist provides an extract of the recording when time and resources are insufficient
for a full transcript or the content does not meet reporting criteria. A full transcript requires the linguist to
render all information in the recording into a standard transcription report format. The linguist uses online
dictionaries, gazetteers, and working aids to improve the transcript. Once completed the linguist stores or
forwards the transcript to a quality control linguist.

5-26.

Processing personnel translate document content and transcripts into English-language text format.

To ensure consistency and quality, the processing team applies a standard, three-phase process to translate
spoken and written information into English. During processing, a linguist provides an extract, summary,
or a full translation of the original document or transcript. The linguist provides an extract or summary of
the document or transcript when time and resources are insufficient for a full translation or the content does
not meet reporting criteria. A full translation requires the linguist to translate all information in the
document or transcript into a standard translation report format. The linguist uses online dictionaries,
gazetteers, and working aids to improve the translation. Once completed the linguist stores or forwards the
translation to the quality control linguist.

5-27.

Professional level linguists review each transcription and translation to ensure consistency with

reporting standards and quality of the translation. With some exceptions, a US Government linguist should

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Collect and Process Information

5 December 2006

FMI 2-22.9

5-11

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

review all information that a non-US linguist processes. Exceptions include operations involving long-
term multinational or coalition partners of the US and US contractors with the requisite skills and the
command’s confidence. Each transcript and translation undergoes two levels of review:

Quality Control.

During quality control, a qualified linguist ensures that the transcript or

translation is accurate and clearly expresses the meaning of the original recording or document.
The quality control linguist reviews the transcript or translation to ensure that it is accurate,
complete, free of bias, and in accordance with reporting standards. The linguist returns the
transcript or translation for correction or personally adds missed content, corrects minor errors,
and fixes minor format errors. Upon completion of quality control, the transcript or translation
is available for analysis.

Quality Assurance.

During quality assurance, a qualified individual reviews the transcript or

translation to ensure that it contains all required information and, if a translation, reads naturally
in English. Once reviewed, the quality assurance linguist saves the completed transcript or
translation to the local database. If authorized, the quality assurance linguist disseminates the
transcript or translation to external databases.

REPORT INFORMATION

5-28.

Collection and processing personnel report information in accordance with their unit SOPs and

reporting guidance. Upon recognition, they report time-sensitive information such as I&W of hostile
action against US forces to their C2 element. If authorized, they report time-sensitive information directly
to affected units. Collection personnel use LANs to transfer text and audio and video files requiring
processing to personnel for transcription, translation, or other processing. Collection and processing
personnel use wide area networks (WANs) to disseminate unprocessed and processed information to
external databases and organizations.

5-29.

Collection and processing personnel use basic reporting procedures to identify, evaluate, and report

time-sensitive information and other information that meets reporting criteria. These reports focus
primarily on conveying facts but can include comments on the source’s reliability and the information’s
credibility. The following describes the basic procedure for reporting information of intelligence value.

Reportable Information.

Collection and processing personnel identify information meeting the

reporting criteria in the task or request. As a minimum, they identify the basic facts (who, what,
where, and when) in the information. If they have the time, analytic skills, target knowledge,
and situational understanding then they use basic analysis techniques and procedures to reach
conclusions about the meaning (why) of the information.

Report Guidelines.

Report formats include standardized reports such as the SALUTE report,

TACREP, information intelligence report, or webbased transcription and translations reports.
Personnel should consider the following guideline when preparing reports:

Timely Information.

Upon recognition, report immediately time-sensitive information

such as warning of hostile action against US and non-US civilians or US, allied, and
coalition forces. Report the information in accordance with reporting guidance including, if
authorized, directly to affected units. Do not delay reports for the sole purpose of assuring
the correct format.

Relevant Information.

Reports should contain only relevant information. The information

Complete Information.

Reports have prescribed formats to ensure completeness of

transmitted information. Unit SOPs should outline the format for each report. The SOPs
should also explain under what conditions to submit each report.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Appendix A

A-2

FMI 2-22.9

5 December 2006

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MISSION

A-2.

The Asian Studies Detachment's mission is to collect, analyze, and report publicly available

information from foreign open sources in response to theater and National level intelligence requirements.
The unit exists primarily to support the tactical intelligence needs of US Army Pacific Command
(USAPACOM), but its products serve all Services, COCOMs, DOD intelligence agencies; non-DOD
customers such as the DNI OSC, the FBI, the Department of State (DOS); and nongovernmental strategic
"think tanks." The Asian Studies Detachment strives to set the standard for providing timely and value-
added reporting on Asia, derived from the fullest possible exploitation of foreign open sources.

ORGANIZATION

A-3.

The Asian Studies Detachment consists of DA civilians (DACs), Japanese Nationals, US contractors,

and a varying number of Army Reservists and National Guardsmen.  Many of staff bring with them
extensive experience from private sector and government organizations in various countries. The DACs are
Japanese linguists. The Asian Studies Detachment's Japanese National employees, all funded and
contracted to the US Government by the Japanese government, make up the bulk of the operation
(Figure A-1).  As the unit's analysts, translators, librarians, and administrative support personnel, the
Japanese personnel accomplish the Asian Studies Detachment's collection, analysis, and reporting mission.
All together, they provide the Asian Studies Detachment with language expertise in Bengali, Burmese,
Chinese, Indonesian, Japanese, Khmer, Korean, Hindi, Malaysian, Nepali, Russian, Tagalog, Thai, Uygur,
and Vietnamese, as well as a handful of European languages.

OPERATIONS

A-4.

The Asian Studies Detachment subscribes to over 400 international publications in hardcopy and

digital format. Not all open source materials used by the Asian Studies Detachment, however, are
acquirable through subscription. The Asian Studies Detachment obtains other materials through
memberships in international research and friendship organizations, and also by direct purchase from
foreign bookstores and publishing houses.

A-5.

The Asian Studies Detachment is not a translation unit. On the contrary, its analysts within each

section research materials, extract information relating to intelligence requirements, and write reports
directly into their native language (Japanese) without actually translating the materials into English
themselves. The Asian Studies Detachment's Translations Branch then translates the reports into English.
The DAC Reports Officers in the Branch check these translations and perform the final editing and
formatting before publishing the reports as intelligence information reports, the unit's primary product.

A-6.

With the exception of some Defense Attaché reporting, the Asian Studies Detachment is the only

unit in the Army that synthesizes and cites a large number of open source references in an intelligence
information report format similar to research papers or essays. The Asian Studies Detachment’s
intelligence information reports support the USAPACOM and the US Army Pacific as well as the DIA, the
NGIC, and the US Air Force's NASIC on topics ranging from North Korean underground facilities to
Chinese Peoples Liberation Army Air Force air and space science and technology developments.

A-7.

In addition to the intelligence information report, the Current Operations Branch of the Asian Studies

Detachment produces a daily Force Protection and Situational Awareness Report, an email product
composed of a compilation of news article excerpts from foreign media websites throughout the
USAPACOM’s AOR. Unlike the intelligence information report, which is more strategic in nature, the
Force Protection and Situational Awareness Report provides US forces stationed or deployed throughout
the USAPACOM’s AOR and other travelers with current FP or security-related open source information.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Asian Studies Detachment

5 December 2006

FMI 2-22.9

A-3

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

A-8.

The intelligence information reports and Force Protection and Situational Awareness Reports are

available on the Asian Studies Detachment's unclassified and classified websites. The Force Protection and
Situational Awareness Reports are also posted on the OSC’s website, the FBI-Honolulu's Law
Enforcement Online website, the FMSO’s WBIL, and the AKO Intelligence Knowledge Collaboration
Center.

CHALLENGES

A-9.

The explosion of the Internet over the last decade has had a tremendous effect on the Asian Studies

Detachment's OSINT techniques and procedures.  Approximately half of the Asian Studies Detachment’s
cited sources currently consist of Internet-derived information, and the percentage is steadily growing.  The
Asian Studies Detachment must meet the near-future challenge of increasing its Internet coverage while
simultaneously protecting its Internet research from OPSEC threats. To this end, the Asian Studies
Detachment has already begun looking at increasing and standardizing its use of the Intelink-SBU for
Internet searches since the system supports increased OPSEC while not compromising its ability to conduct
overt collection.

A-10.

The Asian Studies Detachment plans to install Intelink-SBU on all of its computers. In addition, the

Asian Studies Detachment is exploring the feasibility of entering the realm of audio visual media analysis
with the possible implementation of tools which enables continuous real-time monitoring, transcription,
and machine translation of foreign-language television broadcasts.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

5 December 2006

FMI 2-22.9

B-1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Appendix B

Intelligence Oversight

B-1.

Executive Order 12333 stems from activities that DOD intelligence and CI units conducted against

US persons involved in the Civil Rights and anti-Vietnam War movements in the 1960s and 1970s. DOD
intelligence personnel used overt and covert means to collect information on the political positions and
expressions of US persons then retained the information in a nationwide database and disseminated the
information to law enforcement authorities. In response to these abuses, the President issued Executive
Order 12333 to provide general principles that, in addition to and consistent with applicable laws, are
intended to achieve the proper balance between the acquisition of essential information and protection of
individual interests.

B-2.

The purpose of Executive Order 12333 is to enhance human and technical collection techniques,

especially those undertaken abroad, and the acquisition of significant foreign intelligence, as well as the
detection and countering of international terrorist activities and espionage conducted by foreign powers.
Accurate and timely information about the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers,
organizations, or persons and their agents being essential to informed decisionmaking in the areas of
national defense and foreign relations. Collection of such information is a priority objective and will be
pursued in a vigorous, innovative, and responsible manner that is consistent with the Constitution and
applicable law and respectful of the principles upon which the US was founded.

B-3.

Executive Order 12333 states the goal of the National intelligence effort is to provide the President

and the National Security Council with the necessary information on which to base decisions concerning
the conduct and development of foreign, defense, and economic policy, and the protection of US national
interests from foreign security threats. Supporting this goal are the following principles which apply to all
intelligence components of the US Intelligence Community:

All means, consistent with applicable US law and Executive Order 12333 and with full
consideration of the rights of US persons, shall be used to develop intelligence information for
the President and the National Security Council. A balanced approach between technical
collection efforts and other means should be maintained and encouraged.

Special emphasis should be given to detecting and countering espionage and other threats and
activities directed by foreign intelligence services against the US Government, or US
corporations, establishments, or persons.

To the greatest extent possible consistent with applicable US law and Executive Order 12333,
and with full consideration of the rights of US persons, all agencies and departments should seek
to ensure full and free exchange of information in order to derive maximum benefit from the US
intelligence effort.

B-4.

For more information on Executive Order 12333 and Intelligence Oversight, visit the Assistant to the

Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight website at

http://www.dod.mil/atsdio/

INTERPRETATION

B-5.

AR 381-10 promulgates the instructions of Executive Order 12333 and DOD Directive 5240.1R.

The following summary of AR 381-10 does not modify or supersede published regulatory instructions,
policy, or legal opinions. A thorough understanding of this regulation is necessary during the planning,
preparation for, execution, and assessment of any intelligence operation. AR 381-10 directs intelligence
organizations to refer questions concerning the interpretation of the instructions on collection, retention,
and dissemination of US person information to the responsible legal office.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Appendix B

B-2

FMI 2-22.9

5 December 2006

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

B-6.

For current policy information on AR 381-10 and Army Intelligence Oversight,

visit the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G2 website at

http://www.dami.army.pentagon.mil/offices/dami-

ch/io/io_home.html

. AR 381-10 is available from the Army Publication Directorate at

http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/index.html

ARMY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

B-7.

AR 381-10 enables Army intelligence components performing authorized intelligence functions to

carry out those functions in a manner that protects the constitutional rights of US persons. The regulation
does not itself authorize intelligence activity. An Army intelligence component must first have the mission
and authority to conduct the intelligence activity. The regulation does not apply to Army intelligence
components when engaged in civil disturbance or law enforcement activities. Army intelligence
components include the following Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve activities:

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, G2.

Senior intelligence officers and staff of MACOMs and other commands and organizations.

G2 and S2 staffs.

MI units.

INSCOM and subordinates units.

US Army Intelligence Center and other organizations when conducting intelligence training.

Contractors of any Army entity when conducting intelligence activities as defined in AR 381-
10.

Any other Army entity when conducting intelligence activities as defined in AR 381-10.

Assigned Functions

B-8.

Titles 10, 32, and 50 of the US Code of Law are the legal basis for the authorized intelligence and CI

functions of Army’s Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve. A number of Executive
Orders, DOD directives, and Army regulations promulgate these sections of the US Code. DOD Directive
5100.1 defines the functions of the DOD. DOD Directive 5100.1 states a common function of Military
Departments (for example, DA) is to “provide adequate, timely, and reliable intelligence and
counterintelligence for the Military Department and other Agencies as directed by a competent authority.”
Based on DOD Directive 5100.1 and Executive Order 12333, the assigned intelligence functions of the US
Army are to––

Collect, produce, and disseminate military and military-related foreign intelligence and CI as
required for execution of the Secretary of Defense's responsibilities.

Conduct programs and missions necessary to fulfill departmental and tactical foreign
intelligence requirements.

Conduct CI activities in support of DOD components outside the US in coordination with the
CIA, and within the US in coordination with the FBI pursuant to procedures agreed upon by the
Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General.

Protect the security of DOD installations, activities, property, information, and employees by
appropriate means, including such investigations of applicants, employees, contractors, and
other persons with similar associations with the DOD as are necessary.

Cooperate with appropriate law enforcement agencies (LEAs) for the purpose of protecting the
employees, information, property and facilities of any agency within the Intelligence
Community.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Intelligence Oversight

5 December 2006

FMI 2-22.9

B-3

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Unless otherwise precluded by law or Executive Order 12333, participate in LEAs to investigate
or prevent clandestine intelligence activities by foreign powers, or international terrorist or
narcotics activities.

Provide specialized equipment, technical knowledge, or assistance of expert personnel for use
by any department or agency, or, when lives are endangered, to support local LEAs. Provision
of assistance by expert personnel shall be approved in each case by the General Counsel of the
providing agency.

Render any other assistance and cooperation to law enforcement authorities not precluded by
applicable law.

B-9.

DOD Directives 5100.1 and 5240.1 are available online from the Defense Technical Information

Center’s Directives and Records Division at

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives

. Executive Order 12333 is

available online from Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight at

http://www.dod.mil/atsdio/

. Titles 10, 32, and 50 are available online from the Government Printing Office

Access online database at

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/uscode/index.html

EFINITION OF A

ERSON

B-10.

AR 381-10 defines a US person as––

A US citizen.

A US permanent resident alien.

An unincorporated association composed substantially of US citizens or permanent resident
aliens.

A corporation incorporated in the US that is not directed or controlled by a foreign government.
(A corporation or subsidiary incorporated abroad is not a US person even if partially or wholly
owned by a corporation in the US.)

B-11.

Unless specifically provided for in a particular procedure, AR 381-10 does not apply to non-U.S.

person information. Such collection is generally authorized pursuant to any lawful function assigned an
Army intelligence component. Unless an Army intelligence component obtains specific information to the
contrary, the following are presumed not to be a US person––

A person or organization outside of the US.

An alien, any person not a citizen or permanent resident alien of the US.

B-12.

Once intelligence personnel have substantiated or have reliable information that a person is an alien

but not a “green-card” holder, they can presume the individual is not a US person. Personnel should not
rely on ethnic stereotypes, activities, or use of a language other than English to determine whether an
individual is a US person or an alien.

OLLECTION OF

ERSON

NFORMATION

B-13.

In intelligence usage, collection means gathering or receiving information by intelligence personnel

in the course of official duties with the intent to use or retain the information for intelligence purposes. An
employee must take an action that demonstrates intent to use or retain the information, such as producing
an intelligence information or incident report or adding the information to an intelligence database. Data
acquired by electronic means (for example, SIGINT or measurement and signatures intelligence
[MASINT]) is “collected” only when it has been processed from digital electrons into a form intelligible to
a human.

B-14.

Under AR 381-10, Procedure 2, Army intelligence activities may collect US person information only

when it is necessary to fulfill an assigned function and when it falls within one of the following categories:

Consensual.

Publicly Available Information.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Appendix B

B-4

FMI 2-22.9

5 December 2006

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Foreign Intelligence.

Counterintelligence.

Potential Sources of Assistance.

Protecting Intelligence Sources and Methods.

Physical Security.

Personnel Security.

Communications Security.

Narcotics.

Threats to Safety.

Overhead Reconnaissance.

Administrative Purposes.

B-15.

The fact that a collection category exists does not convey authorization to collect. There must be a

link between the collection of the US person information and the Army intelligence component’s assigned
mission and function. This link is particularly important in OSINT and data exploitation.

B-16.

Army intelligence components may collect US person information by lawful means but must exhaust

the least intrusive collection means before requesting a more intrusive collection means. In general, this
means—

Collection is made first from publicly available sources or with the US person’s consent.

If that collection is not feasible or sufficient, Army intelligence components will seek to collect
the US person information from cooperating sources.

If cooperating source information is not feasible or sufficient, Army intelligence components
will seek to collect using other lawful means that do not require a warrant or Attorney General
approval.

If none of the above means is feasible, Army intelligence components units may request
approval for the use of techniques requiring a warrant or Attorney General approval.

B-17.

Within the US, Army intelligence components may only collect foreign intelligence concerning US

persons by overt means, unless all the following conditions are met:

The foreign intelligence sought is significant and does not concern a US person’s domestic
activities.

The foreign intelligence cannot be reasonably obtained by overt means.

Collection has been coordinated with the FBI.

Other than overt means was approved in writing by the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G2 or the
Commander, INSCOM.

B-18.

The following considerations are applicable to the collection of US person information from the

Internet:

Army intelligence components must use government computers to access the Internet for official
Government business unless otherwise authorized.

If OPSEC so requires, such as to protect a government computer from hacker retaliation, a
MACOM commander may approve non-attributable Internet access.

IP addresses, URLs, and email addresses that are not self-evidently associated with a US person
may be acquired, retained, and processed by Army intelligence components without making an
effort to determine whether they are associated with a US person as long as the component does
not engage in analysis focused upon specific addresses. Once such analysis is initiated, the
Army intelligence component must make a reasonable and diligent inquiry to determine whether
the data are associated with a US person.

Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 2) - page 22