MANUAL OF NATO SAFETY PRINCIPLES FOR THE STORAGE OF MILITARY AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES (May 2010)

ANNEX I-B

AASTP-1

(Edition 1)

Section II - Criteria for Q-D Tables 1A-1C

In this section the different types of distances are covered as follows:

- Inter-Magazine Distances

paragraphs

1-8

- Explosives Workshop Distances:

paragraph

- Inhabited Building Distances/PTRD’s:

paragraphs

10-14

D1-Distances and D2-Distances

Distance Functions

D1 = 0.35 Q^1/3 Valid for Q ≤ 30 000 kg

D2 = 0.44 Q^1/3 Valid for 30 001 ≤ Q

≤

120 000 kg

Explanation

The D1- and D2-distance functions are based on UK trials (Ref. 1) with barricaded open

stacks of aircraft bombs, subsequently reviewed (Ref. 2) in the light of US trials on

modular storage. The distances prevent simultaneous propagation of detonation to

adjacent stacks beyond the earth barricades (see paragraph 1.3.3.1.) though some damage

to bombs and occasional fires or delayed explosions may occur.

The use of D2-distances is limited to situations not involving combustible materials and

with only lightweight weather protection (i.e. metal shed roof or tarpaulin). Delayed

propagation by fire should not occur.

D3-Distances

Distance Function

D3 = 0.5 Q^1/3

This formula gives the normal minimum separation between the walls of adjacent igloos

when the relevant roof and wall of the igloo at the PES and that at the ES are both

protected by the prescribed amount of earth (Ref. 3-14, 17).

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Explanation

The D3-distances apply to any combination of rear-walls and side-walls. Thus the head-

wall and door(s) of the acceptor igloo, at the ES, would not be exposed face-on to the

blast from an explosion at the PES. This minimum separation should not be used in wet

sand or wet clay which is associated with unusually large crater size and ground shock

effects.

D4-Distances

Distance Function

D4 = 0.8 Q^1/3

This formula is based upon French (Burlot) (Ref. 15) and US trials (Ref. 8, 13, 16).

D4-distances prevent propagation of an explosion by flame through the crater and by

blast. Barricades give protection against propagation by projections.

Explanation

The D4-distances give normal minimum separation between the walls of adjacent igloos

when either the relevant wall of the igloo at the PES or that at the ES is protected by the

prescribed amount of earth, but not both. The D4-distances apply when the front of the

one igloo faces the rear-wall of another provided the construction of the head-wall and

door(s) are of sufficient quality. Thus the head-wall and door(s) of the acceptor igloo

would be exposed face-on to the blast from an explosion at the PES. This is why the peak

overpressure for Design Load for Head-Wall and doors in Protection of Igloos against

Blast specified for face-to-face exposure is greater than that for those in parallel despite

the greater inter magazine distance.⁵ The use of igloos with their axes perpendicular

presents special problems which require individual assessment. The D4-distances are not

sufficient when the front of one igloo faces the side-wall of another (see paragraph

below).

⁵ Change 2 Part II Paras 2.3.2.2.b)1) and 2). Part II Para 2.3.2.2.b) now refers to these details

contained in a D-doc, Nationally Approved Structures

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D5-Distances

Distance Function

D5 = 1.1 Q^1/3

This formula is used when the front of one igloo faces the side-wall of another.

Explanation

The D5-distances give the normal minimum separation between the side of a donor igloo

(PES) and an acceptor head-wall

(ES) without significant risk of explosion

communication (by impact of ejecta and structure debris) (Ref. 8).

D6-Distances

Distance Function

D6 = 1.8 Q^1/3

This formula is based upon US trials (Ref.

). D6-distances prevent propagation of an

explosion by flame and blast when the walls of the ES are of reinforced concrete at least

25 cm thick.

Explanation

The D6-distances give the normal minimum separation between the walls of adjacent igloos

when the layout would qualify for the use of D4-distances but the design of head-wall, door

frame or door(s) does not meet the stringent requirements specified in paragraph 2.3.2.2.

In some cases it may be economic to improve the design of these features in order to

qualify for the smaller Inter-Magazine Distances.

D7-Distances

Distance Function

D7 = 2.4 Q^1/3

This formula is based upon French (Burlot) (Ref. 15) and UK trials (Ref.

). The D7-

distances prevent propagation of an explosion by flame, heat and blast.

Explanation

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D8-Distances

Distance Function

D8 = 3.6 Q^1/3

This formula is based upon UK trials (Ref.

). The D8-distances prevent propagation by

fragments where the radius of fragments is greater than the flame radius.

Explanation

D9-Distances

Distance Function

D9 = 4.8 Q^1/3

Explanation

D10-Distances

Distance Function

D10 = 8.0 Q^1/3

This formula is based upon UK trials (Ref.

) and US trials (Ref.

). The D10-distances

protect personnel against severe injuries by blast.

Explanation

The D10-distances give the minimum distance from any aspect of an igloo to ensure that

the blast effects are tolerable for an explosives workshop which is barricaded and has a

protective roof. The normal design load for an explosives workshop is free field over-

pressure of 0.2 bar, the positive duration (ms) is 4.0 Q^1/3 and the positive impulse per unit

area is 0.4 Q^1/3 (bar ms).

Minimum Distance

D = 270 m

The distance is the minimum distance from an igloo at which the hazard from rocks and

structural debris is tolerable for an explosives workshop which is unbarricaded or has no

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protective roof. This minimum distance is used in conjunction with the formula for blast

protection given by D10-distances.

10.

D11-Distances

Distance Functions

D = 3.6 Q^1/2

This formula is valid for Q ≤ 4 500 kg. The distances are two thirds of the Inhabited

Building Distances given by D = 5.5 Q^1/2, suitably rounded (Ref. ).

D = 14.8 Q^1/3

This formula is valid for Q > 4 500 kg. The distances are exactly two thirds of the

Inhabited Building Distances given by 22.2 Q^1/3 (Ref. ).

Explanation

Minimum Distance

D = 180 m

The distance is exactly two thirds of the minimum Inhabited Building Distance

D = 270 m (Ref. ).

11.

D12-Distances

Distance Function

D12 = 22.2 Q^1/3

Explanation

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12.

D13-Distances

Distance Functions

D13 = 5.5 Q^1/2

This formula is valid for Q ≤ 4 500 kg. The distances were based originally on a UK

analysis (Ref.

) of bomb damage to traditional British brick dwellings including a survey

of accidental explosions and trials. Subsequently the US independently re-appraised the

expected damage from small explosions (Ref. ). The Group (Ref. ) abolished the former

reduction of distances by 20 % for Q ≤ 3 600 kg in the light of UK trials (Ref.

) and US

trials (Ref.

) and statistical analysis of damage from accidental explosions (Ref.

). The

distances do not correspond to a fixed value of peak overpressure, the positive impulse

per unit area approximates to ?? bar ms (Ref. ).

The expected degree of damage to dwellings is tolerable since the extent of buildings

affected by an explosion not exceeding 4 500 kg would not be great (Ref. ).

D13 = 22.2 Q^1/3

This formula is valid for Q > 4 500 kg. The distances were based originally on the same

analysis (Ref.

) as 1) above. The US had contemporaneously adopted values tending to

20 Q^1/3 based on a review of a comprehensive study of damage to dwellings of North

American construction from a very large accidental explosion

(Ref. ). The Group

subsequently adopted the criterion 50 mb peak overpressure for all normal types of

construction (excluding curtain wall) and for caravans (Ref.

) in the context of the

tolerable degree of damage to a limited number of dwellings (individual risk). Discussion

continues on the tolerable extent of such damage (group risk) (Ref. ).

Explanation

Minimum Distances

D = 270 m

This distance is the minimum distance at which the risk of injury from

projections for an individual in a dwelling is considered to be tolerable in

sparsely populated areas (i.e. individual risk). It is not tolerable in a built-up

area (group risk), nor in a vicinity of an igloo which produces many pieces of

structural debris (Ref.

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D = 400 m

This distance is the minimum distance for tolerable group risk in a built-up

area (Ref ). It is also the minimum distance for tolerable individual risk in a

sparsely populated area near an igloo owing to the many pieces of structural

debris produced.

13.

D14- and D15-Distances

Distance Functions

D14 = 14.0 Q^1/3

D15 = 18.0 Q^1/3

Explanations

The D14- and D15-distances are based on US full scale and model trials

(Ref. 18-20).

D14-distances are used for Inhabited Building Distances from the rear of and

D15-distances from the side of earth-covered buildings acting as a PES. The

buildings must meet the requirements of subparagraph 1.3.6.7.a), have an

internal volume exceeding 500 m³ and have a NEQ of Hazard Division 1.1

ammunition not exceeding 45 000 kg. In no case may the Q-D be less

than 400 m.

14.

D16- and D17-Distances

Distance Functions

D16 = 9.3 Q^1/3

D17 = 12.0 Q^1/3

Explanations

The D16- and D17-distances are based on US full scale and model trials

(Ref. 18-20).

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The D16- and D17-distances are the Public Traffic Route Distances correspon-

ding

(i.e.

2/3) to D14- and D15-Inhabited Building Distances. The

D16-distances therefore apply to the rear of and the D17-distances to the side

of an earth-covered building acting as a PES. The buildings must meet the

requirements of subparagraph 1.3.6.7.a), have an internal volume exceeding

500 m³ and have a NEQ of Hazard Division 1.1 ammunition not exceeding

45 000 kg. In no case may the Q-D be less than 270 m. However, the full

Inhabited Building Distances

(D14- and D15-distances) with a minimum

of 400 m should be used, when necessary, in accordance with

subparagraph 1.3.1.14.b).

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Section III - Criteria for Q-D Tables 2A-2F

In this section the different types of distances are covered as follows:

- Inter-Magazine Distances

paragraphs

1-2

- Explosives Workshop Distances: paragraph

- Public Traffic Route Distances: paragraphs

4-5

Fixed Distance

D = 2 m

This distance is used whenever the ES offers protection against fragments and/or debris

from the PES.

Explanation

Fixed Distances

D = 10 m - 25 m - 90 m

These distances are dependent on:

The fragments and debris likely to arise from the PES in the event of an

accidental explosion in the PES.

The susceptibility of the ES i.e. door facing PES, weak roof etc. to attack by

such debris and/or fragments.

The desired level of protection.

Explanation

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Fixed Distances

D = 25 m - 90 m - 135 m

The fixed distance 25 m is used for the barricaded workshop with a protective roof i.e. it

offers good protection against fragments. The fixed distances 90 m and 135 m are used

for barricaded workshops with light roofs and unbarricaded workshops with or without

protective roof. 90 m or 135 m are used depending on the PES contains ammunition up to

60 mm calibre only or ammunition above 60 mm calibre.

Explanations

(for D = 25 m)

D = 90 m. Based upon US trials (Ref.

). Acceptable risk from fragments and

lobbed ammunition. Workshops can be evacuated and traffic can be stopped

before the final fragment saturation has been reached. In the first minutes of an

accidental explosion only a few items and fragments can be expected to be

propelled at that distance. The possibility that protected buildings may be

breached by an explosion within them and that subsequent explosions may

cause ammunition to be lobbed out through these breaches is accepted.

(for D = 135 m)

Fixed Distances

D = 90 m - 135 m

A fixed distance of 90 m or 135 m depending on the calibre of the ammunition in the PES

is used when traffic can be stopped promptly to avoid the worst attack.

Explanation

D = 90m and 135 m. Based upon US trials. Acceptable risk from fragments and lobbed

ammunition. Workshops can be evacuated and traffic can be stopped before the final

fragment saturation has been reached. In the first minutes of an accidental explosion only

a few items and fragments can be expected to be propelled at that distance. The

possibility that protected buildings may be breached by an explosion within them and that

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Section IV - Criteria for Q-D Tables 3A-3C

In this section the different types of distances are covered as follows:

- Fixed Distances

paragraphs

1-5

- Distance Functions Distances

paragraphs

6-9

Fixed Distance

D = 2 m

This distance is used, providing virtually complete protection, whenever the PES is an

earth-covered building or heavy-walled building with or without protective roof, which is

side - or rear - on to the side, rear or face (when doors and head-wall are resistant to fire)

of an ES which is an earth-covered building or building of non-combustible construction

with walls of 70 cm concrete, brick or equivalent with protective roof.

Explanation

Fixed Distance

D = 10 m

This distance is used, providing high/limited degree of protection, whenever the PES is

an open stack or light structure, barricaded or unbarricaded, or earth-covered building

with door facing the ES and where the ES is a side-on earth-covered building not

complying with paragraph 2.3.2.2. or a barricaded open stack or light structure.

Explanation

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Fixed Distance

D = 25 m

This distance is used as alternative to 2 m or 10 m to provide a better degree of protection

or in cases where resistance of head-wall and doors is inadequate.

Explanation

Known as Fire-Fighting Distance this distance prevents ignition of buildings and stacks

by radiant heat, whilst UK and US trials with propellants in buildings designed to vent

through the door end show that the contents of the buildings are thrown through the front

only.

Fixed Distance

D = 160 m

This distance is used as minimum distance for Public Traffic Routes when the PES is an

unspecified earth-covered building with door facing the route and likely reaction of

drivers on busy roads is considered to be acceptable.

Explanation

2/3 minimum Inhabited Building Distance used for PES detailed in subparagraph 27.a)

above.

Fixed Distance

D = 240 m

This distance is the minimum Inhabited Building Distance when the PES is an

unspecified earth-covered building with door facing the inhabited building.

Explanation

Based upon US trials with propellants. Minimum distance for protection against burning

items projected by mortar effect (i.e. directional projection).

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D1-Distances

D1 = 0.22 Q^1/2

D1-distances are used, with a minimum of 25 m, in those cases when because of

orientation or construction of either PES or ES, 25 m fixed distance is inadequate.

Explanation

Based upon UK trials with propellants. Derived from UK formula D

1.05 W^0.44.

Distances protect against communication by flame and heat.

D2-Distances

D2 = 3.2 Q^1/3

D2-distances are used, with a minimum of 60 m, as distance to workshops from all types

of PES except when the PES is an unspecified earth-covered building with unbarricaded

door facing the workshop.

Explanation

Based upon UK and US trials with propellants. Derived from UK formula D

= 8 W^1/3;

corresponding US formula D

7 W^1/3 (approx.). Distances protect against effect of

radiant heat. Heavy-walled buildings are considered to give no appreciable protection

against the hazard.

D3-Distances

D3 = 4.3 Q^1/3

D3-distances are used as Public Traffic Route Distance, with a minimum distance of 60

m (but see paragraph 27 above), when reaction of drivers on busy roads is considered to

be acceptable.

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Section V - Criteria for Q-D Tables 3D-3F

In this section the different types of distances are covered as follows:

- Fixed Distances

paragraphs

1-4

- Distance Function Distance

paragraph

Fixed Distance

D = 2 m

This distance is used, providing virtually complete protection, for all side- or rear-on

earth-covered ES regardless of PES and when the PES is a side- or rear-on earth-covered

building and the ES is a face-on earth-covered building with protective door and head-

wall or a heavy-walled building with protective roof.

Explanation

Fixed Distance

D = 10 m

This distance is used, providing either virtually complete or high/limited degree of

protection, where the PES is a heavy-walled building with or without protective roof or

an open stack or light structure with or without barricade and the ES is a face-on earth-

covered building or barricaded open stack or light structure.

Explanation

Fixed Distance

D = 25 m

This distance is used as alternative to or in place of 10 m when resistance of headwall and

door of an earth-covered building or other form of ES is inadequate. It is also used as

Workshop Distance where the workshop is a barricaded heavy-walled building with

protective roof.

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Explanation

Known as Fire-Fighting Distance this distance prevents ignition of buildings and stacks

by radiant heat, whilst UK and US trials with propellants in buildings designed to vent

through the door end show that the contents of the buildings are thrown through the front

only.

Fixed Distance

D = 60 m

This distance is used as alternative to or in place of 25 m when construction or orientation

of the PES/ES is considered to be inadequate. It is also used as Workshop Distance where

the workshop does not have a protective roof and/or a barricade and as fixed Public

Traffic Route Distance when traffic can be stopped promptly.

Explanation

Based upon French (Burlot's) trials. Minimum distance from a PES containing Hazard

Division 1.3 items, other than propellants.

D4-Distances

D4 = 6.4 Q^1/3

D4-distances are used as Inhabited Building Distances with a minimum of 60 m.

Explanation

Based upon UK trials with propellants. Derived from UK formula D = 16 W^1/3. Distances

protect against flame and heat.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

No.

Paper ref.

Date

Contents

ESTC SOLTAU TRIALS

AUG 1947

AFWL-TR-67-132

MAY 1968

High Explosive Storage

Test BIG PAPA

AC/258(ST)WP/1

OCT 1970

Original basis for discussion

AC/258-D/152

JUL 1971

Summary of London

meeting, February 1971

AC/258-D/176

FEB 1972

Summary of Brussels

meeting, January 1972

AC/258(ST)WP/31

NOV 1972

Blast Data from

ESKIMO I

Informal Working Papers

JAN-AUG

Blast and response data

United Kingdom

1972 and

from UK model tests

SEP-DEC

1972

NWC TP 5430

APR 1973

Final technical report

on ESKIMO I

AC/258-R/14

JAN 1974

AC/258-D/211 principles

approved as part of AC/258-D/70

NWC TP 5557

SEP 1974

Final technical report

on ESKIMO II

US(ST)IWP/11

SEP 1974

US data on earth-covered

igloos

US(ST)IWP/16

NOV 1974

ESKIMO III test results

US(ST)IWP/49

JAN 1976

ESKIMO IV test results

AC/258-D/211(2nd Revise)

MAY 1977

Quantity-Distances for

earth-covered magazines

(igloos)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS - PART II

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION….……………………………………………………………………..……..II-1-3

CHAPTER 2 - RESERVED……………………………………………………………………….………...…

II-2-1

CHAPTER 3 - ABOVEGROUND STORAGE……………………………………………………………

….II-3-1

SECTION I - SPECIAL STORAGE CONFIGURATIONS……………………………………………………II-3-1

SECTION II - STORAGE BUILDINGS AND THEIR CONSTRUCTION…………………….….….………II-3-4

SECTION III - BARRICADES: DESIGN CRITERIA…………………………………………….…...……….II-3-6

SECTION IV - LIGHTNING PROTECTION……………………………………………………… ………….II-3-11

SECTION V - STANDARD OF INTERNAL LIGHTING IN EXPLOSIVES STORAGE BUILDINGS…. II-3-17

CHAPTER 4 - RESERVED…………………………………………………………………………………….….II-4-1

CHAPTER 5 - DESIGN ENVIRONMENT CRITERIA…………………………………………………………II-5-1

SECTION I - LIST OF SYMBOLS………………………………………………………………….……………II-5-1

SECTION II - GENERAL…………………………….………………………………………………..…………II-5-5

SECTION III - AIRBLAST………………………………………………………………………………..……..II-5-14

SECTION IV - PROJECTIONS: FRAGMENTS, DEBRIS, LOBBED AMMUNITION…………….…..….II-5-30

SECTION V - GROUND SHOCK………………………………………………………………………….……II-5-45

SECTION VI - CRATERING…………………………………………………………………………………….II-5-49

SECTION VII - THERMAL RADIATIONS…………………………………………………………….…..….II-5-55

SECTION VIII - DAMAGE CRITERIA/HAZARD LIMITS - RISK ASSESSMENT GUIDES……….…..II-5-59

SECTION IX - REFERENCES/ PC CODES/FIGURES/TABLES……………………………………………II-5-71

CHAPTER 6 - OPERATIONS IN AN EXPLOSIVES AREA……………………………………….………… II-6-1

SECTION I - INTRODUCTIONS…………………………………………………………………….….………II-6-1

SECTION II - GENERAL SAFETY PRECAUTIONS…………………………………………………..……..II-6-2

SECTION III - ARRANGEMENT OF AMMUNITON AND EXPLOSIVES IN A BUILDING OR

STACK……………………………………………………………………………………………………….…..…II-6-6

SECTION IV - HANDLING OF AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES…………………………………..….II-6-10

SECTION V - REPAIR, MODIFICATION, INSPECTION AND PROOF OF AMMUNITION……….…..II-6-12

SECTION VI - DESTRUCTION OF AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES……………………….……..….II-6-19

CHAPTER 7 - DETAILED INFORMATION RELATING TO HAZARDS FROM ELECTRO MAGNETIC

RADIATION TO AMMUNITON CONTAINING ELCTRO-EXPLOSIVE DEVICES…………….……..…II-7-1

ANNEX II-A - RESERVED…………………………………………………………….……………..…….……II-A-1

ANNEX II-B - DETAILED INFORMATION RELATED TO EARTH-COVERED MAGAZINES

(IGLOOS)……………………………………………………………………………………..…………….………II-B-1

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CHAPTER 3 - ABOVEGROUND STORAGE

Section I - Special Storage Configurations

2.3.1.1.

Storage in Open Stacks/Buffered Storage

Storage in Open stacks

The storage of shell in open stacks is described in paragraph 1.3.3.2. The special types of projectiles and the

conditions for this type of storage are as follows:

The projectiles should be filled only with TNT or Amatol. RDX/TNT is unsuitable.

The projectiles should have walls generally similar to the 155 mm M107 and the 8 inch Howitzer

projectiles as regards robustness and ability to withstand fragment attack. In particular, projectiles

with thin noses (HESH or HEP) are unsuitable.

The projectiles should be unfuzed or should be fitted with nose plugs of a substantial design. The

thickness of the plug must be at least 25 mm.

Each stack should be restricted to 6 800 kg NEQ and to 1 000 projectiles.

The projectiles in a stack should be arranged with axes parallel and noses in the same direction.

The separation of adjacent stacks of the maximum size should be 1.3 m between nearest parts (nose-

plug rings or projectiles' bases). The separation of smaller stacks should be that indicated in Figure 3-

I. Adjacent stacks may present the projectiles either nose-to-nose or base-to-base, but not nose-to-base

nor vice versa.

At the ends of each stack the side-walls of projectiles will be exposed. These side-walls are relatively

vulnerable to attack by fragments from another stack. Care must be taken to ensure that the

arrangement of the stacks on a site (module) or in a building provides adequate protection against the

risk of propagation by this means. One method is to ensure that all stacks are parallel and have the

same dimensions, thus forming a rectangular arrangement.

Another method is to use the walls of the storage building or the traverse to protect the ends of stacks.

A third method is to observe the D9-distances in Part I, Annex A, Table 1 but such a large separation

is rarely practical.

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These stacks should be restricted to open sites (modules) with minimal weather protection or to

aboveground buildings with walls and roofs of light construction. Exceptionally existing buildings

with light roofs but solid walls may be used provided that these solidly constructed walls do not

exceed 3 m in height. The stacking technique is based on US and UK tests in the open air and is not

necessarily valid in an earth-covered building or an underground storage site which imposes a much

greater confining effect.

An accidental explosion of one stack would scatter and disarrange the neighbouring stacks thus

destroying the critical geometry upon which this stacking technique relies. To minimize any risk of

subsequent fires which could cause the "cook-off" of one of these disarranged projectiles, and the

resultant mass explosion of many other projectiles, softwood should be avoided in any pallets and

dunnage. Combustible materials should be avoided as far as possible in the structure of a building

used for such stacks.

10)

The total NEQ on a storage site (module) or in a building should be restricted to 110 000 kg.

11)

Each module or building should be surrounded by a barricade substantially of earth. This may be the

double-slope type or the single-slope with one vertical wall type. The foot of the barricade should not

be less than 2.4 m from the nearest stack. In establishing the height of the barricade the "2° rule"

should be observed (see Section III).

12)

Where adjoining modules or buildings are separated by a shared barricade, its thickness together with

the distances from the stacks to that barricade are considered to provide adequate protection. Normal

Inter-Magazine Distances do not apply.

13)

The minimum Explosives Workshop Distance is 150 m in the case of barricaded workshops with

protective roofs. Workshops without such protection should not be sited within the zone of severe

debris risk, deemed to be the sectors lying within 30° on each side of those sides of the module or

building which are parallel to the projectiles and extending to a distance of 600 m. Outside this zone,

unprotected explosives workshops should be sited in accordance with Table 1 of Part I, Annex A.

14)

A minimum Inhabited Building Distance and Public Traffic Route Distance of 600 m should be

observed because of the severe risk from numerous whole projectiles likely to be projected from the

upper tiers of stacks near an exploding stack. Such projectiles are not expected to explode upon

impact but present a serious debris hazard. This debris would be projected all at once and possibly

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without warning, unlike explosions involving ammunition of Hazard Division 1.2 where there usually

is time for evacuation.

Buffered Storage

The storage of bombs using the buffered storage concept is briefly described in Part I, Paragraph 1.3.3.1. d).

This concept can be used in all types of above-ground storage facilities. The special conditions for this type of

storage are as follows:

The geometry of bomb and buffer stacks is critical and must be maintained at all times. (The buffer

stack must preclude any direct line of sight between stacks of bombs.)

Vertical and horizontal offsets of rows and columns of containers in the buffer stacks are to be used to

prevent alignments of the containers which would allow line of sight spaces through which fragments

of a detonating bomb stack could pass unimpeded to the other stack of bombs in storage.

Bombs must be orientated nose to nose in those portions of the stacks which face each other. Metal

nose and tail plugs must be used in all bombs.

In computing the maximum amount of explosives which could be involved in an accidental explosion

in a buffered storage arrangement, Hazard Division 1.4 munitions are not included in the total net

explosives quantity.

The largest stocks of MK82/84 bombs authorized for buffered storage are

27, 000 kg NEQ Bomb stacks will be separated by a minimum of 11.6 meters.

When otherwise authorized, inert material or Division 1.4 munitions may be stored in the same

structure or facility where buffered storage is in use.

Note:

Use of buffered storage concept with MK82/84 bombs and the specific arrangement and types of

buffer material is to be determined in the national area of responsibility. Inquiries regarding this

concept and its implementation may be directed to the Secretary of AC/326.

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Section II - Storage Buildings and their Construction

2.3.2.1.

Structural Materials

Non-combustible materials must be used in the construction of buildings for storage of ammunition and

explosives.

Buildings for the storage of bulk explosives relatively sensitive to spark or friction should not have any

exposed iron, steel, aluminium or any aluminium alloy containing more than 1 % of magnesium where it may

come into contact with explosive substances.

Buildings for the storage of ammunition with a toxic chemical hazard should be provided with a non-absorbing

material on the floors and the walls to a height at least equal to the top of the stack. The building should have a

barricade (see Section III). The building must be well ventilated.

2.3.2.2.

Protection of Igloos against Blast

Performance Criteria

For detailed information see PFP(AC/326-SG/5)D(2010)0001 Nationally Approved Structures, Ed

December 2010.

Design Load for Head-Walls and Doors

For detailed information see PFP(AC/326-SG/5)D(2010)0001 Nationally Approved Structures, Ed

December 2010.

Design Load for Roof and Earth-Covered Walls

For detailed information see PFP(AC/326-SG/5)D(2010)0001 Nationally Approved Structures, Ed

December 2010.

Ventilation Openings

For detailed information see PFP(AC/326-SG/5)D(2010)0001 Nationally Approved Structures, Ed

December 2010.

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2.3.2.3. Protection against Projections

Buildings: For detailed information see PFP(AC/326-SG/5)D(2010)0001 Nationally Approved Structures, Ed

2, 2 December 2010.

earth-covered buildings: For detailed information see PFP(AC/326-SG/5)D(2010)0001 Nationally Approved

Structures, Ed 2, 2 December 2010.

2.3.2.4. Pressure Release

For detailed information see PFP(AC/326-SG/5)D(2010)0001 Nationally Approved Structures, Ed

December 2010.

2.3.2.5. Lightning Protection

All permanent storage buildings and workshops for ammunition and explosives should be provided with

lightning protection. The method of assessment of need for such protection and the details of suitable systems are given

in Section IV.

2.3.2.6. Rocket Storage Buildings

Buildings utilized for the storage of rockets in a propulsive state (i.e. unpackaged rockets or missiles in the

assembled condition) should be of sufficient strength to withstand their thrust. Alternatively the rockets should be

provided with devices to secure them and thereby eliminate the additional hazard arising from the flight of the rocket

(see paragraph 1.3.3.5.).

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Section III - Barricades: Design Criteria

2.3.3.1.

Functions of Barricades

General

The design criteria for a barricade depend on its location and the intended function.

Interception of High Velocity Projections

An effective barricade intercepts high velocity projections from a PES which otherwise may cause

practically instantaneous propagation of explosion to ammunition and explosives at an ES; the

barricade therefore has sufficient resistance to high velocity projections to reduce their speed to a

tolerable level. The geometry of the barricade in relation to the PES and the ES is such that it

intercepts the projections through a sufficient, solid angle. When the barricade is subject to

destruction by blast from the PES, it is designed to remain substantially intact for a sufficient time to

achieve its purpose.

An effective barricade reduces the number of high velocity projections which otherwise may

endanger personnel and ES inside and outside the explosives area, but this is usually a secondary

function.

Lobbed Ammunition and Fragments

An effective barricade also intercepts some lobbed items of ammunition and lobbed fragments but this is an

incidental benefit. It is not usually practical to intercept items projected at a high elevation.

Modification of Blast and Flame

A barricade at a PES may induce directional effects of the blast and flame or it may merely perturb

them. This is a secondary function of a barricade, unless it is especially designed to achieve one or

more of these purposes.

A barricade between a PES and an ES may shield the ES from blast and flame. In order to have a

marked shielding effect, the barricade is located close to the ES. The barricade may be part of the

building-wall at the ES.

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2.3.3.2.

Geometry of Earth Barricades

General

Proper barricade geometry is necessary to reduce the risk that high velocity projections escape above or around

the ends of the barricade and so produce an explosion in an adjacent site. Since such projections do not move

along perfectly linear trajectories, reasonable margins in barricade height and length must be provided beyond

the minimum dimensions which block lines of sight.

Height of Barricade

Line AB

(a)

On level terrain point A is chosen as a reference on either of two stacks (see Figure 3-II). If

the stacks have different heights, point A is on the lower stack. Point A is at the top of that

face of the chosen stack which is remote from the other stack. If the stacks are covered by

protective roofs, point A may be at the top of that face of the chosen stack which is nearer to

the other stack (see Figure 3-II).

(b)

On sloping terrain point A is on the stack whose top face is at the lower elevation (see Figure

3-III). Point A is at the top of that face of the chosen stack which is remote from the other

stack.

If the stacks are covered by protective roofs, point A may be at the top of that face of the

chosen stack which is nearer to the other stack. Point B is on the top face of the other stack

(see Figure 3-III).

(c)

Line AB must pass through at least 2.4 m of barricade material or undisturbed natural earth

between the two stacks, whether or not they are contiguous.

Line AC (2° Rule)

(a)

Point A is chosen in accordance with subparagraph 1) above.

(b)

On level or sloping terrain a second line (AC) is drawn at an angle of 2° above line AB.

(c)

On level terrain, when stacks are separated by less than 5 Q^1/3 whether or not they are

contiguous, line AC must pass through at least 1.0 m of barricade material or undisturbed

natural earth.

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MANUAL OF NATO SAFETY PRINCIPLES FOR THE STORAGE OF MILITARY AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES (May 2010) - page 8