Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 2)

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CFACC

combined force air component command

counterintelligence

CJSOTF

combined joint special operations task force

combat load

CMO

civil-military operations

CNO

computer network operations

COA

course of action

COCOM

combatant command (command authority)

COIN

counterinsurgency

COMSEC

communications security

CONOPS

concept of operations

CONUS

continental United States

COP

common operational picture

counterproliferation

CPOF

command post of the future

counterterrorism

D3A

decide, detect, deliver, and assess

direct action

DLD

digital liaison detachment

DGS

distributed ground system

DIRSPACEFOR

Director of Space Forces (DS4)

DOCEX

document exploitation

DOD

Department of Defense

DSU

direct support unit

E
EHF

extremely high frequency

EMDCOA

enemy most dangerous course of action

EMPCOA

enemy most probable course of action

EOD

explosive ordnance disposal

EPW

enemy prisoner of war

electronic warfare

EXCHECK

execution checklist

EXFIL

exfiltration

5Ws

who, what, where, when, and why

F2T2EA

find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess

F3EAD

find, fix, finish, exploit, assess, and disseminate

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FARP

forward arming and refueling point

FBCB2

Force XXI battle command brigade and below

fires cell

FECC

fires and effects coordination cell

FFIR

friendly force information requirement

FFT

friendly force tracking

FID

foreign internal defense

frequency modulation

FOB

forward operations base

FRAGORD

fragmentary order

FFT

friendly force tracking

FSA

fire support area

FSCC

fire support coordination center

FSCM

fire support coordination measure

FSE

fire support element

FSF

foreign security forces

FSO

fire support officer

GARS

Global Area Reference System

GCC

geographic combatant commander

GCCS

Global Command and Control System

GEOINT

geospatial intelligence

GFC

ground force commander

GMLRS

Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System

GPS

Global Positioning System

GRG

gridded reference graphic

high frequency

HHQ

higher headquarters

HMMWV

high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle

host nation

HPT

high-payoff target

HUMINT

human intelligence

HVI

high-value individual

HVT

high-value target

I & I

integration and interoperability

IDN

Initial Distribution Number

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IED

improvised explosive device

IGO

intergovernmental organization

IMU

inertial measurement unit

INFIL

infiltration

INTREP

intelligence report

INTSUM

intelligence summary

information operations

IPB

intelligence preparation of the battlefield / battlespace

IPI

indigenous populations and institutions

IPOE

intelligence preparation of the OE

IPW

interrogation of prisoners of war

infrared

ISAF

International Security Assistance Force

ISR

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

irregular warfare

J-3

operations staff section

JAAT

joint air attack team

JADOCS

Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System

JAOC

joint air operations center

JCMOTF

joint civil-military operations task force

JFACC

joint force air component commander

JFC

joint force commander

JFE

joint fires element

JFLCC

joint force land component commander

JFMCC

joint force maritime component commander

JFO

joint fires observer

JFSOCC

joint force special operations component commander

JIOC

Joint Intelligence Operations Center

JIPTL

Joint integrated prioritized target list

JISE

Joint Intelligence Support Element

JOA

joint operations area

JOC

joint operations center

joint publication

JPOTF

joint psychological operations task force

JRTC

joint readiness training center

JSCP

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

JSOA

joint special operations area

JSOAC

joint special operations air component

JSOTF

joint special operations task force

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JSPOC

Joint Space Operations Center

JTAC

joint terminal attack controller

JTF

joint task force

JWICS

Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System

LAN

local area network

LeMay Center

Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and
Education

LNO

liaison officer

LOC

line of communications

MARSOC

Marine Corps special operations command

MARSOF

Marine Corps special operations forces

MASINT

measurement and signature intelligence

MCCDC

US Marine Corps Combat Development Command

MCM

maneuver control measure

MCPDS

Marine Corps Publications Distribution System

MCRP

Marine Corps reference publication

MCS

maneuver control system

MDMP

military decision-making process

main effort

MEDEVAC

medical evacuation

MEF

Marine expeditionary force

METT-T
(USMC)

mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available-time available

METT-TC
(USA)

mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available-time available, and civil considerations

MGRS

military grid reference system

MHE

materials handling equipment

MILDEC

military deception

MILSTRIP

Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedure

MLRS

Multiple Launch Rocket System

MMC

material management center

MND

multinational division

MTTP

multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures

MSOAG

Marine Special Operations Advisory Group

MSOB

Marine special operations battalion

MSOC

Marine special operations company

MSOS

Marine special operations school

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MSOSG

Marine special operations support group

MSOT

Marine special operations team

MWR

morale, welfare, and recreation

NAI

named area of interest

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVSOC

Navy special operations component

NAVSOF

naval special operations forces

NAVSUP

Navy supplement

NFA

no-fire area

NGO

nongovernmental organization

NIPRNET

Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network

NIST

national intelligence support team

NLW

nonlethal weapon

NOFORN

not releasable to foreign nationals

NSAV

nonstandard aviation vehicle

NSWTG

naval special warfare task group

NSWTU

naval special warfare task unit

NTC

National Training Center

NSFS

naval surface fire support

NTTP

Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures

NVG

night vision goggle

OCIE

organizational clothing individual equipment

OCONUS

outside the continental United States

ODA

operational detachment-Alpha

operational environment

OEF

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM

OGA

other government agency

OIF

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

OPCON

operational control

OPIR

overhead persistent infrared

OPLAN

operation plan

OPORD

operation order

OPR

office of primary responsibility

OPSEC

operations security

OPSKED

operational schedule

OPSUM

operation summary

OSD

Office of the Secretary of Defense

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OSINT

open source intelligence

PACE

primary, alternate, contingency, emergency plan

PIC

provincial Iraqi control

PIR

priority intelligence requirement

PLT

platoon

PMESII

political, military, economical, social, information, and
infrastructure

PMESII-PT
(USA)

political, military, economical, social, information,
infrastructure-physical environment and time

PNT

precision, navigation, and timing

POC

point of contact

POI

person of interest

POL

petroleum, oils, and lubricants

POSREP

position report

personnel recovery

PREPO

prepositioned

PSYOP

psychological operations

QDR

Quadrennial Defense Review

QRC

quick reference checklist

QRF

quick response force

RDSP

rapid decision-making synchronization process

RFI

request for information

RFT

red force tracker

RHIB

rigid hull inflatable boat

ROE

rules of engagement

ROZ

restricted operations zone

situational awareness

SACC

supporting arms coordination center

SATCOM

satellite communications

SBT

special boat team

SDV

SEAL delivery vehicle

site exploitation

SE1

supporting effort 1

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SE2

supporting effort 2

SEAL

sea-air-land team

special forces

SFLE

special forces liaison element

SFODA

special forces operational detachment-alpha

SIGINT

signals intelligence

SIPRNET

SECRET Internet Protocol Network

SITREP

situation report

SME

subject matter expert

special operations

SOA

special operations aviation

SOCCE

special operations command and control element

SOC-R

special operations craft-riverine

SODARS

special operations debrief and retrieval system

SOF

special operations forces

SOI

sphere of influence

SOLE

special operations liaison element

SOP

standard operating procedure

SOTF

special operations task force

SOW

special operations wing

SOWT

special operations weather team

SPINS

special instructions

special reconnaissance

SSE

sensitive site exploitation

SSR

space support requirement

TACLAN

tactical local area network

TACON

tactical control

TACP

tactical air control party

TAI

target area of interest

TAIS

transportation automated information systems

TBMCS

theater battle management core system

TECHINT

technical intelligence

task force

TGO

terminal guidance operations

TGT

target

THF

temporary holding facility

THT

tactical human intelligence team

TIC

troops in contact

TIP

target information packet

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TLAM

Tomahawk land attack missile

TLE

Tomahawk land attack missile liaison element

TOC

tactical operations center

TPT

tactical PSYOP team

TRADOC

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command

TRP

target reference point

TSE

tactical site exploitation

TSOC

theater special operations command

TST

time-sensitive target

TTP

tactics, techniques, and procedures

task unit

UAS

unmanned aircraft system

UHF

ultra high frequency

United States

USAF

United States Air Force

USASOC

United States Army Special Operations Command

USCENTCOM

United States Central Command

USSOCOM

United States Special Operations Command

USSTRATCOM

United States Strategic Command

UTM

universal transverse mercator

unconventional warfare

UXO

unexploded ordnance

VHF

very high frequency

VTOL

vertical takeoff and landing

WARNORD

warning order

WFF

warfighting function

WMD

weapons of mass destruction

X, W, Z

ZOR

zone of responsibility

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

advanced operations base—

In special operations, a small temporary base

established near or within a joint special operations area to
command, control, and / or support training or tactical

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operations. Facilities are normally austere. The base may
be ashore or afloat. If ashore, it may include an airfield or
unimproved airstrip, a pier, or an anchorage. An advanced
operations base is normally controlled and / or supported by
a main operations base or a forward operations base. Also
called

AOB

. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-05.1)

air component coordination element—(

DOD) An Air Force component

element that interfaces and provides liaison with the joint
force land component commander, or commander Army
forces. The air component coordination element is the senior
Air Force element assisting the joint force land component
commander, or commander Army forces in planning air
component supporting and supported requirements. The air
component coordination element is responsible to the joint
force air component commander and coordinates with the
joint force land component commander's staff, representing
the joint force air component commander's needs in either a
supporting or supported role. Also called

ACCE

. (JP 1-02)

air liaison officer—(

DOD) The senior tactical air control party member attached

to a ground unit who functions as the primary advisor to the
ground commander on air power. An air liaison officer is
usually an aeronautically rated officer. Also called

ALO

. (JP

1-02)

area of operations—

An operational area defined by the JFC for land and naval

forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the
entire operational area of the JFC, but should be large
enough for component commanders to accomplish their
missions and protect their forces. Also called

. (JP 1-02.

Source: JP 3-0).

battlefield coordination detachment—(

DOD) An Army liaison that provides

selected operational functions between the Army forces and
the air component commander. Battlefield coordination
detachment located in the air operations center interface
includes exchanging current intelligence and operational
data, support requirements, coordinating the integration of
Army forces requirements for airspace coordinating
measures, fire support coordination measures, and theater
airlift. Also called

BCD

. (JP 1-02)

combined joint special operations task force—

A task force composed of

special operations units from one or more foreign countries
and more than one US Military Department formed to carry
out a specific special operation or prosecute special

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operations in support of a theater campaign or other
operations. The combined joint special operations task force
may have conventional nonspecial operations units assigned
or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. Also
called

CJSOTF.

(JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-05)

concept of operations—

A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely

expresses what the joint force commander intends to
accomplish and how it will be done using available
resources. The concept is designed to give an overall picture
of the operation. Also called

CONOPS

(JP 1-02. Source: JP

5-0)

conventional forces—

1. Those forces capable of conducting operations using

nonnuclear weapons. 2. Those forces other than designated
special operations forces. Also called

CF.

(JP 1-02. Source:

JP 3-05)

fires—

The use of weapon systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect

on a target. (JP 1-02. Source: 3-0)

information operations—(

DOD) The integrated employment of the core

capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network
operations, psychological operations, military deception, and
operations security, in concert with specified supporting and
related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp
adversarial human and automated decision making while
protecting our own. Also called

. (JP 1-02)

integration—(

DOD, NATO) 1. (DOD only) In force protection, the synchronized

transfer of units into an operational commander’s force prior
to mission execution. 2. (DOD only) The arrangement of
military forces and their actions to create a force that
operates by engaging as a whole. 3. In photography, a
process by which the average radar picture seen on several
scans of the time base may be obtained on a print, or the
process by which several photographic images are
combined into a single image. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance—

An activity that synchronizes

and integrates the planning and operation of sensors,
assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination
systems in direct support of current and future operations.
This is an integrated intelligence and operations function.
(JP 1-02. Source: JP 2-01) Army only addition: For Army
forces, this activity is a combined arms operation that
focuses on priority intelligence requirements while answering

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the commander’s critical information requirements. Also
called

ISR.

(Source: FM 3-0)

interoperability—(

DOD, NATO) 1. The ability to operate in synergy in the

execution of assigned tasks. 2. (DOD only) The condition
achieved among communications-electronics systems or
items of communications-electronics equipment when
information or services can be exchanged directly and
satisfactorily between them and / or their users. The degree
of interoperability should be defined when referring to
specific cases. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-32)

irregular warfare—

A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for

legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s).
Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches,
though it may employ the full range of military and other
capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence,
and will. Also called

IW.

(JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

joint fires—

Fires delivered during the employment of forces from two or more

components in coordinated action to produce desired effects
in support of a common objective. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

joint fire support—

Joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, and special

operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory,
populations, airspace, and key waters. (JP 1-02. Source: JP
3-0)

joint operations area—

An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a GCC or

subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force
commander (normally a joint task force commander)
conducts military operations to accomplish a specific
mission. Also called

JOA.

(JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

joint special operations area—

An area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by

a joint force commander to the commander of a joint special
operations force to conduct special operations activities. It
may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct
action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a
continuing broad range of unconventional warfare
operations. Also called

JSOA.

(JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

naval special warfare task unit—

A provisional subordinate unit of a naval

special warfare task group. Also called

NSWTU.

(JP 1-02.

Source: JP 3-05.1)

operational area—

An overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms

for geographic areas in which military operations are
conducted. Operational areas include, but are not limited to,

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such descriptors as area of responsibility, theater of war,
theater of operations, joint operations area, amphibious
objective area, joint special operations area, and area of
operations. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

operational control—

Command authority that may be exercised by

commanders at any echelon at or below the level of
combatant command. Operational control is inherent in
combatant command (command authority) and may be
delegated within the command. When forces are transferred
between combatant commands, the command relationship
the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing
commander will relinquish) over these forces must be
specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is
the authority to perform those functions of command over
subordinate forces involving organizing and employing
commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating
objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to
accomplish the mission. Operational control includes
authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations
and joint training necessary to accomplish missions
assigned to the command. Operational control should be
exercised through the commanders of subordinate
organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through
subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or
functional component commanders. Operational control
normally provides full authority to organize commands and
forces and to employ those forces as the commander in
operational control considers necessary to accomplish
assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include
authoritative direction for logistics or matters of
administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit
training. Also called

OPCON.

(JP 1-02. Source: JP 1.)

operational environment—(

DOD) A composite of the conditions,

circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of
capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.
Also called

. (JP 1-02)

psychological operations—(

DOD) Planned operations to convey selected

information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence
their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately
the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups,
and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is
to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior

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favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called

PSYOP

(JP 1-02)

special operations forces—

Those Active and Reserve Component forces of

the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense
and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct
and support special operations. Also called

SOF.

(JP 1-02.

Source: JP 3-05.1)

special operations task force—

A temporary or semi-permanent grouping of

ARSOF units under one commander and formed to carry out
a specific operation or a continuing mission. Also called

SOTF

. (Source: FM 3-05)

support—

1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains

another force in accordance with a directive requiring such
action. 2. A unit that helps another unit in battle. 3. An
element of a command that assists, protects, or supplies
other forces in combat. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 1)

supported commander—

1. The commander having primary responsibility for all

aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities
Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the
context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the
commander who prepares operation plans or operation
orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2. In the context of a support command
relationship, the commander who receives assistance from
another commander's force or capabilities, and who is
responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander
understands the assistance required. (JP 1-02. Source: JP
3-0)

supporting commander—

1. A commander who provides augmentation forces

or other support to a supported commander or who develops
a supporting plan. This includes the designated combatant
commands and Department of Defense agencies as
appropriate. 2. In the context of a support command
relationship, the commander who aids, protects,
complements, or sustains another commander's force, and
who is responsible for providing the assistance required by
the supported commander. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

synchronization—

1. The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and

purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a
decisive place and time. 2. In the intelligence context,
application of intelligence sources and methods in concert
with the operation plan to ensure intelligence requirements

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are answered in time to influence the decisions they support.
(JP 1-02. Source: JP 2-0)

tactical air control party—

(DOD) A subordinate operational component of a

tactical air control system designed to provide air liaison to
land forces and for the control of aircraft. Also called

TACP

(JP 1-02)

tactical control—

Command authority over assigned or attached forces or

commands, or military capability or forces made available for
tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of
movements or maneuvers within the operational area
necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.
Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical
control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or
below the level of combatant command. Tactical control
provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the
application of force or tactical use of combat support assets
within the assigned mission or task. Also called

TACON.

(JP

1-02. Source: JP 1)

time-sensitive targets—

A joint force commander designated target requiring

immediate response because it is a highly lucrative, fleeting
target of opportunity or it poses (or will soon pose) a danger
to friendly forces. Also called

TST.

(JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-

60)

unconventional warfare -

(DOD) A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary

operations, normally of long duration, predominantly
conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate
forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and
directed in varying degrees by an external source. It
includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion,
sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted
recovery. Also called

. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-05)

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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

Official:

GEORGE W. CASEY JR.

General, United States Army

Chief of Staff

JOYCE MORROW

Administrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army

1011713

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, Army National Guard, and US Army Reserve:

Distribute in accordance with the initial distribution number (IDN) 116009,

requirements for FM 6-03.05.

By Order of the Secretary of the Air Force

STEPHEN J. MILLER

Major General, US Air Force

Commander

Curtis E. LeMay Center for

Doctrine Development and Education

ACCESSIBILITY:

Publications and forms are available on the e-Publishing Web site

at www.e-publishing.af.mil for downloading or ordering.

RELEASABILITY:

Distribution authorized to US Government agencies and their

contractors only to protect technical or operational information

from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange

Program or by other means. This determination was made on

25 September 2008

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE

WASHINGTON,

DC 20505

April 23, 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution

SUBJECT: Technical Specifications for Construction and Management of Sensitive Compartmented

Information Facilities, Version 1.2

REFERENCES: A. Memorandum, Same Subject dated May 5, 2011

B. ICD 705, Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities
C. ICS 705-1, Physical and Technical Standards for Sensitive Compartmented

Information Facilities

D. ICS 705-2, Standards for the Accreditation and Reciprocal Use of Sensitive

Compartmented Information Facilities

This memorandum promulgates Version 1.2 of the Technical Specifications for Construction and

Management of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities to the Intelligence Community which
shall replace Version 1.1, effective immediately.

The Technical Specifications was designed to be a living document that enables periodic updates

to keep up with changing and emerging technology. Based upon input from the Intelligence Community
and as a result of a cooperative effort by physical and technical experts from the IC elements and our
industrial partners, this Version 1.2 of the Technical Specifications has been updated to meet the needs of
the community and enhance the standards identified in ICS 705-1, Physical Security Standards for
Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities.

Questions may be directed to Mr. Robert Maher, Senior Policy Officer for Physical and Technical Security
at 932-0773 (secure) or 7301-227-8561(non-secure).

Francisco Montoya Jr.

Attachments:

ICD 705 -Technical Specifications Version 1.2

Summary of Changes

Summary of changes to Technical Specifications for Construction and Management of Sensitive
Compartmented Information Facilities

Cover – Change date and version

Page 3 – Added note to warn users of classification when associating threat information and facility
location.

Page 4 – Re-worded approval of CAs to designate the AO as the primary approval authority of
Compartmented Areas within SCIFs.

Pages 8-9 – Changed “Type X Gypsum” to “wallboard” to remove the standard of fire resistant gypsum
and permit use of other wallboard types.

Pages 8-9 – Changed references to wall design drawings to “suggested” wall types to enable variety of
wall construction techniques to meet the security standards.

Page 9 – Added explanation to glue and screw plywood to ceiling and floor to clarify standard. Stud
placement changed to 16 on center to match drawing and correct error.

Page 9 – Added statement for runners at ceiling and floor in Walls B and C to clarify and equal Type A
Wall.

Page 9 – Added statement to finish wall and paint from true floor to true ceiling in Walls B and C to
clarify and equal Type A Wall.

Pages 18 – 19 Replaced drawings to reflect “suggested” wall construction methods and remove
references to “Type X gypsum wallboard”.

Page 34 – Removed 5 minute forced entry standard – as agreed by the PTSEWG, security in depth of
Chief of Mission facilities and enhanced walls were sufficient physical protection.

Page 53 – Updated FIPS encryption standards and certification to remove a standard that could not be
met by commercial alarm systems.

55, 56, 63, and Fixed Facility Checklist – Replaced Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 140-2
with Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to remove a standard that could not be met by commercial
alarm systems.

Page 83 – Added statement previously found in DCID 6/9 which reinforced the ability to allow TSCM and
TEMPEST test equipment into SCIFs without inspection or delay.

Page 112 TEMPEST Checklist – Removed references to “inspectable space” as requested by the TEMPEST
Advisory Group (TAG).

Page 113 TEMPEST Checklist – Removed references to “Red-SCI” information.

Page 114 TEMPEST Checklist – Removed parenthetical reference to cell phones and Bluetooth.

UNCLASSIFIED

ECHNICAL

PECIFICATIONS FOR

ONSTRUCTION

AND

ANAGEMENT OF

ENSITIVE

OMPARTMENTED

NFORMATION

ACILITIES

VERSION 1.2

IC Tech Spec‐for ICD/ICS 705

An Intelligence Community Technical Specification

Prepared by the

Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive

April 23, 2012

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Chapter 1

Introduction

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Chapter 1.

Introduction

Purpose

This Intelligence Community (IC) Technical Specification sets forth the physical and
technical security specifications and best practices for meeting standards of Intelligence
Community Standard (ICS) 705-1 (Physical and Technical Standards for Sensitive
Compartmented Information Facilities). When the technical specifications herein are applied
to new construction and renovations of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities
(SCIFs), they shall satisfy the standards outlined in ICS 705-1 to enable uniform and
reciprocal use across all IC elements and to assure information sharing to the greatest extent
possible. This document is the implementing specification for Intelligence Community
Directive (ICD) 705, Physical and Technical Security Standards for Sensitive
Compartmented Information Facilities (ICS-705-1) and Standards for Accreditation and
Reciprocal Use of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (ICS-705-2) and
supersedes Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/9.

The specifications contained herein will facilitate the protection of Sensitive Compartmented
Information (SCI) against compromising emanations, inadvertent observation and disclosure
by unauthorized persons, and the detection of unauthorized entry.

Applicability

IC Elements shall fully implement this standard within 180 days of its signature.

SCIFs that have been de-accredited but controlled at the SECRET level (IAW 32 Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR) parts 2001 and 2004) for less than one year may be reaccredited
one time using the previous standard. The IC SCIF repository shall indicate that the
accreditation was based upon the previous standards.

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Chapter 2

Risk Management

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Chapter 2.

Risk Management

Analytical Risk Management Process

The Accrediting Official (AO) and the Site Security Manager (SSM) should evaluate

each proposed SCIF for threats, vulnerabilities, and assets to determine the most efficient
countermeasures required for physical and technical security. In some cases, based upon
that risk assessment, it may be determined that it is more practical or efficient to mitigate
a standard. In other cases, it may be determined that additional security measures should
be employed due to a significant risk factor.

Security begins when the initial requirement for a SCIF is known. To ensure the

integrity of the construction and final accreditation, security plans should be coordinated
with the AO before construction plans are designed, materials ordered, or contracts let.

Security standards shall apply to all proposed SCI facilities and shall be

coordinated with the AO for guidance and approval.  Location of facility
construction and or fabrication does not exclude a facility from security standards
and or review and approval by the AO.  SCI facilities include but are not limited
to fixed facilities, mobile platforms, prefabricated structures, containers, modular
applications or other new or emerging applications and technologies that may
meet performance standards for use in SCI facility construction.

Mitigations are verifiable, non-standard methods that shall be approved by the

AO to effectively meet the physical/technical security protection level(s) of the
standard. While most standards may be effectively mitigated via non-standard
construction, additional security countermeasures and/or procedures, some
standards are based upon tested and verified equipment (e.g., a combination lock
meeting Federal Specification FF-L 2740A) chosen because of special attributes
and could not be mitigated with non-tested equipment. The AO‟s approval is
documented to confirm that the mitigation is at least equal to the
physical/technical security level of the standard.

Exceeding a standard, even when based upon risk, requires that a waiver be

processed and approved in accordance with ICD 705.

The risk management process includes a critical evaluation of threats, vulnerability,

and assets to determine the need and value of countermeasures. The process may include
the following:

Threat Analysis. Assess the capabilities, intentions, and opportunity of an

adversary to exploit or damage assets or information. Reference the threat
information provided in the National Threat Identification and Prioritization
Assessment (NTIPA) produced by the National Counterintelligence Executive
(NCIX) for inside the U.S. and/or the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB),
Security Environment Threat List (SETL) for outside the U.S. to determine
technical threat to a location. When evaluating for TEMPEST, the Certified

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Chapter 2

Risk Management

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TEMPEST Technical Authorities (CTTA) shall use the National Security Agency
Information Assurance (NSA IA) list as an additional resource for specific
technical threat information.

NOTE: These threat documents are classified.

Associating the threat level or other threat information with the SCIF location
(including country, city, etc.) will normally carry the same classification level
identified in the threat document. Ensure that SCIF planning documents and
discussions that identify threat with the country or SCIF location are protected
accordingly.

It is critical to identify other occupants of common and adjacent

buildings. (However, do not attempt to collect information against U.S. persons
in violation of Executive Order (EO) 12333.) In areas where there is a diplomatic
presence of high and critical threat countries, additional countermeasures may be
necessary.

Vulnerability Analysis. Assess the inherent susceptibility to attack of a

procedure, facility, information system, equipment, or policy.

Probability Analysis. Assess the probability of an adverse action, incident, or

attack occurring.

Consequence Analysis. Assess the consequences of such an action (expressed

as a measure of loss, such as cost in dollars, resources, programmatic
effect/mission impact, etc.).

Security in Depth (SID)

SID describes the factors that enhance the probability of detection before actual

penetration to the SCIF occurs. The existence of a layer or layers of security that offer
mitigations for risks may be accepted by the AO. An important factor in determining risk
is whether layers of security already exist at the facility. If applied, these layers may,
with AO approval, alter construction requirements and extend security alarm response
time to the maximum of 15 minutes. Complete documentation of any/all SID measures
in place will assist in making risk decisions necessary to render a final standards decision.

SID is mandatory for SCIFs located outside the U.S. due to increased threat.

The primary means to achieve SID are listed below and are acceptable. SID requires

that at least one of the following mitigations is applied:

Military installations, embassy compounds, U.S. Government (USG)

compounds, or contractor compounds with a dedicated response force of U.S.
persons.

Controlled buildings with separate building access controls, alarms, elevator

controls, stairwell controls, etc., required to gain access to the buildings or
elevators. These controls shall be fully coordinated with a formal agreement or
managed by the entity that owns the SCIF.

Controlled office areas adjacent to or surrounding SCIFs that are protected by

alarm equipment installed in accordance with manufacturer‟s instructions. These

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Chapter 2

Risk Management

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controls shall be fully coordinated with a formal agreement or managed by the
entity that owns the SCIF.

Fenced compounds with access controlled vehicle gate and/or pedestrian gate.

The AO may develop additional strategies to mitigate risk and increase

probability of detection of unauthorized entry.

Compartmented Area (CA)

Definition

A CA is an area, room, or a set of rooms within a SCIF that provides controlled
separation between control systems, compartments, sub-compartments, or Controlled
Access Programs.

Requirements

The CA shall be approved by the AO with the concurrence of the CA Program

Manager or designee. The CA Checklist (Chapter 13) shall be used to request
approval.

Any construction or security requirements above those listed herein require

prior approval from the element head as described in ICS 705-2.

Access Control

Access control to the CA may be accomplished by visual recognition or

mechanical/electronic access control devices.

Spin-dial combination locks shall not be installed on CA doors.

Independent alarm systems shall not be installed in a CA.

Visual Protection of CA Workstations

If compartmented information will be displayed on a computer terminal or group of
terminals in an area where everyone is not accessed to the program, the following
measures may be applied to reduce the ability of “shoulder surfing” or inadvertent
viewing of compartmented information:



Position the computer screen away from doorway/cubicle opening.



Use a polarizing privacy screen.



Use partitions and/or signs.



Existing private offices or rooms may be used but may not be a mandatory
requirement.

Closed Storage

When the storage, processing, and use of compartmented information, product, or
deliverables is required, and all information shall be stored while not in use, then all of
the following shall apply:

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Chapter 2

Risk Management

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Access and visual controls identified above shall be the standard safeguard.

Compartmented information shall be physically stored in a General Services

Administration (GSA) approved safe.

Open Storage

In rare instances when open storage of information is required, the following apply:

If the parent SCIF is accredited for open storage, a private office with access

control on the door is adequate physical security protection.

If the parent SCIF has been built and accredited for closed storage, then the

CA perimeter shall be constructed and accredited to open storage standards.

The CA AO may approve open or closed storage within the CA. Storage

requirements shall be noted in both the CA Fixed Facility Checklist (FFC) and, if
appropriate, in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).

Acoustic and Technical Security

All TEMPEST, administrative telephone, and technical surveillance

countermeasure (TSCM) requirements for the parent SCIF shall apply to the CA
and shall be reciprocally accepted.

When compartmented discussions are required, the following apply:

(1)

Use existing rooms that have been accredited for SCI discussions.

(2)

Use administrative procedures to restrict access to the room during

conversations.

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Chapter 3

Fixed Facility SCIF Construction

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Chapter 3.

Fixed Facility SCIF Construction

Requirements outlined within this chapter apply to all fixed facility SCIFs. Additional
information and requirements for facilities located outside the U.S., its possessions or
territories, are found in Chapters 4 and 5. Additional information and requirements for
temporary SCIFs are described in Chapter 6.

Personnel

Roles and responsibilities of key SCIF construction personnel are identified in ICS 705-1
and restated here for reference.

AO Responsibilities

Provide security oversight of all aspects of SCIF construction under their security

purview.

Review and approve the design concept, Construction Security Plan (CSP), and

final design for each construction project prior to the start of SCIF construction.

Depending on the magnitude of the project, shall determine if the Site Security

Manager (SSM) performs duties on a full-time, principal basis, or as an additional
duty to on-site personnel.

Accredit SCIFs under their cognizance.

Prepare waiver requests for the IC element head or designee.

Provide the timely input of all required SCIF data to the IC SCIF repository.

Consider SID on USG or USG-sponsored contractor facilities to substitute for

standards herein. (SID shall be documented in the CSP and the FFC.)

Site Security Managers (SSMs) Responsibilities

Ensure the requirements herein are implemented and advise the AO of

compliance or variances.

In consultation with the AO, develop a CSP regarding implementation of the

standards herein. (This document shall include actions required to document the
project from start to finish.)

Conduct periodic security inspections for the duration of the project to ensure

compliance with the CSP.

Document security violations or deviations from the CSP and notify the AO

within 3 business days.

Ensure that procedures to control site access are implemented.

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Chapter 3

Fixed Facility SCIF Construction

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CTTA Responsibilities

Review SCIF construction or renovation plans to determine if TEMPEST

countermeasures are required and recommend solutions. (To the maximum extent
practicable, TEMPEST mitigation requirements shall be incorporated into the SCIF
design.)

Provide the Cognizant Security Authority (CSA)AO with documented results of

review with recommendations.

Construction Surveillance Technicians (CSTs) Responsibilities

Supplement site access controls, implement screening and inspection procedures, as
well as monitor construction and personnel, when required by the AO

Construction Security

Prior to awarding a construction contract, a CSP for each project shall be developed

by the SSM and approved by the AO.

Construction plans and all related documents shall be handled and protected in

accordance with the CSP.

For SCIF renovation projects, barriers shall be installed to segregate construction

workers from operational activities and provide protection against unauthorized access
and visual observation. Specific guidance shall be contained in the CSP.

Periodic security inspections shall be conducted by the SSM or designee for the

duration of the project to ensure compliance with construction design and security
standards.

Construction and design of SCIFs should be performed by U.S. companies using U.S.

citizens to reduce risk, but may be

performed

by U.S. companies using U.S. persons (an

individual

who has been lawfully admitted for permanent residence as defined in 8

U.S.C. 1 101(a)(20) or who is a protected individual as

defined

by Title 8 U.S.C. 1 324b

(a)(3)).

he AO shall ensure mitigations are implemented when using non

U.S. citizens.

These mitigations

shall be documented

the CSP.

All site control measures used shall be documented in the CSP. Among the control

measures that may be considered are the following:



Identity verification.



Random searches at site entry and exit points.



Signs at all entry points listing prohibited and restricted items (e.g., cameras,
firearms, explosives, drugs, etc.).



Physical security barriers to deny unauthorized access.



Vehicle inspections.

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Chapter 3

Fixed Facility SCIF Construction

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Perimeter Wall Construction Criteria

General

SCIF perimeters include all walls that outline the SCIF confines, floors, ceilings,

doors, windows and penetrations by ductwork, pipes, and conduit. This section
describes recommended methods to meet the standards described within ICS 705-1
for SCIF perimeters.

Perimeter wall construction specifications vary by the type of SCIF, location, use

of SID, and discussion requirements.

Closed storage areas that do not require discussion areas do not have any forced

entry or acoustic requirements.

Open storage facilities without SID require additional protection against forced

and surreptitious entry.

When an existing wall is constructed with substantial material (e.g., brick,

concrete, cinderblock, etc.) equal to meet the perimeter wall construction standards,
the existing wall may be utilized to satisfy the specification.

Closed Storage, Secure Working Area (SWA), Continuous Operation, or Open

Storage with SID - Use Wall A - Suggested Standard Acoustic Wall (see construction
drawing for details).

Three layers of ⅝ inch-thick wallboard, one layer on the outside of the SCIF and

two on the inside of the SCIF provide adequate rigidity and acoustic protection
(Sound Class 3).

Wallboard shall be attached to 3 ⅝ inch-wide metal studs or wooden 2 x 4 studs

placed a maximum of 24 inches on center.

Continuous runners (same gauge as studs) for securing studs shall be anchored to

the true floor and true ceiling structures.

The interior two layers of wallboard shall be mounted so that the seams do not

align (i.e., stagger joints).

Acoustic fill shall be placed between the studs in a manner which prevents

slippage.

The top and bottom of each wall shall be sealed with an acoustic sealant where it

meets the slab.

Wall penetrations shall be treated and sealed with acoustic material.

Entire wall assembly shall be finished and painted from true floor to true ceiling.

Open Storage without SID -- Use Wall B - Suggested Wall for Expanded Metal or

Wall C - Suggested Wall for Plywood.

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Chapter 3

Fixed Facility SCIF Construction

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Three layers of ⅝ inch-thick wallboard, one layer on the outside of the SCIF and

two on the inside of the SCIF provide adequate rigidity and acoustic protection
(Sound Class 3).

Metal studs shall be 3 ⅝ inch-wide, 16 gauge metal, mounted a maximum of 16

inches on center.

Wooden studs will be 2 x 4 studs mounted a maximum of 16 inches on center.

Continuous runners (same gauge as studs) for securing studs shall be anchored to

the true floor and true ceiling structures.

Wall B - Suggested Wall for Expanded Metal (see drawing for Wall B-Suggested

Construction for Expanded Metal).

(1)

Three-quarter inch mesh, # 9 (10 gauge) expanded metal shall be affixed to

the interior side of all SCIF perimeter wall studs.

(2)

Expanded metal shall be spot-welded to the studs every six inches along the

length of each vertical stud and at the ceiling and floor.

(3)

Hardened screws with one inch washers or hardened clips may be used in

lieu of welding to fasten metal to the studs. Screws shall be applied every six
inches along the length of each vertical stud and at the ceiling and floor.

(4)

Fastening method shall be noted in the FFC.

(5)

Entire wall assembly shall be finished and painted from true floor to true

ceiling.

Wall C - Suggested Wall for Plywood (see drawing for Wall C-Suggested

Construction for Plywood).

(1)

Two layers of ⅝ inch-thick wallboard, one layer on the outside of the SCIF

and one on the inside of the SCIF. A plywood layer shall substitute one layer of
wallboard on the inside wall as compared to the standard acoustic wall.

(2)

Wallboard shall be attached to 3 ⅝ inch-wide metal studs or wooden 2 x 4

studs placed a maximum of 16 inches on center.

(3)

Continuous runners (same gauge as studs) for securing studs shall be

anchored to the true floor and true ceiling structures.

(4)

One layer of ⅝ inch-thick plywood shall be attached vertically, directly to the

wall studs.

(5)

The plywood shall be continuously glued and screwed to the studs every 12

inches along the length of each stud and at the ceiling and floor .

(6)

Entire wall assembly shall be finished and painted from true floor to true

ceiling.

Radio Frequency (RF) Protection for Perimeter Walls

Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 2) - page 15