F16C/D. FLIGHT MANUAL (2002)

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

322

Pilot Fault List-Engine

PW 229

FAULT

CAUSE

CORRECTIVE ACTION/REMARKS

ENG A/B FAIL and
ENG THST LOW

Engine hardware deterioration/detected

performance loss

Reduce engine rpm to 85% or less, unless re

quired to sustain flight. High thrust levels may

result in further deterioration/performance loss.

Land as soon as possible

ENG A/I TEMP

Antiice valve failed open and/or bleed air

temperature greater than 850

Reduce throttle setting to midrange unless

required to sustain flight. Operating the engine

above midrange with anti ice system failed on

above midrange with antiice system failed on

may result in engine stall. Land as soon as prac

tical

ENG A/I FAIL

Engine antiice valve failed in closed

position

Avoid areas of known or suspected icing

conditions

ENG MACH FAIL

The CADC supplied mach number to the

DEEC is no longer available

Supersonic stall protection is inoperative. Do not

retard throttle below MIL while supersonic. If

CADC caution light is also on, refer to CADC

MALFUNCTION, this section

ENG A/B FAIL

AB system failure detected

AB RESET switch-AB RESET. Land as soon as

practical if fault does not clear. AB operation is

partially or fully inhibited

ENG THST LOW

Loss of redundant FTIT signals received by

DEEC
DEEC has detected a failed open or miss

ing nozzle

MIL rpm is reduced 7 percent by DEEC. Land as

soon as practical
If a failed open or missing nozzle is suspected,

refer to NOZZLE FAILURE, this section

ENG BUS FAIL

Communication lost between EDU and

MUX bus

Illuminates AVIONICS FAULT caution light. A

subsequent engine fault causes a nonresettable

ENGINE FAULT caution light and is not displayed

on the PFLD

ENG PFL DGRD

Communication lost between EDU and

DEEC

Do not retard throttle below MIL while super

sonic. Only ENG A/I TEMP PFL can subsequently

be displayed

NOTE:

A short duration fault condition may cause display of a PFL without illumination of the ENGINE FAULT caution light.

Figure 33.(Sheet 1)

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

323

Pilot Fault List-Engine

129

FAULT

CAUSE

CORRECTIVE ACTION/REMARKS

ENG LUBE LOW

Oil quantity below preset limit

Refer to OIL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION, this

section

ENG A/I FAIL

Engine antiice valve failed in closed posi

Avoid areas of known or suspected icing condi

ENG A/I FAIL

Engine antiice valve failed in closed posi

tion or indication malfunction

Avoid areas of known or suspected icing condi

tions

ENG MACH FAIL

The CADC supplied mach number to the

DEC is no longer available

Supersonic stall protection is inoperative. Do not

retard throttle below MIL while supersonic. If

CADC caution light is also on, refer to CADC

MALFUNCTION, this section

ENG BUS FAIL

Communication between engine and

MUX bus lost

Illuminates AVIONICS FAULT caution light.

Other engine PFL's cannot be displayed

ENG A/B FAIL

AB system failure detected

Land as soon as practical if fault does not clear.

AB operation inhibited. If nozzle remains closed

at idle below 0.5 mach, refer to ABNORMAL EN

GINE RESPONSE, this section

ENG EMS FAIL

Data transmission from DEC lost

BIT/selftest received from DEC

indicates a failure

EMSC BIT/selftest detects a failure

Other PFL's either cannot be displayed or, if dis

played, are not reliable

ENG HYB MODE

A PRI fuel flow scheduling problem was

detected

Supersonic stall protection is inoperative. Do not

retard throttle below MIL while supersonic.

Check engine response to throttle movement

when subsonic. If engine responds normally,

land as soon as practical. If engine does not re

spond normally, refer to ABNORMAL ENGINE

RESPONSE, this section

NOTE:

A short duration fault condition may cause display of a PFL without illumination of the ENGINE FAULT caution light.

Figure 33.(Sheet 2)

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

324

Pilot Fault List - FLCS

(FLCS warning light illuminated)

FAULT

CAUSE

CORRECTIVE ACTION/REMARKS

FLCS AOA WARN

Dual AOA failure

Refer to AOA MALFUNCTIONS

FLCS DUAL FAIL

Dual electronic, sensor, or power failure in

one or more axes

Refer to FLCS DUAL ELECTRONIC FAILURE

FLCS LEF LOCK

LEF's are locked due to multiple failures,

LE FLAPS switch position, or asymmetry

Refer to LEF MALFUNCTIONS

STBY GAIN

Dual air data failure

Refer to AIR DATA MALFUNCTIONS

FLCS BIT FAIL

FLCS BIT has detected a failure

Perform a second FLCS BIT. If fault does not clear,

notify maintenance. Fault only occurs on ground

(TF FAIL warning light illuminated)

FAULT

CAUSE

CORRECTIVE ACTION/REMARKS

SWIM NVP FAIL

NVP data bad, AMUX wraparound failure,

NVP selfmode failure, or cyclic test prob

lem monitor failure

Refer to TF FAIL WARNING LIGHT

SWIM RALT FAIL

SDC monitor failure or CARA data bad

SWIM SCP FAIL

Below set clearance failure

SWIM ATTD FAIL

INS attitude estimator failure

SWIM ATF FAIL

NVP ATF select failure

SWIM VEL FAIL

GPS/INS failure

Figure 33.(Sheet 3)

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

325

Pilot Fault List - FLCS

(FLCS FAULT caution light illuminated for all except FLCS BUS FAIL)

FAULT

CAUSE

CORRECTIVE ACTION/REMARKS

FLCS ADC FAIL

First failure of triplex air data input

signal

Refer to AIR DATA MALFUNCTIONS

FLCS AOA FAIL

First failure of triplex AOA input signal

Refer to AOA MALFUNCTIONS

FLCS AOS FAIL

AOS feedback function is inoperative due

to failure

Perform FLCS reset to attempt to clear fault;

fault cannot be reset if INS or CADC is failed
If fault does not clear, the autopilot cannot be

engaged. Position the STORES CONFIG switch

to CAT III if the aircraft is configured with a

GP/STORE/LINE loading. Refer to T.O.

GR1F16CJ12 *

FLCS FLUP OFF

MANUAL TF FLYUP switch moved to DIS

ABLE

FLCS BIT detects MANUAL TF FLYUP switch

in DISABLE

Position the MANUAL TF FLYUP switch as re

quired. A FLCS reset extinguishes FLCS FAULT

caution light
Position MANUAL TF FLYUP switch to ENABLE.

Rerun FLCS BIT

FLCS A/P DEGR

Autopilot operating outside of attitude

limits or unable to hold commanded

mode

Refer to AUTOPILOT MALFUNCTIONS

FLCS A/P FAIL

Autopilot has disconnected or cannot be

engaged due to loss of needed data

Refer to AUTOPILOT MALFUNCTIONS

FLCS BUS FAIL

Communication lost between FLCC and

MUX bus

Illuminates AVIONICS FAULT caution light.

Other FLCS PFL's may not be displayed on the

PFLD. Refer to FLCS page on MFD for FLCS PFL's

BRK PWR DEGR

Power supply failure detected in one or

more branches

Refer to FLCS SINGLE ELECTRONIC FAILURE

FLCS CCM FAIL

Erroneous output command detected by

CCM

Refer to FLCS SINGLE ELECTRONIC FAILURE

FLCS HOT TEMP

FLCC sensors detect two branches in

excess of 75

Refer to FLCS TEMPERATURE MALFUNCTIONS

ISA ALL FAIL

Two or more ISA's have reported a first

servo valve failure

Refer to SERVO MALFUNCTIONS

ISA LHT FAIL

ISA RHT FAIL

ISA LF FAIL

ISA RF FAIL

ISA RUD FAIL

Indicated ISA has reported a first servo

valve failure

Refer to SERVO MALFUNCTIONS

FLCS SNGL FAIL

Indicates single electronic or sensor fail

ure in one or more axes

Notify maintenance. Fault only occurs on

ground

FLCS MUX DEGR

BIT detected degradation of FLCC MUX

interface

FLCS reset will not clear fault. Perform a second

FLCS BIT. If fault does not clear and no other

faults are reported, the system redundancy is

adequate for flight. Notify maintenance after

flight. Fault only occurs on ground

NOTE:

The potential for a departure from controlled flight is significantly increased if the AOS feedback function is inoperative and maneuvering
with

GP/STORE/LINE loadings occurs with the STORES CONFIG switch in CAT I.

Figure 33.(Sheet 4)

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

326Change 1

GROUND EMERGENCIES

FIRE/OVERHEAT/FUEL LEAK (GROUND)

An engine or JFS fire/overheat can be detected by

flames, smoke, explosion, signal from ground crew,

or radio call. FTIT may exceed

PW 229

800

129

935

C and, if ac power is available, ENG

FIRE warning or OVERHEAT caution light may

illuminate.

Throttle-OFF.

JFS switch-OFF.

FUEL MASTER switch-OFF.

ENG FEED knob-OFF (if external power

applied).

If fire continues:

Abandon aircraft.

HOT START (GROUND)

PW 229

Hot start-FTIT over 800

C. During engine

start, if the FTIT increases at an abnormally rapid

rate through 750

C, a hot start can be anticipated.

129

Hot start-FTIT over 935

C. During engine

start, if the FTIT increases through 750

C while

engine rpm is less than 40 percent, a hot start can be

anticipated.

Throttle-OFF.

FTIT indicator-Monitor.

If FTIT remains above 500

JFS switch-START 2.

Motor engine with JFS until FTIT reaches

200

C or for four minutes (JFS ground

operating limit), whichever occurs first.

HUNG START/NO START

PW 229

Hung start-RPM has stopped increasing below

IDLE and FTIT is stabilized at less than 800

No start-Lightoff does not occur within 20 seconds.

Throttle-OFF. Notify maintenance.

HUNG START/NO START

129

Hung start-RPM has stopped increasing below

IDLE and FTIT is stabilized at less than 935

No start-Lightoff does not occur within 10 seconds.

Throttle-OFF. Notify maintenance.

ENGINE AUTOACCELERATION (GROUND)

If the engine autoaccelerates on the ground, primary

consideration should be given to shutting the engine

down as quickly as possible. With engine shut down,

only the brake/JFS accumulators are available to

supply hydraulic pressure for braking. Stop the

aircraft by making one steady brake application.

When the aircraft is fully stopped, have chocks

installed or engage parking brake. Leave the battery

on until chocks are installed.

Throttle-OFF.

FUEL MASTER switch-OFF.

ANTISKID MALFUNCTION (GROUND)

b2t

If a failure affecting braking performance is

detected while the aircraft is moving above 5 knots,

the ANTI SKID caution light illuminates. In most

cases this represents the loss of a wheel speed sensor

signal, and the system switches to an alternate

braking mode. In this mode, if differential braking is

applied (15 percent or greater difference between

pedals), both brakes oscillate between pressure as

metered and no pressure. Braking effectiveness is

reduced by 50 percent or greater. If brake pedals are

within 15 percent, the system uses the information

from the remaining good wheel speed sensor and

stopping distance is increased by approximately 25

percent on both wet and dry runways. An ANTI

SKID caution light which only illuminates below 5

knots indicates a malfunction that does not affect

braking performance. Normal braking and antiskid

are available; however, system redundancy may

have been lost.

b2t

Below 20 knots ground speed the alternate

braking mode is less effective. Place BRAKES

channel switch to CHAN 2 and ANTISKID switch to

OFF. Braking will be manual.

LESS

b2t

In case of an antiskid failure, the ANTI

SKID caution light illuminates and the brake system

automatically switches to pulsating pressure. In this

mode, braking effectiveness is reduced approxi

mately 50 percent; however, in most cases, braking

effectiveness is as good as can be obtained with

ANTISKID switch in OFF while avoiding wheel

lockup and its associated risk of control difficulty.

Short field landing distances are increased approxi

mately 60 percent for dry runway and 25 percent for

wet runway from those normally computed.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

327

If the ANTI SKID caution light illuminates (with the

ANTISKID switch in ANTISKID):

DRAG CHUTE switch-DEPLOY (if re

quired).

Brakes-Apply as needed.

NOTE

b2t

Use of maximum symmetric pedal

pressure provides the best stopping

performance. Differential brake only

when essential for directional control.

If the ANTI SKID caution light

illuminated above 5 knots

groundspeed, the aircraft may oscillate

due to pulsating brake pressure (if 15

percent or greater differential pedal

pressure is applied). Changing brake

channels may restore normal braking.

LESS

b2t

Maximum pedal pressure is

required to obtain approximately 50

percent of normal braking force. If less

than maximum pedal pressure is used,

braking is extremely degraded. The

aircraft will oscillate due to pulsating

brake pressure. Changing brake chan

nels will not restore normal braking

since the same antiskid signal is used

in both brake channels.

NWS-Engage (if required).

If manual braking is desired or after aircraft is

stopped:

b2t

BRAKES channel switch-CHAN 2.

ANTISKID switch-OFF.

No antiskid protection is available

with the ANTISKID switch in OFF

b2t

and BRAKES channel switch in

CHAN 2. Brakes should be applied

with caution to avoid wheel lockup and

blown tires.

NOTE

LESS

b2t

Below normal taxi speed,

pulsating braking is only marginally

effective. Stopping distance may be

shortened with antiskid off.

BRAKE FAILURE

Malfunctions in systems which affect normal braking

are described in the emergency procedure which

addresses each specific system. One of the brake

failure modes is the loss of one brake circuit. With this

failure, both brakes are still available; however,

significantly more pedal force than normal is

required to achieve a specific braking effectiveness.

Another failure mode is loss of brakes on one or both

MLG. Changing brake channels may return the

system to normal operation. Turning the ANTI

SKID switch to OFF

b2t

and confirming BRAKES

channel switch in CHAN 2 may also restore braking;

however, the system reverts to manual control and

antiskid protection is lost. (Status of the power

source for toe brake transducers can be determined

by testing the FLCS PWR lights on the TEST switch

panel.) Release brake pedal pressure before

changing channels or turning off the ANTISKID

switch to avoid immediate brake lockup if braking

returns. When moving the ANTISKID switch, be

very careful not to select the PARKING BRAKE

unless that is what is intended. If directional control

is a problem (such as with one brake inoperative on

landing roll), do not hesitate to use NWS. If

conditions permit, consider a goaround if the brakes

are found to be inoperative on landing. Lower hook

if a cable is available. If normal brakes cannot be

restored, do not hesitate to use the parking brake if

a cable is not available. The lower the groundspeed,

the less chance there is for aircraft damage when

using the parking brake. If the aircraft is

accelerating, use the parking brake early. It may be

possible to cycle the parking brake on and off and

stop the aircraft; however, regardless of technique,

use of the parking brake may result in blown tires.

Another failure mode is a hydraulic leak in the brake

itself, which might not be apparent until after

twopoint aerodynamic braking. In this case, if a

cable is not available, the aircraft should be stopped

using the good brake and NWS for directional

control. Once the aircraft is stopped, do not engage

the parking brake; use continuous pedal pressure on

the good brake only. Failure to do so could deplete the

hydraulic system and result in total brake failure

prior to chock installation.

Accomplish as many steps as required:

NOTE

If conditions permit, consider a go

around if the brakes are found to be

inoperative on landing. An approach

end cable arrestment is recommended.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

328

BRAKES channel switch-Change channels.

Release brakes prior to changing

brake channels or turning antiskid off.

b2t

BRAKES channel switch-CHAN 2.

ANTISKID switch-OFF.

Release brakes prior to changing

brake channels or turning antiskid off.

NWS-Engage (if required).

HOOK switch-DN.

If arresting cable is not available or if at low

groundspeed:

ANTISKID switch-Intermittent PARKING

BRAKE, then ANTISKID.

If in a congested area, use the parking

brake immediately to stop.

HOT BRAKES

The pilot has the responsibility to determine when a

hot brake condition exists. The pilot evaluates the

situation by analyzing the variables that influence

brake temperature: GW, pressure altitude, OAT,

speed at brake application, etc. Refer to T.O.

GR1F16CJ11, PART 2, BRAKE ENERGY LIMITS

- MAXIMUM EFFORT BRAKING. Observations by

ground crewmembers should also be used as certain

malfunctions that result in overheated brakes, such

as dragging brakes, may not be readily apparent to

the pilot. Perform hot brake procedures anytime hot

brakes are suspected.

It is impossible for the ground crew to avoid the hot

brake and engine intake danger areas while pinning

the EPU or chocking the aircraft. Therefore, if

conditions permit, the aircraft should be shut down

without pinning the EPU or chocking the wheels.

Release brake pressure as soon as possible to

minimize heat transfer between the brake surfaces

and the wheel. This action also relieves hydraulic

pressure to the brakes, which if leaking, could feed a

hydraulic fire.

Perform the following after any event that may result

in hot brakes:

Request firefighting equipment and proceed

directly to the designated hot brake area or

nearest area clear of other aircraft and

personnel.

If a hot brake condition is a result of a

dragging brake, taxiing the aircraft

worsens the condition.

Any leaking hydraulic fluid may be

ignited by hot wheel and brake

surfaces.

Wheel fusible plugs may relieve tire

pressure at anytime during the 15

minutes after brake application.

With hot brakes, avoid inflated MLG

tire side area within 300 feet for 45

minutes after aircraft has stopped. If

required, approach from the front or

rear for firefighting purposes only.

When in the hot brake area:

Align aircraft with nose into wind if possible.

Do not use the parking brake.

If battery power is not available, toe

brakes will be inoperative after engine

shutdown.

Do not turn MAIN PWR switch to OFF

until the nosewheel is chocked.

Attempt to park in a level area to

minimize risk of aircraft rolling if the

brakes should fail after shutdown.

Use only minimum possible toe brake

pressure to hold aircraft stationary

until engine is shut down and nose

wheel is chocked.

EPU switch - OFF.

Throttle - OFF.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

329

Nose wheel - Chocked.

MAIN PWR switch - OFF.

Exit toward the front of the aircraft.

If a brake fire occurs:

Go to GROUND EGRESS, this section.

MAIN GENERATOR FAILURE (GROUND)

If the main generator fails on the ground, the standby

generator provides power for full normal braking

(both channels) and NWS. Abort the aircraft. Taxiing

is permissible.

MAIN AND STANDBY GENERATOR FAILURE

(GROUND)

If the main and standby generators fail on the

ground, the FLCS PMG and aircraft battery provide

power for full normal braking (both channels). The

EPU should activate and provide power for NWS.

Stop and engage the parking brake prior to

attempting to reset the generators.

If main or standby generator resets and further

taxiing is required, brakes should be checked

carefully. Allow the aircraft to begin rolling slowly

and check for normal braking. If normal braking is

inoperative, immediately engage the parking brake.

If MAIN GEN and STBY GEN lights illuminate:

Stop the aircraft.

Turn EPU on, if required, to obtain NWS.

ANTISKID switch-PARKING BRAKE.

OXYGEN-100%.

EPU switch-OFF.

If chocks are not installed, be prepared

to immediately engage the parking

brake if it disengages when the EPU is

shut off.

If further taxiing is required:

ELEC CAUTION RESET button-Depress.

Toe brakes and parking brake are available

with or without the EPU as long as the MAIN

PWR switch is not moved to OFF.

If main or standby generator cannot be

reset, NWS is inoperative unless the

EPU is activated.

Refer to ACTIVATED EPU/HYDRAZINE

LEAK, this section.

EMERGENCY ENTRANCE AND CREW RESCUE

Refer to figure 34 for emergency entrance and crew

rescue procedures.

EMERGENCY GROUND JETTISON

Ground jettison of the 300gallon, 370gallon, or

600gallon fuel tank(s) results in the tank(s) striking

the ground before the pylon aft pivots release. The

tank(s) will probably rotate horizontally and may

strike the LG. Use EMER STORES JETTISON on the

ground only as a last resort. Refer to EMERGENCY

JETTISON, this section.

GROUND EGRESS

The order of accomplishment of ground egress steps

depends on the nature of the emergency. For quickest

ground egress (without jettisoning the canopy), place

the canopy switch up and then prepare for exit while

the canopy is opening. However, if fire or danger of

explosion exists, accomplish steps necessary for

egress prior to opening canopy to retain maximum

protection until ready for exit. Disconnect parachute

risers, lapbelt, survival kit, and gsuit. Oxygen and

communication leads are quickdisconnect. If

required, the canopy can be jettisoned even after it

has been partially or fully opened. If the canopy is

restrained by debris or jammed by crash damage,

attempted jettison may result in a portion of the

canopy rocket exhaust entering the cockpit. This

exhaust may present a heat and blast hazard in the

cockpit; toxic gases are present and 100 percent

oxygen should be used.

Throttle-OFF.

Ejection safety lever-Safe (up).

Harness and personal equipment-Release.

EPU switch-OFF (time permitting).

Exit over the left side (conditions

permitting) to avoid EPU exhaust

gases.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

330

If time and conditions permit:

a. Insert a 1/4-inch drive socket wrench/speed handle

into canopy handle lock access plug and rotate ccw

to remove plug.
b. Insert an 8-inch or longer piece of number 25 drill

rod (or 1/8-inch rod) into opening and push inboard

to unlock canopy handle.
c. Position external CANOPY switch to UP.

d. If canopy is still not open, insert 1/4-inch drive

socket wrench/speed handle into the external

canopy handcrank receptacle and rotate cw

Open the canopy emergency release door and extend

the canopy jettison D-handle to full length of cable

(approximately 6 feet). When the cable tightens, pull

handle hard to jettison the canopy.

The canopy jettisons upward and back toward

the vertical tail with great force. Stand to the

side and slightly aft of canopy to full length

of the cable to avoid canopy rocket blast.

RIGHT OR LEFT

SIDE OF AIRCRAFT

1.c.

1.d.

1.b.

1.a.

1F-16X-1-0027X

Emergency Entrance and Crew Rescue

(Typical)

ACCESS PLUG

CANOPY HANDLE

(Locked)

(Unlocked)

DRILL ROD

Positioning the external CANOPY switch to UP

prior to unlocking the canopy will overheat

the canopy actuator motor or pop the circuit

breaker.

(approximately 52 or 87 revolutions

required to fully open canopy).

CANOPY

SWITCH

CANOPY SWITCH

Figure 34.(Sheet 1)

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

332

Canopy-Open.

Consider canopy jettison so rear

seat occupant can egress more rapidly.

Opening the canopy with the

MANUAL CANOPY CONTROL hand

crank is extremely difficult. If immedi

ate egress is required, the canopy

should be jettisoned rather than

opened with the handcrank.

If canopy does not raise:

OXYGEN-100%.

If jettison is unsuccessful, heat, blast,

and toxic gas from the rockets may

enter the cockpit.

To prevent the flow of oxygen into the

cockpit after the oxygen hose is

disconnected, do not select EMER.

Canopy-Jettison.

Pulling the CANOPY JETTISON T

handle other than straight out may

cause the handle to jam.

HOT REFUELING EMERGENCY

In the event of a fire or fuel leak/spill while refueling

in hot pit area, refer to FIRE/OVERHEAT/FUEL

LEAK (GROUND), this section. In the event of fire in

the area of refueling operation (other than in the hot

pit area), have the refueling operation discontinued

and taxi clear.

ACTIVATED EPU/HYDRAZINE LEAK

If landing with an activated EPU or a hydrazine leak

is detected while the engine is running:

Inform landing base of hydrazine leak or EPU

operation and request bioenvironmental services

support.

Treat any leak as a hydrazine leak

until investigation proves otherwise.

OXYGEN-100%.

When on the ground:

AIR SOURCE knob-OFF (if required).

Consider turning the ECS off to prevent the

possibility of hydrazine fumes or EPU

exhaust gases entering the cockpit.

If AIR SOURCE knob is placed to OFF,

also turn off nonessential avionic

equipment as electronic equipment

may be damaged.

PX III

If AIR SOURCE knob is placed to

OFF, OBOGS caution light will illumi

nate. If OXY LOW warning light

illuminates before ground crew ar

rives with oxygen bottle, activate EOS.

Taxi to designated isolated parking area (if

required) and park aircraft with left wing into

wind if possible.

Insure all nonessential personnel are clear.

EPU switch-OFF.

Shut down the engine (after left main wheel is

chocked).

NOTE

To prevent sitting in a sealed cockpit

(hot) without ECS, consider waiting

for ground crew to arrive with ladder

and oxygen bottle prior to shutting

down the engine.

NWS FAILURE/HARDOVER

NWS failure may be detected by the NWS FAIL

caution light or uncommanded NWS inputs with no

caution light. If NWS FAIL caution light is on, do not

engage NWS. If the NLG strut is overextended, the

NWS cannot engage. If the NLG strut overextends

after NWS engagement, NWS becomes disengaged

and the AR/NWS light goes off.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

333

NWS malfunctions at any speed may

cause an abrupt turn, tire skidding or

blowout, aircraft tipping, and/or

departure from the prepared surface.

NWS-Disengage.

AR/NWS light-Verify off.

Rudder and brakes-As required.

TAKEOFF EMERGENCIES

DELAYED ROTATION

Several factors can cause the airspeed at which

rotation occurs to be greater than that determined

from T.O. GR1F16CJ11. As the weight of external

stores carried increases, more nose down moment

must be overcome to rotate for takeoff. Another

factor is the application of roll stick force in addition

to aft stick force. Applying a roll input reduces the

maximum trailing edge up position for one

horizontal tail and increased airspeed may be

required to compensate. The last and most

significant factor is improper servicing of the nose

gear strut. Improper servicing may not be detectable

during preflight inspection and may cause rotation

speed to increase by up to 15 knots. All of these

factors combined may add up to 25 knots to the

computed airspeed for rotation. If pretakeoff flight

control checks were normal and the engine is

operating normally (acceleration check normal), the

aircraft will rotate above computed rotation speed.

Therefore, takeoff should not be aborted due to

delayed rotation until at least takeoff speed is

attained. Notify maintenance after flight if a

significantly delayed rotation occurred.

ABORT

The decision to abort or continue takeoff depends on

many factors. Considerations should include, but not

be limited to, the following:

Runway factors:Runway remaining, surface

condition (wet, dry, etc.), type and/or number of

barriers/cables available, obstructions alongside or

at the departure end, wind direction and velocity,

and weather and visibility.

Aircraft factors:GW, stores, nature of the

emergency, speed at decision point, and importance

of becoming airborne.

Stopping factors:Maximum antiskid braking,

speedbrakes, aerodynamic braking, hook, and drag

chute.

Aborting takeoff at high speed with a

blown tire may be more dangerous

than continuing takeoff. For heavy

GW takeoffs, an abort at high speed

with a blown tire is extremely danger

ous because braking and directional

control are impaired.

At high speed (prior to WOW), forward

stick pressure in excess of approxi

mately 2 pounds results in full trailing

edge down deflection of the horizontal

tails. This causes excessive loads on

the NLG which can lead to nose tire

failure and possible structural failure

of the NLG.

Failure to use full antiskid braking or

applying brakes with engine above idle

thrust significantly increases the

wheel brake temperature and proba

bility of a wheel brake fire.

Normally, with the short takeoff distances of the

aircraft, abort is not a problem unless directional

control is a factor (e.g., blown tire). An early decision to

abort provides the most favorable circumstances. If

there is any doubt about the ability to stop on the

runway, lower the hook.

Consider aborting after becoming airborne only when

sufficient runway is available and flight to a key

position is not possible.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

334

Aborts above 100 KCAS require diligent adherence to

the procedures in this section for the abort to be

successful. If aborting after rotation, retard throttle to

IDLE and maintain twopoint attitude while applying

maximum wheel braking (maximum pedal pressure

(antiskid on) consistent with maintaining directional

control). When wheel brakes become effective, the nose

automatically lowers. After the nosewheel is on the

runway, use maximum effort braking (full aft stick, full

open speedbrakes, and maximum wheel braking). If

aborting before rotation, retard throttle to IDLE,

maintain threepoint attitude and apply maximum

effort braking if stopping distance is critical. NWS

should be engaged if directional control is a problem.

Consider following hot brake procedures after any

abort. Taxiing after an abort will further increase brake

temperature.

When braking absorbs a high amount

of energy, do not shut down engine

until firefighting equipment is avail

able and do not use the parking brake.

Hot wheels and brakes may ignite

leaking hydraulic fluid. Wheel fusible

plugs may relieve tire pressure within

15 minutes after stop.

Throttle-IDLE.

When the throttle is retarded to IDLE

from MAX AB, the thrust and rpm

decay to idle can take up to 24 seconds.

Do not mistake high thrust/rpm for

failure of the engine to respond to the

idle command. Engine shutdown from

MAX AB may result in a tailpipe fire.

DRAG CHUTE switch-DEPLOY (if required).

Wheel brakes-Apply (as required).

HOOK switch-DN (if required).

The hook should be lowered at least 1500 feet

from the cable to allow adequate time for hook

to stabilize and for full holddown force to be

developed by the hook actuator.

Refer to CABLE ARRESTMENT, this section.

The hook may miss the cable if the

aircraft is not slow enough to compress

the MLG struts sufficiently to make

WOW or if forward stick pressure is

held.

If on fire:

Throttle-OFF.

NOTE

With engine shut down, NWS is lost

and EPU does not activate automati

cally. After hydraulic pressure drops,

braking is available using the brake/

JFS accumulators only. Stop straight

ahead and engage parking brake.

FUEL MASTER switch-OFF.

ENGINE MALFUNCTION ON TAKEOFF

An engine malfunction on takeoff presents a

demanding situation where critical actions must be

accomplished quickly with little time for analysis. If

takeoff is continued, a straight ahead climb is

generally preferred over an immediate turn to low

key. This action provides more favorable ejection

parameters and an increase in analysis time. If

necessary, use only shallow turns to avoid

aggravating the situation. Jettison stores if required

to reduce GW.

ENGINE FAILURE ON TAKEOFF

Engine failure shortly after liftoff may not permit

time for analysis or corrective action. The primary

concern should be to trade any excess airspeed for

altitude and to eject prior to allowing a sink rate to

develop. Jettisoning stores may aid in gaining

altitude but must not delay the ejection decision. If

the failure occurs later in the takeoff phase, time may

be available for analysis or corrective action.

If conditions permit:

Abort.

If conditions do not permit an abort:

Zoom.

Stores-Jettison (if possible).

Eject.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

335

AB MALFUNCTION ON TAKEOFF

An AB malfunction can be detected by a thrust loss

and nozzle closure or failure of AB to light within

allowed time or stalls accompanied by a loud bang

or pop. An AB failure (other than a slow/no light)

may indicate other engine problems. If possible,

abort the takeoff. If takeoff is continued, the throttle

should be retarded to MIL. If normal thrust is not

available in MIL, refer to LOW THRUST ON

TAKEOFF OR AT LOW ALTITUDE (NONAB), this

section. AB operation should not be reattempted

unless required to sustain flight.

If decision is made to stop:

Abort.

If takeoff is continued:

Throttle-MIL.

Stores-Jettison (if required).

LOW THRUST ON TAKEOFF OR AT LOW ALTITUDE

(NONAB)

PW 229

Low altitude, for engine malfunction purposes, is

generally defined as 10,000 feet AGL or below.

Low thrust can be the result of DEECrelated

failures; a failed open, damaged or missing nozzle; or

an engine rpm rollback. A failed open, damaged or

missing nozzle may result in significant thrust loss

and the inability to take off or maintain level flight.

For description of failed open, damaged or missing

nozzle, refer to NOZZLE FAILURE

PW 229

, this

section. Low thrust can also be the result of the start

bleed strap failing to close during the normal start

cycle.

If low thrust occurs during takeoff and conditions

permit, the takeoff should be aborted. If the takeoff

must be continued or in any critical phase of flight

and MIL thrust is not sufficient, AB should be used.

An excessively open nozzle may reduce the chance

for successful AB light. If the AB does not light

(allow the DEEC to automatically resequence the

AB if conditions permit), place the ENG CONT

switch to SEC.

If an automatic transfer to SEC occurs or SEC is

selected manually, resulting thrust is 7080 percent

of normal MIL thrust with no AB capability. If

thrust is still low, consider jettisoning stores.

If on takeoff and the decision is made to stop:

Abort.

If takeoff is continued and/or thrust is insufficient:

Throttle-AB.

The chances for a successful AB light with the

nozzle open more than 30 percent are

reduced.

If thrust is still insufficient or AB does not light:

ENG CONT switch-SEC.

With nozzle loss, catastrophic engine

failure and fire are probable with

prolonged high power settings above

850

C FTIT while in SEC.

NOTE

In a partial thrust situation, thrust

available may increase as altitude

decreases. 250 knots approximates the

airspeed at which thrust required for

level flight is the lowest.

Stores-Jettison (if required).

If nozzle is failed open, damaged, or missing:

Airspeed-Climb to arrive at 250 knots or

descend at 250 knots to obtain level flight

above minimum recommended ejection altitude

or minimum safe altitude, whichever is

appropriate.

NOTE

With a missing nozzle, level flight may

not be attainable above 5000 feet MSL.

If descent is required, maintain 250

knots with throttle set at 850

C FTIT.

If level flight cannot be maintained by 1000 feet above

minimum recommended ejection altitude or mini

mum safe altitude, whichever is appropriate:

Throttle-As required to maintain 250 knots

in level flight.

If airspeed drops below 250 knots,

trade altitude to reacquire 250 knots.

Do not descend below minimum

recommended ejection altitude or

minimum safe altitude, whichever is

appropriate.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

336

Land as soon as possible. Plan a flameout

landing. Refer to FLAMEOUT LANDING, this

section.

LOW THRUST ON TAKEOFF OR AT LOW ALTITUDE

(NONAB)

129

Low altitude, for engine malfunction purposes, is

generally defined as 10,000 feet AGL or below.

Low thrust can be the result of DECrelated failures,

the nozzle failing, or an rpm rollback. These

situations may result in significant thrust loss and

the inability to take off or maintain level flight. If low

thrust occurs during takeoff and conditions permit,

the takeoff should be aborted.

If the takeoff must be continued or in any critical

phase of flight, when MIL thrust is insufficient, AB

should be used. An automatic transfer to HYB or SEC

may occur resulting in less than MIL thrust with no

AB capability (SEC). An excessively open nozzle may

reduce the chance for a successful AB light. If the AB

does not light, the ENG CONT switch should be

placed to SEC.

If an automatic transfer to SEC occurs or SEC is

selected manually, resulting thrust is 7095percent of

normal MIL thrust with no AB capability. If thrust is

still low, consider jettisoning stores.

If on takeoff and the decision is made to stop:

Abort.

If takeoff is continued and/or thrust is insufficient:

Throttle-AB.

The chances for a successful AB light with the

nozzle open more than 30 percent are

reduced.

If thrust is still insufficient or AB does not light:

ENG CONT switch-SEC.

NOTE

In a partial thrust situation, thrust

available may increase as altitude

decreases. 250 knots approximates the

airspeed at which thrust required for

level flight is the lowest.

Stores-Jettison (if required).

ENGINE FIRE ON TAKEOFF

An engine fire may be indicated by the ENG FIRE

warning and/or OVERHEAT caution lights, high

FTIT, smoke, or fumes. Refer to ENGINE FIRE, this

section.

LG FAILS TO RETRACT

If the LG handle warning light remains on after the

LG handle is placed to UP, the LG or LG doors are not

fully up and locked.

Airspeed-300 knots maximum.

LG handle-DN. (Use DN LOCK REL button

if required.)

If LG handle does not lower, select

BRAKES CHAN 2 and position ALT

FLAPS switch to EXTEND.

PW 229

Nozzle remains closed, resulting in

higher than normal landing thrust.

If LG comes down normally:

GW-Reduce prior to landing.

If LG does not indicate down:

Do not cycle LG handle. Damage to LG

or LG doors may result.

Go to ALTERNATE LG EXTENSION, this

section.

LG HANDLE WILL NOT RAISE

If the left MLG WOW switch fails to the ground

position, the LG handle does not move out of the DN

position. In addition, the TO/LDG CONFIG warning

light and touchdown skid control system are affected.

The LG handle may be raised by first depressing the

LG handle downlock release button.

If conditions permit:

Airspeed-300 knots maximum.

GW-Reduce prior to landing.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

Change 1337

If LG must be raised:

LG handle DN LOCK REL button-Depress.

LG handle-UP.

TO/LDG CONFIG light is on if left MLG

WOW switch has failed.

When desired:

LG handle-DN. (Use DN LOCK REL button

if required.)

If LG handle does not lower, select

BRAKES CHAN 2 and position ALT

FLAPS switch to EXTEND.

PW 229

Nozzle remains closed, resulting in

higher than normal landing thrust.

After touchdown:

Brakes-Apply after wheels spin up.

Touchdown antiskid protection may

not be available. Landing with feet on

the brake pedals may result in blown

tire(s).

BLOWN TIRE ON TAKEOFF

Tire failure on takeoff is difficult to recognize and may

not be noticed in the cockpit.

Possible indications of a NLG tire failure include a

loud explosion, slight deceleration, vibrations, flying

debris, and at night, a flash or flame. These

characteristics can be mistaken for an engine stall.

Rubber debris may cause damage to the engine, NWS

wiring harness, WOW switch assembly and/or gear

position sensor wiring. NWS may not be available

even though the AR/NWS light is on and the NWS

FAIL light is off.

Aborting takeoff at high speed with a

blown tire may be more dangerous

than continuing takeoff. For heavy

weight takeoffs, an abort at high speed

with a blown tire is extremely danger

ous because braking and directional

control are impaired.

NOTE

The decision to take off or abort depends

on the speed at the time of the failure,

GW, stopping distance required, and

arresting gear availability.

If takeoff is continued, do not retract the LG, reduce

GW if practical, and prepare to land as soon as

practical.

Directional control during stopping is the primary

concern when aborting with a blown tire. Heavy GW

and high speed aborts place greater demands on the

brakes and tires. This may cause damage to the NWS,

wheels, and struts which may result in loss of

directional control. In addition, heavy differential

braking may result in MLG tire failure.

If aborting with a blown MLG tire, leave antiskid on

to minimize possibility of skidding the good tire. If the

wheel with the blown tire does not turn, the antiskid

switches to the

b2t

alternate braking mode,

LESS

b2t

pulsating antiskid mode. Use roll control to relieve

pressure on the blown tire and NWS to maintain

directional control.

If aborting with a blown NLG tire, hold the nosewheel

off the runway (if able) and use twopoint

aerodynamic braking until control effectiveness

begins to decay. Lower the nosewheel to the runway

and immediately engage NWS, if available, to

maintain directional control. Use aft stick to reduce

load on the NLG after brakes are applied. If NWS is

not available, the aircraft tends to drift right.

Attempt to move to the left side of the runway before

rudder effectiveness is lost and maintain directional

control with rudder and differential braking. Stop

short of the departureend arresting cable if possible.

The small nosewheel rolling radius with the tire

missing may allow the cable to pass over top of the

nosewheel and cause NLG collapse.

A NLG tire failure accompanied by complete tire

separation from the wheel may cause reverse

castering. The conditions for this to occur are the

NWS disengaged or inoperative; the nose wheel rim

rolling on a deformable surface (i.e. asphalt); and

lateral force applied to the nose wheel from either a

rudder input or differential braking. If reverse

castering occurs the nose wheel will turn in the

opposite direction of rudder and brake inputs making

it extremely difficult to maintain directional control.

F16C/D. FLIGHT MANUAL (2002) - page 20

F16C/D. FLIGHT MANUAL (2002) - page 20