Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 1)

MONITOR(ING)

1. Maintain(ing) sensor awareness on specified GROUP.

2.* (AIR-MAR) Directive call to an aircraft to maintain

contact/targeting information on a maritime surface contact.

MOTHER

(AIR-MAR) Parent ship.

MOVE BURN

(A/S) Directive call to AC-130 to move GLINT in specified

(bearing)**

direction. NOTE: Do not use LEFT/RIGHT for moving a

BURN.

MOVER(S)**

Unidentified surface vehicles(s) in motion.

MUD (type w/direction/

Informative call Indicating RWR ground threat displayed

range if able)

with no launch indication.

MUSIC

Radar electronic deceptive jamming.

NAILS (direction)

1. RWR indication of AI radar in search. (NOTE: NATO

term is SPOTTED).

2.* (A/S) 2.75-inch flechette rockets.

NAKED

No RWR indications.

NEAR-FAR**

Fighter term depicting a radar-apparent description of two

or more contacts within a GROUP separated in range.

NEGATIVE

Sensor information on a friendly aircraft is lost.

CONTACT**

Termination of CONTACT, track plotting is not warranted.

NEGATIVE LASER**

(A/S) Aircraft has not acquired Laser energy.

NEW PICTURE

Used by controller or aircrew when tactical picture has

changed. Supersedes all previous calls and re-establishes

picture for all players.

NO FACTOR

Not a threat.

NO JOY

Aircrew does not have visual contact with the

target/bandit/landmark. Opposite of TALLY.

NOTCH(ING)

Directive/informative call that an aircraft is in a defensive

(direction)

position and maneuvering with reference to an air-to-air

threat.

OCCUPIED**

Ground equipment present at tasked target location.

Opposite of VACANT.

OFF (direction)

Informative call indicating attack is terminated and

maneuvering to the indicated direction.

OFFSET (direction)

Directive/informative call indicating maneuver in a specified

direction with reference to the target.

OILFIELD

[NATO] Activated friendly MEZ (Opposite of KOBOLD)

(system) OKAY

System indicated is fully operative (cancels BENT).

ON STATION

Informative call that unit/aircraft has reached assigned

station.

II-16

OPENING

Increasing in separation.

ORBIT(ING)

Directive(descriptive) call to hold on current or indicated

position.

OUT (direction)

Informative call indicating a turn to a cold aspect relative to

a known threat.

OUTLAW**

Informative call that a BOGEY has met point of origin

criteria for ROE.

PACKAGE

Geographically isolated collection of GROUPs.

PACMAN

[NATO] Informative call that the fighters have found the end

of the threat formation and are converting; given in range

and bearing from the BULLSEYE (e.g. “BLUE 4 is

PACMAN 290/5”).

PADLOCKED

Informative call indicating aircrew cannot take eyes off an

aircraft, ground target, or surface position without risk of

losing TALLY/VISUAL.

PAINT(S)

An interrogated group/radar contact that is responding with

any of the specified IFF/SIF modes and correct codes

established for the ID criteria.

PANCAKE

[NATO] Land or I wish to land (reason may be specified,

e.g. PANCAKE AMMO, PANCAKE FUEL).

PARROT

IFF/SIF transponder.

PASSING**

Descriptive term for when two GROUPs initially separated

in range, decrease range separation and pass each other.

PEDRO

[NATO] Rescue helicopter.

PICTURE

A request to provide air information pertinent to the mission

in a digital bullseye format.

PIG(S)**

(A/S) Friendly glide weapon(s) (e.g. JSOW). See (weapon)

AWAY.

PIGEONS

Magnetic bearing and range to HOMEPLATE.

PINCE

Threat maneuvering for a bracket attack.

PINNACLE

[NATO] (EW) An emission believed to originate from a

platform assumed to be FRIENDLY.

PITBULL

1. Informative call that the AIM-120 is at MPRF active

range.

2. Informative call that the AIM-54 is at active range.

PITCH/ PITCHBACK

Directive call for fighter or flight to execute a nose-high

LEFT/RIGHT

heading reversal.

PLAYMATE

Cooperating aircraft.

II-17

PLAYTIME

Amount of time aircraft can remain on station, given in

hours plus minutes (e.g. ONE PLUS THIRTY equals one

hour and thirty minutes).

(freq) POGO (freq)

Switch to communication channel number preceding

POGO. If unable to establish communications, switch to

channel number following POGO. If no channel number

follows POGO, return to this channel.

POINT**

Datalink sensor point/track of interest.

POLAR BEAR

[NATO] Friendly aircraft has VISUAL/contact on the

(direction)

FRIENDLY PACKAGE and is joining.

POP

1. (A/S) Starting climb for A/S attack.

2. Max performance climb out of low-altitude structure.

POPCORN**

CSAR aircraft departing the landing zone (LZ). Usually

followed by number of recovered personnel, (e.g. "STING

1, POPCORN PLUS 2")

POPEYE

Flying in clouds or area of reduced visibility.

POP-UP

1. (A/A) Informative call of a GROUP that has suddenly

appeared inside of briefed range.

2. (S/A)* Criteria used as a self-defense method, within the

ROE, to protect friendly air defense elements from

HOSTILE aircraft.

POSIT

Request for friendly position; response in terms of a

geographic landmark or from a common reference point.

POST HOLE

Rapid descending spiral.

PRESS

Directive call that a requested action is approved and

mutual support will be maintained.

PRINT (type)

Active NCTR reply.

PULSE**

Informative/Directive call used to illuminate an enemy

position with flashing IR energy.

PUMP

A briefed maneuver to minimize closure on the threat or

geographical boundary with the intent to re-engage. Used

to initiate a Grinder tactic.

PURE

Informative call indicating pure pursuit is being used or

directive to go pure pursuit.

PUSH (channel)

Directive to switch to designated frequency; no

acknowledgment required.

PUSHING

Departing designated point.

QUAIL**

Enemy air-/surface-launched cruise missile.

RACKET

(EW) Intercepted electronic emission that has been

assigned to a number of the trackblock.

II-18

RANGE**

A picture label describing two GROUPs separated in

distance along the same line of bearing. Groups names will

be LEAD GROUP / TRAIL GROUP.

RAYGUN (position/

Indicating a radar lock-on to unknown aircraft. A request

heading/ altitude)

for a BUDDY SPIKE reply from friendly aircraft meeting

these parameters.

RED LIGHT**

Time when search and rescue (SAR) aircraft is no longer

SAR capable.

REFERENCE

Directive to assume stated heading.

(direction)

RENO

[NATO] (A/A) Indicates that more than one radar contact is

observed and the pilot is able to distinguish his assigned

target.

RENT

(EW) Report of characteristics of an intercepted signal.

REPEAT**

1. (S/S) Directive call (during adjustment) to fire again

using the same firing data.

2. (S/S) Directive call (during fire for effect) to fire the same

number of rounds using the same method of fire for effect.

REPORTED

Information provided is derived from an off-board source.

(information)**

RESET

Proceed to a pre-briefed position or area of operations.

RESTAKE**

Request for Joint STARS to drive a new STAKE at the

target centroid reported with direction of travel and

elevation. Initiated by aircrew.

RESUME

Resume last formation/route/mission ordered.

RETROGRADE

Directive/informative call to withdraw in response to a

threat, continue mission as able, may RESET/RESUME if

threat is negated.

RIDER

A BOGEY that is conforming to safe passage routing,

airspeed, or altitude procedures.

RIFLE

(A/S) Friendly air-to-surface missile launch.

RIPPLE

(A/S) Two or more munitions released or fired in close

succession.

ROGER

Indicates the receipt of radio transmission; does not

indicate compliance or reaction.

ROLEX (+/- time)

Time line adjustment in minutes always referenced from

original preplanned mission execution time. PLUS means

later; MINUS means earlier.

ROPE

Circling an IR pointer around an aircraft to help the aircraft

identify the friendly ground position.

II-19

ROTATOR**

Joint STARS MTI returns that signifies a high probability of

a rotating antenna.

RUMBA

*Radar has detected jamming/mutual interference but

has not resolved the type.

[NATO] Own ship maneuvering for ranging.

SADDLED

Informative call from wingman or element indicating the

return to briefed formation position.

SAM (direction)

Visual acquisition of a SAM in flight or a SAM launch,

should include position.

SAME

Informative reply indicating that the aircrew has the

identical information as was just stated.

SANDWICHED

Aircraft or element is between opposing aircraft or

elements.

SAUNTER

Fly at best endurance.

SCAN

[NATO] Search sector indicated and report any contacts.

SCHLEM**

(A/A) Training term for simulated high off boresight IR

missile launch. Not assessable for simulated kill/kill

removal.

SCRAM (direction)

1. Directive/informative call to egress for defensive or

survival reasons; no further HVAA mission support is

expected.

2. [NATO] Directive call to cease the intercept and take

immediate evasive action. Implies that the target aircraft is

being engaged by SAMs or other air defense fighters.

SCRAMBLE

Takeoff as quickly as possible.

SCRUB**

Joint STARS Moving Target Indicator (MTI) return that

signifies a low slow airborne target

SCUD

Any threat theater ballistic missile (TBM).

SEARCHER

(EW) Unit having intercept equipment without DF

capability. All references to DUFFERs are applicable to

searchers within their capabilities.

SEPARATE(ING)

Leaving a specific engagement; may or may not reenter.

SEPARATION**

Request for separation between two GROUPS. Response

will include the follow-on GROUP's separation, altitude, and

fill-ins.

SET ___

A command to set (or have set) a particular speed. May be

in knots/indicated or in Mach.

SHACKLE

One weave, a single crossing of flight paths; maneuver to

adjust or regain formation parameters.

SHADOW

Follow indicated target.

II-20

SHIFT (direction)

Directive call to shift laser/IR/radar/device energy.

SHOOTER

Aircraft/unit designated to employ ordnance.

SHOPPING**

An aircraft request to Joint STARS for a target.

SHOT**

(S/S) Informative call indicating round(s) has(ve) been

fired.

SHOTGUN

1. Pre-briefed weapons state.

2. [NATO] Pre-briefed weapons state at which

separation/bugout should begin.

(system) SICK**

System indicated is degraded/partially operative. (NOTE:

NATO term is SOUR)

SIDE-SIDE**

Fighter term depicting a radar-apparent description of two

or more CONTACTs within a GROUP separated in

azimuth.

(system) SILENT

1. (time) System will be unavailable for time indicated.

2. *Directive/informative call to indicate datalink is, or

should be placed, in receive only.

3. [NATO] (EW) Broadcast station is not transmitting. May

also be used as an order and must be followed by a

frequency or station designator. If possible it should be

followed by an estimated time of return to the air.

SINGER

Informative call of RWR indication of SAM launch.

(type/direction)

SINGLE

Descriptive call indicating one GROUP, CONTACT, etc.

SKATE

(A/A) Informative or directive call to execute launch-and-

leave tactics.

SKINNY**

Current survivor coordinates.

SKIP IT

Veto of fighter COMMIT, usually followed with further

directions.

SKOSH

(A/A) Aircraft is out of/or unable to employ active radar

missiles.

SKUNK

A maritime surface contact that has not yet been identified.

SLAPSHOT

Directive call for an aircraft to immediately employ a best

(type/bearing)

available HARM against a specified threat at the specified

bearing.

SLICE/ SLICEBACK

Directive calls to perform a high-G descending turn in the

(LEFT/RIGHT)

stated direction, usually 180-degree turn.

SLIDE**

Directive/informative call to/from HVAA to continue present

mission while flowing from station in response to perceived

threat, implies intent to RESET.

II-21

SLIP(PING)

(A/S) Directive (or informative) call indicating the attacker

will attack the target at the alternate TOT.

SLOW*

Contact with ground speed of less than 200 knots. (NOTE:

NATO = 200 to 400 knots)

SMASH (ON/OFF)

Directive call to turn on/off anti-collision lights.

SMOKE

(A/S) Smoke marker used to mark a position.

SNAKE

(A/S) Directive call to oscillate an IR pointer about a target.

SNAP

1.* Fighter request for immediate BRAA call (with

appropriate fill-ins) to the group described. Indicates fighter

intent to intercept/join.

2. (heading) Urgent directive call to turn to a heading.

SNAPLOCK (BRAA)**

Informative call indicating fighter has obtained a radar

contact inside briefed range, aspect, or radar mode.

SNEAKER

[NATO] (EW) An intelligence-gathering vessel.

SNIFF (type)

(EW) Passive sensor indication of a radar emitter.

SNIPER (type, location

Directive call for an aircraft to employ a range-known

[range, bearing])

HARM against a specified threat at the specified location.

SNOOPER

[NATO] An aircraft employed in the detection and reporting

of opposing forces while avoiding detection by those

forces.

SNOOZE

Directive or informative call indicating initiation of EMCON

procedures. Opposite of ALARM.

SORT

Directive call to assign responsibility within a GROUP;

criteria can be met visually, electronically (radar), or both.

SORTED

Sort responsibility within a GROUP has been met.

SOUR

(Opposite of SWEET).

1. (mode/type) Invalid/no response to an administrative

IFF/SIF check.

2. (link name)* (e.g. " TIMBER SOUR ") Indicates there

are potential problems with net entry and initiates pre-

mission link troubleshooting.

[NATO] Equipment indicated is not operating efficiently

SPADES

An interrogated group/radar contact that lacks all of the

ATO (or equivalent) IFF/SIF modes and codes required for

the ID criteria.

SPARKLE

1. (A/S) Target marking by IR pointer.

2. (A/S) Target marking by gunship/ FAC-A using

incendiary rounds.

SPIKE(D) (direction)

RWR indication of an AI threat in track or launch.

II-22

SPIN

Directive or informative call to execute a timing/spacing

maneuver.

SPITTER (direction)

An aircraft that has departed from the engagement or is

departing the engaged fighter’s targeting responsibility.

SPLASH(ED)

(A/A) Target destroyed.

(A/S) Weapons impact.

3.*

(S/S) Informative call to observer or spotter five

seconds prior to estimated time of impact.

SPLIT

Informative/directive call that flight member is leaving

formation to pursue a separate attack; VISUAL may not be

maintained.

SPOOFER

(EW) An entity employing electronic or tactical deception

measures.

SPOOFING

Informative call that voice deception is being employed.

SPOT

(A/S) Acquisition of laser designation.

SQUAWK (mode/code)

Operate IFF/SIF as indicated or IFF/SIF is operating as

indicated.

SQUAWKING (mode #)

An informative/descriptive call denoting a BOGEY is

responding with an IFF/SIF mode or code other than that

prescribed by the ATO/identification criteria.

STACK

Two or more CONTACTs within GROUP criteria with an

altitude separation in relation to each other.

STAKE**

Joint STARS reference point for A/S targeting operations.

STARE (w/ laser code

Directive call to cue the laser spot search/tracker function

and reference point)**

on the specified laser code in relation to the specified

reference point. Reference point may include the following:

INS steerpoint, GEOREF, bearing and range or datalink

point.

STATUS

1. Request for an individual’s tactical situation.

(GROUP) Request for a full positional update in digital

bullseye format on the specified group.

STEADY

(A/S) Directive call to stop oscillation of IR pointer.

STERN

Requests for, or directive to, intercept using STERN

geometry.

STINGER

1. (A/A) Three-ship inner GROUP formation with two lead

CONTACTs line abreast and the SINGLE in trail.

2.* (S/A) An IR man portable air defense system

(MANPADS).

II-23

STOP

1. (A/S) Stop IR illumination of a target.

2.* (BURN) (A/S) Directive call to AC-130 to stop GLINT.

3. (abort code) [NATO] (A/S) JTAC directs aircrew to

abort the attack. This is a mandatory instruction.

STRANGER

Unidentified traffic that is not a participant with the action in

progress.

STRANGLE ( )

Turn off equipment indicated.

STRIPPED

Informative call that aircraft is out of prebriefed formation.

STROBE(S) (bearing)

Radar indication(s) of noise jamming.

SUNRISE

Informative call that C2 radar functions are available.

Opposite of MIDNIGHT.

SUNSHINE**

(A/S) Directive or informative call indicating illumination of

target is being conducted with artificial illumination.

SWEET

(Opposite of SOUR.)

1. (mode/type)* Valid response to an administrative

IFF/SIF check request.

2. (link name)*. (e.g. TIMBER SWEET) Confirms receipt

of datalink information.

[NATO] Equipment indicated is operating efficiently

SWITCHED

Indicates an attacker is changing from one aircraft to

another.

TACTICAL

(A/A) Request/directive to switch to tactical control.

TAG (system,

(EW) Response to an emitter ambiguity resolution request

location)**

(COLOR).

TALLY

Sighting of a target, non-friendly aircraft, landmark, or

enemy position. Opposite of NO JOY.

TARGET ( )

Directive call assigning targeting responsibilities.

TARGETED

Informative call that GROUP responsibility has been met.

TEN SECONDS

(A/S) Directive to terminal controller to standby for LASER

ON call in approximately 10 seconds.

TERMINATE

1. (A/S) Stop laser illumination of a target.

2. In training, cease local engagement without affecting the

overall exercise.

THREAT (direction)

Untargeted HOSTILE/BANDIT/ BOGEY is within a briefed

range of a friendly aircraft.

THROTTLES

Reminder to set throttles appropriately considering the IR

threat and desired energy state.

THUNDER**

(A/S) Informative call one minute prior to A/S weapons

impact.

II-24

TIED

Positive radar contact with element or aircraft.

TIGER

Enough fuel and ordnance to accept a commitment.

TIMBER

The Link 16 network

TIMECHECK

Informative call to check/change IFF code.

TOGGLE**

Execute a briefed change of an avionics setting.

TOY**

HARM targeting system (HTS) pod.

TRACK (direction)

GROUP/CONTACT's direction of flight/movement.

TRACK NUMBER (#)**

Datalink information file.

(system) TRACKING**

Enemy air defense system is maintaining situational

awareness on friendly.

TRAVEL

[NATO] (EW) Change radar frequency.

TRASHED

Informative call that missile has been defeated.

TRESPASS (system,

The addressed flight is entering the threat SAM ring of a

position)

specific (system) at the stated location.

TROUT

[NATO] (EW) Take a DF bearing on transmission

indicated.

TUMBLEWEED

Indicates limited situational awareness, (i.e., NO JOY,

BLIND) and is a request for information.

UNABLE

Cannot comply as requested or directed.

UNIFORM

UHF/AM radio.

VACANT**

Ground equipment not present at tasked target location.

Opposite of OCCUPIED.

VAMPIRE

Hostile anti-ship missile.

VECTOR

Alter heading to magnetic heading indicated. (Use of true

headings to be established before operation commences).

VERY FAST**

Target speed greater than 900 knots / 1.5 Mach

VIC

Picture label with three groups with the single closest in

range and two groups, azimuth split, in trail. *Group names

should be LEAD GROUP and NORTH TRAIL GROUP and

SOUTH TRAIL GROUP or EAST TRAIL GROUP and

WEST TRAIL GROUP.

VICTOR

VHF/AM radio.

VISUAL

Sighting of a friendly aircraft or ground position. Opposite

of BLIND.

WALL

Picture label with three or more groups primarily split in

azimuth. *Group names should be NORTH GROUP,

MIDDLE GROUP, SOUTH GROUP or WEST GROUP,

MIDDLE GROUP, EAST GROUP.

II-25

WARNING (color)

Hostile attack is:

(RED) Imminent or in progress.

(YELLOW) Probable.

(WHITE) Improbable (all clear).

WEAPONS ( )

(S/A) Fire only:

(FREE) - at targets not identified as FRIENDLY IAW

current ROE.

(TIGHT) - at targets positively identified as HOSTILE

IAW current ROE.

(HOLD/SAFE) - in self-defense or in response to a

formal order.

WEDGE**

Three-ship inner GROUP formation with a single

CONTACT closest in range and two trail CONTACTs line

abreast.

WEEDS

Indicates that aircraft are operating close to the surface.

WEIGHTED (cardinal

Descriptive term used for a multiple GROUP formation

direction)**

(WALL, LADDER, VIC, CHAMPAGNE) that is offset in one

direction.

WHAT LUCK

Request for results of missions or tasks.

II-26

WHAT STATE

Request for amount of fuel and missiles remaining.

Response to WHAT STATE is--

1. (US response)*

(1st number) number of active radar missiles remaining.

(2nd number) number of semi-active radar missiles

remaining.

(3rd number) number of IR missiles remaining.

(4th number) thousands of pounds of fuel (given to one

decimal point), or time remaining. Example response to

WHAT STATE: “BLUE TWO IS 3-1-2 BY 7 POINT 5” is

equivalent to 3 AIM-120s, 1 AIM-7, 2 AIM-9s and 7,500 lbs

of fuel remaining.

2. (item) Ammunition and oxygen are reported only when

specifically requested or critical.

3. [NATO response]

WEAPONS___-___(-___) I have ___semi-active plus___

IR missiles. Remaining and gun ammunition is (PLUS,

MINUS, ZERO).

(PLUS) - Gun(s) fitted and sufficient ammunition for a gun

attack.

(MINUS) - Gun(s) fitted but not sufficient ammunition for a

gun attack.

(ZERO) -No gun(s) fitted. A fourth character can be given

to indicate the number of front hemisphere capable

missiles available (e.g. an aircraft with a serviceable radar,

loaded with 2 Sparrows, 2 Phoenix, 2 Sidewinder AIM-9L,

and fully loaded gun would report its state as “WEAPONS

4-2-PLUS-6”).

WIDE**

Descriptive term used to indicate the separation between

the farthest GROUPs in azimuth in a relative formation of

three or more groups, used to describe a WALL, VIC,

CHAMPAGNE, or BOX.

WILCO

Will comply with received instructions.

WINCHESTER

No ordnance remaining.

WOOFER

[NATO] (EW) Off board active radar decoy.

WORDS

Directive or interrogative call regarding further information

or directives pertinent to the mission.

WORKING

1. (system w/location) Platform gathering EOB on a

designated emitter.

2. Platform executing EID on a specific aircraft/group to

obtain identification necessary for BVR employment.

YARDSTICK

Directive to use A/A TACAN for ranging.

ZAP**

Request for data link information.

ZIPLIP

Directive call to minimize radio transmissions.

II-27

Chapter III

CATAGORY SYNOPSIS

1. GENERAL AIR OPERATIONS

Note:(General operating terms for aircrew and units that operate with aircraft)

[N] = NATO brevity word

ABORT

CONS/CONNING

IN PLACE

ACTION

CONTACT

INDIA

ALFA CHECK

CONTINUE

INTRUDER

ALARM

CRUISE [N]

JINK

ANCHOR(ED)

CYCLOPS

JOKER

ANGELS

DASH

KILL

ANYFACE

DEPLOY

KNOCK IT OFF

AS FRAGGED

DIVERT

KOBOLD [N]

AUTHENTICATE

ECHO

LAME DUCK

AUTOCAT

ESTIMATE

LAST

BASE

FADED

LEAN

BANDIT

FEET WET/DRY

LINER [N]

BEAD WINDOW

FENCE

MARKING

BENT

FLARE(S)

MARSHAL(ING)

BINGO

FLASH

MICKEY

BITTERSWEET

FLAVOR

MIDNIGHT

BLIND

FLOAT

MOTHER

BOGEY

FOX MIKE

MUSIC

BRAA

FRIENDLY

NEGATIVE CONTACT

BREAK

GADABOUT [N]

NO FACTOR

BREAKAWAY

GADGET

NO JOY

BREVITY

GATE

(system) OKAY

BROADCAST

GINGERBREAD

ON STATION

BUGOUT

GLOWWORM [N]

ORBIT(ING)

BULLSEYE

GO ACTIVE

OUTLAW

BUSTER

GO CLEAR

PADLOCKED

BUTTON

GO SECURE

PAINT(S)

BUZZER

GOODWILL

PANCAKE [N]

CAP/CAPPING

GREEN

PARROT

CAV-OK

GREYHOUND

PIGEONS

CEASE ENGAGEMENT

HARD

PITCH / PITCHBACK

CEASE FIRE

HEADS UP

PLAYMATE

CHATTERMARK

HIT(S)

PLAYTIME

CHECK

HOLDING HANDS

POGO

CHERUBS

HOLD FIRE

POLAR BEAR [N]

CHICKS

HOME PLATE

POP

CLEAN

HOOK

POPEYE

CLEARED

HOSTILE

POSIT

COLD

HOTDOG

PRESS

COMEBACK

HOTEL FOX

PUSH

CONFETTI

PUSHING

III-1

2. AIR-TO-AIR

Note: (General air-to-air employment terms for fighters and controllers

ACTION

CONS/CONNING

HARD

ABORT

CONTACT

HEADS UP

ACTION

CONTAINER

HEADBUTT

ALARM

CONTINUE

HEAVY

ALPHA CHECK

COVER

HIGH

ANCHOR(ED)

CRANK

HIT(S)

ANGELS

CROSSING

HOLDING HANDS

ARM

CRUISE

HOLD FIRE

AZIMUTH

CUTOFF

HOOK

BASE

CYCLOPS

HOSTILE

BANDIT

DASH

HOT

BANZAI

DECLARE

HOUNDOG [NATO]

BEAM

DEEP

HUSKY

BEARING

DELOUSE

BITTERSWEET

DEFENSIVE

BLIND

DEPLOY

IN PLACE

BLOW THROUGH

DRAG

INDIA

BOGEY

DROP(PING)

INTERROGATE

BOGEY DOPE

DUCK [NATO]

JINK

BOX

ECHELON

JUDY

BRAA

ECHO

KILL

BRACKET

ENGAGED

KNOCK IT OFF

BREAK

ESTIMATE

LADDER

BROADCAST

EXTEND(ING)

LAST

BROKE LOCK

EYEBALL

LEAD-TRAIL

BUDDY LOCK

FADED

LEAKER(S)

BUDDY SPIKE

FAST

LEAN

BUGOUT

FLANK

LEVEL

BULLSEYE

FLARE

LINE ABREAST

BUSTER

FLASH

LINER [NATO]

CAP/CAPPING

FLASHLIGHT

LOCKED

CEASE

FLOAT

LOW

ENGAGEMENT

FLOW

MADDOG

CEASE FIRE

FOX THREE

MANEUVER

CHAMPAGNE

2ND FOX THREE

MARKING

CHEAPSHOT

FOX 3 (X)-SHIP

MARSHAL(ING)

CHECK

FRIENDLY

MEDIUM

CHERUBS

FURBALL

MERGE(D)

CHICKS

GADGET

MIDNIGHT

CLEAN

GATE

MONITOR(ING)

CLEARED

GIMBALL

MUSIC

CLOSING

GOPHER

NAILS

COLD

GORILLA

NAKED

COMEBACK

GRAND SLAM

NEAR-FAR

COMMIT

GREEN

NEGATIVE

COMPOSITION

GROUP

CONTACT

CONFETTI

GUNS

NEW PICTURE

III-3

NO FACTOR

RESUME

SPOOFER

NO JOY

RETROGRADE

SQUAWK

NOTCH(ING)

RIDER

SQUAWKING

OFF

RUMBA

STACK

ON STATION

SADDLED

STATUS

OPENING

SANDWICHED

STERN

OUT

SAUNTER

STINGER

OUTLAW

SCHLEM

STRANGER

PACKAGE

SCRAM

STRANGLE

PACMAN [NATO]

SCRAMBLE

STRIPPED

PADLOCKED

SCRUB

STROBES

PAINT(S)

SEPARATE(ING)

SUNRISE

PARROT

SEPARATION

SWEET

PASSING

SHACKLE

SWITCHED

PICTURE

SHADOW

TACTICAL

PITBULL

SHOOTER

TALLY

PITCH /

SHOTGUN

TARGET

PITCHBACK

SIDE-SIDE

TARGETED

PINCE

SILENT

TERMINATE

PITBULL

SINGLE

THREAT

PLAYMATE

SKATE

THROTTLES

POLAR BEAR

SKIP IT

TIED

POP

SKOSH

TIGER

POP-UP

SLICE/SLICEBACK

TRACK

POPEYE

SLIDE

TRASHED

POSIT

SLOW

TUMBLEWEED

POST HOLE

SNAP

VERY FAST

PRESS

SNAPLOCK

VIC

PRINT (type)

SNIFF

VISUAL

PUMP

SNOOZE

WALL

PURE

SORT

WEEDS

PUSH

SORTED

WEDGE

PUSHING

SOUR

WEIGHTED

RANGE

SPADES

WHAT LUCK

QUAIL

SPIKE(D)

WHAT STATE

RAYGUN

SPIN

WIDE

RENO

SPITTER

WINCHESTER

REPORTED

SPLASH(ED)

WORKING

RESET

SPLIT

YARDSTICK

III-4

3. AIR-TO-SURFACE

Note: (Terms for general air-to-surface employment for attack aircraft and

controllers)

ABORT

GREYHOUND

OCCUPIED

ATTACK(ING)

GUNS

OFF

(weapon) AWAY

HIT(S)

PIG(S) AWAY

BRACKET

HOT

POP

BRUISER

RIFLE

BUMP/BUMP-UP

KILL

RIPPLE

CAPTURED

LONG RIFLE

ROLEX

CLEARED HOT

LOOKING

SCAN

COLD

LOW DOWN

SCUD

COMEOFF

LEAN

SKUNK

CONTACT

MAGNUM

SLIPPING

CONTINUE

MAPPING

SPLASH(ED)

CONTINUE DRY

MARK

TALLY

DANGER CLOSE

MILLER TIME

THUNDER

DIVERT

MONITOR(ING)

VACANT

ENGAGE

NO JOY

VISUAL

4. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (CAS)

ATTACK(ING)

THUNDER

ATTACK COMPLETE

(weapon) AWAY

BUMP/BUMP-UP

CAPTURED

CLEARED

CLEARED HOT

CLEARED TO

ENGAGE

COLD

COME OFF

CONTACT

CONTINUE

CONTINUE DRY

DANGER CLOSE

ENGAGE

GUNS

HIT(S)

HOT

LONG RIFLE

LOOKING

OFF

OFFSET

RIFLE

SMOKE

SPARKLE

STOP (ABORT

CODE) [NATO]

III-5

12. SURFACE-TO-AIR

Note: Terms for surface-to-air units for coordination and deconfliction

ABORT

GRANDSLAM

SQUAWKING

BIRD

GREYHOUND

STRANGLE

BIRD(S) AFFIRM

GUNS

SWEET

BIRD(S) NEGAT

HIGH

TRACKING

BITTERSWEET

HOLD FIRE

UNABLE

CEASE ENGAGEMENT

KILL

VAMPIRE

CEASE FIRE

LEAKER(S)

VERY FAST

CHERUBS

LOW

WARNING

COMPOSITION

MEDIUM

RED

CONTACT

RESET

YELLOW

CONTINUE

RIDER

WHITE

COVER

SCRAM

WEAPONS

ENGAGE

SCRUB

FREE

FADED

SLOW

TIGHT

FAST

SOUR

HOLD/SAFE

FEET WET/DRY

SPADES

(system) WELL

FRIENDLY

SPLASH(ED)

WILCO

GADGET

SPOOFING

WINCHESTER

13. SURFACE-TO-SURFACE

BULLDOG

GO ACTIVE

LASING

CEASE

GO CLEAR

MARK

ENGAGEMENT

GO SECURE

REPEAT

CEASE FIRE

GREYHOUND

SHOT

CEASE LASER

HOLD FIRE

SPLASH(ED)

CHECK FIRING

KILL

DANGER CLOSE

LASER ON

14. NATO-SPECIFIC TERMS

BAY

(EW)

KOBOLD (AIR-GEN)

BEANSTALK

(Datalink)

LINER

(AIR-GEN)

BLOTTER

(EW)

MIKEDUFF

(EW)

CLAM

(EW)

OILFIELD(AIR-GEN)

CLOWN

(EW)

PACMAN

(A/S, A/A)

CRUISE

(AIR-GEN)

PANCAKE (AIR-GEN /AIR-MAR)

DANCE

(EW)

PEDRO

(CSAR/SAR)

DUCK

(AIR-GEN)

PINNACLE

(EW)

FAKER

(AIR-MAR)

POLAR BEAR (AIR-GEN)

FAN__TACK__

(EW)

RENO

(A/A)

FEELER

(EW)

SCAN

(AIR-GEN /AIR-MAR)

FERRET

(EW)

SNEAKER

(EW)

GADABOUT

(AIR-GEN)

SNOOPER

(EW)

GLOWWORM

(AIR-GEN)

STOP (abort code)

(CAS)

GRIDIRON (EW)

TRAVEL (EW)

HOUNDOG

(A/A)

TROUT

(EW)

HUFFDUFF

(EW)

WOOFER

(EW)

III-9

Glossary

A/A

air-to-air

AAA

anti-aircraft artillery

AGL

above ground level

AGM

air-to-ground missile

air interdiction/air intercept

AIC

air intercept control

AIM

air intercept missile

amplitude modulation

area of operations

ARM

anti-radiation missiles

A/S

air-to-surface

ASCM

anti-ship cruise missiles

ASM

anti-ship missile

ATM

air tasking message

ATO

air tasking order

AWACS

airborne warning and control system

BRAA

bearing, range, altitude, and aspect

BVR

beyond visual range

command and control

CAP

combat air patrol

CSAR

combat search and rescue

direction finding

decision range

ECM

electronic countermeasures

EID

electronic identification

EMCON

emission control

electro optical

EOB

electronic order of battle

electronic warfare

F-POLE

distance between shooter and target at impact

FAC-A

forward air controller-airborne

feet

frequency modulation

GCI

ground control intercept

GEOREF

geographical reference

Glossary-1

GLINT

gated laser intensifier

HARM

high-speed anti-radiation missile

high frequency

HIGH-G

high gravity

HPRF

high pulse repetition frequency

HTS

HARM targeting system

HVAA

high value airborne assets

IAW

in accordance with

ICAO

International Civil Aviation Organization

identification

IDM

improved data modem

IFF

identification, friend or foe

INS

inertial navigation system

infrared

JTAC

joint terminal attack controller

JSOW

joint stand-off weapon

LOS

line of sight

landing zone

MALD

miniature air launch decoy

MAR

minimum abort range

MEZ

missile engagement zone

MFDF

medium frequency direction finding

MPRF

medium pulse repetition frequency

MSL

mean sea level

MTI

moving target indicator

NCTR

noncooperative target recognition

nautical mile

NPG

network participation group

NVD

night vision device

OPTASK

operational tasking

PPI

plan position indicator

PRF

pulse repetition frequency

pickup zone

ROE

rules of engagement

Glossary-2

Handling and Releasability Caveats for

JCISFA Published Electronic and Print Media

The JCISFA designates this document for official use by US government agencies with specific

releasability (REL) caveats to participating nations of the NATO Training Mission Iraq (NTM-I) and the

Iraqi Police Forces. Certain operating and generating force concepts provided within this document may

not be approved or currently in use by US Joint and Service doctrine and or policy.

Official, US military/government personnel to include their supporting contractors, as well as current

coalition and allied partners may restate, cite, integrate sentences, phrases, paragraphs, and graphics

contained within this document for inclusion into their official products or research. However, the

integration of JCISFA “US UNCLASSIFIED, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY [FOUO]” information into

official products or research renders them FOUO. As such, originators or official holders of said products

and research must maintain and control the information within official channels and may not release said

products containing JCISFA FOUO to the public without the expressed written consent of the JCISFA.

The JCISFA furnishes this information with the expressed understanding that holders of this information

will use it for official defense-related purposes only. All information contained within this document

must have the same degree of protection that the United States affords information marked “US

UNCLASSIFIED, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY [FOUO]” in accordance with Joint/Service Regulations,

the NATO Codification System (NCS), and coalition agreements.

Participating partner nations of NATO and ISAF will not release information within this document to

another country or international organization beyond the established coalitions of NATO Training

Mission Iraq (NTM-I) and the Iraqi Police Forces without the express written permission from the

JCISFA.

The JCISFA has expanded the marking on the face of the document in order that non-DoD holders of the

information (e.g. DoS, USAID) understand the handling requirements and sensitivity of the document.

Such expanded marking facilitates an understanding in context to DoD FOUO to that of DoS SENSITIVE

BUT UNCLASSIFIED (SBU) as controlled unclassified information (CUI). Specifically, “This JCISFA

published document contains information exempt from mandatory disclosure under FOIA. Exemptions(s)

2 and 5 apply.” See DoD 5200.01R and DoD 5400.7R for additional exemptions that may apply.

Official holders of this document may place it on protected UNCLASSIFIED intranets within military

organizations provided access to these information systems (IS) is restricted through user ID and

password or other authentication means. This ensures that only properly accredited military and

government officials have access to these documents. Joint Directives strictly forbid posting “U.S.

UNCLASSIFIED, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY [FOUO]” documents to Department of Defense (DOD)

Websites that do not restrict access to authorized personnel. DOD Web Site Administration Policy and

Procedures require appropriate mechanisms to protect sensitive information. You can view these handling

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When no longer needed, holders of JCISFA- designated “U.S. UNCLASSIFIED, FOR OFFICIAL USE

ONLY [FOUO]” print and electronic media will shred and destroy using approved paper shredders,

CDROM destroyers, or magnetic reimaging means.

Justice System

Court System

Warrant, Investigation and Trial

Tribal System

Section 2: Iraqi Federal Police Operations and Effects

Part I: Counterinsurgency (COIN) and the Role of Police

Police as a Counterinsurgency Force

Principal Adversaries of the Federal Police

Police Effectiveness in the Spectrum of Conflict

COIN Principal: Securing the Environment

COIN Principal: Winning the Support of the People

Part II: The Iraqi Federal Police Organization and Structure

Organization

Personnel

Leadership

Rank

Pay and Food

Equipment

Communications

Weapons

Vehicles

Facilities

Uniforms

Systems

Staff Systems

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In the future the FP Divisions are proposed have a fully manned Medical Company to support its

subordinate units. In addition to the lack of command emphasis the major constraints to the

medical system in the FP is a severe shortage of medical doctors in Iraq overall, and especially in

the FP, leaving the organization with very little medical expertise or leadership as well as pay being

more than 40% below MOD & Ministry of Health (MOH), restraining the recruiting of trained

medical employees

Section 3: Advisor Challenges and Strategies

Leadership Challenges and Strategies

Ineffective Leadership

Nepotism and Corruption

NCO Corps

Rapport

Working with Coalition Forces

Capabilities Challenges and Strategies

Systems

Para-military vs. police organization

Policing Strategy

Conclusion

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Section 1: Iraq; History, Demographics and Government

Overview

This section gives a brief history of Iraq, basic demographics and languages that may be

encounters and an overview of the Iraqi government. The Iraqi Federal Police (FP) is a

microcosm of the nation of Iraq and is influenced by history and culture as much as any

organization in the security forces. The governments roles in security and rule of law and how

the FP interface with the numerous governing, justice and security agencies and outside the

Ministry of Interior are important issues to be considered.

Description of Iraq

Land

The geography of Iraq is defined in terms of four main zones or regions: the desert in the west

and southwest; the rolling upland between the upper Tigris and Euphrates rivers; the highlands

in the north and northeast; and the alluvial plain through which the Tigris and Euphrates flow.

The desert zone, lying west and southwest of

the Euphrates River, is part of the Syrian Desert,

which covers sections of Syria, Jordan, and

Saudi Arabia. The region, sparsely inhabited by

pastoral nomads, consists of a wide, stony plain

interspersed with rare sandy stretches. A wide

pattern of wadis runs from the border to the

Euphrates. Some wadis are over 250 miles long

and carry torrential floods during the winter

rains.

The uplands region, between the Tigris north of

Samarra and the Euphrates north of Hit, is

known as Al Jazira, and is part of a larger area

that extends westward into Syria between the

two rivers and into Turkey. Water in the area

flows in deeply cut valleys, and irrigation is

much more difficult than it is in the lower plain.

Much of this zone may be classified as desert.

The northeastern highlands begin just south of a line drawn from Mosul to Kirkuk and extend to

the borders with Turkey and Iran. High ground and steppes give way to mountains ranging

from 1,000 to nearly 4,000 meters near the Iranian and Turkish borders. Except for a few

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valleys, the mountain area is suitable only for grazing in the foothills and steppes. There are

large oil fields near Mosul and Kirkuk.¹

An alluvial plain begins north of Baghdad and extends to the Persian Gulf. Here the Tigris and

Euphrates rivers lie above the level of the plain in many places, and the whole area is a river

delta interlaced by the channels of the two rivers and by irrigation canals. Intermittent lakes,

fed by the rivers in flood, also characterize southeastern Iraq. A large area just above the

confluence of the two rivers at Al Qurnah and extending east of the Tigris beyond the Iranian

border is marshland, known as Hawr al Hammar, the result of centuries of flooding and

inadequate drainage. Much of it is permanent marsh, but some parts dry out in early winter,

and other parts become marshland only in years of great flood.

Vegetation is scarce throughout Iraq as the southern, southwestern, and western parts of the

country are enveloped in deserts. The country has few trees, except for the cultivated date,

palm and the poplar,

The fauna in Iraq includes the cheetah, gazelle, antelope, hyena, wolf, jackal, wild pig, hare, and

bat. Numerous birds of prey are found in Iraq, including the vulture, buzzard, raven, owl, and

various species of hawk as well as other birds including the duck, goose, partridge, and sand

grouse. Lizards are also fairly common.

Rivers

The Tigris flows from the mountains of southeastern Turkey through Iraq. Baghdad, the capital

of Iraq, stands on the banks of the Tigris. The port city of Basra straddles the Shatt al-Arab.

The Euphrates is the longest and historically one of the most important rivers of Southwest

Asia. The river originates in the Taurus Mountains and then flows through Syria and Iraq.

The Tigris unites with the Euphrates near Basra, and from this junction to the Persian Gulf the

mass of moving water is known as the Shatt-al-Arab.

Climate

Average temperatures in Iraq range from higher than 48 °C (120 °F) in July and August to below

freezing in January. Most of the rainfall occurs from December through April and averages

between 4 to 7 inches annually. The mountainous region of northern Iraq receives much more

precipitation than the central or southern desert regions.

¹ Helen Chapin Metz, ed. Iraq: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1988.

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Roughly 90% of the annual rainfall occurs between November and April, most of it in the winter

months from December through March. The remaining six months, particularly the hottest

ones of June, July, and August, are dry.

The summer months are marked by two types of wind phenomena. The southern and

southeasterly sharqi, a dry, dusty wind with occasional gusts of more than 50 mph, occurs from

April to early June and again from late September through November. It may last for a day at

the beginning and end of the season but for several days at other times. This wind is often

accompanied by violent dust storms that may rise to heights of several thousand meters and

close airports for brief periods. From mid-June to mid-September the prevailing wind, called

the shamal, is from the north and northwest. It is a steady wind, absent only occasionally

during this period. The very dry air brought by this shamal permits intensive sun heating of the

land surface, but the breeze has some cooling effect.

Population and Ethno-religious Breakdown

The 2009 estimates of Iraq’s population vary between 28 million and more than 31 million

people. There has not been an accurate census in many years. Nearly 75% of the population

lives in the region stretching southeast from Baghdad to Basra and the Persian Gulf.

Iraq is home to several ethnic groups, the most numerous being Arabic speaking people at

between 75-80%, followed by Kurds at 15-17%. Iraqi Turkmen and Assyrians follow with other

distinct minority groups

including Armenians, Persians,

Shabaks and Lurs.

Shia Islam is the predominant

religion, followed by Sunni

Islam and a Christianity

minority. Small communities

of Baha'is, Mandaeans, and

Yezidis also exist. Until 1948,

there was also a 150,000

strong Jewish community but

it has dwindled down to no

more than a few today. Most

Kurds are Sunni Muslim, with

about 10% being Shia in

central Iraq.

Language

Arabic is the most commonly spoken language. Kurdish, Iraqi Turkish and Syriac are spoken in

the north, and English is the most commonly spoken and taught Western language.

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History of Iraq

The country of Iraq has a rich and remarkable history going back to the foundation of

civilization. The people of Iraq today are well informed and take great pride in their role in the

history of the world. It is a common topic of discussion in many settings. Advisors should have

a basic knowledge of not only ancient Iraqi history, but also of Iraq’s ties to Islamic history and

the modern history of the county.

Ancient History of Iraq

Iraq lies in what commonly referred to historically as the Fertile Crescent. Running through the

heart of the country are the great Tigris and Euphrates rivers which fed and nourished the

beginnings of civilization. For the first time farmers were able to produce crops in an

abundance allowing people in society to develop concepts such as industry, government and

religion instead of devoting themselves to subsistence and survival.

The nation of Sumeria arose in this area around 4000 B.C. The Sumerians developed irrigation

canals, and the first known form of writing. Later civilizations in the region include the

Chaldeans, Hittites, Assyrians and Babylonians. Over the centuries empires such as the Greeks,

Romans, Parthians, Arabs, Mongols, Ottoman Turks, and the British controlled and conflicted

over the region known as Mesopotamia. Iraq conspicuously and strategically lies at the crux of

three continents, Asia, Africa, and Europe.

Mesopotamia and specifically the city of Baghdad were devastated by the Mongols in 1258.

During the late 14th and early 15th centuries, sects of Turkmen ruled the area. Later, most of

Iraq would become part of the Safavid Empire that arose in Iran in 1501. In the 16th century

Iraq became a part of the Ottoman Empire lasting through the end of World War I.

Influence of Islam on Iraqi History

Islam came to Iraq from the Arabian Peninsula, where in A.D.610, Muhammad, a merchant of

the Arabian town of Mecca, began to preach about a series of revelations granted him by God

through the angel Gabriel. An ardent monotheist, Muhammad denounced the polytheism of

the Meccans. Mecca’s economy was based on a thriving pilgrimage to the numerous pagan

religious sites in the area, earning him the hostility of the town's leaders. In A.D.622 accepted

an invitation to settle with group of followers in what is now known as Medina. The move, or

hijra, marks the beginning of the Islamic era and of Islam as a force in history. The Muslim

calendar begins in A.D.622.

In Medina Muhammad continued to preach and eventually defeated his detractors in battle.

His followers regarded his words as coming directly from God and after his death in A.D.632

compiled them into the Quran, the holy scriptures of Islam.

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After Muhammad's death the leaders of the Muslim community consensually chose Abu Bakr,

the Prophet's father-in-law and one of his earliest followers, to succeed him as the caliph

(successor). Some favored Ali, Muhammad's cousin and the husband of his daughter Fatima,

but Ali and his supporters recognized the community's choice. The next two caliphs were

recognized by the entire community. When Ali finally succeeded to the caliphate in A.D.656 the

governor of Syria rebelled. After the ensuing civil war, Ali moved his capital to present day Iraq,

where he was later murdered, leading to the divisions of Shia and Sunni Islam.

Originally political, the differences between Sunni and Shia took on theological and

metaphysical overtones as well. In principle a Sunni approaches God directly and there is no

clerical hierarchy. Sunni imams are primarily a prayer leader and are usually men of

importance in their communities, but they need not have any formal training.

In Shia Islam is the distinctive institution of Imamate, a much more exalted position than the

Sunni imam. In contrast to Sunni Muslims, who view the caliph only as a temporal leader and

who lack a hereditary view of Muslim leadership, Shia Muslims believe the Prophet Muhammad

designated Ali to be his successor as Imam, exercising both spiritual and temporal leadership

and that the rightful successor must be a descendant of Ali.

Modern History of Iraq

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Ottoman Empire planned to construct a Baghdad

Railway that would be under German control. The railway became a source of international

tension because it would link Berlin to the Persian Gulf providing Germany with a connection to

her colonies in Africa free from the influence of the British Navy. These tensions played a minor

role in the origins of the First World War

The Ottomans allied with Germany in the war and Iraq became a secondary battleground for

the British Empire. Emir Faisal, from of the ruling Hashemite family of Mecca, led an Arab

revolt against the Ottoman sultan during the World War I with the advice and assistance of T. E.

Lawrence, famously known as Lawrence of Arabia. After the war he obtained the throne of the

newly formed nation of Iraq, under the influence of the British mandate. Although the

monarch was legitimized and he was proclaimed King in 1921, nominal independence was only

achieved in 1932, when the British mandateofficially ended.

King Faisal I was later succeeded by his son King Ghazi who unsuccessfully claimed Iraqi

sovereignty over Kuwait as his most significant contribution. King Ghazi died in 1939 after

crashing his racecar into a lamppost. His four-year old son King Faisal II was proclaimed king

while Ghazi’s brother, Abd al-Ilah acted as regent until 1953 when Faisal came of age.

In 1945, Iraq joined the United Nations and became a founding member of the Arab League. In

1948, Iraq and five other Arab countries fought a war against the newly-declared State of Israel.

Iraq was not a part of the May 1949 cease-fire agreement. The cost of the war had a

significantly negative impact on Iraq's economy.

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The Hashimite monarchy was overthrown on 14 July 1958 under the leadership of Brigadier

Abdul-Karim Qassem. King Faisal II and Abd al-Ilah were executed and their bodies displayed in

public. The new government proclaimed Iraq to be a republic. Qassem soon withdrew Iraq

from the pro-Western Baghdad Pact of the previous regime establishing friendly relations with

the Soviet Union. He demanded the annexation of Kuwait and paved the ground for the Iran-

Iraq war. It was also during Qassem's rule as Prime Minister that confrontation with the

Kurdish minority began.

In 1961 Kuwait gained independence from Britain and Iraq immediately claimed sovereignty.

Britain reacted strongly to Iraq's claim on Kuwait and sent troops to deter Iraq. Qassem was

forced to back down and Iraq recognized the sovereignty of Kuwait 1963.

A period of considerable instability followed the failed confrontation with the British over

Kuwait. Qassem was assassinated and the Ba'th Party took power. Nine months later a

successful coup against the Ba`th government ousted them, but about five years later the Ba'th

Party again took power in a 1968 revolution. Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr became president and

chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC).

In July of 1979, Bakr resigned and Saddam Hussein assumed the offices of both President and

Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council. Under Saddam Hussein, the Sunni Arab

minority dominated political and economic life. Hussein’s territorial disputes with Iran led to an

inconclusive and costly war with Iran from 1980 to 1988 which again devastated Iraq’s economy

and treasury. The war left Iraq with the largest military in the Persian Gulf, but with huge debts

and an ongoing rebellion by Kurdish elements in the north.

In 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait resulting in the Gulf War in which Iraq was quickly defeated by a

U.S. led coalition that included for the first time other Arab nations warring against Arabs.

United Nations economic sanctions were imposed and operations Northern and Southern

watch, declared "air exclusion zones" north of the 36th parallel and south of the 32nd parallel.

These sanctions continued until 2003.

In March 2003, the United States, with military aid from other nations, invaded Iraq. After

another relatively quick victory by the coalition a violent insurgency formed against the

occupation forces. Saddam Hussein was captured on December 13, 2003. On June 28, 2004,

the occupation was formally ended by the U.S.-led coalition, which transferred power to an

interim Iraqi government. In January of 2005 and again in January of 2008 successful

parliamentary elections were held.

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Organization and Security Roles of the Iraqi Government

Federal Government

The federal government of Iraq is defined under the current Constitution as an Islamic,

democratic, federal parliamentary republic. The federal government is composed of the

executive, legislative, and judicial branches, as well as numerous independent commissions.

The executive branch is composed of the President and the Council of Ministers.

The President of the Republic is the head of state, elected by two-thirds majority of the Council

of Representatives and is limited to two four-year terms. The President ratifies treaties and

laws passed by the Council of Representatives, issues pardons on the recommendation of the

Prime Minister, and performs the "duty of the Higher Command of the armed forces for

ceremonial and honorary purposes,” according to the Constitution of Iraq. In essence, the

President is a figurehead and has very little real power or authority.

The Council of Ministers is composed of the Prime Minister and his cabinet. The Prime Minister

is the direct executive authority responsible for the general policy of the State and the

commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He directs the Council of Ministers, and presides over

its meetings and has the right to dismiss the Ministers on the consent of the Council of

Representatives.

The cabinet is responsible for overseeing their respective ministries, proposing laws, preparing

the budget, negotiating and signing international agreements and treaties, and appointing

undersecretaries, ambassadors, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, the Director of the

National Intelligence Service, and heads of security institutions.

The legislative branch is composed of the Council of Representatives and a Federation Council.

The Federation Council will be composed of representatives from the regions and the

governorates that are not organized in a region. As at 2009, the Federation Council had not yet

come into being.

The Council of Representatives is the main elected body of Iraq. Members are elected for

terms of 4 years. The Constitution of Iraq defines the "number of members at a ratio of one

representative per 100,000 Iraqi persons representing the entire Iraqi people.”

The council elects the President of Iraq, approves the appointment of the members of the

Federal Court of Cassation, the Chief Public Prosecutor, and the President of Judicial Oversight

Commission on proposal by the Higher Juridical Council. Additionally the council approves the

appointment of the Army Chief of Staff, and those of the rank of division commanders and

above, and the director of the intelligence service, on proposal by the Cabinet.

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The federal judiciary is composed of the Higher Judicial Council, the Supreme Court, the Court

of Cassation, the Public Prosecution Department, the Judiciary Oversight Commission, and

other federal courts that are regulated by law. One such court is the Central Criminal Court.

The Higher Judicial Council manages and supervises the affairs of the federal judiciary. It

oversees the affairs of the various judicial committees, nominates the Chief Justice and

members of the Court of Cassation, the Chief Public Prosecutor, and the Chief Justice of the

Judiciary Oversight Commission, and drafts the budget of the judiciary.

The Central Criminal Court of Iraq is the main criminal court of Iraq. The CCCI is based on an

inquisitorial system and consists of two chambers: an investigative court, and a criminal court.

The Supreme Court is an independent judicial body that interprets the constitution and

determines the constitutionality of laws and regulations. It acts as a final court of appeals,

settles disputes amongst or between the federal government and the regions and

governorates, municipalities, and local administrations, and settles accusations directed against

the President, the Prime Minister and the Ministers. It also ratifies the final results of the

general elections for the Council of Representatives.

There are several independent commissions described in the constitution of Iraq. The High

Commission for Human Rights, the Independent High Electoral Commission, and the

Commission on Public Integrity are independent commissions subject to monitoring by the

Council of Representatives. The Central Bank of Iraq, the Board of Supreme Audit, the

Communications and Media Commission, and the Endowment Commission are financially and

administratively independent institutions. The Foundation of Martyrs is attached to the Council

of Ministers. The Federal Public Service Council regulates the affairs of the federal public

service, including appointment and promotion.

Local Government

1. Baghdād

10. Bābil

2. Salāh ad-Dīn

11. Al-Karbalā'

3. Diyālā

12. An-Najaf

4. Wāsit

13. Al-Anbar

5. Maysān

14. Nīnawā

6. Al-Basrah

15. Dahūk

7. Dhī Qār

16. Arbīl

8. Al-Muthannā

17. Kirkuk

9. Al-Qādisiyyah

18. As-Sulaymāniyyah

The basic subdivisions of Iraq are the autonomous regions and the governates. Governates are

most commonly referred to as Provinces. Iraq is divided into 18 governorates (muhafazah). The

governorates are further divided into districts (qadhas). Local elections for the governates

were held in the 2009 Iraqi Provincial elections on 31 January 2009. The constitutionally

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recognized Kurdistan Autonomous Region includes parts of a number of Northern provinces,

and is largely self-governing in internal affairs.

Iraqi Security Forces

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are the military, paramilitary and civilian law enforcement

entities that serve under the Government of Iraq for the protection and stability of the nation.

The armed forces are administered by the Ministry of Defense (MOD), and the Iraqi Police

Services are administered by the Ministry of Interior (MOI).

Ministry of Defense

MOD forces are the army, the air force and the navy. The Iraqi Army is currently an objective

counter-insurgency force positioned throughout the county to provide security and other

services on a local level by using infantrymen on dismounted patrols. Eventually the Iraqi Army

is meant to become a more traditional military force focused on defense against external

threats to the nation. The Light infantry brigades are equipped with small arms, machine guns,

RPGs, body armor and light armored vehicles. Mechanized infantry brigades are equipped with

T-54/55 main battle tanks and BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles. There are a number of T-72

main battle Tanks in the force and Iraq has ordered a number of U.S. made M1A1 Tanks for

2010 and 2011. The FP commonly works with and alongside the Army.

The Iraqi Navy is a small force with about 1,500 sailors and officers, including 800 Iraqi Marines.

The forces are designed to protect shoreline and inland waterways infiltration. The navy is also

responsible for the security of offshore oil platforms.

The Iraqi Air Force is designed to support ground forces with surveillance, reconnaissance and

troop lift. The two reconnaissance squadrons use light aircraft, three helicopter squadrons are

used to move troops and one air transportation squadron uses C-130 transport aircraft to move

troops, equipment, and supplies. The Air Force is has about 3000 personnel, but is planned to

grow nearly nine times larger by 2020.

Ministry of Interior

The Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI) is responsible for the overall internal security of Iraq. MOI

commands a number of uniformed security forces, including the FP, Iraqi Police Service (IPS),

and Department of Border Enforcement (DBE). MOI also runs the Iraqi Civil Defense

Directorate (firefighters and emergency response organization). MOI also has

criminal/domestic intelligence capabilities, and regulates Private Security Companies operating

in Iraq.

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directly under the Minister of Interior and two national police divisions.

Under the command of LTG Hussain Al-Awadi, the National Police ranks grew to approximately

42,000 personnel, improved training and professionalism, worked to remove corruption,

improved the ethnic and religious diversity in the ranks and implement a police code of ethics.

The Iraqi National Police re-designated as the Federal Police effective 1 August 2009. Aside

from the name, there were no major changes to the structure or operations of the force.

Iraqi Police Service

The Iraqi Police Service (IPS) falls under the Security Department of MOI. The Police are

administered at the provincial level and are generally called Iraqi Police or IPs. Each provincial

police force has Patrol, Station, Traffic and Highway Patrol branches. The Patrol Police answer

calls for assistance, take suspects into custody and deliver them to Police Stations for

subsequent holding or release. The Station Police compile and maintain crime reports, respond

to requests for assistance from the public and assist Investigative Judges in criminal cases. The

Traffic Police have duties such as directing traffic, enforcing traffic laws, registering vehicles,

and issuing driver’s licenses. Provinces also have Highway Patrol Police who patrol the major

highways, provide law enforcement and internal security along Iraq’s highways. The IPS are

recruited locally and are generally reflective of the demographic makeup of its neighborhoods.

Historically, Iraqi police do not have a good reputation. Because they were not essential to the

[former] regime’s survival, the Iraqi police were typically under-resourced and poorly paid, with

the average policeman making around $5 or less per month. Because of the poor pay and

resources, police were not highly regarded and often supplemented their income through

corruption. Though the police had a reputation among citizens for being able to maintain

order, this security depended a great deal on their reputation for human rights abuse.² It

should also be considered that the role of police in Iraq and the Arab societies is different than

that of western police. Police in western society are generally proactive and work to deter,

detect and defeat crime. Historically, Iraqi police have been more reactionary and respond to

crime only after it has been committed.

The FP often work with the Iraqi Police because of overlapping geographical responsibilities,

but it is a strained and difficult relationship. The FP generally view the IP as inferior within the

MOI and as a security force. The chain of command is often not clear and the roles and

responsibilities are seldom well defined. The FP view the IP as lazy and corrupt (often

stemming from the historical perceptions) and are reluctant to actively work with or train them

because commanders and staffs do not want to be held responsible for what the IPs do or fail

² Tony Pfaff, Development and Reform of the Iraqi Police Forces, Strategic Studies Institute United States

Army War College, January 2008

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to do. The IPs are often a scapegoat for the FP. Some of these views are founded in fact.

There are lazy, corrupt and ineffective IPs.

However, there has not been the focus from the Iraqi Government or the Coalition Forces on

the IPS that there has been on the Army and FP. They are not as well trained and equipped.

Additionally, members of the IPS and their families were directly targeted by multiple insurgent

groups during the sectarian violence and suffered significant casualties. Until the duties,

responsibilities and chain of command become clear; and until the FP cooperate with and/or

train them, the situation for the IPS will remain unchanged and it will provide little mutual

benefit to the FP.

Department of Border Enforcement

Iraq's borders are controlled by the Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) and the

Department of Ports of Entry (POE) collectively. The DBE operates over 40 border facilities.

Organized into five regions, there are 14 land points of entry and more than 28,000 trained DBE

personnel.

The DBE and the FP rarely conduct combined missions or operate together. Since both are

elements of the uniformed MOI security forces it is possible for an officer to transfer between

the two organizations, although not common.

Law and Justice

The current Constitution of Iraq was approved in a national referendum in October 2005 and

stipulates the format of the republican government, and the rights, and responsibilities of the

Iraqi people. The Constitution promises several civil liberties including freedom of speech,

freedom of religion, freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of expression, a free press, and a

right to have a private life. All such personal liberties contain two main exemption clauses: the

Iraqi Council of Representatives has the power to define what these freedoms mean, and that

no freedom may conflict with Islamic morality. Islam is the official state religion, and no law

may be enacted or enforced that violates “the undisputed teachings of Islam”.

Rule of Law

The heart of having a successful government in Iraq and the ability of the military, and

especially the police, to protect and serve the people is through the application and

enforcement of the rule of law.

The rule of law means that the law is above everyone and it applies to everyone. Whether

governor or governed, rulers or ruled, no one is above the law, no one is exempted from the

law, and no one can grant exemption to the application of the law. This is a common concept in

the U.S. and much of the developed world, but Iraq spent 30 years under the Saddam Hussein

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regime where the rule of law or any rules that did not benefit the regime did not apply. The

military and especially police were instruments of the regimes application, or lack of application

when fitting, of the rules. Those rules contradicted the rule of law in every way. The

government’s police, commanders, and those in authoritative positions were above the law

and/or exempted from it and could grant exemption to its application as they saw fit. It is a

difficult concept to move beyond; not only for the police, but for the courts and corrections

systems too.

Justice System

The Iraqi judicial system is based on the inquisitorial system similar to the French legal system.

It is a system where part of the court is actively involved in determining the facts of the case. It

is very different than the U.S. justice system which is an adversarial system where the role of

the court is solely that of an impartial referee between parties. Additionally, the Iraqi legal

system places more of an emphasis on testimonial evidence, usually from two or more

witnesses, and less on forensic evidence.

Court System

The Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI) consists of two chambers: an investigative court and a

criminal court. In the Iraqi system the investigative court is actively involved in determining the

facts of the case. Evidence is gathered by military and police forces and presented to an

Investigative Judge (IJ). The IJs determine if there is evidence that a crime was committed and

if the case will get a warrant and ultimately go to criminal court. The IJ in a sense is similar to a

U.S. grand jury, but the IJs have wide and sweeping powers. It is up to the individual judge’s

discretion to decide on the standards of evidence and may vary by individual. Most judges will

place weight in witness and victim statements as well as pictures and video evidence; and much

less in science and forensics. The IJ is the part of the justice system that the FP will interact

with the most, primarily the FP S2 because they are involved in the warrant process.

Warrant, Investigation and Trial

The Iraqi system is logical, but not a simple process. All forces (ISF and Coalition) are required

to attain a warrant from an Iraqi Judge before any arrest or detention is made. Multiple

officers must sign off on a warrant packet before it even reaches the IJ who issues the warrant.

It is not necessarily a time sensitive process as officials may take time making sure everything is

in order. Once the warrant is issued the security force may execute a raid to detain the

suspect.

Once the warrant is executed and a suspect is arrested a detention order must be issued.

Within 24 hours, the Investigate Judge holds a hearing to determine whether there is enough

evidence to hold the detainee. The detention order must be renewed every two weeks until

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the person is convicted or released. Judges are more likely to approve a detention order if they

signed the warrant.

Once a judge determines there is enough information for a trial, an investigative hearing is held.

Evidence is presented and the witnesses and accused may testify. Witnesses can testify

anonymously because Iraqis have no right to confront their accusers, but the judge will usually

want to have the testimony given to him in person. The judge will make a recommendation on

the verdict and then forwards the case to the criminal court.

A three judge panel of the criminal court reviews the case, including the evidence and records

of the testimony. They may question witnesses again, but they are not required to do so. Once

they’ve concluded, the panel will render a verdict and impose a sentence, if appropriate.

The FP usually have little to do with the process after the detention order is issued unless a

judge wants the testimony of a member of the FP, or they are transporting a witness to the

court.

The FP generally have no significant interaction with the Iraqi corrections system.

Tribal System

The tribe is an extremely important factor in Iraq, even in a republic. The vast majority of Iraqi

people identify themselves as members of one of the country's 150 tribes. Even those Iraqi

citizens without a tribal backg0round often turn to a neighborhood sheikh for representation or

assistance with the government.

Tribes have always been, and continue to be, a stabilizing force within Iraq. Historically the

tribes have fulfilled the functions of conflict resolution and resource management. This is a

positive for the nation as a whole as tribal leaders are key in providing resolution to disputes

and conflict. However, the tribal system and tribal law will often come into conflict with the

rule of law, Iraq’s federal justice system and the FP.

It is common for tribal leaders to solicit the FP, or judges, to release a detained suspect to them

or to let the tribal leaders handle an incident that that came under the scrutiny of the law. A FP

Commander may come under intense pressure to consider to the tribes and tribal law in these

instances. He is often a member of a tribe and this will have a great deal of influence on him.

But he is an enforcer of federal law and obligated to serve the rule of law. The commander

must be considerate and strike the right balance with the tribal leaders.

The FP must be considerate and interact positively with the tribes in their operational

environment as well as be able to uphold the law of the republic. If the tribes are ignored the

units will become ineffective and not have the trust or support of the people. If a sheikh is

ignored he is shamed, and his legitimacy threatened. Often the commander will spend a great

deal of time negotiating with the tribal leaders, but he does not cave to them and submit to

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Section 2: Iraqi Federal Police Operations and Effects

Part I: Counterinsurgency (COIN) and the Role of Police

“Few military units can match a good police unit in developing an accurate human

intelligence picture of their area of operation. Because of their frequent contact with the

populace, police are often the best force for countering small insurgent bands supported by

the local populace.”

FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency pg 6-19

Overview

This section outlines the fundamental counterinsurgency (COIN) principals found in FM 3-24

and applies these principals to the role of the Federal Police (FP) in the COIN environment.

Success in COIN operations requires establishing a legitimate government that is supported by

the people. Achieving this goal requires the host nation (HN) to render the insurgent irrelevant,

uphold the rule of law, and provide a basic level of essential services and security for the

populace. Key to all of these tasks is developing an effective HN security force.

The goal of policing in a COIN environment is to provide political legitimacy to the government

through the population’s acceptance of authority. Since the police are best positioned to affect

the population’s perception of the government on a daily basis, they become the frontline COIN

force.

The Iraqi FP are presently employed to fight insurgents and militias and were originally

designed to fill the gap between the local police and Iraqi military. The force has transitioned

to establish security; enforce the rule of law; and fight organized crime. The principals of

fighting organized crime and addressing criminal activities is not very different than fighting in a

COIN environment. In fact much of the crime in Iraq is insurgent related; either in financing it

or effects of it. The mission and operational set of the FP make it a natural counterinsurgency

force.

Police as a Counterinsurgency Force

The primary counterinsurgency objective is to provide security and the rule of law to enable

local institutions to grow and increase in effectiveness while decreasing the ability of the

insurgency to execute operations. Because of their frequent contact with the populace, police

are often the best force for countering small insurgent bands supported by and residing within

the populace. However, in the case of larger and more mature insurgencies, the relatively small

groups of local police are likely not adequate and will be ineffective and overwhelmed. A

larger, more military oriented police force such as the FP may be more effective because these

forces commonly are better equipped, trained at a higher level, and can draw from intelligence

resources at the national level.

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Additionally an organization like the FP can be given the mandate of working primarily as a

counterinsurgency force, providing focus to the mission. The FP have the ability to mass forces

in an area and then engage and defeat the threat. The trade off is that the FP are less likely and

often less capable of providing the community policing functions as local police. The FP will

often been seen as outsiders and the population may be less willing to cooperate and pass

information on the insurgents as they would be to local police. In the more urban areas such as

Baghdad the federal and local police overlap and are most effective working together.

Principal Adversaries of the Federal Police

Within the current operational environment, the FP face four principal adversaries that disrupt

order within the community:

• Militias

• Insurgents

• Terrorists

• Criminals

Although four separate entities, these four elements are often interrelated. From 2004 to 2007

the principal adversaries of the FP were militias. These militias were part of the sectarian based

insurgencies in Iraq. The largest and best example is the Jayesh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia headed

by Muqtada al-Sadr. There were/are also other insurgent bands operating outside of the

militias. In the summer of 2007 most of the militia groups were broken and the remnants

formed splinter organizations, i.e. Special Groups from the remnants of JAM.

Terrorist organizations also operate within the environment. The largest example of this is Al

Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). In the complex environment of Iraq, terrorist organizations may act in

collusion with Militias or be adversaries of each other. It is also important to note that many of

the FP leaders do not distinguish a difference between insurgents and terrorists, and do not

recognize Iraq as having an insurgency problem, but only a terrorist problem.

The final category is the criminals, and should not be overlooked or dismissed. Many of the

insurgent leaders were former criminals and a large portion of the insurgent group and militia

members are criminals who are looking to get paid for their services. Additionally, many of the

militia groups became organized criminals after 2007, or the splinter groups resort to criminal

activity to finance insurgency operations.

The FP combat these adversaries either as para-military or as police, depending on the

situation. The path to success against any and all of these enemies is through good intelligence

that has to come from the population. Whether the FP is in a military or a police orientation,

the intelligence gathering processes and the requirement to secure the environment and the

populace remains key to success.

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Police Effectiveness in the Spectrum of Conflict

As mentioned earlier, it depends on the level, maturity and size of the insurgency as to how

effective a police force can be in counterinsurgency operations and will determine if the police

unit acts as more of a military or police force . Effectiveness is also dependant on level of

training, resources and intelligence the unit has. Every unit and every situation is different for

many reasons.

Police advisors usually can help increase effectiveness in the following areas:

• Development of intelligence and sources

• Warrant based targeting within the rule of law

• Detainee operations

• Security operations planning

• Resource and logistics management

COIN Principal: Securing the Environment

Long term success in COIN depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and

consenting to government rule. The first step to gaining trust and confidence in the

government is to provide a safe and secure environment for the populace to live and work.

Initially this involves securing the populace and establishing / securing essential services.

Countering an insurgency requires a police force that is visible night and day. If the populace

believes that insurgents and criminals control the streets it is impossible for the government to

gain any credibility. The FP maintain a presence through checkpoints and patrols.

The purpose of the checkpoints is to secure key infrastructure or other sites thus assisting in

creating a safe environment in the community. The FP in effect use the checkpoints as mini

police stations. When the police at the checkpoints and on patrol are proactive and efficient in

their duties and display competence and commitment, showing genuine interest in safety and

security of the local population, they will contribute significantly to not only their own success,

but to the legitimacy of the government.

COIN Principal: Winning the Support of the People

The FP must understand that winning the support of the people is a fundamental principal to

their COIN fight and that it is a necessity to accomplish their mission. The police are the most

visible agents of the government and are expected to protect the people from any and all

elements that would do them harm and must be actively engaged and interact with the

community. They must treat the people with respect and decency while maintaining authority

and providing adequate security.

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The support of the people is not a given for the police in Iraq. Corruption among police at all

levels is a persistent problem. Police using their position for personal financial gain is relatively

common. Acceptance of bribes from insurgent groups, criminals or even tribal leaders is also a

problem. Additionally, the first forms of the FP were disbanded and reformed because of

looking the other way during incidents of sectarian violence or even participation in the

violence. It can be difficult for the people to trust the police and accept that they are there for

the good of the people. This is especially true in Iraq where the police were used by Saddam

Hussein to control the population and brutally crush dissent. The police were seen as corrupt

and not as protectors. The Iraqi FP must go out of their way to prove themselves as stewards of

security and protection.

The relationship between the police and the people should be mutually beneficial. The police

protect and secure the population and the people give the police information on criminals and

insurgents. The police can then convert the information into intelligence and actions to arrest

the enemy or prevent the criminal acts can be taken further securing the population.

The police must understand how to get information from someone while protecting the person

who is giving it to them from harm. The criminals or insurgents punish anyone giving up

information that would stop one of their acts of violence. Protecting the people and families of

those who choose to trust the police is very important.

Part II: The Iraqi Federal Police Organization and Structure

The following information is to assist the advisor in understanding the overall organization of

the FP and how a typical unit will be organized and structured. Every unit will vary and the

Brigades and Battalions are very much personality based and will differ based on the

commander. Additionally, there are differences in units according to the situation and

geographic location. It is the duty of each advisor to determine and work within these lines.

However, there is a base model of FP organization and structure that the MOI intends to retain

as the force is expanded.

Organization

Currently, the FP are comprised of four motorized divisions with 15 brigades, including a

mechanized brigade and a sustainment brigade. There is currently a plan to expand to a fifth

mechanized division and an overall strength of approximately 21 brigades and several special

protection forces. The MOI plans to place a FP brigade in each Province by 2012.

Each fully formed Division commands four brigades, usually with three FP battalions and a

Special Troops Battalion (STB). The Divisions also have a STB and a Commando or QRF battalion

directly under their HQ. The QRF battalions are proposed to be Air Assault qualified in the

future. Future proposals call for a Sustainment Brigade with a Sustainment Battalion, a

Maintenance Battalion and a Motor Transport Battalion in each Division. A standard FP

Battalion has four Police companies and a Recon Platoon. The Brigade STBs tend to be

underdeveloped and undermanned at this time, but these battalions do contain the brigade

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staff, maintenance and fuel support troops, a Commando company and the brigade security

company.

The brigades of 1st and 2nd Divisions are numbered 1 through 8 similar to the Iraqi Army. The

3^rd Division Brigades are named in honor of an Iraqi hero or the region it is assigned. Other

elements are in flux as the 4th and 5^th Divisions are formed. For example the 1^st Mech Brigade

is proposed to be transferred to the planned 5^th Mech Division and the planned Diyala Brigade

may form under the 4th Division.

The Federal Police Command HQ retains control of the FP Sustainment Brigade, the supply

depots and the training centers, as well as currently having command and control of the Mech

Brigade. The Divisions in the field have an administrative and logistical relationship with the FP

Command HQ, but operationally fall under the command and control of the Area Commands

(equivalent to Corps echelon). The Area Commands fall under the regional Operations

Commands. Ultimately they answer to the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC).

This command relationship often results in a combined Task Organization that deviates from

the IFP standard order of battle. For example: An Area Command may be assigned two Iraqi

Army (IA) Divisions and one FP Division. Further, a FP Battalion may be attached to an IA

Brigade and vice versa.

It is important to note that the Area Commands are joint, so a FP Commander is eligible to

command an Area Command and future plans call for the two Area Commands in Bagdad to be

all FP.

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Iraqi Federal Police (IFP) Standard Order of Battle³

Federal Police Command Headquarters - Baghdad

IFP Basic Training Academy - Numaniyah

IFP Academy - Al Amarah

Sader Al-Kanat Training Academy

IFP Training School (Carabinari Training)

IFP Al Muthanna Vehicle Supply Depot

IFP Supply Depot

IFP Sustainment Brigade

Sustainment Brigade Special Troops Battalion (Med Co and HQ Co)

Sustainment Battalion

Maintenance Battalion

Motor Transport Battalion

1st IFP Mechanized Brigade

1st Mechanized Brigade Special Troops Battalion

1st Mech Battalion

2nd Mech Battalion

3rd Mech Battalion

4th Mech Battalion

Diyala Brigade - Planned

Diyala Brigade Special Troops Battalion - Planned

1st Diyala Motorized Battalion - Planned

2nd Diyala Motorized Battalion - Planned

3rd Diyala Motorized Battalion - Planned

IFP Central Bank Protection Force - Planned

IFP Embassy Protection Force - Planned

IFP Antiquities/Ruins Security Force - Planned

1st Federal Police Motorized Division

1st Division Special Troops Battalion

1st (Seyafiyaa) Commando Battalion

1st Motorized Brigade

1/1 Brigade Special Troops Battalion

1-1/1 Motorized Battalion

2-1/1 Motorized Battalion

3-1/1 Motorized Battalion

2nd Motorized Brigade

2/1 Brigade Special Troops Battalion

1-2/1 (Wolf) Motorized Battalion

2-2/1 Motorized Battalion

3-2/1 Motorized Battalion

3rd Motorized Brigade

3/1 Brigade Special Troops Battalion

1-3/1 Motorized Battalion

2-3/1 Motorized Battalion

3-3/1 Motorized Battalion

4th Motorized Brigade

4/1 Brigade Special Troops Battalion

1-4/1 Motorized Battalion

2-4/1 Motorized Battalion

3-4/1 Motorized Battalion

³ Open source, current as of October 2009 and subject to change. Planned units are displayed in italics.

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2nd Federal Police Motorized Division

2nd Division Special Troops Battalion

2nd (Unity) Commando Battalion

5th (Sword) Motorized Brigade

5/2 Brigade Special Troops Battalion

1-5/2 Motorized Battalion

2-5/2 Motorized Battalion

3-5/2 Motorized Battalion

6th Motorized Brigade

6/2 Brigade Special Troops Battalion

1-6/2 Motorized Battalion

2-6/2 Motorized Battalion

3-6/2 Motorized Battalion

7/2 (Lightning) Motorized Brigade

7/2 Brigade Special Troops Battalion

1-7/2 Motorized Battalion

2-7/2 Motorized Battalion

3-7/2 Motorized Battalion

8/2 (Falcon) Motorized Brigade

8/2 Brigade Special Troops Battalion

1-8/2 Motorized Battalion

2-8/2 Motorized Battalion

3-8/2 Motorized Battalion

3rd Federal Police Motorized Division

3rd Division Special Troops Battalion

3rd (Justice) (AAslt) Commando Battalion

Al Askarian Motorized Brigade

Al Askarian Brigade Special Troops Battalion

1st Motorized Battalion

2nd Motorized Battalion

3rd Motorized Battalion

Knights Raider Light Brigade

Knights Raider Brigade Special Troops Battalion

1st Battalion

2nd Battalion

3rd Battalion

Abu Risha Light Brigade

Abu Risha Brigade Special Troops Battalion

1st Battalion

2nd Battalion

3rd Battalion

Al Mosuli Motorized Brigade

Al Mosuli Brigade Special Troops Battalion

1st (Salah) Motorized Battalion

2nd (Jalil) Motorized Battalion

3rd Motorized Battalion

4th Federal Police Motorized Division

4th Division Special Troops Battalion - Forming

4th Division QRF Battalion - Planned

1/4 (Basra) Motorized Brigade

1/4 INP Brigade Special Troops Battalion

1-1/4 INP Motorized Battalion

2-1/4 INP Motorized Battalion

3-1/4 INP Motorized Battalion

Other 4^th Division Brigades - Planned

5th Mechanized Federal Police Division - Planned

5th Mechanized Division Special Troops Battalion - Planned

5th Mechanized Division QRF Battalion - Planned

Other 5^th Division Brigades - Planned

Personnel

The FP is manned with para-military type soldiers called Shurta (Police). It is common for

leadership to call the Shurta Jundee (Arabic for soldier), especially if he has a previous army

backg0round. In the MOI the Shurta are considered employees, and do not sign enlistments as

they do in MOD.

The requirements for employment in the FP are to apply for entry, be able to read and write,

pass a physical and pass basic police training. Recruiting is usually held in drives in Baghdad and

other larger cities. A part of the vetting process is examining the recruit for scars caused by

bullets or knives and questionable tattoos (may indicate criminal or militia affiliation). These

things indicate possible involvement in criminal or insurgent activity or past prison time.

Recruits cannot have been a member of Sadaam Hussein’s former Intelligence Agency, Special

Forces or Sadaam’s personal security detail.

There are backg0round checks that are conducted, but the effectiveness of these checks can be

questionable. The ability to read and write is stated a requirement, but many Shurta have

entered the force without the ability. The vetting process has improved since prior to 2007.

The FP senior command has placed a greater emphasis on quality over quantity. But it still has

much room for improvement.

The ranks of the FP are Shiite dominated, but beginning in 2008 a new push to integrate Sunnis

in order to diversify the force and shed its sectarian reputation was made. The lack of female

Shurta is a persistent problem. There are very few, if any, women in the FP and any that are do

not perform policing duties. This cultural issue is difficult for the FP to deal with. The

conventional thought is that men protect women in the culture and not the other way around.

Yet the FPs run into the problem of dealing with females in their daily tasks such as security

voting sites or searching people at religious festivals.

Leadership

Officers have two methods to enter the FP. First, to have been prior commissioned officers of

the old Iraqi Army (usually Military Academy graduates) or commissioned Police Officers in the

previous regime. Second, to have a college degree, be accepted and pass a basic officer’s

academy. Most officer’s in the second category work in specialized fields that are aligned with

their college degree such as communications.

The majority of the Officer and senior NCO leadership of the FP were former army and may be

limited on their knowledge of policing operations, but have significant experience managing

and employing infantry forces. It is common to see a bias among the officers and within the

Shurta against officers who were not previously professional military officers.

It must be considered that some of the officers are politically connected and reached their

positions through nepotism. It is also an open secret that commands are “purchased.”

Although this comes across as very corrupt, it is their system and is also common in many

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military forces outside of Iraq. The result, however, is a lack of consistent effective leadership

with commanders ranging from proficient, to ineffective, to completely corrupt.

The NCO Corps is present, but holds very little true authority. Dependant on individual

commanders, a sergeant major may hold a great deal of influence with the commander but it

varies by unit and situation. A Shurta is promoted to Sergeant by time in service (four years)

and not by merit or potential. The Company Sergeants (First Sergeant) are usually selected

because of ability and other qualities.

Leadership positions within the units are generally rank heavy. Majors (Raaed) command

companies (although Captains and Lieutenants can command), Colonels (Aqeed) command

battalions and Brigadier Generals (Aameed) command brigades. There is usually a large

number of Colonels at the brigade staff level.

Rank

Rank insignia for the FP is identical to that of the Iraqi Army except that shoulder boards are

dark blue (or digi-blue). The rank is worn on the shoulder of the uniform.

The former military officers usually have gold stars while former police use white stars,

however this designation is unofficial. It is rare for the enlisted Shurta, to include NCOs, to

wear any rank insignia. It is also common to see a FP Sergeants Major and Warrant Officers

wearing U.S. style Command Sergeant Major insignia on their collars.

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FP Officers who have a red stripe on their rank are graduates of the

Iraqi Command and General Staff College and outrank fellow officers

of the same rank without the red stripe. The red stripe brings with it

the denotation of ―Staff (Rokum) to the titled rank. A FP Battalion

Commander who is a LTC (Moquaddam), and has the red stripe on

his rank is a Staff LTC (Moquaddam Rokum), outranks other LTC

Battalion Commanders without the stripe. It is important to

recognize the Rokum status when referring to an Officer‘s rank. The

Rokum status is prestigious and is present in the Iraqi Army, FP,

Border Police and local IP rank structure. An Iraqi Officer will

maintain his Rokum status throughout his career, and it will

represent his formal military education on the Iraqi staff process.⁴

Pay and Food

The process of paying and feeding Shurta is very different than the systems used by U.S. Forces.

It is essentially an analog system that is based on cash changing hands. Obviously there is a

high possibility for corruption anytime cash is exchanged.

The basic process is personnel rosters are sent to the FP HQ by each unit. These rosters are

verified by both the FPHQ and the MOI. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) allocates the money

and each units Pay officer picks up the money. Each unit sets a date and time for payment

distribution. There are no electronic transfers; all payments are cash.

Included in the pay is a 90 thousand Dinar (around $78) monthly per Diem for food. Each

Shurta turns over his 90K Dinar to the unit Food Officer where the money is combined and food

is locally purchased. Each unit generally has a dining facility of some sort for the Shurta and a

smaller one for the Officers. Personnel are employed as kitchen staff and prepare all meals.

Unit (BN and higher) Commanders may also have their own kitchen staff that prepare their

personal meals and chai as well as food for entertainment or meetings.

⁴ How the Iraqi Army Operates, Edition 1.2, JCISFA

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The critical points for corruption in the process are with the records and the Per Diem. It is

common to find that the units books are “cooked,” i.e. - nonexistent employees are carried on

the rosters. At first glance this seems to be a prime example of personal corruption, but in

some instances there are good intentions behind this. Some examples may be that the families

of Shurta killed in the line of duty are being taken care of by carrying the deceased on the books

and giving the families the pay. Other less charitable instances are a Commander using the

money for bribes or simply enriching himself.

The 90K Dinars per diem is often used in a corrupt manner. Common examples are

substandard food being purchased as a low price and pocketing the extra money or using some

of the money to purchase fuel for the unit on the black market.

Equipment

Each FP unit is equipped by MOI based on a standardized and published MTOE. Generally the

units are fairly well equipped with hardware and the FP has gone through several iterations of

fielding for vehicles and uniforms. The major problem is that the end item is issued in

compliance with the MTOE, but many units lack the subcomponents of an end item or have the

inability to replace worn out parts or items and the inability to effectively maintain the

authorized equipment. This often results in units or individuals purchasing their own

equipment (often black market) or the unit using funds marked for food to purchase repair

parts.

Communications

The FP rely on two means for primary communications; Motorola ICOM radios (or compatible

models) and cellular telephones. There are very few tactical radio systems available and few if

any subject matter experts available for maintenance and repair. The major challenge

presented with this hardware is communications security.

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It is very common for the FP leadership to carry several cell phones and is the principal means

of communicating with other commanders and senior staff officers as well as with their

Coalition forces partners and even the Advisors. Cell phones have the potential to be

monitored and present a security risk as they could be captured and/or stolen and exploited by

insurgents or criminals. Coalition Forces Electronic Countermeasure (ECM) devices also have a

disruptive effect on the use of cell phones as communication. However, to the FP leadership

the convenience of cell phones, and the fact that it is often the only means of communicating

with each other, will outweigh the associated risks and complications.

Cell phones have become very accessible in Iraq and most of the Shurta have their own phone.

This tends to be a double edged sword as it helps the enlisted members of the units stay in

contact with the unit and their families; but on the negative side it can be at best a distraction

and at worst an OPSEC breach. Most units have a stated policy that personal cell phones are

not allowed to be used on duty, but the results of enforcement of this policy are mixed.

The ICOM radios are more secure because they have encryption

capability but also have the risk of being monitored and exploited.

The ICOMs are usually located with the checkpoint commanders and

patrol leaders as well as at the operations headquarters of each

echelon. Each echelon will have its assigned frequencies and net.

The traffic on the radio can be very high at times, but it gives the

benefit of increased situational awareness across the units. As with

the other FP equipment there tends to be problems in maintenance

and replacing parts and accessories, especially batteries.

Communications suffers from the immature and often ineffective

MOI supply system. Accountability can also be a problem.

The majority of staff to staff communication is conducted via staff couriers delivering reports to

headquarters. The FP have made significant improvements in automation, but limit the use of

computers to generating reports and briefings. Computer viruses are a major problem for the

FP and tend to cripple their ability to network among units and headquarters.

Weapons

The FP are armed much more heavily than a traditional police

force. The Shurta carry rifles and patrol vehicles are heavily

armed. However, the FP are not as heavily armed as the Iraqi

Army. Standard weapons include pistols, light and heavy

machine guns, and assault rifles.

Most officers carry a Glock 19 (9mm) pistol in a hip holster. The

Glock is the most common pistol used by both MOI and MOD.

Some Officers and NCOs may carry a pistol that is personal

weapon. The types these weapons vary.

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The standard weapon for a Shurta is the AK-47. Most of these rifles are surplus from the

former regime and the Iraqi government has redistributed. The level of maintenance varies

from very good to poor depending on the unit and the skill of the individual armorer at that

unit. Generally the rifles are not zeroed, but Shurta are assigned individual weapons.

Accountability also varies from unit to unit, but is usually decent because individuals do not

want to give up or lose their weapons.

The most common light machine gun used by the FP is the PK Machine Gun. The PKM fires belt

fed 7.62x54mm ammunition from an open bolt. It has open sights similar to that of an AK. The

maintenance of the PKM also varies among units. Muzzle awareness and safety are larger

concerns with the PKM. The Shurta that carry the PKM rarely have any significant training with

the weapon and are usually selected because of their body size. The PKM is common at the

checkpoints, but is often employed incorrectly or ineffectively (i.e. - not oriented on high speed

avenues of approach or on high ground supporting the position).

Many units use the DShK 12.7mm anti aircraft machine guns mounted to patrol trucks. The

weapons are mostly previously captured or were discarded by the former Iraqi Army and most

are reconditioned or rebuilt by cannibalizing other

discarded weapons. The DShK is usually mounted in the

bed of a patrol vehicle and rigged with a gunner’s seat

mounted to the base of the weapon. There is very little

training conducted with these heavy weapons and

safety is a major concern. In most cases the gunner or

the weapon are not capable of depressing or rotating

the weapon to prevent “flashing” other personnel or

vehicles. Additionally, the drivers will tend to drive at

high speeds and make erratic movements while the gunner is positioned behind the loaded

weapon. Personnel should be extremely careful and vigilant when operating around these

weapons.

There is a proposal to equip the FP with light 60mm mortars in the future, but it is unclear if it

will be approved for a government force other than the army to have that type of weapon.

It is common for FP units to keep some captured weapons and ammunition if confiscated. This

is authorized, but the unit is supposed to report any weapons retained. Often units will keep

RPGs, which are not authorized by MTOE, to use for base defense. Sniper rifles are also often

retained. The FP are NOT authorized to keep mortars, munitions or explosives. Those items

are to be turned over to Iraqi EOD, or can be turned over to Coalition Forces for forensic

exploitation.

Vehicles

The Iraqi FP use several types of vehicles ranging from pick-up trucks to armored vehicles. The

FP use a blue and white paint scheme associated with police forces. Red and Blue police light

bars are usually mounted on top of the vehicles.

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The most common vehicles are pick-ups. These vehicles range from small Chevy LUVs and Ford

Rangers, Ford F-150 and Chevy Silverado, to bigger models like the F-350. Most of the pickups

are modified with fabricated steel plates on the doors and in the bed for small arms protection.

The FP are also equipped with a significant number of M1114 Armored HMMWVs which have

been reconditioned and transferred from U.S. forces. The M1114 has armor on both sides as

well as the bottom providing better protection than the “add on” armored pickups the FP use.

Another benefit is the weapons turret that

provides a platform meant to hold and fire

the weapon. However, the mounts usually

have to be modified to hold the PKM type

weapons of the FP. The M114s have also

been painted in the blue and white police

scheme of the FP. The major challenge is

in maintenance. The FP have a training

program established, but still are limited

on certified and capable HMMWV mechanics. U.S. forces partnered with the FP are able to

help as far as maintenance training; however ordering parts is a significant problem. The U.S.

forces use M1151 model HMMWVs, and although the vehicles look similar, especially to an

Iraqi, the parts association is only 40% the same. The MOI is establishing a contract for M1114

parts but it is unclear how efficient the contract will be, how long it will last, and how it will fit

with unit level field maintenance of the FP.

REVA armored vehicles are present usually at the Brigade HQ level. The Brigade will usually

have 10-12 of the vehicles. REVAs are a

4x4 personnel carrier that offers more

protection against IEDs, RPGs and sniper

fire than the ad hoc armored pick-ups. It

can seat 10 passengers and is equipped

with two hatches for light machine guns.

Maintenance and parts replacement are a

concern for these vehicles. It is common

for the vehicles to be static at important points such as bridge crossings but many units

effectively use the vehicles for route clearance operations.

The Mechanized Brigade is equipped with the BRDM armored vehicles, mostly BDRM-2s. The

Mech Brigade maintained the desert sand color scheme on the vehicles. The vehicles are often

used to establish strong points and for route clearance.

Facilities

The FP occupy a variety of established facilities. Many are buildings and compounds that

belonged to former regime MOI and MOD. Some facilities are abandoned factories or similar

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locations. These types of facilities are generally tied into the city power grids and electricity is

available, but they experience the rolling brown and blackouts common in the cities.

At the checkpoints the FPs often build plywood structures for shelter. These small buildings are

austere but do provide shelter from the sun and wind. The Shurta live at the checkpoints so

there are bunks and amenities such as portable stoves or hot plates to prepare food and make

tea. Electricity is usually pirated into the shacks by an extension cord. Living and working at

these checkpoints is difficult at best.

The living conditions are improved if the facility is a Joint Security Station (JSS). The biggest

improvement is the consistent power that the Coalition Forces bring with their generators. The

Iraqis may have generators of their own, but often lack the fuel to run them on a consistent

basis. Still, living on a JSS is difficult for Iraqis and Americans alike.

Uniforms

The FP have adopted a uniform consisting of pixilated black

and blue camouflage uniform similar to the U.S. Army Combat

Uniform. The uniform includes a patrol cap, body armor and

PASGT Kevlar helmet. Officers and Warrant Officers/Sergeants

Major wear either a black or maroon beret (officially the black

beret is for FP and the maroon for IA) with the Iraqi national

eagle symbol affixed on the left side. The body armor tends to

be a mix of camouflage patters or solid black or tan colors.

The Shurta required to wear body armor are issued a ballistic

vest and have some form of plate insert. However, it is very

rare to see the officers wear body armor due to machismo and

cultural perceptions.

The Shurta usually wear desert combat boots. Officers may

wear combat boots or shoes. There is no standard foot gear in

the FP. Boots are a common item that FP troops (including

officers) will request from their advisors or coalition force partners.

Many of the FP Shurta tend to wear excessive amounts of equipment. It is common to see a

Shurta on a checkpoint wearing kneepads on his calves and knees, elbow pads, sunglasses and

goggles on his helmet. Some will purchase modified uniforms with extra pockets and Velcro at

their own expense. Flashlights and other accessories are common parts of the uniform. Shurta

will often ask for batteries for their accessory equipment.

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Systems

Work-Leave Schedule

The Iraqi Security Forces (both MOI and MOD) employ what to western standards is a very

liberal work leave policy. Generally, a Shurta in the FP works for 21 days and is entitled to

seven days of leave (FPs refer to the time off as jasim which roughly translates to vacation or

time of rest). In some cases there are two key personnel that occupy one billet and share a

weekon week-off schedule.

This schedule can be disruptive and frustrating to the advisor and coalition partners working

with the FP, and causes some resentment. There are reasons for this policy that make cultural

sense.

The Iraqis work what can be described as a firehouse schedule. They live at the HQ, or at the

checkpoints, often in very austere conditions, for the entire time that they are on duty. Rarely

does a Shurta work near their home and they do not see their families for the entire time they

are on duty. With no centralized pay system or electronic payment into a bank account the

Shurta have to return home to support their families and give them their pay. This system is

similar to the old Iraqi Army system. It can be frustrating but is an established method and

system that is an embedded part of the FP culture.

The FP doctors at the medical clinics are authorized to give Shurta’s up to 3 days of sick leave.

The Shurta are not authorized to leave the unit site area during sick leave.

Training

One of the biggest obstacles for the FP is training. Operations will always take precedence over

training. Resourcing the training can also be difficult and is often a low priority or an entirely

new concept.

The FP have three main national training centers. Basic Recruit Training (BRT) should take place

at Numiniya training center south of Baghdad. Numiniya is also home to the FPs mortar

training school. The second step of FP training is held at Solidarity in northern Baghdad. This

training is the FP specialty training course designed to take basic

recruits and turn them into Federal Police. The 3^rd training

facility is the Federal Police Specialty Training Center at Camp

Dublin on Victory Base Complex. The main training event at

Camp Dublin is Special Unit Training run by the Italian Carabinieri

(Italy’s national police force) under the NATO training mission.

The 12 week course provides training in Public Disorder, Law

Enforcement, Investigations, Forensics, SWAT and Urban

Operations. The course also focuses on leadership and train-the-

trainer type of training.

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The object of Carabinieri training is to professionalize the FP and increase the capabilities of

entire battalions. Training units are pulled from operations and remain at the Camp Dublin site

throughout the course. This does present challenges to the national command as these units

have to be temporarily replaced in their area of operations and requires high level planning and

coordination with the operations centers which maintain command and control of FP units

while in their AO.

As the ISF gain more control over the security of Iraq, the focus of the FPs will continue to shift

to training and professionalizing the force. The HQ FP Commander and staff are focused on

training and will accept training from any source to better their organization.

Staff Systems

The Iraqi military was originally trained and heavily influenced by the British military, hence

they are more comfortable with the British model of staff systems. The FP are organized and

operate along the same lines as the Iraqi Army as far as systems and planning. The FP may be

more centralized in execution and loose in the process of planning. It is important to

understand the process that the FP Commander and staff will use in planning and how to

engage within it.

Generally the FP staff officers will reject the highly structured Military Decision Making Process

(MDMP) that American forces use and gravitate to the British Estimate Process, which is most

similar to what they learned in the old Iraqi Army (especially Staff College graduates).

The British Estimate Process consists of seven components:

1) What is the enemy doing and why?

2) What have I been told to do and why?

3) What effects do I want to have on the enemy and what direction must I give to develop

a plan?

4) Where can I best accomplish each action/effect?

5) What resources do I need to accomplish each action/effect?

6) When and where does each action take place in relation to each other?

7) What control measures do I need to impose?

As previously stated, the FP Commander and S3 tend to do all the planning in a vacuum and do

not always involve the staff. They may use this process, but very loosely, or they may not use it

at all.

The Iraqi staff systems are similar to the American systems but are influenced by culture and

traditions (Arab, Iraqi, military) and differ in ways ranging from subtle to distinct. In the

American system the staff is in place to help the commander make decisions and to control the

unit while the commander commands. The Iraqis tend to be more compartmentalized in their

duties and processes. Each officer and section has their own lane and are discouraged from

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even inquiring about other’s areas. The commanders tend to command and control their

formations making all decisions. Unity of effort is viewed through a different lens than an

American, but that does not diminish the need for efficient and effective staff systems and

personnel.

Administration

The Administrative Officer (S1) is often considered just as important as the S3 and is often the

same rank or possibly a higher rank than the S3. The S1 handles the human resource aspects of

the units as well as being the officer that engages MOI and other government agencies. For

example, the S1 may have to register the vehicles for the entire brigade at the Department of

Traffic. Generally, the S1 is a very experienced, skilled and intelligent officer. Most S1s have a

solid handle on personnel numbers and other administrative records. At brigade and higher

levels there may be additional officers responsible for finance and mail.

Intelligence and Investigations

The most unique staff section and staff function that the FP have is the Intelligence section.

The S2 in the FP is very different from the S2 in the American system. The FP S2 Officers are a

part of the National Iraqi Intelligence Agency (NIIA), the MOI intelligence organization and are

assigned to units of all levels by NIIA. The units Investigators are also members of NIIA. This

results in the S2's serving two masters, the MOI and their FP unit Commander. How much they

work with or work for the commander is based on the personal relationship with that

commander. The relationship therefore varies by unit. Some have a good relationship and will

work well with the unit; others will not work together at all. Usually the S2’s allegiance to the

MOI will take precedence over his allegiance the unit. Often it can be an adversarial

relationship in which the commander considers the S2 a spy or the S2 conducts his own

independent operations outside the control or even knowledge of the battalion or brigade.

The FP S2 tends to be a master Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collector, managing multiple

sources and collecting on individuals or networks within their geographically assigned area. The

S2 section may conduct independent raids to capture and detain suspects. The interrogators

and investigators of the unit work for the S2. The section also handles and conducts the

detainee operations within the unit.

The concept of targeting is also different. Targeting for the Iraqi S2 is rarely a proactive process

as U.S. Forces apply it. All targeting in Iraq is now warrant based and the S2 usually has the

responsibility of submitting evidence and acquiring the warrant, however most warrants are

pushed down from Division or higher levels. For the most part the S2s and their investigators

do not put very much effort into targeting. They often see it as a waste of time and get

frustrated with the Iraqi Judges and the justice system.

Generally the S2 is also very secretive and severely stovepipes information. Again, it depends

on the relationships within the unit, but the S2 rarely works with the operations staff. It is

common for neither section to know or understand what the other section is doing.

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Operations

Operations in the FP hold the most potential for the advisor to influence and improve. The

focus of the operations sections is to manage the day to day business of the unit. The sections

will have an operations room where the radios and phones are located. The S3 or a watch

officer is on duty in the ops room. Generally the unit will receive and generate a fairly large

amount of paper reports. Most units can effectively battle track on maps and keep a very

detailed operations log book. But there is rarely the ability or interest in conducting predictive

analysis or gaining more advanced situational awareness.

The S3 of the units plan and coordinate missions but, depending on the strengths and

experience of the unit, this area can be lacking. The planned missions tend to be canned or “off

the shelf” operations. Often planning is conducted by the Commander and S3 in late night

sessions without other staff members. Because the S2 and S3 rarely work together the

operations are seldom intelligence based. The level of detail and the effectiveness of the

planning depend on the capabilities of the S3. Often, it specifically depends on if the S3 is a red

striper (Staff College graduate) or not. Generally most planning and coordination takes place at

brigade and higher levels. Written orders are unit dependant. The FP use the same format and

process (British) for orders as the Iraqi Army but may not produce written orders in advance of

a mission for fear of compromising the mission. At battalion and below the orders are usually

simply patrol schedules. Occasionally, and dependant on the unit, brigades will produce

written orders. At Division and higher it is common to see written orders. It is also common for

these headquarters to keep orders of successful mission and shelve the order to be used again

the next time there is a similar requirement.

Operational security (OPSEC) is a persistent and overriding issue with the operations of the FP.

Often, subordinate commanders are not told of a mission until the last possible moment. That

is also why it is common to see planning held close to a commander and S3. The S3 may plan a

large and complex mission on his own, never telling his own operations staff about the

operation. The prevailing thought is that once sensitive information is out, it will quickly be

spread and the enemy will know. This belief is not unfounded. There is a web of personal,

family, tribal and other issues that will affect the security of information in any unit. If the

Shurta know details of the mission there is a good chance the criminal or insurgent groups will

know as well.

Logistics

Logistics can be considered the weakest link in the FP system. The MOI logistics system is

established but the same suppliers that supply the U.S. Forces, also supply the Iraqi system.

Manufacturers have a relationship with the U.S. Forces to fill and ship all orders to U.S. Forces,

both in Iraq and Afghanistan, before filling any other orders. Since the Iraqi Army has been the

priority of the U.S. since 2003, they have had time to develop an ASL and increase stock level of

their emergency reserve. The MOI has been handled in a different manner since the focus has

shifted.

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Although the logistics system is established, it has not been tested to its fullest due to the lack

of supplies arriving to theater. The system is not necessarily broken, but nothing is pushed if

there is nothing to push. The FP have developed many ‘work arounds’ that is normal for them,

but not for U.S. Forces. Methods from charging the user for the supplies he uses or punishing a

Shurta for losing or damaging equipment. Many Shurta take their own money to buy parts to

keep their trucks running, but it is still not enough to meet the demand of their requirements.

When the supplies are available, they are pushed in equal portions to all units so no favoritism

is shown. Due to the lack of supplies, the logistics organization of the FP operates within a tight

centralized management structure resulting in a very reactive process.

There are seven categories of general supply used by the Federal Police:

• Personal Supply - uniforms, individual equipment, law enforcement equipment, and

hand tools.

• General Materials - office equipment, stationary, housekeeping supplies, and

equipment.

• Fuels - petroleum fuels, lubricants, hydraulic and insulating oils, preservatives, liquids

and gases, coolants, de-icer and anti-freeze compounds.

• Weapons and Ammunitions - ammunition (40mm, 7.62mm, and 9mm calibers),

pyrotechnics, cleaning kits, and other associated items.

• Vehicles - armored vehicles, pickup trucks, sedan, SUVs, water and fuel tankers,

motorcycles and ambulances.

• Repair Parts - repair parts and components include kits, assemblies, and subassemblies

(repairable or non-repairable) which are required to maintain organic MOI fleets and

equipment.

• Medical Supplies - medications, equipment and general medical supplies.

The FP is supported through the

national warehouse located at Baghdad

Police College and Abu Ghraib for

centrally procured and U.S. issued

items. The Federal Police Sustainment

Brigade manages the logistics at the

national level.

The Sustainment Brigade’s tasks are to

move personnel, supply, and fuel

distribution capabilities; maintain the

fleet vehicles owned by the FP; sustain

the FP with all classes of supply,

maintain a national stock level

requirement of the supplies; and

provide Level I and II medical

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treatment, medical supply, and ground evacuation capability. The Sustainment Brigade is

severely constrained by lack of equipment and personnel and is often not capable of supporting

the FP organization at the national level.

At the every unit (battalion and higher) there is an officer responsible for supply and a separate

officer responsible for maintenance and fuel. Often either officer or both are called the

Administrative Officer. The supply officer is usually a part of the S3 shop while the

maintenance and fuel officer is considered a

primary staff officer. These two officers do not

necessarily coordinate with each other or

synchronize efforts.

Sustainment in the FP is accomplished through a

pull request process. The process is usually “Fill

or Kill”; meaning that if the items requested are

not on hand at the warehouse the request is

outright denied. Since everything is done

manually, there is no backorder process and

they cannot hold requests until items arrive.

The one exception to the pull request process is

fuel distribution.

The method for request in most of these categories is the Form 101. The form is actually an

Iraqi Army standard form, but it is used by MOI and the FP for supply purposes. The exception

to the use of the Form 101 is the Fuels category.

The request must be an MTOE authorized item and must be physically checked against the

MTOE quantity. Often the unit is required to write a cover letter for the Form 101 that justifies

the need of the item. The 101 and the cover letter must be signed by the unit commander and

is taken directly by the unit supply officer to the Commander of the FP Sustainment Brigade.

Although the Administrative Officer is supposed to inform the next higher HQ of the request,

and inquire to see if the higher HQ can fill the request, they do not necessarily have to do so. In

reality, a battalion supply officer is authorized to go direct to the Sustainment Brigade. The

same officer is required to receive the supplies in person for the unit.

The Sustainment Brigade Commander reviews the request and either approves it and sends the

request and supply officer to the warehouses run by the supply battalion, or disapproves the

request.

If the items requested are on hand and the request is converted to a Form 102 designating

what items warehouse is required to issue and the unit supply officer receives the items. This is

often based on the relationship that the unit supply officer has with the Brigade Commander.

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If the items requested are not on hand and the units are allowed to purchase items direct from

a vendor, but most likely lack the money to do so as there is not an established budget for the

FP. If the unit does not have cash available and the value of the request is less than 50 million

Dinars, additional steps are taken for approval to purchase the items from a local vendor

through MOI Finance and MOI Contracting. If requested a Finance officer validates the request

by physically going to the unit to verify there is a valid need of the requested supplies or

equipment. Based on the validation, the request can be reduced or disapproved by the finance

office. If approved a check is made to the vendor and the item is purchased by contracting at

the MOI Warehouse and then issued to the unit supply officer.

If the items requested are not on hand and the value of the request is over 50 million Dinars the

process is elevated to MOI and becomes much more complex. Contracting runs an

advertisement in newspapers for ten days for bids. The bids are reviewed and screened by a

committee from the Legal, Inspector General, Finance and Contracting directorates at MOI. A

second committee (must be different personnel from first committee) is formed to review a

minimum of three qualified bids and chose the best vendor based on price, and requirements.

Once the vendor is chosen Finance reviews the proposed contract and Contracting creates a

binding contract with the vendor which must be signed by the Minister of Interior. A special

committee is formed to oversee the contract to make sure the vendor is performing to the

requirements of the contract. The committee also oversees the distribution of supplies and

equipment.

The current exception to this is the FP 2^nd Division. The 2^nd Division has established a

Sustainment Battalion out of its own troops to man and operate as a supply organization. All of

the units within or attached to 2^nd Division must submit its entire request to this battalion and

they will submit the request to the Sustainment BDE. The Sustainment Battalion will receive all

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of the supplies and issue the items requested to their units. They do have the capabilities to

stock an ASL, but due to the lack of supplies at the MOI level, they are not issued supplies to

stock. The current stock at the BDE level is for emergency and reserve requests from the entire

force.

Ammunition is a highly controlled item and requests for ammunition differ from the normal

supply process, but the unit supply officer is still responsible for the category of supply. The

unit prepares an Ammunition Expenditure Report signed by battalion, brigade, and division

commanders and presents it to the Federal Police Commanding General. Operational ammo is

based upon the Unit Basic Load on the MTOE. Training ammunition allocation is based on the

experience of the shooter (years in service) and on a yearly schedule of marksmanship practice.

The request is supposed to be forecasted and may literally take months to fill. The FP CG

retains approval authority for all ammunition and may deny the request, reduce the amount, or

approve the full amount. The final approval for ammo is granted by the MOI Deputy Minister

of Finance & Administration.

Maintenance

There are three categories of repair for the Federal Police:

• Field Maintenance Repair - Consists of general and routine vehicular maintenance

checks, services, adjustments, or minor repairs conducted by unit mechanics at the

battalion and brigade level or from the local service stations where available. Generally

there is no budget available to contract work at local service stations.

• Medium Factory Repair - Conducted by Sustainment Brigade at their repair facility in

Baghdad. Services include general repair, partial reconditioning, modification, and

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minor rebuilding. Medium factory repair is used when repair exceeds field maintenance

capabilities.

• Base Factory Repair - Consists of full reconditioning, major conversions, or major

repairs (similar to depot-level repair).⁵

The majority of the maintenance done is the unit level field maintenance repair. The quality of

maintenance is unit dependant. Most have experienced mechanics that are capable of

maintaining the pickup trucks in the fleet. Maintenance of the M1114 HMMWVs and the REVA

Armored vehicles is more challenging. Even the Sustainment Brigade is limited on knowledge

and experience with these vehicles. The Sustainment Brigade does have the facilities and

equipment to properly diagnose and repair all types of FP vehicles, but many units are reluctant

to evacuate their vehicles to the Sustainment Brigade. Vehicles are assessed and repaired in

the order they arrive. The lack of prioritization results in long delays for some vehicles that

have reality minor problems. This results in the commanders having little faith in the system.

Often the FP Commander fears corruption or theft will occur if he lets another unit touch his

vehicles or he has an unrealistic expectation that his problems have an immediate fix.

Additionally, the all of the FP repair facilities are located in or near Baghdad and it is difficult for

units in outlying Provinces to evacuate their vehicles that distance.

Fuel

Fuel is handled differently than the other types of supply in the FP. Fuel is a scheduled push to

units at the beginning of each month. Each FP unit send memo listing all vehicles and the type

of fuel required. Iraqi vehicles use either benzene (gasoline) or diesel. This monthly push does

not include generator fuel, which is requested separately through the MOI Logistics

Department and approved by the Deputy Minister for Administration. Forecasting is simply not

something in the Iraqi mindset. An allocation of fuel is provided on a monthly basis based on

the number of vehicles without consideration for operations or the fluctuating prices of fuel.

Some Brigades have large storage containers at their HQ for storage. Generally each brigade

will distribute an equal amount to each battalion and hold 10 to 20% as a reserve. The Brigades

have the ability to request emergency resupply through the Division HQ, but this is seen as

showing weakness and subordinate units are rarely willing to ask.

⁵ Ministry of Interior Logistic Handbook v2.1, Iraqi Ministry of Interior.

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Fuel is a contentious issue throughout the FP. The problems range from poor unit level

management to national disputes between MOI and MOO, all resulting in fuel shortages.

Corruption is a major problem concerning fuel in the FP. Fuels are easily pilfered and easily sold

on the black market. It is also common for government officials (local, Provincial, MOI) to

literally pull up to fuel tanks and take what they want, with threats of retribution to the Shurta

if they try to stop them. Even the FPs might steal unit fuel for use in their personal vehicles or

generators. Regardless of the reasons, the result is degraded capabilities for the FP.

Medical

The medical system is underutilized and often dismissed in the FP. Medics are selected and

trained at unit level, but they are often used as regular Shurta. The confidence in the medics is

often very low and the Shurta do not want to use them. There often little command emphasis

placed on the medical systems of the units. Medics are able to distribute some medications

and may know basic life saving techniques, but commonly have significant shortages in supply.

This limits what their effectiveness and makes the Shurta even less confident in their abilities.

Units usually have an agreement with a local hospital or medical clinic for medical care. During

field operations a medic and ambulance driver are supposed to evacuate casualties to that

location. Rarely do they inform the medical facilities of possible operations or mass casualties

due to OPSEC.

Medical supply works similar to general supply, using the Form 101 and 102. Requests are filled

at the lowest level; unfulfilled requests continue up the chain of command until filled. Supplies

are acquired through local vendors. Medical supply may periodically be push packages to all

MOI organizations based on number of employees.

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Section 3: Advisor Challenges and Strategies

“You Will Never Win… Nor Should You. One of the hardest things for U.S. leaders to

understand is what success looks like. Advising is the decisive military component of

building partner capacity (BPC) and COIN. In BPC and COIN, there are few if any

noticeable victories. Progress tends to occur at a glacial pace and cannot usually be

tracked on a day-to-day basis. The advisor attaining a tactical objective does not

achieve success; success is achieved by the Foreign Force (FF) achieving the objective.

Conversely, failure belongs to the advisor. In a more immediate sense, advisors will

likely never please their own Service with regard to the forces they are advising, and

they will never fully satisfy the demands of the FF unit. Advisors are figuratively and

literally caught in the middle. Advising is the art of striving to make a win-win

situation for all parties. Thus, the advisor and FF relationship is like the offensive line

and quarterback on a football team: The advisor removes the obstacles in the way of

the FF and takes the blame when the quarterback gets sacked. Only a FF plan will

succeed—and it will only succeed if it is their plan.”

FM 3-07.10

Advising the Iraqi Federal Police (FP) in the midst of an insurgency is a challenging and often

frustrating undertaking. The environment is complex with a mix of insurgent and criminal

activity as well as the FP being unique organization that is a mix of both military and police.

There is no comparable organization in the United States and everything concerning the FP and

the individuals in it are influenced by cultural and ethno-religious factors and previous

experience.

The task may seem daunting if not impossible, but these difficulties can be overcome through

patience, understanding, knowledge and determination. The information in this section is

drawn from After Action Reviews, interviews and Best Practices of many Advisors and

Transition Teams taking in account years of experience and ideas as well as academic and

military/police studies. Common problems and issues are discussed. Every FP unit,

Commander and Staff will be different and require a unique advisory approach. There is no one

solution or a cookie cutter approach that will work. However, this information will help the

advisor develop strategies and provide tools to make an impact on the Iraqi FP.

Leadership Challenges and Strategies

Ineffective Leadership

The FP leadership at the unit level varies in quality. The problems are compounded by the fact

that the units are extremely command centric. If the commander is ineffective, the unit is

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usually ineffective. Advisors will often find themselves in a leadership development role. This

may be difficult due to differences in rank and leadership styles and traits, but for the long term

stability and growth of the FP, must be done.

Leadership development includes the delegation of authority, decision making at the

appropriate level, leaders taking initiative, and counseling. Some [FP] commanders delegate

effectively by ensuring their executive officers or deputy commanders can make decisions in

their absence, others do not.⁶ Advisors can encourage the Iraqis to delegate and empower

their subordinates. But the most successful technique is for the Advisor to demonstrate the

value in this and as it achieves results, slowly the Iraqi commander may grant more authority

and gain trust in his subordinates. Iraqis are notorious for avoiding development of junior

leaders. It is often threatening to them. Advisors must encourage change and convince their

counterparts to develop leadership within their units, for long term progression of the FP.

Nepotism and Corruption

Corruption, favoritism and nepotism are a common aspect of the FP. The level it is found in an

individual unit is the function of the leadership. There is very little chance that an advisor could

eliminate corruption, but through vigilance and mentorship it can be limited. Nepotism also

has to be acknowledged, but the advisor does not choose the leader and is best served by

fostering continued development regardless of how the leadership position was attained.

Advisors cannot detect, nor can they fight all corruption in the FP. But Advisors working

together at all levels and help limit and influence against it.

NCO Corps

The quality of the NCOs in the FP also varies. Many of the senior NCOs are veterans of the Iran-

Iraq war and as a result may hold some influence with the commanders. Junior NCOs are often

promoted only because of time in service and there is little to no professional development for

FP NCOs. The overriding challenge is that FP Officers do not value their NCOs, and the Shurta

do not respect the position.

NCOs need authority and the capability to solve Shurta problems. The instinct of the average

Shurta is to go to an officer for every problem. Unless NCOs are given authority and develop

the ability the Shurta will not respect them and they will hold little value to the officers. The

NCO Advisor is therefore critical. Advisors provide the example, not only to the Shurta, but to

the officers as well. They show the value of NCOs. Additionally, they can teach and assist in

NCO professional development, even at the unit level. There is no quick solution. NCOs will

only be developed by time, training and experience.

⁶ Decker B. Hains, Thoughts on Advising Iraqi Security Forces Using and Organized Development Approach, Small

Wars Journal, Small Wars Foundation, 2009

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Rapport

To be effective at implementing strategies and solutions an advisor must build a relationship

based on mutual understanding, respect and trust with their counterpart. It may not be easy

considering that your counterpart may be ineffective as a leader, corrupt or in his positions

because of politics or favoritism. But it will be impossible to advise or influence the Iraqi leader

without the establishment positive rapport.

To establish rapport understanding is key. This includes understanding of the FP organization,

doctrine and methods as well as understanding the Iraqi and local cultures. The advisor must

also be willing to share his culture and experiences to help his counterpart gain an

understanding of him.

Mutual respect is also key. This is gained by living with, eating with and fighting alongside the

FP. Shared experiences and dangers will build respect. The counterpart should grow to respect

who the advisor is, what he knows, and how he performs. If that sounds like the old Be-Know-

Do of Army leadership doctrine, it is, and it works.⁷

Trust is extremely important and comes over time as understanding and respect are solidified.

As with all elements of rapport, trust is mutual. Reliability is critical to trust, and it can be

difficult and frustrating. Iraqi’s are seldom punctual and tend to do things on their time when

they feel like it. The advisor cannot afford to do the same. Regardless of local customs, the

advisor should do everything he says he’ll do.⁸ Failure to do so is seen as a broken promise and

trust is diminished. Be careful what you say and what you state that can be interpreted as a

promise.

Working with Coalition Forces

The FP may or may not have a good reputation with U.S. forces and the relationship and

partnership may or may not be a good one with respective units. The advisor is the critical link

between the FP and the U.S. Force. By living with and assisting the FP in both day to day

activities and on security operations trust will be developed. But when it concerns their own

Army, advisors are often considered different and not part of them. The relationships can

become very frustrating and difficult.

To do the right thing the advisor must relate to and empathize with the FP on a personal and

cultural level. However, it is important to avoid “going native” and pursuing the agenda of the

FP to the determent of the U.S. or Coalition Forces. The advisor is there to coach, assist and

advise the FP. The U.S. Forces are there to partner with the FP. The end state for both the

⁷ Rapport Primer, JCISFA, pg. 2, 2008

⁸ Rapport Primer, JCISFA, pg. 3, 2008

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advisor and the U.S. unit are the same; to establish conditions that develop a legitimate,

credible, competent, capable, committed and confident security force. Still, there may be a

tense or strained relationship between the advisors and the U.S. force they work with. There

will likely be times of conflict between the FP and U.S. partner forces. The advisors will be in

the middle of this. However, the advisor is also in the best position to mediate an agreement

and help each party understand each other’s wants, needs and position.

Capabilities Challenges and Strategies

Systems

One of the biggest impacts an advisor can make on the FP is to help them embrace, develop

and execute their systems in an efficient and effective manner. There are many ways to

influence FP systems, but doing so is not easy. It requires creativity and working within their

systems. Doing the work for them may present a short term solution, but does not accomplish

the long term goals.

Shadow tracking is a method to influence their systems without doing it for them. It can be

especially effective in logistics and can affect change in training management and troops to task

as well. Simply monitor what they are doing within their systems in these areas and report that

information up the advisor chain. If done right each higher headquarters also tracks the

information and can help influence bottlenecks or road blocks. To do this effectively as an

advisor requires attention to detail and development of your own systems to function

effectively. But it is a great way to gradually affect change and provide assistance in the FP.

The reluctance to share intelligence and stovepipe information is another FP problem that can

be influenced. A good way to do this is to establish a joint operations center with the FP units,

either by the advisory team or the partnered U.S. unit. OPSEC will have to be considered, but

the sharing of assets and knowledge will lead to the sharing of intelligence that becomes a two

way road. Additional benefits to a joint ops center would be getting the intelligence and

operations staffs in a situation to work together as they work together with the U.S./CF intel

and ops staffs. It also provides the opportunity to teach analysis, in order to turn information

into intelligence and then demonstrate how to take action upon that intelligence.

Para-military vs. police organization

The FP is a unique organization that falls somewhere between the military and the police. The

FP is a para-military organization designed to be a quick strike commando force, but they are

usually employed as a law and order security force. This is not likely to change anytime soon,

and most FP units have not received the training to function as a regular police force.

Compounding this gap in training is the fact that the vast majority of the FP leadership are

trained military officers and have very little practical policing experience. The result is a great

deal of friction concerning FP operations.

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The advisor can help reduce this friction by knowing and understanding the Iraqi systems and

operating through the FP within these systems as well as be being creative and finding methods

to coach and advise the FP on subjects that they may not be familiar with, or even resistant to.

Some of the most important subjects are rule of law, security and policing methods.

Within the rule of law Warrant Based Targeting has emerged as a critical article for the FP. An

advisor must understand how warrant based targeting works and how to coach and assist the

FP to use it properly and make it advantageous. Acquiring warrants is key to the rule of law,

but is a new concept as a requirement for military forces, as well as a new concept for Iraq as a

whole after 30 plus years of dictatorship. It is often seen as a hindrance and a waste of time by

the FP and they are often frustrated by the justice system. Regardless of their view, the FP

must operate within the system to be effective.

The process of acquiring warrants is described in section one, but the most important part is

convincing the FP to properly use the process and coaching them in the collection of evidence

and the handling of witnesses. Collecting evidence and building a warrant is the same process

as targeting, and there is no difference whether the target is a criminal, a terrorist or an

insurgent. The principles of D3A (Decide, Detect, Deliver and Assess) and F3EAD (Find, Fix,

Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate) remain valid. The change is in the standards the FP

has to meet in order to find, arrest and convict the enemy within the rule of law.

Policing Strategy

If the FP continue to fill the role and operate as police they need to form and implement

strategies to address law enforcement, crime prevention and counter-insurgency / counter-

terrorism issues they face. In the following paragraphs are several policing strategies that the

advisor may introduce to the FP. These strategies are not mutually exclusive, but can be

employed together to better address the challenges the FP face. Nor are these strategies a

silver bullet solution. Arab/Iraqi culture and local environment will affect how or if the

strategies are employed. These methods have proven effective in various parts of the world

and if coached to the FP and integrated with effective COIN strategies may address many of the

problems the FP face.

Intelligence-Led Policing (also known as intelligence-driven policing) originated in the United

Kingdom in the early 1990’s. Due to an increase in property crime, the Kent constabulary began

prioritizing calls for service and referring the less serious calls to other entities. This concept

allowed the police to focus their resources on groups or individuals who were responsible for

the majority of the property crime. The concept resulted in a dramatic reduction in crime and

better use of police resources. The emphasis was shifted from crimes to criminals. The

intelligence developed on targeted criminals resulted in arrest of those responsible for the

majority of crimes and produced a more efficient and effective law enforcement effort.

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The purposes of Intelligence-led policing are:

• Targeting repeat or active offenders

• Identify and address hot spots

• Linking crimes and incidents

• Application of measures to prevent crime and disorder⁹

FM 3-24 describes COIN as an intelligence-driven endeavor and that among other things; the

function of intelligence in COIN is to facilitate an understanding of the insurgents. In a sense

this policing strategy is the method to do just that as well as take action on the results of the

analysis. In intelligence led policing the key is shifting the focus from the crime to the specific

criminals, developing intelligence on and targeting them or the areas they operate. The same

can be done for an insurgency. Shifting the emphasis to the insurgent (or groups) would allow

the FP to become pro-active and engage the individual or group before a catastrophic event

occurs and simply react to it.

Community Policing is a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies, which support the

systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques, to proactively address the

immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and

fear of crime.

Community policing is comprised of three key components:

• Community Partnerships - Collaborative partnerships between the law enforcement

agency and the individuals and organizations they serve to develop solutions to problems

and increase trust in police.

• Organizational Transformation - The alignment of organizational management,

structure, personnel, and information systems to support community partnerships and

proactive problem solving.

• Problem Solving - The process of engaging in the proactive and systematic examination

of identified problems to develop and rigorously evaluate effective responses.¹⁰

Community policing is on the Mission Essential Task List (METL) of most FP units, but very few

understand the theory let alone implement it. Conventional wisdom among many of the FP

(and many advisors) is that community policing is a western concept and does not fit culturally

in Iraq. In reality, many units already incorporate aspects of community policing because of the

Iraqi culture.

⁹ Stephen L. Mallory, The Concept of Asymmetrical Policing, International Police Executive Symposium Working

Paper No 12, September 2007

¹⁰ Community Policing Defined, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U. S. Department of Justice, April

2009

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The first component of community policing is building community partnerships between the

agency and individuals/organizations in the community they serve. Example of these may be

local government agencies, tribal leaders, business, service providers and media. These

partnerships are meant to develop solutions and increase trust in the police. Most FP

commanders have already built these relationships within their Operational Environment out of

necessity. It is culturally necessary to have communication with the tribal leadership and it is

the duty and expectation of the tribes to solve problems within the community.

The next component is organizational transformation, and may be the largest road block to

effective community policing for the FP. The FP mandate is to be a quick reaction force to

project power across the Provinces to maintain law and order. However, the FP is currently

employed to bridge the gap while local police are developed. The FP are organized as para-

military force but employed as community police. If the FP are to be a community police force

changes to the organizational structure need to be made. The climate and culture of the force

from military to police would have to take place. The focus of geographic assignment would

have to shift from unit based (military) to personnel based (police). Additionally the

organizational training would have to change to match the mission.

The final component, problem solving, is simply becoming proactive; identifying and

acknowledging problems; and evaluating and implementing effective solutions to the problems.

Community policing emphasizes proactive problem solving in a systematic and routine fashion.

Rather than responding to crime only after it occurs, community policing encourages agencies

to proactively develop solutions to the immediate underlying conditions contributing to public

safety problems.¹¹ Again this strategy applies to insurgency the same as it does crime. Simply

responding to an insurgent event will not quell the insurgency in the long run.

The major hurdles to implementing the proactive solutions are cultural. First, the problem has

to be identified and then acknowledged. Culturally the commander has a difficult time

acknowledging problems because to admit the problems in the first place would cause him to

lose face in front of superiors and subordinates. Often the course with the least personal risk is

to do nothing and deny the problem exists. This goes back to the need for structural change in

the culture and climate of the FP.

Preventative policing is a defining characteristic of most modern police forces in much of the

world. It is complementary to intelligence led policing and incorporates many aspects of

community policing. Preventive policing [gives] police a chance to get ahead of crime and

criminals - to give [police] the tools they need to effectively cut crime and make the community

safer, and to do so in partnership with - not in opposition to - the people they serve.¹² This is

accomplished by partnering with the communities and pushing the police force to solve

¹¹ Community Policing Defined, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U. S. Department of Justice, April

2009

¹² David A. Harris, Making a Case for Preventive Policing, http://www.calea.org/online/newsletter/No90, 2006

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