Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 1)

problems by looking for patterns and addressing the problem areas instead of responding to

each crime as a discrete incident.

The keys to preventative policing are getting the police force out on the streets to be seen as an

entity that protects the people and their interests. Once this connection and trust are

established the police get better information from the population about the areas they work in.

This information turns into real and actionable intelligence on the criminals and insurgents and

in the end the population’s concerns are addressed and the police improve security.

Intelligence drives operations, operations provide security.

In this sense it can be argued that prevention should be the cornerstone to FP operations. They

do not want to simply show up at the site after an insurgent group makes an attack or commits

an act of terrorism. Prevention should be the center of any counter-insurgent/anti-terrorism

plan. Prevention works in the very situation that many Iraqi communities are in now.

Lackawanna, New York where a terrorist sleeper cell planed to strike in or near the community

is a good example of this.

The Arab community in Lackawanna - people who came to the U.S. from Yemen - saw

the danger, and they did not sit still. The community came to law enforcement - in fact,

they came to their very own community-policing officer - and reported the suspicious

activity of members of the cell. They did this because they trusted law enforcement to

do the right thing. And by doing this, the Arab community in Lackawanna, in partnership

with its police, averted what could have been a terrible disaster.¹³

The pitfall of preventive policing for the FP is the nature of prevention. Although it is results

based, it is very difficult to measure the effectiveness of prevention. Generally Iraqi units focus

on hard metrics to measure accomplishment. Often the guidance to a FP Brigade or Battalion

Commander is to make a specific number of arrests or find a specific number of caches. These

metrics are results based, but prevention will take a back seat. Usually when prevention works

no one but the enemy knows if the actions of the police were effective. Prevention won’t have

the statistics that combat related activities will. Preventive policing will require a cultural

transformation in the measurement of success, as well as, redefining what success means. In

traditional policing, success is measured in number of arrests. In preventive policing success is

measured in absence of crime. Arrests (or kills) is much easier to track and a more tangible

statistic to show progress. Measuring the absence of anything is difficult at best. It is hard to

prove progress, difficult to communicate and is not a common in the culture. Additionally,

preventive policing risks becoming an all-or-nothing position. If any incident happens, the

entire concept could be considered a failure, especially in the politically charged environment

of Iraq. Communication and patience at all levels are critical if the proven concept of

preventive policing is employed by the FP.

One of the best assets available when it comes to policy strategy is the Law Enforcement

Professional (LEP) found attached to U.S. Battalion and Brigade staffs. This individual likely has

¹³ David A. Harris, Making a Case for Preventive Policing, http://www.calea.org/online/newsletter/No90, 2006

US UNCLASSIFIED

REL NTM-I, Iraqi Police

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

years of knowledge and experience in these police strategies as well as common tactics,

techniques and procedures associated with policing.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that being an advisor to the Iraqi FP can be a challenging and often frustrating

job. There is no comparable organization in the United States to draw a basis of knowledge

from. The experience and backg0round of both the FP and the advisors is decidedly military,

and the FP mission and mandate do not necessarily match their duties.

The FP is a unique organization filled with unique individuals. This requires a creative approach

to problem solving and influencing with culture, rapport, experience, ethno-religious

backg0round and many other factors shaping the situation. There are many possible solutions to

many issues. The advisor is on point for finding and implementing these solutions to

accomplish the long term goals and objectifies for not only the U.S. and Coalition forces, but for

the FP and the Iraqi Security Forces as well. The goal of this document is the give the advisor a

head start in getting oriented to the FP and the environment in which he will operate.

US UNCLASSIFIED

REL NTM-I, Iraqi Police

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION

ORGANISATION DU TRAITÉ DE L’ATLANTIQUE NORD

HEADQUARTERS, SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION

7857 BLANDY ROAD, SUITE 100

NORFOLK, VIRGINIA, 23551-2490

5000 TSX 0170/TT-7579/Ser: NU0462

TO:

See Distribution

SUBJECT:

Commanders’ and Staff Handbook for Countering Improvised

Explosive Devices

DATE:

10 August 2011

The Improvised Explosive Device (IED) has become a feature of the modern

battlefield and is likely to remain a serious challenge in the future. In responding to this

challenge, NATO must remain adaptable and flexible while developing robust and effective

Counter-IED (C-IED) policies and procedures for current and future operations. C-IED

activities should also be widely understood and integrated within and across all levels of

command (particularly Intelligence and Operations) and not relegated to a single functional

area.

The Commanders’ and Staff Handbook for Countering Improvised Explosive Devices

(C-IED) is provided at Enclosure 1 and has been developed to provide guidance on “what

needs to be done” rather than “how to do it”. The Handbook was developed during the

Operational C-IED Command and Control Experiment (September 2008) and validated

during the NATO C-IED SOP Handbook Validation Experiment (May 2011). It describes

outputs, staff responsibilities and enablers for commanders and staff to consider when

integrating C-IED into the preparation, planning and execution of operations, and how to

incorporate C-IED activities into all staff functional areas. It is designed for use by

commanders and staffs at the operational and tactical levels.

NATO organizations and Nations are encouraged to disseminate the handbook

widely. They are also invited to submit feedback, in support of periodic revisions of the

document, to the ACT C-IED Integrated Product Team Leader, Col John Greaves,

john.greaves@act.nato.int; +1-757-747-4244.

FOR THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION

R G Cooling CB

Vice Admiral, GBR N

Chief of Staff

Allied Command Transformation

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE:

1. Staff Handbook for C-IED Input to Preparation, Planning and Execution of

Operations

DISTRIBUTION:

External -

Action:

SHAPE (Attn: COS; NMRs)

JFC BS

JFC NP

JCL

COS ISAF

COS IJC

Comdt NATO School

NATO JEWCS

Dir C-IED COE

Dir MILENG COE

Dir COE DAT

Dir HUMINT COE

Dir EOD COE

Dir JCBRN COE

Dir JAPCC

Dir CSW COE

Dir CCD COE

HQ ALCC

Non-NATO ISAF Troop Contributing Nations MoDs

USJS J7

Internal -

Action:

DCOS MCD

ACT Distribution list II

ACT Distribution list III - National Liaison Representatives

ACT Distribution list V - PFP Staff Element (PSEs)

ACT Distribution list VI - PFP National Liaison Representatives

Information:

DCOS CD

DCOS JFT

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Preface

Aim and Purpose

This handbook is designed to assist commanders and staffs in understanding,

planning, and conducting Counter-IED (C-IED) staff processes in an operational

environment. It recommends the organisation, process, and capabilities to facilitate

the planning, integration, and execution of C-IED activities in operational staff

functions.

Background

The adaptive IED challenge will remain a potential threat across the full range

of Alliance operations. Consequently, integrating C-IED activities and enablers

(people and equipment) for defensive (Defeat the Device) and offensive (Attack the

Networks) operations requires clearly documented and practised staff processes.

Stove-piped C-IED expertise and operations have proven unreliable to support

overall operational objectives and theatre campaigns synergistically. As a result,

NATO has conducted two C-IED specific experiments to define and validate the

optimal staff organisation and processes to fully integrate and maximise C-IED

activities in the overall operational campaign. This information is contained in the

following handbook and is provided as a recommended guide to operational

commanders and staffs.

As NATO’s C-IED Capability Monitor, I encourage the Alliance and associated

Nations to implement these validated techniques and guidance in order to improve

the synergistic effects that an integrated C-IED effort will provide to Alliance

operations.

Kjell-Ove Skare

Major General, NOR A

NATO C-IED Capability Monitor

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COMMANDERS’ AND STAFF HANDBOOK FOR COUNTERING IMPROVISED

EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (C-IED)

REFERENCES

AJP 3.15A - Countering IEDs.

STANAG 2294 - C-IED Training Standard- Ed.1 dated 20 Jan 09.

AAP 6 - NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.

AAP 15 - NATO Glossary of Abbreviations used in NATO documents and

Publications.

CONTEXT

There is likely to be an IED threat in all military deployments and this should

be a key consideration when undertaking the preparation, planning and execution of

current and future NATO deployed operations. Generic detail of the threat

environments and the C-IED approach are described in Reference A but for each

deployment further specific operational analysis must be undertaken to ensure a

mission focussed approach. Key to this is the generation of C-IED awareness and

capability within the staff at every level of command.

This handbook sits under References A and B and is intended to be

complimentary to existing NATO doctrinal publications and formation HQ operational

planning and capability development. It should be noted that although the handbook

is aligned with the AJP 3.15A, it seeks only to provide an operational and tactical

level staff perspective. It is designed for use within military HQs at all levels and is

equally applicable for National C-IED capability development. It will be a living

document and updated and amended in conjunction with NATO publications and the

lessons identified/ lessons learned process.

This handbook does not seek to define staff HQ or national operational

planning processes for C-IED but should be used as a reference manual during the

planning and execution of operations. Every operational deployment will have

different requirements, depending upon environmental and operational variables;

therefore the Commander must identify appropriate C-IED activities and processes

within his staff functions as a priority.

C-IED is a relatively new phenomenon and has yet to be fully institutionalised

into existing military staff training and functions. All staff must be aware of this fact

and take every opportunity to develop wider awareness and understanding to better

integrate C-IED aspects into all training and processes.

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AIM OF THE HANDBOOK

The aim of the handbook is to outline outputs, staff responsibilities and

enablers for Commanders and staff to consider when integrating C-IED into the

preparation, planning and execution of operations, and to foster an Attack the

Network mindset.

CONCEPT AND APPLICABILITY

It is widely acknowledged that IEDs will be a major threat for all levels of

current and future operations and it is therefore imperative that national and NATO

Formation and Unit HQs are able to prepare for, plan and conduct C-IED activities.

Clearly defined C-IED outputs will enable the force to undertake these activities

throughout the JOA in order to achieve the mission.

Definition. Reference A defines C-IED as follows:

The collective efforts at all levels to defeat the IED system by

attacking the networks, defeating the device and preparing the

force.

C-IED approaches the IED as a systemic problem and C-IED actions aim to

defeat the IED System. However, IEDs are only one of a number of forms of

asymmetric attack used by insurgents, criminals, terrorists and other malign actors.

The networks (e.g. Narcotics, Financial, Cyber, Piracy, Human Trafficking, IED,

Terrorism, etc.) overlap and, therefore, will concurrently service the plethora of other

requirements and activities of the adversary. Attack the Networks activities should

take place at all levels: strategic, operational and tactical and, as the networks are

predominantly personality-based, activities will focus against adversarial

personalities and processes/activities as well as against IEDs/facilities/materials and

their production, and will require a broad approach to the problem.

As there is an overlap of activities within the networks, they concurrently

support the different aspects of the insurgents’ or adversaries aims and objectives.

Understanding of, and intelligence on, these networks will be vital to not only the

overall attack the network process but also the ability to identify the nodes and

linkages within the financial, commercial, and communication sectors as well as an

adversary’s own structures and interactions within the population. Most importantly,

understanding these networks will highlight the adversary’s critical vulnerabilities; the

target for all operational planning and activity. Thus planning for C-IED actions must

include consideration of, and actions against, the adversarial networks in the widest

context and recognition and understanding of friendly force Attack the Network

operations taking place to achieve unity of effort and meet the Commander’s intent.

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10.

As the breadth of Attack the Network activities can transcend boundaries at all

levels, from national through political to military, it is vital to engage with those

functions, activities and personalities that are involved in the fight. This will entail

military planners and commanders stepping outside their ‘comfort zone’ and

engaging with entities from organizations that they may have had little or no contact

with. This requires flexibility and adoption of new mind sets and appreciation of

differing priorities and perspectives and, as personally uncomfortable and

challenging as this may be, it is vital to success in attacking the networks and the C-

IED system they support.

11.

C-IED operations should not be planned or executed in isolation and must be

fully integrated into the national or NATO force strategic objectives. A C-IED

capability is generated when a series of tasks, activities and techniques are

undertaken and integrated within the wider context of operational and tactical

activities. C-IED may be undertaken within the full spectrum of operations although

it is likely to be a greater factor within hybrid threat environments such as an

insurgency, terrorism campaigns and during Stabilisation, Security, Transition and

Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO). C-IED should be viewed as an activity to

achieve the overarching mission rather than a distinct and separate function.

12.

C-IED activities can take place at the local, national, regional, and

international level. Subsequently, designing an operation to defeat the IED threat

requires a comprehensive strategy that integrates and synchronizes series of actions

and tasks from the tactical to the strategic levels of command and requires

interaction with non-military organizations and the populace. As with the wider

hybrid operations C-IED actions may be categorized as direct (focused on the

enemy) or indirect (focused on the population). Whether direct or indirect, C-IED

operations can be proactive or reactive and applicable to one or more of the three C-

IED pillars. The guidance within the handbook is designed to be scalable, flexible

and applicable to a variety of structures and requirements.

C-IED APPROACH AND AREAS OF ACTIVITY

13.

C-IED APPROACH. Reference A directs that the C-IED approach is to be

made up of three mutually supporting pillars in order to defeat the IED system.

These are:

Attack the Networks.

Defeat the Device.

Prepare the Force.

14.

The C-IED Areas of Activity provide an integrated approach to focus the C-

IED effort effectively and must be an integral element of the staff function and

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coordination at, and across, all levels. At the operational and tactical level the

understand activity underpins the process and is critical to orientating the staff in

order to undertake the other four activities. The pursue and predict activities are

more applicable to Attack the Network operations whilst protect is undertaken to

Defeat the Device and prepare is a key Prepare the Force activity. Operational level

staff are likely to be focused on understand, pursue and predict but must understand

and support protect and prepare activities. Fig 1 illustrates the relationship between

the activities, C-IED approach pillars at the operational and tactical levels.

C-IED

(To defeat the IED system)

Key

Undertaken at both

PURSUE

the Operational and

Prepare

Defeat the

Tactical Level

AND

the

Device

PREVENT

Primary focus of Op.

Force

level staff but also

significant activity at

Attack the

PREPARE

PROTECT

tactical level

Networks

Primarily undertaken

at the Tactical Level

Understanding and Intelligence

UNDERSTAND

Fig 1: Schematic to show C-IED Areas of Activities within the C-IED approach

pillars at the operational and tactical levels.

15 July 2011

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15.

These C-IED Areas of Activity are described in more detail below.

Understand. This activity underpins the pursue, prevent, protect and

prepare activities and is fundamental to the development of a comprehensive

picture of the IED system and its interaction with the human, physical and

information environments in which it operates.

(1)

What to Understand?

Operational Environment

The backg0round culture and social dynamics of the

population

The adversary

The IED network characteristics and criticalities

IEDs as a weapon

Friendly Forces capabilities (incl HN)

(2)

How to understand?

Effective Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

Cultural and social training and awareness

Engagement with people

Analysis of IED network criticalities and vulnerabilities

Post incident exploitation

Host Nation assistance to include security force aspects

(3)

Using the following sources:

Cultural advisors, Historical data and adversary analysis

ISR (incl SIGINT, IMINT, MASINT, DOCINT, ELINT and

HUMINT)

Exploitation - Material - (technical, biometric, forensic,

media,)

Personnel - (biometric, tactical questioning,

detainee questioning)

Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)

Specialist technical intelligence (EW, Weapons

Intelligence and use of scientific expertise)

(4)

Being supported by the following activities:

All sources analysis

Geospatial Intelligence

IS databases and analytical tools

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Secure communications

Common lexicon and reporting

Intelligence sharing and liaison activities

Measurements of effectiveness

Pursue. Those full-spectrum cross-governmental actions inside and

outside the JOA to degrade an adversary IED capability.

(1)

What elements of the IED Network to pursue?

International Leadership and support

Regional and Local leadership and support

Infrastructure and Facilities

Resourcing and supply of IED components

IED makers

IED emplacers, initiation and adversary exploitation teams

(2)

How do we pursue?

Identifying criticalities and vulnerabilities of the IED

network

Network focused intelligence collection plan

Targeting of network-critical nodes (physical and

influence)

Population centric operations to isolate the adversary

(3)

By using the following:

Products of understanding activity

Targeted operations against network-critical personnel

Targeted operations against supply routes and facilities

Key Leader and population engagement to isolate the

networks

Operational level input into and coordination with:

Political and Diplomatic activities

HN judicial system

Economic measures

NGOs and OGDs

Info Ops

Reconstruction activities

(4)

Supported by the following:

Network-focused intelligence collection plan (operationally

driven)

Pro-active mindset of combat arms

SOF

FIRES

ISR

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Exploitation Intelligence (media, technical and biometric)

Info Ops integration into operations

CIMIC integration into operations

Prevent. Those activities influence activities inside and outside the

JOA that deter involvement in IED system and reject IEDs as an adversary

tactic. These activities may include:

(1)

What activities of the IED system do we wish to prevent?

Direct involvement in the IED system

Support to the IED system

The use of IEDs as an adversary tactic

(2)

How do we prevent the IED system from operating effectively?

Deterring involvement in and support to the IED system

by shifting the balance of risk/motivation.

Encouraging the population to reject IEDs as an

adversary tactical Operational level input into

international, political and diplomatic influence activities to

deter adversarial networks

(3)

Using the following:

Products of understanding activity

Kinetic targeting (deterrent)

Tailored information operations at all levels (international

to local)

Development of HN governance within police, judicial and

prison systems

Coordinated Ops/info ops and CIMIC focused operations

Appropriate posture, presence and profile of Friendly

Forces

(4)

Supported by:

Robust kinetic targeting policy

Liaison with other military and non-military agencies

Well defined and understood concepts of operation

Measurements of effectiveness

Protect. Those measures that improve Host Nation and alliance

freedom of movement and security. These will be undertaken at the tactical

level but enabled by the operational staff.

(1)

What are we protecting against?

Loss of support within home nations

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The denial of FF freedom of movement

FF and HN casualties

Damage to FF and HN property and equipment

(2)

How do we protect?

Limit the strategic effects of IEDs

Prediction of IED locations

Detection of emplaced IEDs

Neutralization of IEDs

Mitigation of IED target effect

(3)

Using the following:

Products of understanding activity

Operational input to strategic communications

Mission planning timelines and resources

Search and Route Clearance capabilities

IEDD (or EOD if national terminology)

Use of EW Force Protection equipment and TTPs

Use of Force Protection TTPs

Physical protection (defensive constructions, armour and

PPE)

(4)

Supported by:

Established military/political STRATCOM links

Situational awareness

Exploitation Intelligence

Geospatial intelligence

Coordinated Research and Development between NATO

and nations

Medic Capabilities

Prepare. Those activities that build capability within host nation

security forces and alliance forces to conduct full-spectrum offensive C-IED

operations within the IED threat environment. These activities may include

the following:

(1)

What are the preparation requirements to undertake across the

DOTMLPFI¹? The following lines of development should be

considered in order to defeat the IED system for the given campaign:

¹ Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, Interoperability.

15 July 2011

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Physical (equipment and manning), Conceptual

(procedures) and Behavioural (mindset and skills) abilities

to undertake:

Understanding

Pursue

Prevent

Protect

(2)

How do we prepare?

Relevant and flexible C-IED doctrine and policies

Flexibility and scalability of structure to meet the

requirements

Realistic and comprehensive individual and collective

training of:

Environmental and cultural awareness

Equipment training

Force Protection TTPs

Attack the Network TTPs

Staff training

Integrated equipment capability programmes and

sustainable lines of logistic communication to/in theatre.

Flexibility of mindset and education of the force

Ensuring appropriate interoperability of forces, equipment,

communication and IT systems

Building indigenous HN security force capability

(3)

By using the following:

Products of understanding activity in a timely manner at

training establishments/exercises

Institutionalising C-IED individual training

Realistic C-IED play during Mission Specific and Mission

Rehearsal training and exercises

(4)

Supported by:

IT systems to provide information/intelligence to home

nations training

Use of simulators

Lessons learnt process

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C-IED TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

16.

C-IED Specified Tasks. In order to undertake these Areas of Activity staff

must identify and complete a number of C-IED-specific tasks, which should deliver

towards one or more of the three pillars. Suggested tasks are listed at Annex A

along with their contribution to the C-IED pillars to assist in ensuring C-IED staff work

is effect-focussed. The process for integrating these into the HQ should be:

Commander must nominate an OPR to oversee and coordinate all C-

IED activities. This role is pivotal to the success of the attack the network

processes and the assimilation of C-IED into the spectrum of military

operations. The OPR will act as the Commander’s C-IED staff officer, when

not deployed, with a watching brief to remain current with IED developments

and attacks worldwide. On operations the OPR will facilitate, manage, and

lead the C-IED effort, by drawing together and co-ordinating the expertise and

efforts of the other staff branches, and become the Commanders’ primary C-

IED SME and C-IED operations advisor. Further details of his role appear

later in Annex A and Annex B - Appendix 6.

Commanders and staff must first identify those tasks necessary to

ensure mission success within the campaign plan.

For each task a responsible department/branch/individual must be

identified. Annex A also lists the C-IED Core Functions each task is likely to

match.

Each task must be subject to a ‘Mission analysis’ to identify detail,

resource or information gaps, supporting information sources and timelines.

Resource requirements must be filled but, if not, the gaps must be

managed.

Development of the task process to include coordination.

Communication between of C-IED related stakeholders, both horizontally and

vertically is vital to success and must become a routine process for all

involved.

Continued revision to ensure relevancy.

17.

Staff Functions contributing to C-IED. C-IED activities must be undertaken

in conjunction with other staff activities and external organisations. Whilst in some

situations a distinct C-IED cell may be appropriate, in most operational and tactical

level HQs, C-IED operations will be considered by members of the existing staff as

required under the direction of the C-IED OPR. The staff functions that most

contribute to C-IED are:

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Information and Knowledge Management.

Intelligence Fusion and Analysis.

ISR.

Exploitation.

Targeting.

Operations and Plans.

Force Protection.

IEDD/ (or EOD if national terminology)

Information Operations.

Search and Route Clearance.

Training and Lessons Identified/Learned.

Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC).

C-IED STAFF ACTIVITIES

18.

The operational situation may demand a C-IED cell to be permanently

established or possibly just on a temporary basis in order to address a particular

issue. Regardless of the existence or structure of any C-IED cell it is suggested that

C-IED activities must be incorporated into the existing battle rhythm of the HQ and

should be coordinated by the C-IED OPR.

19.

Having confirmed the C-IED tasks and required inputs, it is necessary to

identify and design appropriate processes in order to achieve them. This must

include coordination or information exchange within the core C-IED staff contributors,

wider HQ staff and outside agencies. These processes will vary according to the

mission, the threat, level of command, HQ structures, available resources and the

commanders’ intent.

20.

There are a number of groupings, media, forums and activities which will

contribute to staff processes, some of which will be applicable for C-IED. During the

initial integration of C-IED within the staff there may be a requirement for formal C-

IED related groupings/meetings to take place. Guidelines for these activities, for

potential responsibilities and possible structures are at Annex C.

21.

C-IED Coord. There is a clear requirement for robust coordination between

these processes and across the wider staff and external organisations, both

vertically and horizontally. The responsibility for such coordination need not

necessarily be the sole task of individuals and may be one of a number of

responsibilities for an existing staff appointment. The schematic at Fig 2 illustrates

the possible C-IED coordination within the staff.

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Typical HQ Staff Activities

Analyse and

Recommend

Analyse and

Undertake

manage

assignment of

assess

external liaison

information

responsibility

critical resources

operational risk

in conjunction with all staff branches

C-IED Coordination Outputs

Attack the Networks

Defeat the Device

Prepare the Force

Exploit information IOT inform

Exploit information IOT

understanding which

understanding to contribute

inform understanding to

contributes to pursue and

to protect activity

contribute to prepare

prevent activities

activity

Fig 2 - Schematic of C-IED coordination within the staff

C-IED TERMINOLOGY AND REFERENCES

22.

Consistent and clear C-IED terminology is vital to understanding specialist

areas of C-IED and ensuring that operational analysis can be undertaken effectively.

Many definitions of C-IED terminology are yet to be ratified which compound the

difficulties of developing coherence within the staff HQ. Annex D contains a list of

approved abbreviations and terms from References D, E and other approved

publications but also includes informal explanations to assist staff working within a C-

IED environment.

23.

C-IED should be integrated into operational planning, which itself is

undertaken within existing doctrine and associated publications. As a result, C-IED

staff activity will require reference to a variety of publications. In order to assist in

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developing capability and operational planning Annex E lists C-IED related

publications in addition to those directly referenced in this handbook.

SUMMARY

24.

This handbook serves as a foundation for staff to develop threat, mission and

resource specific C-IED capabilities and input to operational preparation, planning

and execution of operations. It is designed to be flexible and scalable and therefore

should be used by commanders and HQ staff in conducting their own assessment of

relevancy and requirements.

Annexes:

C-IED Specified Tasks within HQs.

C-IED Inputs and Specified Tasks within HQs

C-IED Structures and Responsibilities within HQs.

C-IED-Related Terminology.

C-IED Associated References.

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ANNEX A TO

ENCLOSURE 1 TO

5000 TSX 0170/TT-7579/SER: NU0462

DATED 10 AUG 11

C-IED SUGGESTED SPECIFIED TASKS WITHIN HQs

This annex lists the suggested specified tasks that may be required for national or HQ staff personnel to undertake when developing a C-

IED capability or operating or preparing to operate in an IED environment. The relevance of each output or task will depend on the

mission, threat, HQ size and structure and level of C-IED capability required. Most of the outputs require coordination of C-IED activity

between existing staff branches but every output contributes to at least one of the three C-IED approach pillars:

Attack the Networks (AtN).

Defeat the Device (DtD).

Prepare the Force (PtF).

Contribution to

Staff Functions

Ser

Possible Specified Task

Purposes

C-IED Approach

Comment

Contributing to

C-IED

Pillar

AtN

DtD

PtF

Coordination

Coordination of all C-IED activity

IOT defeat the IED system

Normally undertaken by

and outputs within the staff and

the Operations branch

between the HQ and other units

so this function has

and agencies.

been included in the

Core C-IED functional

area.

All Branches

Provide specialist input to briefing

IOT support the decision making of the

senior staff as required

commander and staff.

Information

Create and manage a fit-for-

IOT provide visibility on the operational

To include personal

and

purpose C-IED database.

picture

profiles, mapping,

Knowledge

IOT support IPB

engagements, NGOs,

Management

IOT support pattern analysis

local leaders, enemy

A-1

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15 Jul 2011

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(IKM)

IOT identify the IED Network

personnel - not just IED

IOT inform operational analysis

locations and timings.

Information

Create a common lexicon of C-

IOT ensure consistency in reporting and

and

IED terminology

information and knowledge

Knowledge

management

Management

IOT enable accurate Operational and

(IKM)

Intelligence Analysis to be undertaken

Information

Monitor and collate IED incidents

IOT identify migration of IED threats

PIRs, CIRs, DPs and

and

by location, type, target and

(devices and networks) across AORs

COAs

Knowledge

enemy TTP

IOT retain situational awareness

Management

(IKM)

INTEL Fusion

Coordination of C-IED IPB

IOT contribute to generic IPB

Input information

and Analysis

requirements and

decision points

connected to the IED

network

INTEL Fusion

Predict and identify IED network

IOT understand the IED network

Using pattern analysis,

and Analysis

activities and patterns of

IOT contribute to IPB

predictive modelling and

behaviour:

IOT contribute to targeting process

war gaming

Financing

Recruiting

Training

IED Construction

INTEL Fusion

Predict and identify IED network

IOT understand the IED network

Using pattern analysis,

and Analysis

personnel, structures and

IOT contribute to IPB

biometric intelligence,

personal relationships

IOT contribute to targeting process

local level engagements

and cultural

understanding

INTEL Fusion

Predict and identify IED network

IOT understand the IED network

Using geospatial

and Analysis

lines of communication:

IOT contribute to IPB

analysis, exploitation

IED material supply sources

IOT contribute to targeting process

results and SIGINT

Supply routes

Communication networks

Facilities

INTEL Fusion

Analyse IED network TTPs to

IOT inform Friendly Forces Force

A-2

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and Analysis

understand tactical emplacement

Protection TTPs.

and targeting methods

IOT understand enemy IED network

capability

IOT detect migration of threats and

components.

IOT identify where and when it is

possible to detect the IED network

INTEL Fusion

Make assessments on the current

IOT retain operational momentum in

Including intentions,

and Analysis

and future threats and their effect

Force Protection and AtN operations

technology and TTPs of

on operations

IED networks.

INTEL Fusion

Link intelligence detection assets

IOT contribute to IPB

and Analysis

and other intelligence sources to

IED related PIRs and decision

points

INTEL Fusion

Coordinate the fusion of

IOT contribute to IPB and information

and Analysis

exploitation inputs with other

and knowledge management.

INTEL

INTEL Fusion

Coordinate the communication of

IOT improve the ability of all

Including HN and NGOs

and Analysis

C-IED intelligence to external

organisations to contribute to C-IED

agencies as appropriate

strategy.

ISR

Contribute to planning of ISR

IOT focus ISTAR assets on relevant

asset usage

elements of the IED system.

IOT best meet C-IED PIRs and CCIRs

IOT detect enemy locations, movement

and utilising of known threat frequencies

ISR

Assistance with interpreting C-IED

IOT provide IED related expertise to

related SIGINT data regarding

SIGINT analysts

IED network communications

ISR

Contribute to HUMINT intelligence

IOT ensure that specialist C-IED related

Including tactical

focussing and interpretation

information is gathered and results

questioning and

analysed.

detainee questioning

ISR

Contribute to OSINT intelligence

IOT ensure that specialist C-IED related

focusing and interpretation

information is gathered and results

analysed.

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Exploitation

Provide specialist C-IED support

IOT ensure that C-IED related

to Media Exploitation (MEDEX)

information is gathered and results

analysed

Exploitation

Issue and manage technical and

IOT create a fit-for purpose and all

tactical exploitation policy for

encompassing technical exploitation

Level 1-3.

capability

Exploitation

Issue and manage biometric

IOT create a fit-for purpose, legal and all

HN security forces likely

exploitation policy for Level 1-3.

encompassing technical exploitation

to require liaison and

capability

LEGAD involvement

required

Exploitation

Create a Level 2 exploitation

IOT provide expert timely and

capability within theatre

operationally focussed physical and

biometric intelligence and evidence

across boundaries

Exploitation

Define Level 2 Exploitation

IOT make best use of resources to meet

priorities

intelligence and post-incident

management requirements.

Exploitation

Develop links between Level 2 + 3

IOT increase intelligence on

facilities including reach-back and

enemy/insurgent/ terrorist personnel

information sharing facilities.

between theatre and NATO nations

Exploitation

Write and issue Weapons

IOT construct a common policy and

Intelligence (Level 1 exploitation)

standard for the collection and initial

SOPs

analysis of IED incident sites.

Exploitation

Identify and define differing

IOT create a detailed understanding of

capabilities within national

WIT capability.

Weapons Intelligence Teams

(WIT) or national equivalent.

Exploitation

Direct and monitor WIT asset lay-

IOT make best use of WIT resources.

down within AOR

Exploitation

Tasking and recovery policy for

IOT make best use of WIT resources.

Tactical level only

WIT or national equivalent.

Exploitation

Develop WIT awareness training

IOT ensure that WIT assets are used to

within C-IED training

best effect.

IOT ensure the value of exploitation is

understood and Level 2 and 3 outputs

are understood and accessible

Exploitation

Liaise with HN authorities security

IOT improve HN exploitation

A-4

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services to integrate HN

understanding and capability

exploitation capability

Exploitation

Undertake technical exploitation

IOT identify technical and forensic

Exploitation Staff. To

of IED related components and

evidence to improve technical

include component

identify external sources of IED

intelligence

identification and

components

IOT inform the commander of strategic

characteristics,

and political involvement

electronic exploitation,

IED construction,

explosives analysis, tool

markings, enemy TTPs

etc

Exploitation

Monitor technical exploitation

IOT identify threat migration in or out of

reports from other theatres

theatre

Exploitation

Recover biometrics and input into

IOT identify personnel within IED

Exploitation Unit Staff

biometric database

network

Exploitation

Input into Biometric Working

IOT align biometric exploitation

Exploitation Unit Staff

Groups

collection and database management

Exploitation

Provide feedback to tactical level

IOT ensure continued enabling of

units of biometrics and

exploitation efforts by tactical units

exploitation successes.

Exploitation

Writing or disseminating C-IED

IOT rapidly disseminate new threats and

Flash Reports or Awareness

enemy TTPs (by technology or region)

reports

to friendly forces.

Exploitation

Coordinate and manage

IOT enable exploitation information to be

exploitation RFIs

available throughout the staff

IOT provide appropriate exploitation

information to outside agencies

Exploitation

Fuse and analyse exploitation

IOT ensure that intelligence information

reports to identify sources of

is integrated

components

Exploitation

Develop and publish HN

IOT improve HN situational awareness

releasable exploitation reports

and contribute to AtN operations

Exploitation

Monitor the process of IED

IOT ensure exploitation priorities match

material through exploitation

operational information requirements

chain

Exploitation

Coordinate external expertise on

IOT fully understand IED target effect

weapons and armour

and FF armour /PPE effectiveness.

A-5

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Exploitation

Ensure exploitation guidelines are

IOT ensure effective prosecution of IED

in line with relevant judicial

network personnel is possible

authorities

Targeting

Contribute to targeting process

IOT disrupt IED network ability to

and prioritisation of IED network

undertake enabling activities.

activities and patterns of

behaviour:

Financing

Recruiting

Training

IED Construction

Targeting

Contribute to targeting process

IOT deny IED network ability to conduct

and prioritisation of IED network

operations

personnel

IOT mount capture/kill operations

against IED network personnel

IOT ensure wider intelligence gathering

is not unduly affected by personnel

targeting

Targeting

Predict and identify IED network

IOT disrupt IED network ability to

lines of communication:

undertake enabling activities.

IED material supply sources

IOT assist in focussing ISR

Supply routes

IOT raise issues that are outside the

Communication networks

military sphere of influence

Facilities

Operations

Provide lead, direction and

IOT ensure C-IED capability is effects

and Plans

coordination for C-IED related

focussed

activities within all staff branches

Operations

Coordinate C-IED related input

IOT ensure commanders and staff retain

and Plans

into routine SITREPs

C-IED situational awareness.

Operations

Assessment and evaluation of

IOT assist in validation TTPs for Force

and Plans

Friendly Forces and HN

protection

movement TTPs

Operations

Plan operations to deny IED

IOT reduce IED network effectiveness

and Plans

network freedom of movement

Operations

Provide general direction for the

IOT ensure exploitation and intelligence

and Plans

prioritisation of C-IED intelligence

gathering opportunities are used without

A-6

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15 Jul 2011

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

gathering opportunities against

inappropriate impact on J3 operations.

tactical operations

Operations

Establish and manage guidelines

IOT ensure Force Protection TTPs are

and Plans

on pre-detonation and BIP-ing of

consistent with security of civilian

IEDs

personnel

Operations

Coordinate C-IED contributions to

IOT ensure coordinated C-IED capability

and Plans

OPLANs and FRAGOs as

and direction to the force

required

Force

Advise on EOF measures to

IOT provide enable force protection by

Protection

counter Suicide IED according to

proportional use of force in accordance

specific threat criteria

with ROE and threat

Force

Train and enable tactical units to

IOT assist tactical level units in

To include terrain

Protection

undertake geospatial analysis

improving Force Protection

analysis of IED

hotspots/VPs, supply

routes, IDF firing points,

and dead ground

studies.

Force

Prediction and dissemination of

IOT provide support to attacking IED

Utilising geospatial tools

Protection

likely IED targets and locations

emplacers.

IOT inform Force Protection measures

Force

Monitor and evaluate friendly

IOT retain the ability to manoeuvre

To include equipment

Protection

forces force protection capabilities

and TTPs.

Force

Monitor the RCIED threat

IOT to inform all owners of EW FP

Threat bands should be

Protection

frequency list.

equipment on RCIED threats

created by Level 2

technical intelligence

assets.

Force

Identify EW Force Protection

IOT contribute to Electromagnetic

Some nations are

Protection

characteristics for national, NATO

Spectrum Management throughout the

reluctant to declare full

and civilian EW systems.

battle space

operating specification

of EW equipment but

will liaise direct with

spectrum management

authorities.

Force

Issue and manage policy for force

IOT conform to electronic spectrum

To include HN security

Protection

protection EW equipment use

management policy.

forces and deconfliction

within friendly forces

between different

nations and equipments.

A-7

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15 Jul 2011

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Force

Monitor and evaluate EW force

IOT confirm that equipment, procedures

Protection

protection equipment and TTPs

and threat fills are appropriate to threat

effectiveness in relation to the

threat

Force

Issue and maintain the policy on

IOT ensure force protection TTPs are

Protection

EW pre-detonation of IEDs

consistent with security of civilian

personnel

EOD

Establish and maintain situational

IOT predict possible explosives sources

To include mines, UXO,

awareness of Explosive

for IED networks.

CBRN, former military

Remnants of War (ERW)

IOT improve situational awareness of

stockpiles,

locations, demining and clearance

security forces

operations within the JOA

IOT gain information of explosives

hazards and ensure ERW operations

priorities met operational demands

IOT identify the legitimate uses/storage

and transit of explosives within AOR

IOT be able to identify legitimate

explosives should they enter the IED

network.

EOD

Issue and manage ERW policy

IOT ensure standard practice and

To include detection,

understanding of ERW operations.

clearance, relocation

and disposal.

Production of SOPs

EOD

Plan and manage ERW clearance

IOT prevent ERW being used within

Production of FRAGOs

and set priorities

IEDs

IOT to make best use of resources to

reduce ERW

IOT retain situation awareness of

geographic areas with ERW, quantities

and types of explosives/munitions

discovered.

EOD

Generate HN capability to deal

IOT generate HN capability to reduce

To include plan for

with ERW

explosive risk.

training, equipment,

management, mentoring

and tasking.

EOD

Ensure ERW data is incorporated

IOT improve situational awareness for

into the C-IED database

security forces.

A-8

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15 Jul 2011

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

EOD

Develop and manage mine and

IOT fulfil force protection requirements

UXO awareness training

IOT mitigate explosive hazards to

programmes and educate within

civilian personnel

FF and the populace

IOT prevent civilians supplying ERW to

IED networks

EOD

Issue and manage EOD policy

IOT ensure standard practice and

understanding of EOD operations

EOD

Identify EOD capabilities by

IOT ensure situational awareness of

nation (incl host nation)

friendly forces capabilities

EOD

Direct force lay-down of

IOT make best use of EOD resources.

EOD/IEDD assets within AOR

EOD

Issue tasking and recovery policy

IOT make best use of EOD resources.

Tactical level only

for EOD/IEDD assets within AOR

EOD

Generate and monitor EOD

IOT generate HN capability to neutralize

To include plan for

capability within HN

the threat.

training, equipment,

management, mentoring

and tasking.

EOD

Monitor EOD reports and maintain

IOT assist/ support HN on EOD tasks.

EOD map and register.

IEDD

Issue and manage IEDD policy

IOT ensure standard practice and

understanding of IEDD operations

IEDD

Identify IEDD capabilities by

IOT ensure situational awareness of

Nations have different

nation (incl host nation)

friendly forces capabilities

standards, capabilities

and understanding of

IEDD operations

IEDD

Direct force lay-down of IEDD

IOT make best use of IEDD resources.

Tactical level only

assets within AOR

IEDD

Monitor IEDD reports and

IOT identify equipment or TTP gaps

IEDD TTPs are likely to

storyboards IOT evaluate IEDD

within IEDD capability

be a national

TTPs in relation to threats

responsibility, but

analysis can assist in LL

process.

IEDD

Generate and monitor IEDD

IOT generate HN capability to neutralize

To include plan for

capability within HN

the threat.

training, equipment,

management, mentoring

and tasking.

Info Ops

Coord C-IED contribution to Info

IOT create awareness of and education

A-9

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NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Operations and act as C-IED

for explosive hazards and actions on

SME

within the civilian community

IOT prevent IED network from receiving

local support

IOT disrupt relationships between

different IED networks and local power-

brokers

Info Ops

Coordinate C-IED Information

IOT provide consistency of advice to

operations with NGOs and UN

retain credibility

ERW operations

Info Ops

Provide C-IED specialist advice to

IOT increase IED awareness and

Strategic Communications

provide balanced reporting in media

Info Ops

Support the quick reaction to IED

IOT mitigate effect of publicity by IED

incidents with meaningful Info

networks.

Ops outputs.

Info Ops

Monitoring and assessment of

IOT mitigate effects of adversary Info

IED network Info Ops campaign

Ops having a strategic effect

Search/ Route

Issue and manage search and

IOT ensure standard practice and

To include offensive and

Clearance

route clearance policy and SOPs

understanding of search and route

defensive search.

clearance operations

Search/ Route

Identify specialist search and

IOT ensure situational awareness of

Clearance

route clearance capabilities by

friendly forces capabilities

nation (incl host nation)

Search/ Route

Direct and manage intelligence

IOT make best use of search and route

Clearance

led search and route clearance

clearance resources.

activities within JOA

Search/ Route

Issue and manage direction for

IOT improve friendly forces force

Clearance

minimum standards of search

protection capability

training for deployed personnel

Search/ Route

Generate search and route

IOT generate host nation capability to

To include plan for

Clearance

clearance capability within HN

detect IEDs and caches.

training, equipment,

security forces.

management, mentoring

and tasking.

Search/ Route

Ensure search and route

IOT inform future operations and

Clearance

clearance reports are

maintain situational awareness in AOR

incorporated into the C-IED

database

A-10

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Training +

Plan, direct and support alliance

IOT develop C-IED capability within the

LI/LL

staff C-IED training and input to

staff

lessons learned

Training +

Plan, direct and support alliance

IOT develop C-IED force protection

LI/LL

C-IED force protection training

capability

and input to lessons learned

Training +

Plan, direct and support alliance

IOT develop C-IED Attack the network

LI/LL

C-IED Attack the network training

capability

and input to lessons learned

Training +

Coordinate C-IED input into RSOI

IOT ensure situational awareness of all

LI/LL

training

forces entering JOA

Training +

Plan, support and mentor HN

IOT develop C-IED capability within the

LI/LL

Staff C-IED training

HN staff

Training +

Plan, support and mentor HN C-

IOT develop HN C-IED force protection

LI/LL

IED force protection training

capability

Training +

Plan, support and mentor HN C-

IOT develop HN C-IED Attack the

LI/LL

IED Attack the Network training

Network capability

97J

Training +

Coordination of training for C-IED

IOT fully exploit capabilities of

LI/LL

database and application users

databases and software

Training +

Establish and maintain a C-IED

IOT comply with NATO LL policy to

LI/LL

lessons identified / lessons

improve operational understanding and

learned database

execution.

CIMIC

Coordinate planning of C-IED

IOT support indirect C-IED operations

activities in support of

IOT provide security to CIMIC

reconstruction operations

operations

C-IED Info Ops

IEDD capability

ERW Clearance

Explosive hazard education

A-11

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ANNEX B TO

ENCLOSURE 1 TO

5000 TSX 0170/TT-7579/SER: NU0462

DATED 10 AUG 11

C-IED INPUTS AND SPECIFIED TASKS WITHIN HQs

In order to achieve the specified tasks in Annex A, staff will need to identify inputs and design

processes within the HQ. The relevant functions that have a contribution to C-IED are:

Information and Knowledge Management (IKM)

Intelligence Fusion and Analysis.

ISR.

Exploitation

Targeting.

Operations and Plans.

Force Protection.

EOD - including ERW and IEDD.

Info Ops.

Search and Route Clearance.

Training and Lessons Identified/Learned.

Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC).

Appendices 1-12 of this Annex show the links between inputs required for each of these

functional areas in order to carry out the specified tasks (as per Annex A). As with the tasks the inputs

will differ within nations or staff HQs according to structure, staff functionality and missions and the

input lists are intended as guidance for HQs to develop their own procedures. Each function may be

liable to provide specialist input to briefing senior staff but as this information will be from across the

relevant function it has not been included as a unique flow diagram.

C-IED Coordination Function. The C-IED Coordination function is the primary enabler to

effective production of C-IED SPECIFIED TASKS. This responsibility usually sits within the

Operations and planning staffs and so has been included in Appendix 6.

Appendices:

Information and Knowledge Management

Intelligence Fusion and Analysis.

ISR

Exploitation

B-1

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APPENDIX 1 TO

ANNEX B TO

ENCLOSURE 1 TO

5000 TSX 0170/TT-7579/SER: NU0462

DATED 10 AUG 11

INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT FUNCTION INPUTS AND SPECIFIED TASKS

EXAMPLE INPUTS

Intelligence

EOD

Training

 Intelligence Reports

 EOD/ERW reports

 Lessons Learned databases

 Advice on classifications/releasability

 IEDD reports and storyboards

 Input into and from training activities

 IED analysis assistance

Exploitation

CIMIC

 Level 1 and 2 Exploitation reporting

 Search reports

 KLE Reporting

requirements

Operations

Plans

Liaison Activities

 OP SITREPS and reports

 Information and Knowledge

 All engagement reports and returns

 Operational context and picture

Management requirements for

(civil and military)

operational planning

 Reports from and to HN LOs

 Development of reporting policy

 Access to other unit/national

Info Ops

CIS

databases

 Information Management requirements

 Database technical and management

 Agreement on terminology

for Info Ops

support

Senior national representative advice on

 Database Connectivity support

national caveats / releasability

EXAMPLE SPECIFIED TASKS

Create and manage fit for purpose C-IED

Create a common lexicon of C-IED

Monitor and collate IED incidents by

database

terminology

location, type, target and enemy TTP

B-3

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APPENDIX 2 TO

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ANNEX B TO

ENCLOSURE 1 TO

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DATED 10 AUG 11

INTELLIGENCE FUSION AND ANALYSIS FUNCTION INPUTS AND SPECIFIED TASKS

EXAMPLE INPUTS

Intelligence

Operations

CIMIC

 Threat assessments and reports

 OP SITREPS and reports

 Reports on KLE and reconstruction and

 Pattern Analysis and predictive modeling

 Operational context and picture

development projects.

 Advice on classifications/releasability

EOD

 Fused Intelligence - SIGINT, HUMINT, IMINTetc.

 EOD and IEDD reporting

Exploitation

Geo

Liaison Activities

 Level 1 and 2 Exploitation reports and expert

 Terrain analysis and assessments

 Coord with other units, formations,

technical advice

organisations and agencies

 Identification of exploitation opportunities

Plans

 Reports from and to HN LOs

 Links and reports to external exploitation

 C-IED PIR and CCIRs requirements

 Political and diplomatic advice

agencies

for operational planning and IPB

 External to JOA situation awareness

ISR

 Operational planning detail to inform

 Results from C-IED interpretation of ISR

threat assessment to future ops

products

Training and Education

 ISR Priorities

 Share information in LL data base

EXAMPLE SPECIFIED TASKS

Coord of C-IED IPB

Predict and identify IED network

Predict and identify

Predict and identify IED network

Analyse IED

activities and patterns of behavior:

IED network personnel

Lines of communication (IED material

network TTPs to

(financing, recruiting, training and

and personal

,supply sources, supply routes,

understand

IED construction)

relationships

communication networks, facilities)

tactical

Make assessments on the

Link intelligence detection assets and

Coordinate the fusion

Coordinate the communication of C-

emplacement

current and future threats

other intelligence sources to IED

of exploitation inputs

IED intelligence to external agencies

and targeting

and their effect on ops

related PIRs and decision points

with other INTEL

as appropriate

methods

ISR FUNCTION INPUTS AND SPECIFIED TASKS

B-4

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ANNEX B TO

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ENCLOSURE 1 TO

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EXAMPLE INPUTS

Intelligence

Operations

Plans

 Threat assessments and reports

 OP SITREPS and reports

 ISR Intelligence requirements for operational

 Operational context and picture

planning and IPB

Exploitation

EOD

Liaison Activities

 Level 1,2 and 3 exploitation reports and

 EOD Reporting

 Coord with other units, formations, organisations

expert technical advice

Technical Assistance to Intel staff

and agencies

 Identification of exploitation opportunities

IEDD

 Reports from and to HN LOs

 IEDD reporting

 Legal advice

 External to JOA situation awareness

ISR

Geo

Coord RFI and tasks of other Joint ISR assets

 Results from C-IED interpretation of ISR

 Terrain Analysis and assessment

products

 ISR Priorities

EXAMPLE SPECIFIED TASKS

Contribute to planning of ISR

Assistance with interpreting C-IED

Contribute to HUMINT intelligence

Contribute to OSINT intelligence

asset usage

related SIGINT data regarding IED

focusing and interpretation

network communications

B-5

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APPENDIX 4 TO

ANNEX B TO

ENCLOSURE 1 TO

5000 TSX 0170/TT-7579/SER: NU0462

DATED 10 AUG 11

EXPLOITATION FUNCTION INPUTS AND SPECIFIED TASKS

EXAMPLE INPUTS

Intelligence

EOD

Information + Knowledge Management

 Threat assessments and reports

 EOD Reporting

 Coordination and integration of databases

 C-IED exploitation requirements to support wider

 Technical and trials assistance

 Forum for the dissemination of threat data

J2 area

 IEDD reporting

 Technical and trials assistance

Exploitation

Logistics

Liaison Activities

 Existing level 1, 2 and 3 exploitation reports

 Support for movement of exploitable material

 Coord with other units, formations, organisations

within and outside JOA.

 Input from J4 MED reports on injury types

and agencies

 Reports from and to HN LOs

Operations

Plans

 Legal advice

 OP SITREPS and reports

 Exploitation requirements for operational planning

 External to JOA situation awareness

 Operational context and picture

and IPB

Geo

Training



Terrain Analysis and assessment

 WIT awareness training requirement within wider

C-IED training

Define Level 2

Direct and monitor WIT asset

Input into Biometric

Coordinate and manage

EXAMPLE SPECIFIED TASKS

Exploitation priorities

lay-down within AOR

Working Groups

exploitation RFIs

Issue and manage

Fuse and analyse

Provide specialist C-IED

Develop and publish HN

Writing or disseminating

Monitor the process of

technical and tactical

exploitation reports to

support to Media

releasable exploitation

C-IED Flash Reports or

IED material through

exploitation policy for

identify sources of

Exploitation

reports

Awareness reports

exploitation chain

Level 1-3.

components

Issue and manage

Write and issue Weapons

Tasking and recovery

Monitor technical

Create a Level 2

Coordinate external

biometric exploitation

Intelligence (Level 1

policy for WIT or national

exploitation reports from

exploitation capability

expertise on weapons

policy for Level 1-3.

exploitation) SOPs

equivalent.

other theatres

within theatre

and armour

Develop links between Level 2 + 3

Identify and define differing capabilities

Liaise with HN authorities security

Undertake technical exploitation of IED

facilities including reach-back and

within national Weapons Intelligence

services to integrate HN exploitation

related components and identify

information sharing facilities.

Teams (WIT) or national equivalent.

capability

external sources of IED components

Provide feedback to tactical units of

Ensure exploitation guidelines are in line

Develop WIT awareness training within

Recover biometrics and input into

biometrics and exploitation successes.

with relevant judicial authorities

C-IED training

biometric database

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TARGETING FUNCTION INPUTS AND SPECIFIED TASKS

EXAMPLE INPUTS

Intelligence

Operations

Training + LL

 IED network intelligence assessments

 OP SITREPS and reports

 Lessons Learned databases

and reports

 Operational context and picture

 Input into and from training activities

 IED network pattern and link analysis

COIs and corroborating intelligence

Exploitation

Geo

 Technical and Biometric exploitation

 Terrain analysis, change detection

Liaison Activities

assessments

and geospatial support

 Coordination to and from other units,

 Identification of exploitation

formations, organisations and agencies

opportunities

 Reports to and from HN LOs

ISR

Plans

 Advice from LEGAD

 C-IED requirements and assistance to

 Targeting requirements for

 Political and diplomatic advice

enemy network detection, identification

operational planning

 Liaison with SOF

and monitoring



EXAMPLE SPECIFIED TASKS

Contribute to targeting process and

Predict and identify IED network lines of

prioritisation of IED network activities and

prioritisation of IED network personnel

communication ( IED material supply sources,

patterns of behaviour (financing, recruiting,

supply routes. communication networks,

training and IED construction)

facilities)

B-7

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APPENDIX 6 TO

ANNEX B TO

ENCLOSURE 1 TO

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OPERATIONS AND PLANS FUNCTIONAL INPUTS AND SPECIFIED TASKS

EXAMPLE INPUTS

Intelligence

EOD

Training + LL

 Threat assessments and reports

 EOD and IEDD Reporting and support

 SPECIFIED TASKS form Lessons learned

 Advice on pre-detonation + BIP-ing of IEDs

process

Exploitation

Geo

CIMIC

 Level 1 and 2 Exploitation reports and

 Terrain analysis, assessments and geospatial

 Reports on KLE and reconstruction and

expert technical advice

reports

development projects.

 Exploitation Policy within J3 priorities

ISR

Search and Route Clearance

Liaison Activities

 Support from ISR asset on operations

 Advice and support from search and route

 Coord with other units, formations,

clearance specialists

organisations and agencies

Operations

AIR

 Reports from and to HN LOs

 OP SITREPS and reports

 Support from AIR component for planning

 Political and diplomatic advice

 Operational context and picture

operations

 Advice from LEGAD

 Prioritisation of resources

 Advice on air platform pre-detonation of IEDs

 Cultural advisors

Force Protection

Plans

 Liaison with SOF

 Integration of ROE/EOF policy with ops

 C-IED requirements for operational planning

 Liaison with CIMIC

EXAMPLE SPECIFIED TASKS

Provide lead, direction and

Assessment and evaluation of

Establish and manage guidelines on

Provide general direction for the

coordination for C-IED related

Friendly Forces and HN movement

pre-detonation and BIP-ing of IEDs

prioritisation of C-IED

activities within all staff branches

TTPs

intelligence gathering

Coordinate C-IED related input into

Plan operations to deny IED

Coordinate C-IED contributions to

opportunities with tactical

routine SITREPs

network freedom of movement

OPLANs and FRAGOs as required

operations

B-8

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NATO UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX 7 TO

ANNEX B TO

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DATED 10 AUG 11

FORCE PROTECTION FUNCTION INPUTS AND SPECIFIED TASKS

EXAMPLE INPUTS

Intelligence

AIR

CIS and COMMS

 Threat assessments and reports

 Advice on air platform assets and capabilities

 ECM Spectrum management policy

Exploitation

Search and Route Clearance

Training + LL

 Level 1 and 2 Exploitation reports and

 Advice and support to search training and

 Specific Force protection SPECIFIED TASKS

expert technical advice

route clearance capabilities

form Lessons learned process

 Exploitation trials reports

 RCIED threat frequency list

Operations

ECM maintenance

Liaison Activities

 OP SITREPS and reports

 Technical input, advice and support from FP

 Coord with other units, formations,

 Operational context and picture

ECM equipment maintainers

organisations and agencies

 Reports from and to HN LOs

Geo

Plans

 Specialist scientific advice

Terrain analysis, assessments and

 C-IED force protection (incl EW) requirements

 Advice from LEGAD

geospatial support

for operational planning

EXAMPLE SPECIFIED TASKS

Advise on EOF measures to

Prediction and

Monitor the RCIED threat

Issue and manage policy for

Monitor and evaluate

counter Suicide IED according

dissemination of likely IED

frequency list.

force protection EW equipment

EW force protection

to specific threat criteria

targets and locations

use within friendly forces

equipment and TTPs

Train and enable tactical units

Monitor and evaluate

Identify EW force protection

Issue and maintain the policy

effectiveness in relation

to undertake geospatial

friendly forces force

characteristics for national,

on EW pre-detonation of IEDs

to the threat

analysis

protection capabilities

NATO + civilian EW systems.

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APPENDIX 8 TO

ANNEX B TO

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EOD - IEDD/ERW FUNCTIONAL INPUTS AND SPECIFIED TASKS

EXAMPLE INPUTS

Intelligence

Info Ops

Training + LL

 Threat assessments and reports

 Mine awareness requirements to Info ops

 HN training strategy

 Engineer Intelligence on ERW

campaign

Exploitation

Search and Route Clearance

CIMIC

 Level 1 and 2 Exploitation reports and

 Search support to EOD planning and

 ERW requirements for CIMIC projects and

expert technical advice

operations

activities

Operations

EOD

Liaison Activities

 OP SITREPS and reports

 ERW

 Coord with other units, formations,

 BIP Policy

 Technical support to management of civilian

organisations and agencies

 ERW requirements for operations

ERW operations

 Reports from and to HN LOs

 IEDD reporting

 Specialist technical and scientific advice

 Support to HN for IEDD operations.

 Advice from LEGAD

Engr Geo

Plans

 NGO/ERW Agency Liaison

 to mine and UXO awareness and training

 IEDD and ERW requirements for operational

 Manoeuvre support and clearance

planning

coordination support

EXAMPLE SPECIFIED TASKS

Establish and maintain

Develop and manage mine

Plan and manage ERW

Issue and manage

Issue tasking and

Monitor EOD reports

situational awareness of

and UXO awareness training

clearance and set

EOD and IEDD policy

recovery policy for

and evaluate IEDD

ERW locations, demining

programmes and educate

priorities

EOD/IEDD assets

TTPs in relation to

and clearance operations

within FF and the populace

within AOR

threats

within the JOA

Issue and manage ERW

Generate HN capability to deal

Ensure ERW data is

Identify EOD/IEDD

Direct force lay-down of

Generate and monitor

policy

with ERW

incorporated into the

capabilities by nation

EOD/IEDD assets

EOD capability within

C-IED database

(incl host nation)

within AOR

B-10

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APPENDIX 9 TO

ANNEX B TO

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ENCLOSURE 1 TO

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DATED 10 AUG 11

INFORMATION OPERATIONS FUNCTION INPUTS AND SPECIFIED TASKS

EXAMPLE INPUTS

Intelligence

EOD

Finance

 IED network threat assessments and

 EOD technical support and assistance

 Financial support and guidance

reports

IEDD

 Guidance on classifications and

 IEDD Technical support and assistance to HN

releasability

for IEDD operations.



Operations

Plans

CIMIC

 OP SITREPS and reports

 C-IED Info Ops requirements for operational

 Coordination of Info ops input to CIMIC

 Operational context and picture

planning

activities and projects

Info Ops

Training + LL

Liaison Activities

 Info operations requirements to meet

 SPECIFIED TASKS from Info Ops Lessons

 Coord with other units, formations,

Strategic Communications policy and

Learned process

organisations and agencies

direction

 Reports from and to HN LOs

 Measurement of effectiveness of Info

 Political and diplomatic advice

ops campaigns

 Cultural advisors

 Liaison with SOF

EXAMPLE SPECIFIED TASKS

Coord C-IED contribution to

Coordinate C-IED Information

Provide C-IED specialist

Support the quick reaction to

Monitoring and assessment

Info Operations and act as

operations with NGOs and UN

advice to Strategic

IED incidents with

of IED network Info Ops

C-IED SME

ERW operations

Communications

meaningful Info Ops

campaign

SPECIFIED TASKS.

B-11

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APPENDIX 10 TO

ANNEX B TO

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ENCLOSURE 1 TO

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DATED 10 AUG 11

SEARCH AND ROUTE CLEARANCE FUNCTION INPUTS AND SPECIFIED TASKS

EXAMPLE INPUTS

Intelligence

EOD

Training + LL

 IED network threat assessments and

 EOD technical support and assistance

 SPECIFIED TASKS from search and route

reports

 EOD support to search and route clearance

clearance Lessons Learned process

planning

 IEDD reporting

 Support to HN for IEDD operations.

Exploitation

Geo

Liaison Activities

 Level 1 and 2 exploitation reports

 Terrain analysis,

 Coord with other units, formations,

 Information on NAIs

organisations and agencies

 Reports from and to HN LOs

ISR

Movement

 Support from ISR products and analysis

 MSR use planning requirements

 Convoy logistic patrol FP capabilities

Operations

Plans

 OP SITREPS and reports

 C-IED Info Ops requirements for operational

 Operational context and picture

planning

 Search requirements for offensive and

defensive operations

EXAMPLE SPECIFIED TASKS

Issue and manage

Identify specialist search

Direct and manage

Issue and manage direction

Generate search

Ensure search and

search and route

and route clearance

intelligence led search

for minimum standards of

and route clearance

route clearance reports

clearance policy

capabilities by nation

and route clearance

search training for deployed

capability within HN

are incorporated into the

and SOPs

(incl host nation)

activities within JOA

personnel

security forces

C-IED database

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APPENDIX 11 TO

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ANNEX B TO

ENCLOSURE 1 TO

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TRAINING AND LESSONS LEARNED FUNCTIONAL INPUTS AND SPECIFIED TASKS

EXAMPLE INPUTS

Intelligence

EOD

CIS

 IED network threat assessments and

 EOD technical support and assistance to

 Support to C-IED database training

reports

training

IEDD

 IEDD Technical support and assistance to

HN for IEDD operations and training.

Exploitation

Force Protection

Training + LL

 Level 1 and 2 exploitation reports

 Support to basic search and ECM training

 SPECIFIED TASKS from Info Ops Lessons

 Technical support to training

Learned process

 HN training policy and direction

Operations

Plans

Liaison Activities

 OP SITREPS and reports

 HN C-IED training requirements for

 Coord with other units, formations,

 Operational context and picture

operational planning

organisations and agencies

 Prioritisation of resources to support training

 Reports from and to HN LOs

 Cultural advisors

EXAMPLE SPECIFIED TASKS

Plan, direct and support alliance staff

Plan, direct and support alliance

Plan, support and mentor HN Staff C-

Plan, support and mentor HN C-

C-IED training and input to lessons

C-IED Attack the network training

IED training

IED Attack the Network training

learned

and input to lessons learned

Plan, direct and support alliance C-

Coordinate C-IED input into RSOI

Plan, support and mentor HN C-IED

Coordination of training for C-

IED force protection training and input

training

force protection training

IED database and application

to lessons learned

users

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APPENDIX 12 TO

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ANNEX B TO

ENCLOSURE 1 TO

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CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS FUNCTION INPUTS AND SPECIFIED TASKS

EXAMPLE INPUTS

Intelligence

Info Ops

Finance

 IED network threat assessments and

 Coordination of Info Ops strategy and regional

 Financial support and guidance

reports

campaigns

Operations

EOD

Liaison Activities

 OP SITREPS and reports

 ERW and IED awareness and education

 Coord with other units, formations,

 Operational context and picture

support

organisations and agencies

 Prioritisation of resources to support training

 Information on ERW and IED concentrations

 Reports from and to HN LOs

Geo

Plans

 Cultural advisors

 Geospatial and geological support

 C-IED CIMIC requirements for operational

 Political and Diplomatic Advisors

planning

Force Protection

Training + LL

 Support to basic search and ECM training

 SPECIFIED TASKS from CIMIC Lessons

Learned process

 Advice on C-IED training requirements for

workforce

EXAMPLE OUTPUT

Coordinate planning of C-IED activities in support

of CIMIC operations

C-IED Info Ops

IEDD capability

ERW Clearance

Explosive hazard education

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C-IED STRUCTURES AND RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN HQs

C-IED activity supports the mission and may not require a dedicated C-IED staff branch as it is

an activity that should be undertaken throughout the HQ staff branches. There may be occasions,

such as when initially developing capability, that a dedicated Task Force within the HQ staff is the

most effective method of delivering the require effect, but these should generally be of short duration

and must not work in isolation. This should be part of the responsibilities of the nominated C-IED

OPR.

A fully resourced and functioning staff may require no independent C-IED personnel (less the

C-IED OPR) as all the functions and specified tasks are allocated to existing personnel within the

traditional staff branches and incorporated in existing staff processes.

C-IED PROCESSES WITHIN THE STAFF

The processes required to turn inputs into specified tasks will also differ within every nation or

staff HQ although there are some forum or media that are likely to be utilised within these processes.

The main tools or media that should be incorporated into HQ C-IED processes are:

Routine Staff Procedures.

Written reports.

Planning, Working, Focus or Coordination groups.

Liaison Activities.

Information System databases and applications.

Routine or bespoke briefings and updates.

C-IED GROUPS WITHIN THE HQ STAFF

In order to direct, focus and manage C-IED effort within HQs there is often a requirement to

establish and hold groups, meetings or forums to deliver specific outputs. Individual HQ will have

different requirements according to structure, mission and existing C-IED capability within the staff.

There are a number of different C-IED related groups that may be formed depending upon the

operational situation and circumstances. These will serve to develop and deliver C-IED capability both

within the staff and for the wider force as follows:

C-IED Steering Group.

C-IED Working Group.

C-IED Focus Group.

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C-IED Coordination Group.

Generic aims, tasks and outline terms of reference are suggested although commanders

should develop their own C-IED architecture within the HQs to meet the requirements taking account

of existing working groups and board structures. Lead personnel and members are suggested where

applicable but may also require analysis and adjustment to ensure C-IED forums are effective.

The level of support within staff branches, e.g. the number of intelligence analysts tasked to

monitor IED-related information alongside their normal duties, will vary depending upon the

appropriate threat response.

C-IED Steering Group:

Aims: To provide C-IED strategy, policy and direction across the staff.

Outputs and Terms of Reference: Develop policy on C-IED capability within the staff

based on the commander’s intent. It will normally be required when developing a capability or

in preparation for a specific mission. Direction will be given to C-IED Working Groups. The C-

IED Steering Group function may not be a standalone grouping but an agenda item on a wider

senior command forum.

Lead: COMD/COS.

Members: Chiefs of the staff branches within the HQ.

C-IED Working Group:

Aims: To direct methodology, delegate responsibilities and allocate resources

according in order to meet the aims of the C-IED Steering Group.

Outputs and Terms of Reference: Typically used to develop C-IED capability across

the force with a wide remit (DOTMLPFI). It will probably have executive powers to allocate

resources and direct responsibility across the staff branches and may be permanent or

temporary in nature.

Lead: Chief Operations

Members: Core representatives from:

(1)

Operations

(2)

Force Protection

(3)

Info Ops

(4)

JOC (situational information management)

(5)

Operational Analysis

(6)

Targeting

(7)

Intelligence

(8)

Technical Exploitation

(9)

Biometric Exploitation

(10) Training

(11) IEDD (incl ECM matters)

(12) EOD (incl ERW)

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(13) Search/Route Clearance

On-call representatives according to requirement:

(1) ISR

(2) LEGAD

(3) Provost

(4) CIMIC

(5) Geo

(6) Plans

(7) External agencies

C-IED Focus Group:

Aim: To focus on a specific area of C-IED in order to assist decision making or

management of capability.

Outputs and Terms of Reference: It is likely that C-IED Focus Groups will be

temporary in duration and have precise terms of reference in order to deliver specific outputs

related to the specified tasks. Executive powers should be limited to these areas. Likely

remits are to identify issues, provide recommendations to decision making or manage projects.

Lead: As directed according to the focus group aim. It is likely to be the lead/SME in a

specialist function.

Members. As required to meet the output. It may include external personnel in order

to leverage specialist expertise.

10.

C-IED Co-ordination Group:

Aim: To coordinate C-IED information and actions within the staff in order to enable

effective C-IED outputs.

Outputs and Terms of Reference: Usually a routine grouping which may form part of

the battle rhythm. It is likely to have no executive power but should be able to make

recommendations to amend communication or emphasis within the staff if required. This will

be the main forum for ensuring that personnel undertaking C-IED work from across the staff

branches are integrated and informed.

Lead: Chief Operations.

Members. Core representatives from:

(1)

Operations

(2)

Force Protection

(3)

Info Ops

(4)

JOC (situational information management)

(5)

Operational Analysis

(6)

Targeting

(7)

Intelligence

(8)

Technical Exploitation

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NATO UNCLASSIFIED

(9)

Biometric Exploitation

(10) Training

(11) IEDD (incl ECM matters)

(12) EOD (incl ERW)

(13) Search/Route Clearance

On-call representatives according to requirement:

(1) ISR

(2) LEGAD

(3) Provost

(4) CIMIC

(5) Geo

(6) Plans

(7) External agencies

CONTRIBUTIONS TO OTHER HQ STAFF GROUPINGS

11.

As shown in the C-IED staff ‘specified tasks’ listing in Annex A to this handbook, input is

required into numerous other staff groups or forums that may not be C-IED centric. HQ structures will

vary and the names and functions of these forums will exist to meet specific requirements but some of

the areas that require C-IED contribution are as follows:

a. Routine or specialist briefings to commanders.

b. ISR prioritisation.

c. Targeting.

d. Info Ops.

e. Force Protection.

Equipment Capability.

g. Exploitation.

h. Plans.

Biometrics INTEL /Biometric Enabling

NATO Force Training

k. Host Nation Training

CIMIC

m. ERW Programs

n. Lessons learned.

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STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES

12.

There should be no requirement for specific C-IED job descriptions within the staff and all

responsibilities relating to C-IED specified tasks should be incorporated within the job descriptions of

existing personnel. These specified tasks can be drawn from Annex A to his handbook. HQs should

not attempt to incorporate all these tasks within the staff unless there is a clear requirement and where

possible mission analysis should be undertaken to ensure the focus is relevant.

13.

In order to enable individuals to deliver the required tasks within their C-IED responsibilities

they must be able to access the required resources, either in the form of a product (inputs) or from

access to relevant knowledge and expertise (enablers). Annex B to this handbook illustrates the

inputs and possible enablers to each core and underpinning function in order to deliver to the specified

tasks.

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C-IED RELATED TERMINOLOGY

This annex is designed to be an initial reference for staff undertaking C-IED staff activities. It

comprises two sections:

Section 1 - Definitions

C-IED related definitions from reference publications as well as other definitions that are emerging

or informal but in common use. Text in italics gives additional contextual information for the benefit

of personnel who may be less familiar with C-IED and IED-related terminology, some of which is

necessarily technical in nature.

Section 2 - Acronyms & Abbreviations

General military and technical acronyms and abbreviations that are likely to be encountered by

staff performing C-IED activities.

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SECTION 1 - C-IED RELATED DEFINITIONS

Asymmetric threat

A threat emanating from the potential use of dissimilar means or methods to circumvent or negate

an opponent’s strengths while exploiting his weaknesses to obtain a disproportionate result. [AAP-

6 (2008)]

ARTEC (Armaments and Technology)

French terminology for level 1 weapons intelligence exploitation team although also undertakes

non-C-IED tasks.

(Informal)

Complex attack

A complex attack is an attack that involves the employment of more than one IED, or an attack

using an IED in conjunction with small arms fire, direct, or indirect fire weapons. Complex attack

scenarios often involve significant insurgent forces planning, and are often conducted in order to fix

security forces within the kill zone(s).Complex attacks may also involve the use of multiple IEDs in

order to target personnel responding to an initial attack. (Informal)

Conventional Munitions Disposal (CMD)

The detection, identification, render safe and final disposal of conventional military munitions that

have not been incorporated in IEDs (Informal)

Counter-IED (C-IED)

The collective efforts at all levels to defeat the IED System in order to reduce or eliminate the

effects of all forms of IEDs used against friendly forces and non-combatants according to the

mission. (AJP 3.15).

Counter-RCIED Electronic Warfare (CREW)

US terminology for Force Protection ECM/EW. (Informal)

Daisy Chain

An IED with multiple linked main charges designed to function simultaneously when the IED is

initiated. (Informal)

Electronic Counter Measures (ECM)

That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to prevent or reduce an adversary’s

effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) through the use of electromagnetic energy.

There are three sub-divisions of ECM: electronic jamming, electronic deception and electronic

neutralisation. [AAP-6 (2008)]

In the context of C-IED, ECM generally refers to RF inhibition (jamming) equipment used for force

protection purposes. (Informal)

Electronic jamming

The deliberate radiation, re-radiation or reflection of electromagnetic energy with the object of

impairing the effectiveness of hostile electronic devices, equipment or systems. [AAP-6 (2008)]

Electronic neutralization

In electronic countermeasures, the deliberate use of electromagnetic energy to either temporarily

or permanently damage enemy devices which rely exclusively on the electromagnetic spectrum.

[AAP-6 (2008)]

Electromagnetic spectrum

The entire and orderly distribution of electromagnetic waves according to their frequency or

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NATO UNCLASSIFIED

wavelength. The electromagnetic spectrum includes radio waves, microwaves, heat radiation,

visible light, ultraviolet radiation, x-rays, electromagnetic cosmic rays and gamma rays. (AcomP-

01)

Electronic Warfare (EW)

Military action to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum encompassing: the search for, interception

and identification of electromagnetic emissions, the employment of electromagnetic energy,

including directed energy, to reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum, and

actions to ensure its effective use by friendly forces. [AAP-6 (2008)]

Event geometry

A description of how an IED system was emplaced, its orientation, the distance to the target, line of

sight etc. (Informal)

Explosive Ordnance (EO)

All munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion materials and biological and chemical

agents. This includes bombs and warheads; guided and ballistic missiles; artillery, mortar, rocket

and small arms ammunition; all mines, torpedoes and depth charges; pyrotechnics; clusters and

dispensers; cartridge and propellant actuated devices; electro-explosive devices; clandestine and

improvised explosive devices; and all similar or related items or components explosive in nature.

[AAP-6 (2008)]

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)

The detection, identification, on-site evaluation, rendering safe, recovery and final disposal of

unexploded explosive ordnance. It may also include explosive ordnance, which has become

hazardous by damage or deterioration. [AAP-6(2008)]

Explosive Remnants of War (ERW)

In the context of C-IED, ERW refers to Explosive Remnants of War - those explosive items and

munitions that remain in a theatre, often under little or no control, from previous conflicts. (Informal)

Note: The alternative abbreviation of ERW refers to its AAP-15 (2008) definition of Enhanced-

Radiation Weapon (effectively a neutron weapon and not C-IED related).

False IED

An item that is reported in good faith as being an IED but is actually an innocuous item (Informal)

Firing switch

The switch used to initiates the IEDs. IEDs are often (but not always) referred to by type of firing

switch (Pressure Plate IEDs, Time IEDs etc) (Informal)

Hoax

A simulated IED or IED event that is designed to disrupt operations, force coalition troops to deploy

countermeasures, used to observe friendly TTPs or to otherwise develop a come-on situation from

which an attack can be mounted. (Informal)

Hotspot

A point or area that has repeatedly been used as a location for IEDs. Some formations and

operations give specific criteria for the definition of hotspots but these are local definitions. Note

the difference between a hotspot and a Vulnerable Point (VP) is that IED will always have occurred

in a hotspot whereas a VP may be a hotspot or a potential hotspot. (Informal)

D-3

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Hybrid threat

The threat posed by any adversary with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non

conventional means adaptively, in pursuit of their objectives. (Working definition in use with SACT

Counter Hybrid Threats IPT)

Improvised Explosive Device (IED)

A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious,

pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass or distract. It

may incorporate military stores, but is normally devised from non-military components. [AAP-6

(2008)]

Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD)

IEDD is the location, identification, rendering safe and final disposal of IEDs. (ATP-72)

IED system

An IED system is a combination of humans, processes and, materiel consisting of one or more

opponent’s entities with all related equipment, technology, skills, knowledge, personnel, and

means of delivery and employment. (AJP 3.15)

Information Operations (Info Ops)

Actions taken to influence decision makers in support of political and military objectives by affecting

other’s information, information based processes, command and control networks and

communications and information networks while exploiting and protecting one’s own information

and/or information networks. There are two main categories of Info Ops: defensive information

operations and offensive information operations, depending on the nature of action involved. (MC

422)

Information

Unprocessed data of every description, which may be used in the production of intelligence. [AAP-

6 (2008)]

Initiator

The initiator is the term given to the initial explosive item within an IED or conventional munitions.

This is usually a detonator (or blasting cap) for high explosive charges but can also be a squib type

item to initiate low explosive chains.

Initiation

The action of a device used as the first element of an explosive train which, upon receipt of the

proper impulse, causes the detonation or burning of an explosive item. [AAP-6(2008)]

Operational level

The level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to

accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations. [AAP-6(2008)]

Person-Borne IED (PBIED)

An IED worn or carried by a person who acts or serves as the delivery or concealment method for

the device. A PBIED is often initiated by the person wearing or carrying the device, but remote /

command or time initiation switches can also be included. These will normally be suicide IEDs but

not always as sometimes the person is unwilling or incapable of undertaking the attack.

Render Safe Procedures (RSP)

The portion of the explosive ordnance disposal procedures involving the application of special

explosive ordnance disposal methods and tools to provide for the interruption of functions or

D-4

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

separation of essential components of unexploded explosive ordnance to prevent an unacceptable

detonation. (ATP-72)

Route Check¹

The conduct of detailed reconnaissance and search procedures at specific points along a route by

units utilising tactical formations and specifically issued search equipments. If IED indicators or

suspected IEDs are observed, the unit will initiate 4Cs and IED reporting procedures. (Informal)

Route Clearance¹

In land operations, the detection and if found, the identification, marking and neutralization,

destruction or removal of mines or other explosive ordnance, improvised explosive devices and

booby traps threatening a defined route to allow a military operation to continue with reduced risk.

Note: Route clearance is normally conducted by military units. [AAP-6(2008)]

Route Search¹

Route Search differs from Route Check or Route Clearance in that it is normally conducted by

Advanced or Intermediate Search trained personnel using additional specialist equipment. A

cordon may be required to provide security so that the Search Teams’ primary focus is on

searching. The entire route is normally searched rather than specific points; the result is that there

is a higher level of assurance that the route can be safely trafficked. [ATP-73-1 (2006)]

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

Directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations

under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.

[AAP-6(2008)]

Search (Military)¹

The management and application of systematic procedures and appropriate equipment to locate

specified targets in support of military operations. Specified targets may include people,

information and material resources employed by an adversary. Military search is subcategorised as

Advanced and Intermediate, which require formal training, and Basic. [ATP 73-1 (2006)]

Tactical Level

The level at which activities, battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish

military objectives assigned to tactical formations and units. [AAP-6(2008)]

Unexploded Explosive Ordnance (UXO)

Explosive ordnance which has been primed, used, armed or otherwise prepared for action, and

which has been fired, dropped, launched, projected or placed in such a manner as to constitute a

hazard to operations, installations, personnel or material and remains unexploded either by

malfunction or design or for any other cause. [AAP-6(2008)]

Vulnerable Point (VP)

Vulnerable points are those locations where it is particularly advantageous for an adversary to

place an explosive device or booby trap than elsewhere. [ATP 73-1 (2006)] In the context of C-IED,

a vulnerable point is a specific location that is assessed to be a likely site for IEDs to be emplaced

because of terrain, channelling, pattern-setting or the enemy’s previous employment.

Weapons Intelligence Team (WIT)

WIT is a pool of specialists that investigate IED incidents when tasked. Their main task is to gather,

analyse, collate and distribute technical/tactical intelligence and forensic evidence, in support of the

exploitation KOA. (AJP 3.15)

¹ Search definitions and procedures vary between nations, units and equipment used. Where possible search operations

should be planned in the terms of levels of risk, threat and assurance in order to provide the desired effect.

D-5

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION 2 - C-IED RELATED ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS

ANFO

Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil (a type of Home-made explosives)

Anti-personnel

Anti-tank (usually landmine)

AJP

Allied Joint Publication

BCIED

Biological and Chemical Improvised Explosive Device

BCMD

Biological and Chemical Munitions Disposal

BDA

Battle Damage Assessment

BIP

Blow in Place

CBRN

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

CBRNE

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive

CEXC

Combined Explosive eXploitation Cell (in-theatre Level 2 exploitation organisation)

C-IED

Counter Improvised Explosive Device

CIMIC

Civil-Military Cooperation

CMO

Civil-Military Operations

CIS

Communications and Information Systems

CJTF

Combined Joint Task Force

CMD

Conventional Munitions Disposal

CONOPS Concept of operations

CPOE

Comprehensive Preparation of the Operating Environment (aka IPB)

CREW

Counter-RCIED Electronic Warfare

CWIED

Command Wire IED

DFFC

Directional Focussed Fragmentation Charge

DJSE

Deployed Joint Staff Element

DTMF

Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency (a technique used in RCIEDs)

ECM

Electronic Counter-Measures

EDD

Explosive Detection Dog (see also MDD and MWD)

EFP

Explosively Formed Projectile/Penetrator

EOC

Explosive Ordnance Clearance

EOD

Explosive Ordnance Disposal

EOF

Escalation of Force

ERW

Explosive Remnants of War

Electronic Warfare

Force Protection

HAZMAT

Hazardous Material

High Explosive

D-6

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

HME

Home-Made Explosive

HMTD

Hexamethylene triperoxidediamine (explosive)

HMX

High-Melt Explosive (also known as High Melting eXplosive, High-velocity Military

eXplosive, or High-Molecular-weight rdX) - Octahydro-1,3,5,7-tetranitro-1,3,5,7-

tetrazocine

Host Nation

HNSF

Host Nation Security Force

Headquarters

HRF

High Readiness Forces

HRS

High Risk Search

HUMINT

Human Intelligence

IED

Improvised Explosive Device

IEDD

Improvised Explosive Device Disposal

INFOOPS

Information operations

INFOSEC

Information security

IPB

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (now known as CPOE)

ISR

Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance

JMETL

Joint Mission Essential Task List.

JCB

Joint Co-ordination Board.

JFC

Joint Force Commander

JOA

Joint Operational Area

JOPG

Joint Operational Planning Group

JTFC

Joint Task Force Commander

JTFHQ

Joint Task Force Headquarters

KLE

Key Leadership Engagement

Lessons Identified

Lessons Learned

LOC

Line of Communication

MDD

Mine Detection Dog (see also EDD and MWD)

MWD

Military Working Dog (may or may not be explosive detection trained). See also

EDD and MDD)

NAI

Named Area of Interest

NEC

Net Explosive Content

NEQ

Net Explosive Quantity

Nitro-glycerine (explosive)

NGO

Non-Governmental Organisation

D-7

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

NRF

NATO Response Force

OGA

Other Government Agencies

OGD

Other Government Departments

OPR

Officer of Primary Responsibility

PBIED

Person-Borne IED

PETN

Pentaerythritol tetranitrate (explosive)

PIR

Passive Infra-Red

PPIED

Pressure Plate IED

PSYOPS

Psychological operations

RCIED

Radio Controlled IED

RCP

Route Clearance Package

RDX

Research Department eXplosive (cyclotromethylenetrinitramine)

REST

Royal Engineer Search Team (UK advanced search capability)

Radio Frequency

RFI

Request For Information

ROE

Rules Of Engagement

RSOI

Reception, Staging, Onward movement and Integration

RSP

Render Safe Procedure(s)

SIED

Suicide IED

SOF

Special Operations Forces

SOP

Standard Operating Procedure

SSE

Sensitive Site Exploitation

STANAG

NATO Standardisation Agreement

SVBIED

Suicide Vehicle Borne IED

TATP

Triacetone triperoxide (Explosive)

TCN

Troop Contributing Nation

TIM

Toxic Industrial Materials

TNT

Trinitrotoluene (explosive)

TTP

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

VBIED

Vehicle Borne IED

VOIED

Victim-Operated IED

WBIED

Water-Borne IED

WIS

Weapons Intelligence Section (UK terminology for WIT)

WIT

Weapons Intelligence Team

D-8

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX E TO

ENCLOSURE 1 TO

5000 TSX 0170/TT-7579/SER: NU0462

DATED 10 AUG 11

C-IED RELATED REFERENCES

This annex provides some of the reference publications which may be useful to staff in creating

their own C-IED capability or input into operational planning:

AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French)

AAP-15, NATO Glossary of Abbreviations Used in NATO Documents and Publications

AEODP-3(A), Principles of Improvised Explosive Device Disposal

AEODP-3(B) Vol1+2 Interservice Improvised Explosive Device Disposal Operations on

Multinational Deployments

AJP-01(C), Allied Joint Doctrine

AJP-2, Allied Joint Intelligence, Counter Intelligence and Security Doctrine

AJP-2.1, Intelligence Procedures

AJP-2.2, Counter Intelligence and Security Procedures

AJP-2.3, Allied Joint Doctrine for Human Intelligence

AJP-2.5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Captured Persons, Materiel and Documents

AJP-3(A), Allied Doctrine for Joint Operations

AJP 3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations

AJP 3.4.1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Peace Support Operations

AJP 3.4.4 Allied Joint Doctrine for Counter-Insurgency

AJP 3.5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations

AJP-3.6(A), Allied Joint Electronic Warfare Doctrine

AJP 3.9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting

AJP 3.10 Pre-Ratification draft Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations

AJP 3.10.1 Psychological Operations

AJP 3.12, Allied Doctrine for Military Engineer Support to Joint Operations

AJP 3.14 Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection

AJP 3.15A Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering IEDs

AJP-5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Planning

AJP-9 NATO Civil-Military Co-operation Doctrine

ATP-72 Inter-service Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations on Multinational Deployments

ATP-73-1 Military Search

STANAG 2294 - C-IED Training Standards

E-1

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

DISTRIBUTION LIMITATION

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

Distribution Limitation: Distribution is authorized to U.S. Government Agencies

only, based on the specific authority cited in the TSWG Classification Guide, 2000.

Other requests for this document shall be referred to CTTSO/TSWG, Attn. CBRNC

Program Manager, P.O. Box 16224, Arlington, VA 22215 or

cbrncsubgroup@tswg.gov.

Warning: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/LAW ENFORCEMENT

SENSITIVE (FOUO/LES). It contains information that may be exempt from public

release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). It is to be controlled,

stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DoD

and TSWG policy relating to LES information and is not to be released to the public

or other personnel who do not have a “need to know” without prior approval of an

authorized TSWG official at cbrncsubgroup@tswg.gov.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

INTRODUCTION

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

The Technical Support Working Group’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and

Nuclear Countermeasures (CBRNC) Subgroup, in cooperation with law enforcement

and intelligence agencies, conducts comprehensive assessments of chemical and

biological materials, devices, and countermeasures. As part of their efforts, they

evaluated the potential effectiveness of production methods found in the form of

recipes from open-source improvised production handbooks that may be used by

extremists groups. They assessed the skill level required to follow the instructions and

determined the availability of the necessary equipment and ingredients.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

The purpose of this handbook is to provide information about general indicators and

warnings, production setups, and end products that are representative of plausible

improvised production methods of chemical and biological agents following methods found in

openly available improvised production literature. The handbook contains mock-up pictures

to assist security and response personnel in recognizing chemical or biological agent

production. The handbook contains specific information on the key indicators of agent

production, including chemicals required for production. It will be noted if a chemical required

for production is also regulated by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) as a List I or

List II chemical (U.S. Department of Justice. DEA, Chemical Handlers Manual, January,

2004). List I and II chemicals are those that, in addition to having legitimate uses, are used in

manufacturing a controlled substance in violation of the Controlled Substances Act. List I

chemicals generally are precursors and have been determined by the DEA to require a level

of control greater than other listed chemicals. List II chemicals generally are reagents and

solvents.

The information in this handbook should be used in conjunction with previous training and

experience.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

PURPOSE

HOW TO USE THIS HANDBOOK

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

This handbook contains 14 color-coded sections. There is one section for each of 13

agents and one for improvised binary dissemination techniques. For each agent there

is a list of key indicators and warnings as well as a description of the production

methods, equipment, and likely product.

DISCLAIMER

The pictures in this book are mock-ups intended to illustrate potential

methods for agent production. Setups may vary and production

methods can change the product outcome.

The following examples may look similar to laboratory setups used for

legitimate purposes or clandestine drug production.

OW TO USE THIS HANDBOOK

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

RICIN

Indicators and Warnings

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

Ricin is extracted from castor seeds, which come from the ricin plant Ricinus communis.

Key Indicators

• Chemicals such as acetic acid (vinegar), acetone, bleach,

carbon tetrachloride, hexane, hydrochloric acid (muriatic

• Castor seeds (not kidney shaped)

acid, DEA List II Regulated Chemical), magnesium sulfate

• Marbles, beaker

(Epsom salts), sodium carbonate, sodium chloride (table

• pH paper

salt), sodium hydroxide (NaOH, lye), sodium sulfate, and

• Lab filter paper or coffee filters with white

sulfuric acid (battery acid, DEA List II Regulated Chemical)

powder

• Dead animals in the area

• Gloves and face mask

• Basic equipment, such as blenders, jars,

and pliers that can be easily obtained

(local hardware store, laboratory supply

house, high school laboratory).

Ricin Plant

Raw Castor Seeds

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

CYANIDES

Indicators and Warnings

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

The cyanides described here include potassium and sodium cyanide salts (KCN and NaCN)

and hydrogen cyanide (HCN). In the absence of access to the purchase of commercially

available cyanide salts, one of several improvised production methods may be followed.

Key Indicators

• Distillation equipment

Rust Shavings

• Propane torch, improvised furnace

• Basic starting ingredients such as ashes, rust,

leather, charcoal, washing soda, and blackboard

chalk, blood

• Basic laboratory equipment (stirring device,

beakers, pH paper, hot plate, etc.)

• Chemicals such as baking soda, calcium

carbonate, calcium chloride, hydrochloric acid

(muriatic acid, DEA List II Regulated Chemical),

Magnetic

iron oxide, potassium carbonate, potassium

Stirring

cyanide, sodium carbonate, and sodium cyanide,

Device

sodium thiosulfate (cyanide antidote), and sulfuric

acid (battery acid, DEA List II Regulated

Chemical)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

SARIN

Indicators and Warnings

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

Sarin (GB) is difficult to produce, requiring ground glass jointed glassware and posing a danger to

the operator due to its high toxicity. Some of the laboratory equipment can be improvised and/or

purchased from laboratory supply houses. Sarin is a volatile chemical that presents both a liquid

and vapor hazard when disseminated.

Key Indicators

• Laboratory glassware

• Improvised distillation equipment including vacuum

distillation equipment and oil bath (cooking oil, motor

oil, etc.)

• Stirring and shaking devices

• Improvised safety equipment such as rubber gloves

and masks

• Dry ice

• Chemicals such as acetone (DEA List II Regulated

Chemical), aluminum chloride, bleach, isopropyl

alcohol, methylchloride (chloromethane), methylene

Distillation Equipment

chloride (dichloromethane or methylene dichloride),

phosphorus trichloride, sodium fluoride, and sodium

hydroxide (lye)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 1) - page 6