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commanders and preloaded to respond to likely IO events that may trend
negatively or positively. The flyer can be distributed to the local people at the
scene to provide accurate, salient information and circulate the contact numbers
for local authorities (tip line).

d. When detailed planning occurs to support a deliberate operation, IO can be
fully integrated into the measured effects. For example, for a clear-hold-build
approach in a COIN operation, themes and messages can be predesigned for
each stage of an operation (and for specific foreign target audiences). CF, SOF,
and FSF complement each other in the IO campaign and communicate the unity
of effort when properly committed.

13. Psychological Operations

Tactical PSYOP teams (TPT) provide an aspect of nonlethal fires that can be
used effectively in order to decrease combat operations and facilitate local
populace support. Although a SOF component, TPTs are utilized within both
forces. TPTs are in short supply, but their TTP can be used by SOF/CF when
TPTs are not available. The following is an outline of recommended PSYOP
objectives, concepts to stress or avoid, and actions to stress or avoid that can be
used by CF/SOF commanders and staffs to shape the OE.

a. Recommended PSYOP objectives are—

(1) Increase acceptance and support of CF, SOF, and coalition partners.
(2) Decrease civilian interference with coalition partners.
(3) Increase support for the local government as an independent, legitimate,

and viable government.

(4) Increase support for the indigenous military and police.
(5) Reduce the combat effectiveness of enemy forces.
(6) Decrease the incidence of injury or death among the civilian population due

to mines or unexploded ordnance (UXO).

(7) Decrease illness caused by poor sanitation or personal hygiene.

b. Concepts to stress to the foreign populace—

(1) For Foreign Populace Safety and Self-preservation.

(a) They should report enemy activity to the nearest local authority or

coalition forces.

(b) That US forces and coalition forces do not target civilians.
(c) That US, coalition, and law enforcement agencies will intrude as little

as possible while attempting to ensure the safety of all by defeating
enemy forces.

(d) That the enemy depends on their silence to allow them to attack

others.

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(2) Inevitability—Points to Stress.

(a) That US, coalition, and national forces will employ military forces,

where required, to defeat the enemy.

(b) That now is the time to stop fighting and rejoin their families.
(c) That the enemy prevents progress and destroys communities.
(d) That the enemy only offers violence and death without the promise of

resolution.

(e) That members of the enemy force have brought foreigners and outside

violence into their society.

(f) That they should participate in the rebuilding of their country.

(3) Legitimacy—Points to Stress.

(a) That US and coalition partners are committed to remaining reliable,

responsive, and capable security partners for the region.

(b) That US and coalition partners are present at the request and support

of their national government.

enhancing life in the area.

(d) That their national government is legitimate and elected by the people

of the country.

c. Concepts to avoid with the foreign populace—

(1) Implying that western culture, methods, or military prowess is superior.
(2) Supporting the interests of a particular ethnic group in the region.
(3) Atrocity themes.
(4) Criticizing local religion, cultures, customs, or traditions.
(5) Making political commitments or policy announcements without prior

approval of US command.

d. Actions to stress to CF/SOF forces—

(1) Learn and respect religious beliefs, culture, customs, traditions, and

property of the local populace.

(2) Seek out and consult with local officials; allow them to make appropriate

decisions and public statements.

(3) Coordinate and conduct combined action with allied host nation military

forces.

(4) Play a low-key, supporting role whenever possible to enhance local

confidence in host nation institutions.

(5) Alleviate suffering of the civilian population through correct and humane

treatment of displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees.

(6) Observe international conventions with respect to the treatment of enemy

prisoners of war and civilians.

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e. Actions for CF/SOF forces to avoid—

(1) Unnecessary damage to private property, crops, livestock, and water

resources.

(2) Disrespectful behavior toward religious persons, customs, or buildings

and/or damage to holy structures.

(3) Mistreatment of detainees or civilian populace.
(4) Actions that undermine the credibility or authority of legitimate local

leadership or host nation institutions.

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Chapter IV

Intelligence

Tell me what you know….tell me what you don’t know….tell me what you
think…always distinguish which is which.
—General Colin Powell-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1989-1993

1. Introduction

a. Commanders drive the intelligence effort by clearly designating priority
intelligence requirements (PIRs) and mission requirements. Staff intelligence
representatives synchronize the intelligence collection, analysis, and
dissemination of information ensuring that commanders are provided necessary
information for the decision-making process. Intelligence synchronization is an
essential process that ties commander’s decisions to mission planning and
execution.

b. Timely, relevant, accurate, and predictive intelligence on the adversary and
environment reduces the risks associated with decision making. Joint intelligence
operations integrate Service, SOF, theater, and national intelligence capabilities
into a unified effort that surpasses any single organizational effort and provides
the most accurate and timely intelligence to a commander. Each intelligence
discipline provides pieces of information synthesized through an analytical
process to approach total situational awareness.

2. Intelligence Lessons Learned

a. CF/SOF intelligence fusion must occur at every level to find and develop
targets and aid in preparing for future operations. Information considered
unimportant to one may be the critical missing piece for the other. SOF
intelligence personnel should keep in constant contact with CF fusion cells and
exploitation cells. This includes SOF intelligence personnel and tactical human
intelligence team (THT), etc. All fusion cells must have “action arms” to be
successful.

b. CF/SOF may have different intelligence priorities. It is up to the CF/SOF
commanders to understand the supported commanders PIRs to successfully
support each another. CF/SOF commanders should also understand the
criticality of time-sensitive information and the procedures to facilitate
time-sensitive execution and differences in procedures to obtain maximum
effects in the OE.

c. SOF intelligence support has been established with a bottom-up support
concept that in many cases is different from CF, which typically has a top down
focus.

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3. SOF Intelligence Cycle

The SOF intelligence/operations cycle is a continuous, mostly bottom up driven
process that allows SOF units to plan and execute operations. Figure 19
illustrates an example of the SOF intelligence/operations cycle.

Figure 19. SOF Intelligence/Operations Cycle

4. CF/SOF Intelligence Fusion

An effective fusion cell consists of the intelligence analysts and intelligence
machinery, plus an action arm. Without an action arm the intelligence is
worthless.

a. The collection and fusion of information from multiple sources is essential to
countering the adversary’s operations security and deception operations. The
product resulting from this multidiscipline fusion effort is known as all-source
intelligence. All-source intelligence production is facilitated through a
collaborative, or federated, effort in which information is rapidly and fully shared
among geographically dispersed organizations, especially in the case of CF/SOF
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b. SOF units can be intelligence amplifiers for CF along all seven disciplines of
intelligence. Specifically, SOF are skilled in human intelligence (HUMINT)
collection and have signals intelligence (SIGINT), and measurement and
signature intelligence (MASINT) systems with which CF are not typically
equipped. The seven intelligence disciplines are—

(1) Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT)
(2) HUMINT
(3) SIGINT
(4) MASINT
(5) Open source intelligence (OSINT)
(6) Technical intelligence (TECHINT)
(7) Counterintelligence (CI)

c. Whenever a CF/SOF unit is operating in an environment or area in which they
have not previously conducted operations, they should always seek the advice
and input of a unit that has operated there (e.g., SOF unit entering a CF AO or
vice versa.) This is a good source of information for units flowing into the same
area. This should be taken to the lowest level possible to get the person or
people with the most knowledge of the area to brief the new unit operating in the
area. SOF units produce a special operations debrief and retrieval system
(SODARS) report upon returning from every deployment.

d. The process of intelligence fusion by both CF/SOF must be the cornerstone of
operational synchronization. The operations of all collection sources must be
synchronized and coordinated to allow cross-cueing and to enable tip-off
opportunities among collectors.

(1) While single-source reports may be sufficient to meet narrowly defined

customer needs, fused reports are essential to gain an in-depth
understanding of the enemy and the environment.

(2) During the intelligence fusion process, all sources of information must be

shared amongst the CF/SOF players to the greatest extent possible to
enable greater synergy for future operations.

(3) The coordination points below encompass most of the critical elements of

information, ensuring that CF/SOF have integrated the intelligence picture
to the maximum extent possible.
(a) Identify and provide current overhead imagery to executing unit, that is

detailed enough to meet the unit’s needs both from the CF/SOF
perspective (which will differ in focus and level of detail), as requested.

(b) Identify and/or update the effects of terrain and weather on the current

operation.

of operations.

(d) Identify and/or update enemy courses of action or indications of

unexpected enemy action or preparation.

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(e) Coordinate information requirements/PIRs encountered or answered

during execution of operation, or modified as appropriate.

(f) Identify HPT’s/HVTs located in the OE.
(g) Identify named areas of interest (NAI)/target areas of interest (TAI) to

maximize intelligence coverage and avoid duplication of effort.

(h) Identify threats/reactions from the civilian populace, including

dislocated civilians, and pilgrim’s impact on operations.

(i) Report BDA/patrol de-briefs/mission reports results to the ground force

commander (GFC).

(j) Compare/share CBRN protection methods in place if OE is located in a

medium or high CBRN threat area.

e. Prior to operations, units must identify the procedures for executing TSTs.

(1) Understand the criticality of time-sensitive information and the procedures

to facilitate time-sensitive execution on both the CF/SOF side to obtain
maximum effects in the OE.

(2) Deconflict targeting, scoped by geography or target-type to help identify

those friction points.

(3) Refer to chapter 3, "Fires and Effects," for more information on CF/SOF

TST operations.

f. Info needs to be shared by all agencies.

(1) Share info on targeted individuals through target information packets

(TIPs.)

(2) Identify limited resources to continue collection.
(3) Targeting information must connect person of interest (POI) to an enemy

cell or activity. Without the connection, there is little or no proof to keep
him in detention.

(4) Identify the action arm and resources to detain the POI.

g. Understanding and effectively communicating the supported commander’s
intelligence priorities is critical.

(1) Multi-Service intelligence disciplines must be synchronized for operational

support.

(2) SOF intelligence support has been established with a bottom-up support

concept that in many cases is different from CF, which typically has a top
down focus.

h. When receiving intelligence of high value, it is imperative to act upon it
(lethally or by monitoring) immediately; however, that may not mean devoting
overwhelming combat power to it immediately.

(1) SOF teams must meet regularly with the CF operations and intelligence

officers to share SITREPs and INTREPs.

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(2) Ensure THTs within the CF commander’s OE are in constant

communication with SOF intelligence personnel.

5. CF/SOF Intelligence Planning Considerations

In order to adequately ascertain all available information needed for a joint
operation, CF/SOF commanders and planners must incorporate the following:

a. Know PIRs and identify gaps that exist in the intelligence database and
products.

b. Know what collection assets are available from supported/supporting forces
and their capabilities (every rotation periodically updates hardware and software
which brings new capabilities as systems mature).

c. Effectively define intelligence requirements and details needed based on the
effects that are desired for the operation. Let the intelligence collection
managers define the asset based on CF/SOF requirements. This is the most
effective method for achieving mission success.

d. Plan the use of tactical HUMINT teams, composed of HUMINT and
counterintelligence (CI) assets, to directly support maneuver commanders.
Maximize use of source operations to support the commander’s PIR. Provide the
teams with adequate secure communications to enable timely reporting. Exploit
nontraditional HUMINT resources such as forces operating in the local
community/area that have interaction with the local population.

e. Consider whether SOF, including PSYOP, CA, and special operations
weather teams can answer or influence any CF PIRs. Recognize that many SOF
have foreign language skills, cross-cultural training, a regional orientation, and
understand the political context of their OEs. Consider whether CF can answer or
influence any SOF PIRs (e.g., through familiarity with the operational area).

f. Ensure there are established procedures for the collection, dissemination, and
sharing of information between CF/SOF to feed back into the targeting process.

g. Be familiar with the single POC for intelligence at the operational level that
usually exists within the Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) or Joint
Intelligence Support Element (JISE) construct that will be the conduit into the
national intelligence support network. For additional guidance refer to JP 3-05.1,

Special Operations Task Force Operations

, or JP 3-33,

Joint Task Force

Operations

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6. Coalition Intelligence Planning

Operations in OIF and OEF have entailed a mixture of coalition forces with US
CF/SOF. In regards to intelligence, the following is a list of considerations for
CF/SOF commanders and planners when working with coalition forces:

a. Establish liaison with multinational intelligence organizations. Provide a
liaison element with secure portable communications and information systems
support.

b. Identify the multinational intelligence operational architecture that unites the
intelligence cells in a common effort. Non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) members will require special consideration for level of access and must
follow preestablished security procedures.

c. Determine the requirement for different levels of intelligence. All national
caveats must be identified during the planning process to avoid negative
influence during execution.

d. Establish and review procedures to expedite sanitization and sharing of
US-generated intelligence products with multinational partners. Likewise,
address the procedures for sharing of non-US originated intelligence with US
forces.

e. Identify the policy on disclosure and/or release of geospatial information to
multinational forces.

f. Request emergency dissemination authority (to specific allies) for imagery/all-
source intelligence.

g. Understand that nongovernmental organizations and intergovernmental
organizations have their own culture, language, and sensitivities of a populace.
This information can be very valuable to commanders.

7. Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Planning

Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) operations support commanders and their
staffs as they plan, coordinate, and execute combat operations. UAS increase
SA. UAS enhance many missions by improving targeting acquisition, detection,
designation, BDA, site exploitation, and target fidelity. UAS create opportunities
to employ lethal and nonlethal effects to enable friendly force operations and
degrade those of the enemy. CF/SOF UAS assets must be synchronized. The
following is a list of considerations for CF/SOF commanders and planners:

a. Synchronization of CF/SOF UAS is critical to reduce duplication of effort,
maximize target coverage, and provide effective airspace management.

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b. Understand that there are many different types of UAS that each Service
employs, which have different roles, capabilities, and limiting factors.

c. UAS intelligence downlink collected from the system must be closely
managed to ensure that a distributed ground station (DGS) is receiving and
exploiting the information for real-time or long-term analysis. CF/SOF
intelligence collection managers and DGS managers must work closely with their
counterparts.

d. Given all the UAS employed in the OE, it is paramount to deconflict airspace
and frequencies to lower the potential of fratricide or mission failure.

8. Space-based Forces Support Planning Considerations

In order to adequately ascertain all available space capabilities needed for joint
operations, CF/SOF commanders and planners should incorporate the following:

a. Know space support requirements (SSR) and identify gaps that exist in space
system products.

b. Know the capabilities and effects each space system can provide through the
mission areas of precision navigation and timing (PNT), satellite communication
(SATCOM), missile defense, and OE awareness through overhead persistent
infrared (OPIR), ISR, and special technical operations.

c. Know what systems/capabilities are rapidly evolving and the limitations of
these systems.

d. While requesting space effects through an SSR, effectively define
space-based capability requirements and details needed based on the effects
desired for the operation. The Director of Space Forces (DIRSPACEFOR or
DS4) and the Joint Space Operations Center (JSPOC) will assign the proper
assets based on the request.

e. Consider how the CF/SOF requests for space effects can influence or impact
SSRs from other users.

f. Be familiar with the DS4, as the single POC for space support at the
operational level.

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Chapter V

Sustainment and Protection

1. Overview

a. SOF are not logistically self-sufficient for extended deployments. JP 4-0,

Joint

Logistics

, states, “For rapid response operations, USSOCOM component

commands will maintain the capability to support SOF elements for an initial
period of 15 days. Services and/or executive agents should be prepared to
support special operations as soon as possible but not later than 15 days after
SOF are employed.” SOF units rely upon regional or geographic combatant
command (GCC) theater infrastructure for virtually all of their support above their
organic capabilities. The planning and execution of logistics support to SOF
must be nested within the GCC’s concepts of operation and support, as well as
tailored to interface with the theater logistics structures. To be effective, theater,
CF, and SOF logistics planners must understand the Title 10 U.S.C.
requirements and logistics organization’s operational processes.

b. USSOCOM authorities and responsibilities for acquisition and logistics under
Title 10, U.S.C. Section 167 is—

(1) Develop and acquire special operations-peculiar equipment, materiel,

supplies, and services.

(2) Coordinate resourcing of materiel and equipment for SOF units with the

joint staff, Services, and combatant commands.

(3) Equip SOF with SOF peculiar equipment and supplies to conduct

operations.

(4) Ensure interoperability of equipment and forces.
(5) Ensure SOF combat readiness.
(6) Monitor SOF preparedness to carry out assigned missions.

c. Logistics control structures in support of SOF.

(1) SOF in the US are normally under the COCOM of the commander, US

Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM). When directed,
CDRUSSOCOM provides US based SOF to a GCC. The GCC normally
exercises COCOM of assigned and OPCON of attached SOF through the
commander of a theater special operations command (TSOC), a subunified
command. When a GCC establishes and employs multiple JTFs and
independent task forces, the commander, TSOC (CDRTSOC) may
establish and employ multiple joint special operations task forces (JSOTFs)
to manage SOF assets and accommodate JTF/task force special
operations requirements. Accordingly, the GCC, as the common superior,
normally will establish supporting or TACON command relationships
between JSOTF commanders and JTF/task force commanders. When

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directed, CDRUSSOCOM can establish and employ a JSOTF as a
supported commander.

(2) The CDRTSOC and JSOTF J-4s are the primary logistic control authorities

for SOF. Responsibilities include oversight of the core logistic capabilities.
The JSOTF J-4 must ensure that JSOTF forces are supported by the
Services, which is required by Title 10, U.S.C. The JSOTF J-4 is
dependent on Service and joint logistic support as the primary means of
support. The JSOTF J-4 may have to recommend and/or set priorities of
support for common items and consolidated functions. Limited resources
available to the JSOTF elements may require the J-4 to provide
prioritization information to the JTF J-4 and/or the appropriate lead Service
logistic organization. In addition to the core logistic capabilities, SOF
peculiar support must be considered. This support includes equipment,
materials, supplies, and services required for SO missions for which there
is no Service-common requirement. These are limited to items and
services initially designed for, or used by, SOF until adopted for Service-
common use by one or more military Service; modifications approved by
CDRUSSOCOM for application to standard items and services used by the
military Services; and items and services approved by the CDRUSSOCOM
as critically urgent for the immediate accomplishment of a special
operations mission.

(3) This support will be provided via USSOCOM Service component logistic

infrastructures and in coordination with theater Service components.
Logistical support to SOF units is the responsibility of each Service’s
logistic command and control structure, and this responsibility exists
regardless of whether the SOF unit requiring support is assigned to the
Service component, the TSOC, JSOTF, joint psychological operations task
force, or a joint civil-military operations task force.

(4) Service responsibilities in support of SOF and joint headquarters (DOD

Directive 5100.3.)
(a) The Secretaries of the military departments shall provide or arrange for

the administrative and logistic support of the headquarters of the
COCOMs and the US element, North American Air Defense
Command, as indicated below. Except as indicated below, the support
responsibility designated for the headquarters of each COCOM
extends to the headquarters of all subordinate joint commands
established within the COCOM.

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Table 7. Service Responsibilities

COMMAND

SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITY

US European Command

Secretary of the Army

US Southern Command

Secretary of the Army

US Joint Forces Command

Secretary of the Navy

US Pacific Command except:

Secretary of the Navy

--US Forces, Korea

Secretary of the Army

US Central Command

Secretary of the Air Force

US Strategic Command

Secretary of the Air Force

US Element, North American Air
Defense Command

Secretary of the Air Force

US Special Operations Command
except:

Secretary of the Air Force

--Joint Special Operations Command

Secretary of the Army

US Transportation Command

Secretary of the Air Force

US Northern Command

Secretary of the Air Force

US Africa Command

Designated Service TBD

(b) In accordance with Section 165 of Title 10, U.S.C., and DOD Directive

5100.1, the supporting Military Departments shall program and budget
to fund, without reimbursement, the administrative and logistic support
required by the supported joint headquarters to perform their assigned
missions effectively. This nonreimbursable support shall include
essential base operating support per DOD Instruction 4000.19 and
direct support of major DOD headquarters activities per DOD Directive
5100.73, except that CDRSOCOM shall program and budget for those
direct support costs of its own major DOD headquarters activities for
which funds have been transferred from the Military Services to Major
Force Program 11.

(5) The Services’ support obligations detailed in Title 10, U.S.C., Section 165

are not always well understood where the Services are responsible for
providing administration and support to their forces assigned to the
COCOMs. GCCs and Service component commanders, in coordination
with the TSOCs, are responsible for ensuring that effective and responsive
SOF support systems are developed and provided (Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Instruction [CJCSI] 3110.06, the Special Operations
Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan [JSCP]). The Services
do not perceive SOF support to be a core Service function, and SOF
support consequently has a low priority for resources. There is no habitual
relationship of support units with their SOF customers—SOF must always
ask who is providing their support on every deployment. An Army brigade
commander does not go to his division commander and ask which direct
support unit (DSU) will support the brigade’s deployment. Support
organizations must move as quickly as their customers move, understand

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their customers’ needs, and carry basic loads tailored to their customer’s
needs. This does not happen for many SOF units. These shortfalls have
been recognized by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and
recommendations to provide enhanced SOF enablers by the Services will
be incorporated into the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report to
Congress.

(6) The current doctrine for parent Services providing logistic support

frequently suboptimizes logistic support at the Service level within a
JSOTF, and then builds an ad-hoc patchwork of logistics capabilities that
are neither efficient nor effective in their delivery of support to an integrated
joint SOF force. One possible solution is to provide lead Service logistic
support to joint SOF, with the most capable Service(s) being directed to
provide common-user support. Each TSOC, in conjunction with the GCC,
could negotiate an agreement by which the most capable Service(s) would
provide support to the entire joint SOF force—including the JSOTF
headquarters—those Service-common support and services for which it is
best suited, regardless of which SOF Service component is the dominant
user. If necessary, the GCC commander could exercise his directive
authority for logistics to implement such an agreement, IAW JP 4-0.

2. SOF Sustainment Lessons Learned

a. Early coordination and mutual support are required for CF/SOF to meet gaps
in support requirements. Small and remote SOF units may require extra
sustainment support from CF. Because of the remoteness of SOF, stockpiling
supplies and equipment is sometimes necessary, even though this may not be a
generally accepted practice.

b. The perishable nature of medical supplies (e.g., blood, medicine,
immunizations) requires frequent resupply or shelf-life extension measures.

c. The role and numbers of contractors have increased in the theaters in which
SOF operate. Contracting logistics support throughout the range of military
operations may be an integral part of the overall process used to obtain supplies,
services, and construction support.

3. SOF Sustainment Challenges

a. SOF units have limited organic combat support (CS) and combat service
support (CSS) support capabilities. They must rely upon the regional or GCC
theater infrastructure for required support above their organic capabilities. The
planning and execution of logistics support to SOF must be nested within the
GCC’s concepts of operation and support, as well as tailored to interface with the
theater logistics structures. To be effective, theater, CF, and SOF logistics
planners must understand the Title 10 U.S.C. requirements and logistics

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organization’s operational processes. SOF are not logistically self-sufficient for
extended deployments. Extrinsic support required SOF units engaged in
persistent operations at the SOTF/CJSOTF will require support not organic,
including mortuary affairs, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), forward surgical
teams, and contingency contracting, etc.

b. Generally, SOF are the first force to enter a theater of operations, often under
austere conditions. Sustained operations of more than 15 days are often the
norm and are conducted with no cover or sanitation for operators. SOF organic
operating support for “force beddown” is an inherent SOF requirement until
theater logistics support arrives to establish the site for sustained operations.
SOF sustainment capability facilitates rapid deployment and limited sustainment
in an immature theater.

c. SOF support resourcing is frequently misunderstood. Because a SOF task
force is by design somewhat isolated, CF support units tend not to understand
why a SOF task force requires so much external support. Due to a lack of
internal support mechanisms, a SOF task force actually requires a
disproportionate share of support resources, which can be directly attributed to
the geographic area of that it occupies. It is imperative that a line of
communication is kept open to other units in the support structure to educate and
help CF units to understand that SOF task forces, while small, shoulders a large
portion of the operational burden. A SOF task force, while half (or less) the size
of a CF task force, often covers a geographical area two or three times that of CF
units.

d. Unlike CF units, SOF units may not have the manpower or equipment to
support military resupply convoys or aerial resupply operations. SOF must
establish good relationships with the CF units, which can be leveraged to meet
logistical shortfalls and have in-transit visibility of critical spares and supplies for
resupply.

e. SOF relies heavily on aviation (rotary and fixed wing), and foreign force
ground transportation, especially when operating in remote areas. In an
environment where there are adequate aviation resources and host nation
ground transportation, this dependency does not pose any particular challenges
beyond routine coordination and forecasting.

f. SOF sometimes contribute to this lack of joint and Service logistic support by
not identifying and articulating its general and peculiar support requirements and
its limited internal support capabilities. SOF use of secrecy may create a firewall
that inhibits Service logistic support. SOF expectations exceed Service norms.
Lack of sufficient SOF organic capability to “bridge the gap” until the Services
arrive is a limiting factor and is not widely understood by Service providers.
Therefore, SOF must articulate its requirements, standards, and expectations to
their Service provider.

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g. The varying interpretations of common logistics and interoperability also
contribute to confusion on providing support. There are varying degrees of
interpretation of the definitions of executive agent, common-item support,
common-user logistics, and Service-common vice SOF peculiar support (“if SOF
needs/uses it, it must be SOF peculiar”). Joint definitions of logistics are different
(e.g., JP 4-0 considers civil engineering to be logistics, whereas the Army does
not). Nor does it address logistic support to a JSOTF headquarters not
established around the nucleus of a Service SOF headquarters, and not covered
by the provisions of DOD Directive 5100.3 when deployed from their home
station. Funding complexities among the Services differ and interoperability
issues of logistics automation systems at joint bases create further confusion and
difficulties.

h. The simplest and most advantageous transportation is foreign force ground
transportation. Foreign force vehicles require no expenditure of military
resources and present virtually no risk to military equipment or personnel. The
downside is the high risk of commodity loss through pilferage, potential for
capture or destruction by the enemy, and the low dependability of delivery. Only
noncritical classes of supply (Class I, III, and IV) should be considered for
delivery by host nation trucks. Fortunately, these three classes represent the
majority of the bulk and weight of supplies moved around the battlefield. Critical
supplies such as ammunition, weapons, spare parts, and sensitive items must be
flown in or escorted by military convoy.

i. During planning, contingency resupply plans and process should be reviewed.

4. CF/SOF Sustainment Planning Considerations

The CF/SOF commanders must unify execution efforts to enable units to perform
their mission. CF/SOF integration and interoperability requires a fully networked,
persistent, and effective approach towards developing and employing their
sustainment capabilities. Although the operational area and size of the force
may be smaller for a crisis response or limited contingency operation, the
mission can still be complex and dangerous, with a variety of sustainment
considerations. Permissive operating environments associated with military
engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence still require CF/SOF planners
to consider measures commensurate with potential risks.

a. During information gathering, discussions with the units, and a review of SOF
logistics lessons learned from OIF/OEF, the following are attributes and
measures:

(1) Responsiveness: Ability to respond within the commander’s timeline.

Units providing logistic support to SOF must—
(a) Provide support to an austere location within 24 hours of notification.
(b) Focus globally or regionally.

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•

Warfighting functions.

•

Direct support tactical logistics.

•

Medical.

•

Civil engineering.

(2) Habitual Association: Ability to establish habitual training and operational

relationships between operational SOF units and the logistics units
providing them logistics support. Units providing logistic support to SOF
must—
(a) Be tailored in their organization, equipment, and training to support

SOF missions.

(b) Routinely train and exercise with their supported SOF units to develop

support and operational understandings/requirements.

(3) Pre-positioning: Ability to provide early and easy access to pre-positioned

(PREPO) assets. SOF PREPO packages must be—
(a) Identified, resourced, positioned, and exercised.
(b) Movable to where they are needed within 24 hours of notification.

(4) Flexibility: Ability to respond to nonstandard missions with tailored support

packages. Units providing logistic support to SOF must be able to provide
modular support packages to JSOTFs ranging in size from 500 to 2,500
personnel.

(5) Interoperability: Ability to operate within the context of current and future

standard joint and Service logistics systems. Units providing DS logistic
support to SOF must have access to all appropriate joint and Service
logistics systems.

b. During planning, CF/SOF commanders and staff must consider the following
protection issues:

(1) Providing physical security for forces and means.
(2) Determine vulnerabilities to known threats based on fused intelligence of

the enemies’ capabilities; applying appropriate deterrent and control.

(3) Prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations/AO, material, and

documents.

(4) Establish area/facility security, law enforcement, guard and patrol

operations.

(5) Establish physical security measures to include fencing and perimeter

stand-off space, land or maritime force patrols, lighting and sensors,
vehicle barriers, and blast protection.

(6) Establish access control measures by installing intrusion detection systems

and electronic surveillance, and access control devices and systems.

(7) Identify indicators of coordinated enemy actions against friendly forces

along required routes, establishing capabilities and measures to prevent
fratricide.

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(8) Apply combat identification characterizations to ROE to enable

engagement decisions and the subsequent use, or prohibition of use, of
lethal weapons and nonlethal capabilities based on intelligence knowledge
of the enemy. An effective C2 process will be critical for this effort and
must be practiced ahead of time.

(9) Ensure timely and accurate preplanned information exchange among

CF/SOF commanders, coalition forces, and other participants involved in
the operation.

(10) Ensure constant CF/SOF information and intelligence coordination to

decision makers during mission execution.

(11) Ensure synchronization of force and support elements.
(12) Although the area of operations for CF/SOF may be the same, the ROE

may differ based on the level of enemy engagement.

5. CF/SOF Protection Considerations

a. The CF/SOF commanders must unify execution efforts of protection activities
to enable units to perform their mission. CF/SOF I&I requires a fully integrated,
networked, persistent, and effective approach towards developing and employing
their protection capabilities. Although the operational area and CF/SOF may be
smaller for a crisis response or limited contingency operation, the mission can
still be complex and dangerous, with a variety of protection considerations.
Permissive operating environments associated with military engagement,
security cooperation, and deterrence still require CF/SOF planners to consider
protection measures commensurate with potential risks.

b. During planning, CF/SOF commanders and staff must consider the following
protection issues:

(1) Providing physical security for forces and means.
(2) Determine vulnerabilities to known threats based on fused intelligence of

the enemies’ capabilities; applying appropriate deterrent, and control.

(3) Prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations/AO, material, and

documents.

(4) Establish area/facility security, law enforcement, guard and patrol

operations.

(5) Establish physical security measures to include fencing and perimeter

stand-off space, land or maritime force patrols, lighting and sensors,
vehicle barriers, and blast protection.

(6) Establish access control measures by installing intrusion detection systems

and electronic surveillance and access control devices and systems.

(7) Identify indicators of coordinated enemy actions against friendly forces

along required routes, establishing capabilities and measures to prevent
fratricide.

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(8) Apply combat identification characterizations to ROE to enable

(9) Ensure timely and accurate preplanned information exchange among

CF/SOF commanders, coalition forces, and other participants involved in
the operation.

(10) Ensure constant CF/SOF information and intelligence coordination to

decision makers during mission execution.

(11) Ensure synchronization of force and support elements.
(12) Although the area of operations for CF/SOF may be the same, the ROE

may differ based on the level of enemy engagement.

(13) Identify IED awareness, identification, protection procedures, and EOD

requirements.

c. Establish guidelines for command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) reporting to ensure
critical information is being fed to the appropriate SOF forces.

d. Combat identification procedures must be established to reduce fratricide.
Especially when SOF are working with FSF. SOF must ensure that CF is
thoroughly briefed on any foreign forces operations they are working with to
prevent fratricide.

e. Theater support contracting services can often be obtained from SOF
contracting teams (if deployed) and from local Service contingency contracting
teams (normally Army) or joint contracting offices. SOF units need to be familiar
with local contract support arrangements and procedures prior to deployment.

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Appendix A

SOF Capabilities

1. Special Operations Forces

a. SOF are inherently joint, can be multinational, and may be employed
unilaterally, or in concert with CF. SOF must be prepared to conduct scalable
operations with various governmental and nongovernmental agencies, other
Services, and the forces of other nations. Successful joint air-ground operations
require a fundamental understanding of SOF capabilities and limitations.

(1) SOF ground elements can complement CF with prior coordination. SOF

can be utilized for strategic and operational objectives and to aid CF
commanders with intelligence collection, special reconnaissance (SR),
direct action (DA), FID, joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) support,
time-sensitive targeting, HVTs, and more. SOF are marked by certain
characteristics that cumulatively distinguish them from conventional
operations. Operational characteristics include—
(a) Principally offensive, usually of high physical and political risk, and

directed at HVTs, often TSTs.

(b) Frequently clandestine in nature and offer the potential for high returns.
(c) Employed when the use of CF is inappropriate or infeasible for either

military or political reasons.

(d) Rely on surprise, security, audacity, and frequently employ deception

to achieve success.

(e) Often conducted at great distances from operational bases and in

hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas.

(f) SOF may require patient, long-term commitment in a given operational

area to achieve national goals through security assistance/nation-
building activities, or extended unconventional warfare (UW)
operations.

(g) SOF are inherently joint and frequently require integration with other

US agencies or multinational forces.

(2) Special operations consist of nine core tasks as outlined in JP 3-05

Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.

(NOTE: CDRUSSOCOM has

approved two additional tasks for updated JP 3-05.)
(a) Unconventional warfare is a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary

operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted
through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized,
trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an
external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare,
subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional
assisted recovery.

(b) Direct Action (DA). Short-duration strikes and other small-scale

offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied,
or politically sensitive environments and which employ specialized

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military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or
damage designated targets. DA differs from conventional offensive
actions in the level of physical and political risk, operational
techniques, and the degree of discriminate and precise use of force to
achieve specific objectives.

actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or
politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of
strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not
normally found in CF. These actions provide an additive capability for
commanders and supplement other conventional reconnaissance and
surveillance actions.

(d) Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Participation by civilian and military

agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by
another government or other designated organization to free and
protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

(e) Counterterrorism (CT). Operations that include the offensive measures

taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism.

(f) Counterproliferation (CP). Those actions (e.g., detect and monitor,

prepare to conduct counterproliferation operations, offensive
operations, WMD, active defense, and passive defense) taken to
defeat the threat and/or use of WMD against the United States, US
military forces, friends, and allies.

(g) Civil Affairs Operations (CAO). Operations usually are planned,

directed, and conducted by civil affairs forces in support of a
commander’s civil-military operations (CMO) plan. While all CAO
support CMO, they remain a distinct CMO element. They embrace the
relationship between military forces, nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and indigenous
populations and institutions (IPI) in areas where military forces are
present. They also involve the application of CA functional specialty
skills in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, which
enhance the conduct of CMO. CA units are organized, equipped, and
trained to carry out missions that specifically include the conduct of
CAO to enhance the conduct of CMO. For additional information on
CA and CMO, refer to JP 3-57,

Civil Military Operations; and

3-05.401,

Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.

(h) Psychological Operations (PYSOP). PSYOP are planned operations

to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to
influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately
the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and
individuals. PSYOP induces or reinforces foreign attitudes and
behaviors favorable to the originator’s objectives by conducting

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planned operations to convey selected information to foreign
audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning,
and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations,
groups, and individuals.

(i) Information Operations (IO). IO is the integrated employment of the

core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations,
psychological operations, military deception, and operations security,
in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to
influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated
decision making while protecting our own.

(3) General Capabilities.

(a) Task organize quickly/deploy rapidly for tailored response.
(b) Gain access to hostile, denied areas, and remote areas of operations.
(c) Function with limited medical support for themselves and those they

support.

(d) Communicate worldwide with organic equipment.
(e) Conduct operations in austere, harsh environments without extensive

support.

(f) Rapidly survey/assess/report local situations.
(g) Cooperate closely with regional military/civil authorities with cultural

astuteness.

(h) Organize people into working teams to help solve local problems.
(i) Maintain lower profile and less intrusive presence than CF.
(j) Address ambiguous situations with unconventional options.
(k) Act as a force multiplier through advising host nation security forces.

(4) Air Capabilities.

(a) SOF fixed-wing and vertical-lift aircraft are equipped for long-range,

adverse weather, and deep penetration of hostile areas. They are
capable of air landing and air dropping personnel, equipment, and
PSYOP materials. They may also extract personnel by airborne pickup
devices or air landing. Vertical-lift aircraft are equipped for suppressive
fire support, PR, and medical evacuation. They are also capable of
operating in confined areas, employing hoist, rope ladder, fast rope, or
rappelling procedures to infiltrate (INFIL) or exfiltrate (EXFIL) SOF
ground and maritime personnel. SOF gunships are capable of
providing precision night CAS as well as limited interdiction and armed
reconnaissance missions in low-threat environments.

(b) In executing the special operations (SO) nine core tasks, SOF ground

elements such as special forces, rangers, Marine Corps special
operations forces (MARSOF), sea-air-land teams (SEAL), special
tactics teams, JTACs can employ terminal guidance operations (TGO).
TGO makes joint air attack and SOF ground operations
complementary by searching for and reporting precise locations of
mobile HVTs. TGO does not include clearance authority for aircraft
ordnance release and should not be confused with terminal attack

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control. SOF may include JTACs and joint fires observers
(JFO)-qualified operators and should be utilized where feasible.

visual, or other guidance to aircraft, missiles, ships, and artillery
elements to facilitate target destruction by ground elements. JFO may
be employed as an extension of a JTAC to facilitate the effects of fires.
Terminal attack control operations may be conducted independently or
in conjunction with CF. They make joint effects and SOF ground
operations complementary. Enemy mobile HPTs that are difficult to
locate from the air are often visible to ground SOF. SOF JTACs may
have the ability to generate target coordinates suitable for inertial aided
munitions. Ground SOF elements can search for, verify the presence
of, and precisely report the location of HPTs. Global positioning
systems, laser designation systems, various beacon systems, or
combinations of the above provide target locations. When SOF ground
teams do not have the organic combat power to engage enemy targets
without compromising their positions, strike aircraft or other long-range
systems are designated to attack targets. Ground SOF may provide
precise BDA of HPTs that otherwise may be obscured or hidden.
These operations require extensive coordination between the
JFSOCC, JFC, JFACC, joint force maritime component commander
(JFMCC), and joint force land component commander (JFLCC) staffs.
Robust liaison elements paired with trained and habitually affiliated
SOF planning and coordinating elements are required to coordinate
and synchronize SOF air-ground operations.

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2. USSOCOM Command Structure.

USSOCOM is a four-star unified command with Service-like authorities and
responsibilities. Figure 20 illustrates the command structure USSOCOM has
with the four Services in addition to JSOC and JSOU.

Figure 20. USSOCOM Command Structure

3. Army Special Operations Forces Operational Elements

a. USASOC (Airborne). Figure 21 illustrates the organizational command and
control of USASOC.

Figure 21. USASOC (A) Command Structure

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b. Special Forces. Special Forces conduct UW, FID, SR, DA, and CT across the
range of military operations.

(1) Special Forces Group (Airborne). Figure 22 is a general organizational

chart for any of the Special Forces Groups.

Figure 22. Special Forces Group (A)

(2) SFOD-A’s are designated by a four-digit number corresponding to the

group (1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 19, and 20)/battalion (1-4)/company(1-3, A=1, B=2,
C=3)/team(1-6). For instance, SFODA 5111 is the first team in Company
A, 1st Bn, 5th SFG. 1st SFG (A) = 1XXX, 3rd SFG (A) = 3XXX, 5th SFG
(A) = 5XXX, 7th SFG (A) = 7XXX, 10th SFG (A) = 0XXX, 19th SFG (A)
9XXX, and 20th (A) = 2XXX.

c. Rangers. Rangers conduct INFIL/EXFIL by land, sea, and air; DA; and
conventional or special light infantry operations.

d. Army Special Operations Aviation. These units provide precision rotary-wing
operations in complex urban areas; long-range INFILs/EXFILs under high threat,
adverse weather and all terrain/environmental conditions; long-range precision
attack and CCA to ground SOF in contact; rotary-wing FID; and PR.

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e. Psychological Operations. PSYOP persuade target audiences to take actions
favorable to mission objectives.

f. Civil Affairs. CA encompass the activities military commanders take to
establish and maintain relationships between their forces and the civil authorities,
general population, resources, and institutions in friendly, neutral, or hostile areas
where their forces are employed. These activities may occur before, during,
after, or in the absence of other military actions.

g. Logistics and Communications Support. They provide robust, deployable,
modular, logistics, and signal support packages.

h. Special Operations Aviation (SOA). SOA assets include rotary-wing A/MH-6
(CCA / airlift), MH-60 (CCA/airlift), and MH-47 (airlift) aircraft.

4. Navy Special Operations Forces Operational Elements

a. As listed in NWP 3-05, SEAL team tasks include CP of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), CT, FID, UW, DA, SR, and IO. Also according to NWP 3-05,
SEALs do not conduct UW as a core task.

(1) A SEAL platoon is normally commanded by a Navy lieutenant (O-3).
(2) A platoon consists of 16 SEALs and may divide into 2 squads or 4

elements. All SEAL platoon personnel are dive, parachute, and
demolitions qualified.

b. SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) Teams. SDV teams conduct clandestine
reconnaissance, DA, and passenger delivery in maritime environments. There
are two active duty SDV teams.

c. Special Boat Teams (SBTs). SBTs conduct coastal patrol and interdiction,
INFIL and EXFIL of SOF, ISR, and rapid mobility in shallow water areas where
larger ships cannot operate. They use three primary vessels: a rigid hull
inflatable (RHIB) for short range ops; a special operations craft–riverine (SOC-R);
and a MK V for medium range ops. There are three active duty SBTs.

d. Naval Special Warfare Command. Figure 23 is an organizational chart
outlining Naval Special Warfare command’s command and control.

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Figure 23. Naval Special Warfare Command Structure

e. Naval Special Warfare Task Group. Figure 24 illustrates an example
command and control structure of a Naval Special Warfare Task Group.

Figure 24. Naval Special Warfare Task Group Structure Example

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5. Air Force Special Operations Forces Operational Elements

a. Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). AFSOC crews and aircraft
can conduct clandestine penetration of hostile, sensitive, or politically denied
airspace. They can navigate precisely along planned routes to points or targets
within narrow time parameters, in conditions of minimum visibility (darkness
and/or adverse weather). Fixed-wing aircraft used for air/land operations can
use minimum length, unimproved landing strips. Tilt rotor wing aircraft possess
terrain following and terrain avoidance systems and procedures.

b. Air Force Special Operations Command Structure. See figure 25. For a more
detailed description of AFSOC’s command and control structure for continental
United States (CONUS) and outside the continental United States (OCONUS)
operations, refer to Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-7,

Special Operations;

JP 3–0,

Joint Operations

;

JP 3–05

, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations; and

3–30

, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.

Figure 25. Air Force Special Operations Command

c. Fixed-wing Aircraft. Fixed-wing aircraft provide precision application
firepower; INFIL, EXFIL, resupply, and refueling of SOF operational elements;
airborne radio and television broadcasts; and C2 capability. AFSOF fixed-wing
assets include—

(1) MC-130E Combat Talon I and MC-130H Combat Talon II. The Combat

Talon aircraft is required to support a range of activities from crisis
response to wartime commitment in SO missions. The Combat Talon’s
mission is to conduct day and night INFIL, EXFIL, resupply, PSYOP, and
aerial reconnaissance in hostile territory using air/land or airdrop
procedures. The Combat Talons are capable of in-flight refueling, giving it

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an extended range. The Combat Talon I is capable of air refueling
specially modified helicopters for extended helicopter operations. The
Combat Talon missions may be accomplished either single-ship or in
concert with other SO assets in varying multiaircraft scenarios. The
Combat Talons are able to air/land and airdrop personnel and equipment
on austere, marked, and unmarked landing/drop zones, day or night, in
adverse weather. Combat Talons can conduct overt, clandestine, and low-
visibility operations.

(2) AC-130H Spectre and AC-130U Spooky. The AC-130 is a C-130 modified

with gun systems, electronic and electro-optical sensors, fire control
systems, enhanced navigation systems, sophisticated communications,
defensive systems, and in-flight refueling capability. These systems give
the gunship crew the capability to acquire and identify targets day or night,
coordinate with ground forces and command and control agencies, and
deliver surgically precise firepower in support of both conventional and
special operations missions. The gunship is best suited for CAS missions
and has a unique capability to deliver ordnance in extremely close
proximity to friendly forces in a TIC situation. Gunships can also perform
interdiction and armed reconnaissance missions, particularly where limited
collateral damage is required.

(3) MC-130P Combat Shadow. The Combat Shadow aircraft is required to

support a range of activities from crisis response to wartime commitment in
SO missions. The mission of the Combat Shadow is clandestine formation
or single-ship intrusion of hostile territory to provide air refueling of special
operations helicopters and the INFIL, EXFIL, and resupply of SOF by
airdrop or air/land operations. To perform these missions, the primary
emphasis is on night vision goggle (NVG) operations.

(4) EC-130J Commando Solo. Commando Solo is an airborne electronic

broadcasting system. The 193rd Special Operations Wing (SOW),
Pennsylvania Air National Guard, operates three EC 130J Commando Solo
aircraft. Its mission is to conduct PSYOP broadcasting in frequency
spectrums including the standard AM/FM radio, television, short-wave, and
military communications bands. This system may also be used to—
(a) Support disaster assistance efforts by broadcasting public information

and instructions for evacuation operations.

(b) Provide temporary replacement for existing transmitters or expand their

areas of coverage.

in its frequency range.

(5) MC-130W Combat Spear. The Combat Spear aircraft is the newest aircraft

in the family of MC-130 aircraft in the AFSOC inventory. The basic
Combat Spear will perform the same mission as the MC-130P.

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