MANUAL OF NATO SAFETY PRINCIPLES FOR THE STORAGE OF MILITARY AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES (May 2010)

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Process and Storage Building

Building materials are generally ineffective in affording EM protection to

EED. Structures provide no protection at all in transmission loss from

frequencies below 1 MHz but may provide some protection in the form of

reflection loss if the polarization and angle of incidence of the EM energy

happens to be favourable, although this is rarely the case. Also, bars in

reinforced concrete do not provide any significant degree of protection.

For all practical purposes, it should be assumed that the field strength which

exists inside a building is as high as it would be if the building did not exist.

However, if the protection level across the frequency spectrum for a specific

building has been determined (screened room) then this level may be used to

determine a safe distance from sources of electromagnetic radiation although it

should be borne in mind that, if doors or windows are opened, the screening

integrity may be adversely affected.

EED and systems containing EED should be stored/processed in authorized

depot and unit process and storage areas. These areas should be sited taking

into account the following:

The susceptibility of the EED, store or weapon system during

processing or storage as appropriate.

The radiated power of transmitters in the area related to the

susceptibility radius of the most sensitive EED present.

1.6.0.5.

Assessment of Hazard

It will

be evident from the previous paragraphs that degrees of risk of unintended

operation arise in any situation in which EED are introduced into close proximity with

RF fields. The degree of risk ranges from negligible to acute in terms of both the

susceptibility of the EED and the power output of the transmitters creating the RF field.

There are no simple rules or procedures for assessing risk. An Electromagnetic Radiation

Hazard Assessment should be conducted by a trained and competent person to ensure the

latest information and guidance found in AECTP 500 (category 508) are applied.

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1.6.0.6.

System Susceptibility

Each situation requires individual examination which must consider the:

Susceptibility of EED whether:

Installed.

Exposed.

Packaged.

Specifically protected.

Characteristics of transmitters.

Distance between the EED and radiating systems such as radios etc.

For systems with an unknown susceptibility pending a detailed inspection, ie structural

or packaging, the restrictions below on RF transmissions in the immediate vicinity

should be imposed:

No radio to be allowed within 2 metres.

No radio to be allowed within 10 metres unless authorised as being

intrinsically safe.

No radio with an ERP greater than 5 watts to be allowed within 50 m.

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CHAPTER 7 - FIRE FIGHTING PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES

Section I - General

1.7.1.1.

Introduction

The aim of these principles is to establish measures and procedures to ensure a minimum

practicable risk in fighting fires involving ammunition and explosives at explosives areas.

These identification measures are based on the classification of fires into four fire divisions

according to the hazard they present. This Chapter also establishes minimum guidelines for the

development of emergency plans, including safety, security, and environmental protection, which have

to be coordinated with local authorities.

Firefighting procedures, training of firefighting personnel, the use and maintenance of

firefighting equipment and vehicles, the provision of water supply and alarm systems, the first aid

measures, and other measures required in firefighting are outside the scope of this Chapter and

shall be the responsibility of the national authority.

The ammunition hazard symbols and supplemental symbols including chemical agent

symbols (see Figure F.2 below) are for firefighting situations only and are not necessarily

applicable to normal operating conditions.

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Section II - Fire Divisions

1.7.2.1.

Ammunition and Explosives Hazard Divisions involved:

1.1

Mass explosion hazard

1.2

Projection hazard but not a mass explosion hazard

1.3

Fire hazard and either a minor blast hazard or minor projection hazard or both,

but a mass explosion hazard

1.4

No significant hazard

1.5

Very insensitive subsatances which have a mass explosion hazard

1.6

Extremely insensitive articles which do not have a mass explosion hazard

1.7.2.2.

Fire Divisions Involved:

Fire division 1 indicates the greatest hazard. The hazard decreases with ascending fire

division numbers as follows:

Hazard Division

Fire Division

Hazard involved

1.1; 1.5

Mass explosion

1.2; 1.6

Explosion with projection

1.3

Mass fire, or fire with minor blast or projections

1.4

No significant hazard

The fire divisions are synonymous with the Storage Hazard Divisions

1.1 through

1.4 ammunition and explosives. But in this case, as described in Part I, Chapter 3, the HD 1.5

belongs to Fire Division 1 (mass explosion) and HD 1.6 belongs to Fire Division 2 (non mass

explosion). Fire Division 1 indicates the greatest hazard. The hazard decreases with ascending fire

division numbers as follows:

1.7.2.3.

Fire Division Symbols:

Each of the four fire divisions is indicated by distinctive symbols (see Figure F.1) in

order to be recognized by fire-fighting personnel approaching a scene of fire. To assist with

identifying at long range, the symbols differ in shape as follows:

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Shape F

ire Division

Octagon

Cross

Inverted triangle

Diamond

The colour of all four symbols is orange in accordance with the colour on UN and IMCO

labels for Class 1 (Explosives).

The use of the specified fire division numbers is left to the discretion of national authorities.

When numbers are used they are painted in black.

1.7.2.3.

Supplementary Symbols:

Due to the peculiarity of hazardous substances in certain types of ammunition

(Compatibility Groups G,H,J and L), the storage of this ammunition requires

supplementary symbols. Those supplementary “Chemical Hazards Symbols“ are used to

indicate the precautions to be taken against the additional hazards proceeding from the

chemical agents of that ammunition (see Figure F.2). The Chemical Hazard Symbols

indicate the following precautions:

wear full protective suit,

wear respirator facepiece,

apply no water.

All three Chemical Hazard Symbols are circular in shape. They correspond to the

ISO 3864 "Safety colours and safety signs". The symbols, their meanings and their sizes

are shown in Figure F.2.

The Apply No Water(symbol No. 3 of Figure F.2) may be placed together with one of the

other if required.

The indicating the requirement to wear full protective clothing should also indicate the

type of full protective clothing to be worn, as the different kinds of chemical agents

demand different protective measures. The type of full protective clothing to be worn at a

chemical ammunition storage site and the method by which this is indicated are the

responsibility of the nation concerned.

The chemical agents mostly used in ammunition, the compatibility groups of that

ammunition and the required in storage are specified in Table T.1

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1.7.2.4.

Protective Clothing:

The following sets of full protective clothing are recommended:

- Protective clothing against casualty agents, consisting of protective respirator

facepiece, impermeable suit, hood and boots, protective footwear and splash suit.

- Protective clothing against harassing agents, consisting of protective respirator

facepiece.

- Protective clothing against white phosphorus (WP) smoke, consisting of fire-resistant

gloves, chemical safety goggles and respirator facepiece.

The different sets of full protective clothing to be worn may be indicated by:

- a white number, corresponding to the set-no., on the blue background of the symbol,

- a white rectangular plaque placed below the symbol listing in black letters the

components of protective clothing to be worn.

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Section III - Firefighting Principles

1.7.3.1.

Fire Prevention (preventive fire protection)

Preventive fire protection comprises all measures suited to prevent the development and

spreading of a fire. These are to develop a plan based on an estimate of the hazards and risk.. This

analysis should comprise:

- employees,

- infrastructure and stockpile,

- exposed sites,

- public and the local environment.

The following measures are to addressed in all cases:

1.7.3.2

Constructional Fire Prevention Measures

The following basic criteria apply:

Buildings designed for the processing or storage of ammunition shall be built of non-

combustible or at least fire-resistant., (according to national standards) construction

material. Supporting and surrounding structural elements shall resist to fire for at least

30 minutes in accordance with national standards.

Chimneys in an explosives area must be provided with a trap to prevent flying sparks.

Heating systems must not have uncovered glowing parts. The temperatures of

exposed heating surfaces and lines must not exceed 120° C.

An efficient fire alarm system shall be installed and maintained.

Ammunition sites are to be equipped with an adequate fire fighting water supply

according to national standards. Fire fighting water supply points shall not be sited

closer than 25m to any process or storage building. They are to be positioned beside

-not in - roads or traffic-ways and be provided with an area of clearance, such that

vehicles will not cause an obstruction. Where alternative water supply points are not

available, protection should be provided for the fire fighting vehicle and it's crew (e.

g. barriers or traverses).

Type, quantity and locations of fire fighting equipment are determined according to

facility-related assessments and shall be adapted to the local conditions during annual

fire fighting demonstrations.

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- Fire prevention also includes lightning protection.

1.7.3.3

Organizational Fire Prevention Measures:

These are to be organized according to national regulations within the scope of general

fire protection taking into account the following criteria:

- order and cleanness as well as strict observance of safety precautions count among the

most effective fire prevention measures, equal to prohibition of smoking, fire and

naked light,

- handling of flammable substances,

- prevention of additional fire loads such as stacking material, packaging material and

the like,

- fire hazards of machines, equipment and tools during ammunition operations or in the

case of overload of electrical lines,

- inflammable undergrowth, laying out fire lanes,

- clear zones, trimming of branches and the like,

- regular instruction of the personnel about actions to be taken in case of fire and in the

use of first aid fire fighting equipment,

- preparation of an emergency planning² and an emergency map³:

² emergency planning: see section V

³ emergency map: a map containing the essential details of a facility or an installation from the

point of view of fire protection.

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Section IV - Fire- Fighting Procedures

1.7.4.1.

General

According to the stage of the fire, ammunition fires are divided into:

The following regulations deal with the special hazards connected with ammunition fires.

- developing ammunition fires and

- established ammunition fires.

1) Developing ammunition fires are fires in the vicinity of ammunition, but which do not

immediately hazard it. The fire brigade should be notified as soon as possible if a fire is

developing in the vicinity of ammunition. Evacuate all non-essential personnel and fight

the fire for as long as it is safe to do so, in accordance with the pre-arranged plan. On

arrival of the fire brigade, the competent person will advise them of the state of the fire.

Provided that the explosives are still not hazarded, they will take immediate action to

fight it. A close watch must be kept upon the fire, so that evacuation of the remaining

personnel can be ordered immediately if it appears that the explosives are about to

become hazarded.

2) Established ammunition fires are those which are hazarding or about to hazard the

explosives.

The term 'established ammunition fire' will be applied to all fires which cannot be

positively identified as 'developing ammunition fires'.

Firefighters of ammunition and explosives fires shall have a thorough knowledge of the

specific reactions of ammunition and explosives exposed to the heat or to the fire itself.

The firefighting forces and other essential personnel shall be briefed before approaching

the scene of the fire. They shall be informed of the known hazards and conditions

existing at the scene of the fire before proceeding to the location of the fire.

Fire involving ammunition and explosives shall be fought according to the hazard

classification, fire division, the stage of the fire, and the procedures specified by the

Defense Component concerned. Special firefighting instructions addressing ammunition

hazards shall be developed according to the needs of the Defense Components.

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All fires starting in the vicinity of ammunition or explosives shall be reported and shall be

fought immediately with all available means and without awaiting specific instructions.

However, if the fire involves explosive material or is supplying heat to it, or if the fire is

so large that it cannot be extinguished with the equipment at hand, the personnel involved

shall evacuate and seek safety. Before fighting ammunition fires in an unknown

situation, the fire brigade has to analyze the situation.

The presence of buildings, earth barricades etc. to protect fire-fighting personnel during

operations is a crucial factor for effective fighting of fires involving ammunition or

explosives. The fire-fighting personnel, their vehicles and equipment must not be

endangered unnecessarily.

1.7.4.2.

Detailed Fire Fighting Procedures

Fires of ammunition and explosives are fought according to their classification in fire

divisions and the stage of the fire.

(a)

Fire Division 1

Fully developed fire: these must not be fought. The fire alarm will be sounded

and all personnel must evacuate immediately to a safe distance and take cover,

in accordance with the pre-arranged plan. The fire brigade will be called from

the vicinity of this point, giving its location and emphasizing that the fire is

fully developed. If the brigade has already been summoned (e. g. from the

incident site during the developing stage), a further call must be made to warn

the fire brigade the fire is now fully developed. The brigade will rendezvous at

the evacuation point to be briefed by the competent person.

Once the mass explosion has taken place, fire fighters should assess the

situation and extinguish any secondary fires, concentrating upon those which

hazard other explosives stores, as advised by the Control Officer, who should

be available by this time.

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(b)

Fire Division 2

Established ammunition fire: In the case of earth covered or heavy walled

ammunition storage magazines the effects of the exploding ammunition will be

contained within the magazine except possibly for those in the direction of the

headwall or doors. Therefore external fires can be fought in close proximity of

the magazines except in the direction of the head-wall or doors. An established

fire must not be fought inside such a magazine nor external fires in front of it

and no firefighting at all in case of light structure magazines. In all cases the

fire alarm will be sounded, all personnel must evacuate immediately to a safe

distance and take cover, in accordance with the pre-arranged that may take

account of the above. The fire brigade is to be withdrawn behind the front wall

line of the magazine or completely from the vicinity of this point, giving its

location and emphasizing that the fire is fully developed. If the brigade has

already been summoned (e. g. from the incident site during the developing

stage), a further call must be made to warn the fire brigade that the fire is now

fully developed. The brigade will rendezvous at the evacuation point to be

briefed by the competent person.

Once the explosives have become involved, lobbed and self propelled items

can be expected, some of which may function on impact. Secondary fires may

be started. Where these hazard other explosives, attempts should be made to

extinguish them without exposing crews to undue risk.

(c)

Fire Division 3

Fully developed fire: these must not be fought. The fire alarm will be sounded

and all personnel will evacuate immediately to a safe distance and take cover

in accordance with the pre-arranged plan. The fire brigade is to be called from

the vicinity of this point, giving its' location and emphasizing that the fire is

fully developed. If the brigade has already been summoned (e. g. from the

incident site during the developing stage), a further call must be made to warn

the fire brigade that the fire is now fully developed. The brigade will

rendezvous at the evacuation point to be briefed by the competent person.

Once the explosives have become involved a particularly intense fire can be

expected, with high levels of radiant heat, probably with flame jets from

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openings in the building. Packages may burst, some violently, but there will be

no explosions. Secondary fires may be started by radiation or projected fire

brands. Once the main fire is seen to be reducing to a level that enables these

to be fought, action should be taken to extinguish them, keeping crews away

from openings in the building. Visors and gloves are advised.

(d)

Fire Division 4

Fires involving items of Fire Division 4 may be fought as dictated by the

situation.

After an extended period of time the ammunition may explode sporadically.

For protection against fragments and missiles the fire-fighting forces should

not approach the scene of fire any closer than necessity dictates, certainly not

any closer than 25 m. When possible the fire should be fought from a protected

location.

(e)

Ammunition requiring Supplementary Symbols

Ammunition containing explosives and additional hazardous agents

(see

Figure F.2) requires special attention and precautions in fire-fighting. Such

ammunition belongs to different fire divisions depending on the kind and

quantity of explosives contained in the ammunition. Such fires are fought in

accordance with the fire division(s) involved taking into account the

precautions indicated by the supplementary l. The issue of the corresponding

special fire-fighting regulations is left to the discretion of the national

authorities.

(f)

Ammunition Containing Depleted Uranium:

Combustion of DU

The combustion properties of DU metal must be taken into account

when dealing with a fire involving DU ammunition.

(ii)

The colour of smoke produced by burning DU may be yellow but the

absence of colour is not a reliable indication that DU metal is not

involved; therefore it is prudent to assume from the outset that DU is

burning and that DU oxide smoke is being produced and to apply the

appropriate precautions, as follows.

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Precautions

Once uranium metal has ignited and a vigorous self-sustaining oxidation

reaction is started, the application of small quantities of conventional

extinguishing agents is likely to be ineffective and may even add to the spread

of the fire by dispersing the burning uranium. For example, insufficient water

to cool the fire would react with hot uranium metal to form hydrogen. For a

small fire involving uranium and no explosives, the most effective

extinguishing agent is one of the inert powdered smothering agents (e. g.

Pyromet) but when explosives are present the closeness of approach necessary

to deliver such an extinguishing agent to the seat of the fire would be

hazardous to the firefighters. In particular, propellants, the most likely

explosives to be closely associated with the DU, may produce intense radiant

heat, firebrands and some ejected fragments. The firebrands may be only small

glowing of packaging materials but it is possible that they could be fiery

fragments of burning propellant

Fire Fighting Methods

In all cases, treat as a radiological risk

- i. e. wear respirator

facepiece, ensure all parts of the body are covered and fight fire from

up-wind direction. Put down smoke with spray jet. Prevent water from

flowing-off, if possible (dikes).

(ii)

DU without an explosive component. Use copious water at optimum

jet/spray range. Do not use halons. No projections are likely, other

than the minor spallations associated with metal fires hit by water.

(iii)

DU with an explosive component. Fight in accordance with the fire

division concerned.

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Section V - Emergency Planning

1.7.5.1.

Standard Operating Procedures

Installations or responsible activities shall develop standard operating procedures (SOPs)

or plans designed to provide safety, security and environmental protection. Plans shall be

coordinated with the applicable national, regional and local emergency response authorities (e.g.

law enforcement, fire departments and hospitals etc.) and any established Local Emergency

Planning Committees (LEPC).

At a minimum, those SOPs or plans shall include the following:

Specific sections and guidance that address emergency preparedness, contingency

planning and security. For security, those SOPs or plans shall limit access to trained and

authorized personnel.

Procedures that minimize the possibility of an unpermitted or uncontrolled detonation,

release, discharge or migration of military munitions or explosives out of any storage unit

when such release, discharge or migration may endanger human health or the

environment.

Provisions for prompt notification to emergency response and environmental agencies

and the potentially affected public for an actual or potential detonation or uncontrolled

release, discharge or migration (that may endanger human health or the environment).

To produce the necessary SOP's is in the responsibility of national authorities.

The commanding leaders of the installations are responsible for the training of their

personnel and the coordination with the LEPC. They also have to ensure that all SOP's and

Emergency Plans belonging to the special installation are reachable to external security and

emergency authorities.

Competent persons belonging to the depot or to an external fire brigade are to be

regularly trained to be available to advise the fire chief and external fire fighters.

Emergency withdrawal distances for nonessential personnel are intended for application

in emergency situations only and are not to be used for facility siting.

Emergency withdrawal distances depend on fire involvement and on whether or not the

hazard classification, fire division and quantity of explosives are known. The withdrawal distance

for essential personnel at accidents shall be determined by emergency authorities on site.

Emergency authorities shall determine who are essential personnel.

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Table T.1 Compatibility Gr oup an d C hemical Hazard Symbols

Required

for Storage of Chemical Ammunition and Substances.

Breath-

Compati-

Apply

Chemical Ammunition and

ing

bility

Full Protective Clothing

Substances

Appara-

Group

Water

tus

Set 1

Set 2

Set 3

Toxic Agents¹

Tear Gas, O-Chlorobenzol

Smoke, Titanium Tetrachloride

(FM)

Smoke,

Sulpher

trioxide-

chlorosulphonic acid solution

(FS)

Smoke, Aluminum-zinc oxide-

hexachloroethane (HC)

White Phosphorous (WP)

White Phosphorous plasticized

(PWP)

Thermite or Thermate (TH)

Pyrotechnic Material (PT)

Calcium Phosphide

Signaling Smokes

Isobutyl methacrylate with oil

(IM)

Napalm (NP)

Triethylaluminim (TEA)(TPA)

Notes:

1 Toxic Agents without explosives components that normally would be assigned to Hazard Division 6.1

may be stored as compatibility group K.

2 See Chapter 2.

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Table T.2 Emergency Withdrawal Distances for Nonessential Personnel.

Unknown Quantity

Known Quantity

Unknown, located in facility,

truck

1250m

and or tractor trailer

Unknown, located in railcar

1500m

For transportation,

≤ 7500kg ˘ 870m;

7500<NEM≤16000 kg ˘ 1120m

Same as unknown

1.1¹ and 1.5

1.5 ˘

1100m

facility, truck trailer or

For facilities,

railcar as appropriate

≤7000kg ˘ 850m

7000 <NEM≤ 25000kg ˘ 1300m

>25000kg ˘ 1300m - 44,4 Q^1/3

1.2¹ and 1.6

560m

1.3²

405m

6,4 Q^1/3 with a 120m minimum.

1.4

100m

Notes:

1 For HD 1.1 and HD 1.2 AE, if known, the maximum range fragments and debris will be thrown (including the

interaction effects of stacks of items, but excluding lugs, strongbacks, and/or nose and tail plates) may be used

to replace the distances given.

2 Emergency withdrawal distances do not consider the potential flight range of propulsion units.

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Figure F.2 Chemical Hazard Symbols

Symbol 1 Wear full protective clothing

Symbol 2 Wear breathing apparatus

Colours:*

Background is blue

Figure and rim are white

Figure, rim and number are white when

set-no. is indicated by number;

Figure and rim when used to indicate

set-no. by colour:

• Red for Set 1 Protective Clothing

• Yellow for Set 2 Protective Clothing

• White for Set 3 Protective Clothing

Symbol 3 Apply no water

Colours:*

Background is white

Circle and diagonal are red

Figure is black

* The specification of the colours is left to the discretion of the national authorities.

(Specification of signs and colours - except orange - is given in ISO 3864 "Safety colours and safety signs")

Sizes

Large

small

[mm]

630

315

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CHAPTER 8 - REPORTS ON ACCIDENTAL EXPLOSIONS

1.8.0.1.

Information Required

In order that reports on damage resulting from accidental explosions be of value to the

"NATO Group of Experts on the Safety Aspects of Transportation and Storage of Military

Ammunition and Explosives (AC/326)" and useful in verifying the safety principles, the information

should include the following:

Type and quantity of ammunition or explosives in the stack or building where the

accident occurred.

NEQ and name of filling and weight of filled items.

Method of packing of the ammunition or explosives where the initial accident occurred

and material of packages.

Distances between the articles in the packages.

Method of storing the ammunition or explosives where the initial accident occurred.

Information as above for neighbouring storage places of ammunition and explosives

stating whether such neighbouring stacks were set off or otherwise affected.

The thickness of walls and roofs if ammunition or explosives were stored in buildings

and whether there were windows through which fragments or debris got into the

buildings.

Distances between buildings, or stacks, if buildings were not used.

The presumed influence of barricades upon the protection of neighbouring buildings and

stacks.

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10)

Fire-fighting measures (attempts to fight fire).

11)

The time between the first and last propagation from stack to stack.

12)

The general effect on inhabited buildings in the vicinity and their inhabitants.

13)

A map indicating the size and distribution of fragments and debris.

14)

A brief summary of the causes and the effects.

1.8.0.2.

Summary Report

A summary report is first required for translation and distribution by NATO. A full report

should be forwarded to NATO as soon as possible. This report would be available on loan to NATO-

countries in the language of the country of origin. A copy of the report should be forwarded to:

Armaments Directorate Secretary, Defense Investment Division, Rm J34 5 , NATO Headquarters,

B1110 Brussels.

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CHAPTER 9 - DEPLETED URANIUM AMMUNITION

1.9.0.1.

Use of Depleted Uranium

Ammunition containing Depleted Uranium (DU) has been developed as an improved

armour piercing weapon, mainly for anti-tank warfare. A round of DU ammunition may consist of a

DU penetrator made of DU metal (or of a DU alloy) and a propellant charge which may be integral

with the penetrator or loaded into the gun separately. The use of DU in armour piercing ammunition

exploits the high density of the metal, which, when propelled at high velocity, results in the delivery

of sufficient kinetic energy to effect penetration. The penetration is accompanied by disintegration of

the projectile and a violent combustion of the fragments thus formed.

1.9.0.2.

Radioactivity

DU is mildly radioactive at a level that is low enough to permit handling and transportation

with simple precautionary measures. DU has a chemical toxicity at the same level as other heavy

metals such as Lead, allowing handling and transportation in authorized packaging without abnormal

risk. The mechanisms whereby radioactivity and toxicity might lead to harmful effects are if:

(1) Personnel are in close contact with DU over extended periods, or

(2) If DU is involved in a fire or explosion in which Uranium Oxides from the

ammunition could be dispersed and inhaled by personnel sited downwind from the

event.

For detailed information on DU, refer to the United Nations Website:

http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/env/du/en.

Also refer to World Health Organisation (WHO) Guidance on Exposure to Depleted

Uranium: (WHO/SDE/OEH/01.12.2001):

http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/en/Recommend_Med_Officers_final.pdf.

1.9.0.3.

Storage Facilities

Storage facilities for DU ammunition will usually be located in military controlled sites, at

distances from the nearest point of public access beyond which the predictable explosive, inhalation

and surface contamination effects would be acceptable. Thus, any accidental contamination requiring

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remedial action should be confined to areas under military control and therefore restriction of access

necessary during such action should not interfere significantly with normal public life.

1.9.0.4.

Principles of Segregation

The separate storage of the DU and explosive components of the ammunition, or, at least,

the separate storage of DU ammunition from other types must be regarded as offering positive safety

advantages and should be adopted whenever practicable.

1.9.0.5.

Fire-fighting

The combustion properties of DU metal should be taken into account when dealing with a

fire involving DU ammunition. It is prudent to assume from the outset that DU is burning

and that DU oxide smoke is being produced and to apply the appropriate precautions, as

follows:

Once uranium metal has ignited and a vigorous self-sustaining oxidation reaction

has commenced, the application of small quantities of conventional extinguishants is likely

to be ineffective and may even add to the spread of the fire by dispersing the burning

uranium. For example, insufficient water to cool the fire would react with hot uranium metal

to form hydrogen gas. For a small fire involving uranium and no explosives, the most

effective extinguishant is an inert powdered smothering agents, but when explosives are

present the closeness of approach necessary to deliver such an extinguishant to the seat of

the fire would be hazardous to the fire fighters. In particular, propellants, the most likely

energetic material to be closely associated with the DU, may produce intense radiant heat,

firebrands and some ejected fragments. The firebrands may be only small pieces of

packaging materials but it is possible that they could be fiery fragments of burning

propellant.

The most practicable method is to drench the fire with copious quantities of water

delivered from a safe distance with the aim of rapidly cooling the combustibles. Normal

precautions in dealing with an explosives fire such as the fire crew sheltering behind

protective barriers should be observed. Self-contained breathing apparatus should be worn

and, where practicable, the fire should be tackled from the windward side. Care should be

taken to ensure that the fire is completely extinguished and that the remaining ashes and

debris are cold and thoroughly saturated with water.

Disposition of water contaminated with DU particulates should be based on the

advice of the local National Authority.

-I-9-2-

Change 3

ANNEX I-A

AASTP-1

(Edition 1)

SECTION I : GENERAL NOTES AND EXPLANATION OF SYMBOLS

A.1.1 Quantity-Distance Criteria

Quantity-Distance criteria and the formulae used to generate values in the Q-D Tables are given in

Part II Annex II-A.

A.1.2 Rounding of Quantity-Distances

The values of quantity-distances in the Q-D Tables 1 to 3 have been rounded up in accordance

with the Table below. It is permitted to determine a QD using the formulae at the foot of the

appropriate column. A calculated distance, in full metres, rounded up in accordance with the table

below, may be used in place of any value in the QD Tables. If an NEQ is back calculated from a

distance, using the appropriate QD formula, the answer should be rounded down to the nearest kg.

ROUNDING OF QUANTITY-DISTANCES

Range of value of Quantity-Distance

Rounding up the nearest

(m)

3 to <100

≥ 100 to < 500

≥ 500 to < 1000

≥ 1000

A.1.4 General Note on Pictographs

The pictographs are intended to simplify the presentation of information in the Q-D Tables. The

tables are intended to be used in conjunction with the principles given in the text of this Leaflet.

The pictographs are purely diagrammatic; their shapes do not imply that actual structures should

have similar shapes and proportions. The orientation shown is intended to indicate the direction of

principal concern for blast, flame, radiant heat and projections as shown by arrows. In an actual

situation every direction must be considered in turn. At a Potential Explosion Site there are

relatively few significant variations but at an Exposed Site it is necessary to distinguish among

different types of construction and among different functions of buildings.

-I-A-2-

Change 3

ANNEX I-A

AASTP-1

(Edition 1)

A.1.5 DEFINITIONS OF FRONT/SIDE/REAR CONFIGURATIONS FOR EARTH-COVERED

BUILDINGS

A.1.5.1 DIRECTIONAL EFFECTS FROM IGLOOS WITH HD 1.1

The directional effects for HD 1.1 or HD 1.3 from buildings which meet the design criteria for

standard igloos are considered to occur :

a. through the front in the area bounded by lines drawn at 150^o to the front face of the PES from

its front corners.

b. through the rear in the area bounded by lines drawn at 135^o to the rear face of the PES from its

rear corners.

c. all area around a PES not included in a. or b. above are considered to be to the side of the PES.

In those cases where an Exposed Site (ES) lies on the line separating rear/side etc. of a PES, the

greater quantity-distance should be observed.

150⁰

FRONT

REAR

135⁰

-I-A-3-

Change 3

ANNEX I-A

AASTP-1

(Edition 1)

SECTION II - QUANTITY DISTANCES TABLES (Q-D TABLES)

It is essential to study the text in Chapter 3 when using this table since they are

complementary. Where “No QD” is shown on the matrix practical considerations will

dictate actual separation distances.

Table 1A HD 1.1 QD Matrix for Earth Covered Storage

PES

Building with earth on the roof

and against

three

walls.

and against

three

walls.

and against

three

walls.

Directional effects through the

door and headwall are away from

door

and

headwall

are

door and headwall are towards an

an Exposed Site.

perpendicular to the direction of

Exposed Site

an ES.

(a)

(b)

(c)

Virtually complete protection

1 Standard NATO Igloo, designed

1.3.3.5 No primary explosives

for 7 bar in accordance with Part 2,

with the door facing away from

PES

Virtually complete protection

2 Standard NATO Igloo, designed

1.3.3.5 No primary explosives

for 7 bar in accordance with Part 2,

with

the

door

facing

perpendicularly to the direction of

PES

Virtually complete protection

High degree of protection

3 Standard NATO Igloo, designed

1.3.3.5 No primary explosives

1.3.5.6 a1 Effect of high velocity

for 7 bar in accordance with Part 2,

projections

with the door towards a PES

or D4

1.3.5.6 a2 Effect of lobbed

High degree of protection

ammunition

Virtually complete protection

4 Igloo designed for

3 bar in

1.3.3.5 No primary explosives

accordance with Part 2, with the

door facing away from PES

Virtually complete protection

5 Igloo designed for

3 bar in

1.3.3.5 No primary explosives

accordance with Part 2, with the

door facing perpendicularly to the

direction of PES

Virtually complete protection

High degree of protection

6 Igloo designed for

3 bar in

1.3.5.6 a1 Effect of high velocity

accordance with Part 2, with the

projections

door towards a PES

1.3.5.6 a2 Effect of lobbed

ammunition

High degree of protection

Limited degree of protection

7 Earth-covered building not

1.3.3.5 No primary explosives

1.3.5.6 a2 Effect of lobbed

complying with Part 2, but with a

1.3.5.3 No items vulnerable to

ammunition

headwall and door(s) resistant to

spall

high velocity projections

(see

1.3.5.6 a). The door faces a PES.

or D7

High degree of protection

8 Earth-covered building not

1.3.3.5 No primary explosives

complying with Part 2, but with a

1.3.5.3 No items vulnerable to

door barricade,

(see

1.3.6.4-

spall

1.3.6.6). The door faces a PES.

or D7

High degree of protection

-I-A-5-

Change 3

ANNEX I-A

AASTP-1

(Edition 1)

Table 1A HD 1.1 QD Matrix for Earth Covered Storage

PES

Building with earth on the roof

and against

three

walls.

and against

three

walls.

and against

three

walls.

Directional effects through the

door and headwall are away from

door

and

headwall

are

door and headwall are towards an

an Exposed Site.

perpendicular to the direction of

Exposed Site

an ES.

(a)

(b)

(c)

Virtually complete protection

High degree of protection

9 Earth-covered building not

1.3.3.5 No primary explosives

complying with Part

2, with or

1.3.5.3 No items vulnerable to

without a headwall and door(s)

spall

resistant to fire and low velocity

1.3.5.6 a2 Effect of lobbed

projections, (see 1.3.5.6 b), but the

or D5

ammunition

door faces away from a PES.

Virtually complete protection

1.3.3.5 No primary explosives

or D6

Virtually complete protection

1.3.5.6 a2 Effect of lobbed

ammunition

Virtually complete protection

Limited degree of protection

10 Earth-covered building not

1.3.5.6 a2 Effect of lobbed

complying with Part

2, with or

ammunition

without a headwall and door(s)

resistant to fire and low velocity

High degree of protection

projections, (see 1.3.5.6 b), but the

1.3.3.5 No primary explosives

door faces perpendicularly to the

1.3.5.3 No items vulnerable to

direction of a PES.

spall

High degree of protection

Limited degree of protection

11 Earth-covered building not

1.3.3.5 No primary explosives

1.3.5.6 a2 Effect of lobbed

complying with Part

2, with or

1.3.5.3 No items vulnerable to

ammunition

without a headwall and door(s)

spall

resistant to fire and low velocity

projections,

(see

1.3.5.6 b), with

or D7

the door facing a PES

High degree of protection

12 Building of non-combustible

1.3.3.5 No primary explosives

construction with walls of nominal

1.3.5.3 No items vulnerable to

450 mm RC

(680 mm brick or

spall

equivalent) and protective roof of

High degree of protection

150 mm RC with suitable support.

or D7

1.3.3.5 No primary explosives

The door is barricaded if it faces a

High degree of protection

1.3.5.3 No items vulnerable to

PES.

spall

High degree of protection

13 Building of non-combustible

1.3.3.5 No primary explosives

construction with walls of nominal

1.3.5.3 No items vulnerable to

450 mm RC

(680 mm brick or

spall

equivalent), without a protective

High degree of protection

roof. The door is barricaded if it

or D7

1.3.3.5 No primary explosives

faces a PES.

High degree of protection

1.3.5.3 No items vulnerable to

spall

-I-A-6-

Change 3

MANUAL OF NATO SAFETY PRINCIPLES FOR THE STORAGE OF MILITARY AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES (May 2010) - page 4