MANUAL OF NATO SAFETY PRINCIPLES FOR THE STORAGE OF MILITARY AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES (May 2010)

AASTP-1

(Edition 1)

ALLIED AMMUNITION STORAGE AND

TRANSPORT PUBLICATION 1

(AASTP-1)

MANUAL OF NATO SAFETY PRINCIPLES

FOR THE STORAGE OF MILITARY

AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES

May 2010

Conditions of Release

The NATO Manual on Safety Principles for the Storage of Ammunition and

explosives (AASTP-1) is a NATO Document involving NATO property rights.

The understanding and conditions agreed for the release of the Manual are that it

is released for technical defence purposes and for the use by the defence

services only of the country concerned.

This understanding requires that the release of the whole, or any part, of the

Manual must not be undertaken without reference to, and the written approval of,

NATO.

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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

MILITARY AGENCY FOR STANDARDIZATION (MAS)

NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION

August 1997

AASTP-1 - MANUAL OF NATO SAFETY PRINCIPLES FOR STORAGE OF

MILITARY AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES is a NATO UNCLASSIFIED publication. The

agreement of interested nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 4440 (Edition 1).

AASTP-1 is effective upon receipt.

AASTP-1 contains only factual information. Changes to these are not subject to the

ratification procedures; they will be promulgated on receipt from the nations concerned.

A. GRØNHEIM

Major General, NOAF

Chairman, MAS

Declassified for release to the public

in accordance with C-M(2002)60.

Reference of decision for release:

AC/326-N(2007)0001-AS1 05-09-2007

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AASTP-1 CHANGE PROPOSAL/COMMENT FORM

To: MSIAC

Serial Number ¹

Custodian

Date Received ¹

Information:

AASTP-1 Part(s) ¹

National Representative(s)

PART 1: (to be completed by the originator)

Originator Details:

Name:

Job Title:

Nation:

Organisation:

Telephone:

Email:

AASTP-1 Details:

Part:

Chapter/Annex:

Section:

Paragraph(s):

Observation:

Proposed Text:

Other Comments/Recommendations/Associated Changes Required:

Supporting Evidence (Reports, Trials, etc):

PART 2: (for completion by the appropriate AASTP-1 Custodian)

Approved?

Yes/No

For inclusion as an amendment to:

Reason for Non-approval:

Signature:

Name:

Custodian of Part:

Date:

CONTENTS

¹ To be entered by MSIAC

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INTRODUCTION

NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION

RECORD OF CHANGES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

PREFACE

SECTION I - GENERAL

PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE MANUAL

BASIS OF THE MANUAL

UPDATING

CONDITIONS OF RELEASE

INQUIRIES

SECTION II - HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE MANUAL

PART I - GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR ALL EXPLOSIVES

STORAGE AND QUANTITY DISTANCE TABLES FOR ABOVE GROUND STORAGE

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 2 - CLASSIFICATION CODES AND MIXING OF AMMUNITION AND

EXPLOSIVES IN STORAGE.

CHAPTER 3 - ABOVEGROUND STORAGE IN DEPOTS

CHAPTER 4 - reserved

CHAPTER 5 - SEPARATION OF POL-FACILITIES WITHIN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

CHAPTER 6 - HAZARD FROM ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION TO AMMUNITION

CONTAINING ELECTRO-EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

CHAPTER 7 - FIRE FIGHTING PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES

CHAPTER 8 - REPORTS ON ACCIDENTAL EXPLOSIONS

CHAPTER 9 - DEPLETED URANIUM AMMUNITION

ANNEX I-A - QUANTITY-DISTANCE TABLES FOR ABOVEGROUND STORAGE

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ANNEX I-B - QUANTITY-DISTANCE CRITERIA FOR ABOVEGROUND STORAGE

PART II - EXPLOSIVES STORAGE MAGAZINE DESIGN AND OPERATIONAL

GUIDELINES FOR EXPLOSIVES FACILITIES

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 2 - reserved

CHAPTER 3 - ABOVEGROUND STORAGE

CHAPTER 4 - reserved

CHAPTER 5 - DESIGN ENVIRONMENT CRITERIA

CHAPTER 6 - OPERATIONS IN AN EXPLOSIVES AREA

CHAPTER 7 - DETAILED INFORMATION RELATING TO HAZARDS FROM ELECTRO

MAGNETIC RADIATION TO AMMUNITION CONTAINING ELECTRO-EXPLOSIVE

ANNEX II A - reserved

ANNEX II B - DETAILED INFORMATION RELATED TO EARTH-COVERED MAGAZINES

(IGLOOS)

PART III - UNDERGROUND EXPLOSIVES STORAGE

CHAPTER 1 - GENERAL

CHAPTER 2 - BACKGROUND INFORMATION

CHAPTER 3 - QUANTITY DISTANCES

ANNEX III A - REFERENCES - UNDERGROUND STORAGE EXPLOSIVES SAFETY

HAZARDS

PART IV - SPECIAL SITUATIONS

CHAPTER 1 - GENERAL

CHAPTER 2 - FIELD STORAGE

CHAPTER 3 - QUANTITY-DISTANCE PRINCIPLES FOR MISSILE INSTALLATIONS

CHAPTER 4 - QUANTITY-DISTANCE PRINCIPLES FOR BASIC LOAD AMMUNITION

HOLDING AREAS

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PREFACE

Section I - General

Purpose and Scope of the Manual

The primary object of this Manual is to establish safety principles to be used as a guide

between host countries and NATO forces in the development of mutually agreeable regulations for

the layout of ammunition storage depots and for the storage of conventional ammunition and

explosives therein. These principles are intended also to form the basis of national regulations as far

as possible.

This Manual is in four parts: Part I sets out general ammunition safety principles for all

explosives storage and QD for aboveground storage; Part II provides technical details for design of

explosives storage magazines and operational guidelines for explosives facilities; Part III deals with

underground storage; and Part IV deals with ammunition handling in special situations such as on

military airfields and during the transfer of ammunition and explosives in naval ports.

A Manual of this type cannot provide the answers to all problems which arise. In

circumstances where the answer is not provided the problem should be submitted to the Secretary of

the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) Ammunition Safety Group (CASG),

AC/326.

Since this Manual is a guide rather than a set of mandatory regulations the words "must",

"should" "may/can" and "is/are" are used in the following sense:

MUST

Indicates a technical requirement which is vital for safety and the

avoidance of a catastrophe.

SHOULD

Indicates a safety requirement which is important but not essential.

MAY/CAN

Indicates optional courses of action and possibilities.

Indicates a fact or a valid technique.

Basis of the Manual

The Manual is based upon, and supersedes NATO DOCUMENT AC/258-D/258 (1976) and

it’s numerous corrigenda. It is one of a series of publications that have been promulgated by the

CASG as Allied Ammunition Storage and Transportation Publications (AASTP’s), as follows:

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AASTP-2 - Manual of NATO Safety Principles for the Transport of Military Ammunition

and Explosives

AASTP-3 - Manual of NATO Safety Principles for the Hazard Classification of Military

Ammunition and Explosives

AASTP-4 - Explosives Safety Risk Analysis

AASTP-5 - NATO Guidelines for the Storage, Maintenance and Transport of Ammunition

on Deployed Operations or Missions

Updating

The Logistic Storage and Disposal Sub-group (SG5), as custodian of this Manual, will keep

this manual current. Proposals for change should be submitted to the Secretary of AC/326 using the

form “AASTP-1 Change Proposal/Comment Form”.

Conditions of Release

The NATO Manual on Safety Principles for the Storage of Ammunition and explosives

(AASTP-1) is a NATO Document involving NATO property rights. The understanding and

conditions agreed for the release of the Manual are that it is released for technical defence

purposes and for the use by the defence services only of the country concerned. This

understanding requires that the release of the whole, or any part, of the Manual must not be

undertaken without reference to, and the written approval of, NATO.

Inquiries

Any questions or requirements for further information should be addressed to the Secretary

of the AC/326 Sub-Group 5 at NATO Headquarters, B-1110 Brussels, Belgium.

Section II - Historical Background of the Manual

This Manual is the result of successive revisions, over a period of 30 years, of a document

(AC/106-D/5 dated 1st September 1963) drafted by an AC/106 Restricted Sub-Group consisting of

representatives of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These experts,

meeting as specialists and not as national representatives, made a study of the systems used in France,

the United Kingdom and the United States which took into account national trials and an analysis of

archives relating to damage from accidental explosions or acts of war. This attempt at consolidation

involved each member waiving some of his own nation´s regulations. This difficulty was overcome

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by accepting that each nation would be free when authorizing implementation of the NATO system in

its territory to refrain from applying any regulation relating to particular items for which, in its view,

no compromise was possible. It was hoped, however, that in view of the very abundant information

which had been used to prepare the document new ideas would become acceptable in the interests of

NATO even if they were not always in accordance with host nation practice up to that point.

The four specialists of the Restricted Sub-Group who drew up the original document were

reconstituted in 1964 as the AC/74 Restricted Sub-Group of Experts on the Storage of Ammunition

(STORAM) to supplement the document. This task included revision of the original document and

completion of annexes on hazard classification tests, storage on military airfields, storage in ships and

barges and underground storage. AC/106-D5(Revised) was issued in 1965.

The Group of Experts on the Safety Aspects of Transportation and Storage of Military

Ammunition and Explosives (AC/258) was created in 1966 to continue this work. A Storage Sub-

Group, set up under its aegis with broader representation, prepared a new revised version published

under reference AC/258-D/70 dated December 1969. This was a very full document, including both

the basic principles from the original document and recommendations dealing with special cases

such as storage on military airfields, on board ship, underground, in the vicinity of petroleum

products or near radio transmitters. The quantity-distance tables were produced in a new format,

using metric units only, in order to simplify the presentation. Certain corrections and

rationalizations were introduced in the tables and in the criteria for quantity-distances. Smaller

intervals than hitherto were introduced in the values of explosives quantity to eliminate the need for

frequent interpolation and the consequent risk of mistakes. Values of quantity-distance were

rounded off to give uniform precision of about 1%. This eliminated cases of unduly large errors in

the small distances in the original tables. Also, detailed annexes were prepared describing tests to be

applied to ammunition in order to decide on its hazard classification. The provisions for

underground storage were completely re-written in the light of recent advances in this field of

explosives technology. However, certain underground explosives storage criteria still remained to

be formulated.

The AC/258 Group had always hoped that the various national storage regulations would be

harmonized on the basis of the principles in its own storage document (AC/258-D/70). Therefore in

1970 the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) on the recommendation of the

Group formally invited nations to adopt the principles, in whole or in part, as the basis of their

national regulations as a matter of policy. Over the next few years member nations made

declarations of intent or firm commitments. In many cases the timing of the change was linked to

another innovation, the adoption of the International System of Classification of Explosives

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formulated by the United Nations Group of Experts on Explosives which dealt with the safety of

both military and civil explosives during transport. The AC/258 Group adopted the UN system of

compatibility groups as an amendment to the storage document in 1971. Evidently the ultimate

degree of standardization could not be achieved until the International System of Classification as a

whole was incorporated in the storage document. This involved replacing the NATO hazard classes

by the divisions of the UN explosives class.

Meanwhile interest in the storage document was growing as several nations outside NATO

requested copies. The requests were usually granted by the appropriate authority. Member nations

asked for additional topics related to storage to be included in the document or in supplements.

Therefore an Editorial Sub-Group of AC/258 was set up in 1971 to promote consistent style and

format in all the texts the Group adopted on these topics and to consider how best to publish the

information.

In 1974 the Group, noted that the corrigenda which had been published (totally 14) had

modified considerably the original text of AC/258-D/70, decided to publish a completely revised

edition as a Manual in three parts: Part 1 dealing with general principles, Part II containing more

detailed information on aboveground storage and on the historical background of the Manual, and

Part III dealing with special types of storage.

During the period of this major revision - where further two corrigenda were published to

AC/258-D/70 - the Group participated in the design and assessment of field tests, both on scaled

models and at full scale, to improve its criteria for quantity-distances (in particular the "ESKIMO"

series of trials in the United States). These tests resulted in more economical methods of storage in

depots and more reliable assessment of the inherent risks of such storage. Members of the Group

also participated in several international tests at a large scale to acquire better data on underground

explosions. The conclusions and recommendations from all this experimental work were

incorporated in the Manual under the reference AC/258-D/258.

Almost the whole of Part I of the Manual was published in 1976 followed by certain chapters

of Part II and Part III in 1977. In the period 1976 to 1982 new chapter and sections were added and

corrections were made to Parts I to III.

In 1981 during the work related to updating the chapter dealing with quantity-distance

criteria for airfield, the Group found that under certain circumstances it was not possible, without

seriously prejudicing operational effectiveness, to apply the normal principles detailed in Part I of

the Manual. As a consequence therefore, it was decided to publish a new part of the Manual - Part

IV- where advice on safety principles under circumstances is given. At the same time it was decided

that certain chapters (Field Storage, Missiles Installations and Basic Load Ammunition Holding

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Areas), which until then had been published in Parts II and III, rightly belonged to the contents of

Part IV. Consequently they have been transferred to the new part of the Storage Manual.

Since 1981, 23 corrigenda to the Manual were issued. In addition, the idea grew that a

presentation more in accordance with NATO standards should be adopted. This was achieved by

restructuring the Manual in the form of an Allied Publication (AP) and producing Standardization

Agreements (STANAG) with which to implement the AP.

In late 2002 AC/258 was merged with AC/310 to form AC/326 and Sub-group 5, Logistics

and Disposal was created in order to manage AASTP’s 1 and 3. Work continued on the

development of AASTP-1 and two important Changes to Edition 1 were published in May 2003 and

May 2006.

In the meantime significant technical support began to be provided to AC/326, including

Sub-group 5 by the creation of the NATO Insensitive Munitions Information Centre (NIMIC),

which became the Munitions Safety Information Analysis Centre (MSIAC) in 2004.

During this period the Group realized - as NATO began conducting deployed operations -

that two elements of ammunition safety - risk management and safety on operations - deserved

special attention and created Sub-group 6 and began the development of AASTP’s 4 and 5. In

concert with the development of AASTP-5 it was determined that some portions of AASTP-1Part

IV should be moved to AASTP-5 (BLAHA and Field Storage).

In 2009 considerable focus was put on the creation of Change 3, which aimed to better

coordinate the four Parts, eliminate duplication, move Part IV portions to AASTP-5, update

technical aspects and - most importantly - introduce a new format for QD Tables in Part I.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS - PART I

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

I-1-3

CHAPTER 2 - CLASSIFICATION CODES AND MIXING OF AMMUNITION AND

EXPLOSIVES IN STORAGE

I-2-1

SECTION I - HAZARD DIVISIONS

I-2-1

SECTION II - COMPATIBILITY GROUPS

I-2-5

SECTION III - MIXING OF AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES IN STORAGE

I-2-8

SECTION IV - SENSITIVITY GROUPS

1-2-13

CHAPTER 3 - ABOVEGROUND STORAGE IN DEPOTS

I-3-1

SECTION I - PRINCIPLES OF THE QUANTITY-DISTANCES

I-3-1

SECTION II - DETERMINATION OF QUANTITY-DISTANCES

I-3-17

SECTION III - QUANTITY-DISTANCES FOR CERTAIN TYPES OF AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES

I-3-21

SECTION IV - QUANTITY-DISTANCES FOR CERTAIN EXPOSED SITES

I-3-24

SECTION V - STORAGE BUILDINGS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND INFLUENCE ON QUANTITY-

DISTANCES

I-3-28

SECTION VI - BARRICADES: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND INFLUENCE ON QUANTITY DISTANCES

I-3-32

SECTION VII - INJURY AND DAMAGE TO BE EXPECTED AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF PROTECTION FOR

HAZARD DIVISION 1.1 AND GROUPING OF STRUCTURES AND FACILITIES

I-3-37

SECTION VIII - Q-D RULES IN THE PARTICULAR CASE OF AMMUNITION CLASSIFIED AS 1.6N

I-3-51

CHAPTER 4 - RESERVED

I-4-1

CHAPTER 5 - SEPARATION OF POL-FACILITIES WITHIN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.I-5-1

CHAPTER 6 - HAZARDS FROM ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION TO AMMUNITION

CONTAINING ELECTRO-EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

I-6-1

CHAPTER 7 -FIRE FIGHTING PRINCIPLES

I-7-1

SECTION I - GENERAL

I-7-1

SECTION II - FIRE DIVISIONS

I-7-2

SECTION III - FIRE FIGHTING PRINCIPLES

I-7-5

SECTION IV - FIRE FIGHTING PROCEDURES

I-7-7

SECTION V - EMERGENCY PLANNING

I-7-12

CHAPTER 8 - REPORTS ON ACCIDENTAL EXPLOSIONS

I-8-1

CHAPTER 9 - DEPLETED URANIUM AMMUNITION

I-9-1

ANNEX I-A - QUANTITY DISTANCE TABLES FOR ABOVE GROUND STORAGE

I-A-1

SECTION I - GENERAL NOTE AND EXPLANATION OF SYMBOLS

I-A-2

SECTION II - QUANTITY DISTANCES TABLES (Q-D TABLES)

I-A-5

ANNEX I-B - QUANTITY DISTANCE CRITERIA FOR ABOVE GROUND STORAGE

I-B-1

SECTION I - GENERAL

I-B-2

SECTION II - CRITERIA FOR QD TABLE 1A - 1C

I-B-5

SECTION III - CRITERIA FOR QD TABLE 2A - 2F

……...……I-B-13

SECTION IV - CRITERIA FOR QD TABLE 3A - 3C

I-B-16

SECTION V - CRITERIA FOR QD TABLE 3D - 3F

I-B-20

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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

1.1.0.1

Purpose and Scope of the Manual

The primary object of this Manual is to establish safety principles to be used as a guide

between host countries and NATO forces in the development of mutually agreeable

regulations for the layout of ammunition storage depots and for the storage of

conventional ammunition and explosives therein. These principles are intended also to

form the basis of national regulations as far as possible.

The Manual is intended to serve as a guide for authorities who are engaged in the

planning and construction of ammunition storage depots or facilities of a capacity of not

less than 500 kg of Net Explosives Quantity (NEQ) per storage site, and for those who

are responsible for the safe storage of ammunition. It also gives principles and criteria for

other related matters such as design environment criteria, etc. The Manual does not

authorize the use of the principles and criteria without consent of the host countries.

NEQ per storage site of less than 500 kg are given special treatment.

It is impracticable to prescribe distances which would be safe distances in the true sense,

i.e. which would guarantee absolute immunity from propagation, damage or injury. An

attempt has therefore been made in the recommendations in this Manual to allow for the

probability of an accident and how serious the resulting damage or injury would be. The

separation distances

(quantity distances) between a potential explosion site and an

exposed site recommended in this Manual therefore represent a compromise deemed

tolerable by AC/326 between absolute safety and practical considerations including costs

and operational requirements.

The risk deemed tolerable depends upon many factors, some of which are objective, such

as the quantity of explosives involved, the nature of the explosives, the packaging of

dangerous items, their distribution within premises or in the open air, distance, the nature

of the terrain and its contours, etc. Other factors are subjective to what extent are damage

and injuries resulting from an explosive accident tolerable? For example, how many

deaths, how many serious injuries, how many buildings destroyed or damaged and other

costs are tolerable? It is therefore clearly essential to have a good knowledge of the

nature of the main hazard, namely blast or projections or fire, as well as the foreseeable

development of the accident: instantaneous, progressive, sporadic etc.

Consideration of these factors will yield the concept of hazard divisions, the net

explosives quantity and the mutual influence of potential explosion site and exposed site.

Quantity-distances are proposed in each case in the form of tables. These quantity

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distances imply a degree of harm or damage which is difficult to quantify but which most

NATO nations regard as tolerable.

There may be occasions when cogent economic or operational considerations, usually of

a temporary nature, warrant the acceptance of a significantly greater risk to life and

property. The granting of waivers or relaxations in such cases is outside the scope of this

Manual. Nevertheless, it is stressed that a detailed assessment of the risks involved must

be made by a competent agency before the appropriate authorities grant such

dispensations. Conversely, authorities which might find unacceptable the risks deemed

"tolerable" in this Manual can always reduce the risks by using suitable protective

devices and/or by increasing the recommended distances. However, this will be possible

only with a higher operating cost.

Under certain circumstances operational requirements demand a degree of relaxation

from the guidelines given in Parts I-III of the Manual. This applies mainly to basic load

holding areas, field storage and missile installations. In the same way, problems

connected with airfields used only by military aircraft and those relating to transfer of

ammunition in naval ports call for specific measures. The principles to be followed in

preparing flexible but consistent safety guidelines in those cases will be found in Part IV

of the Manual.

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CHAPTER 2 - CLASSIFICATION CODES AND MIXING OF

AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES IN STORAGE

Section I - Hazard Divisions

1.2.1.1.

General

In order to promote the safe storage and transport of dangerous goods, an International

System for Classification has been devised. The system consists of 9 classes (1-9) of which Class 1

comprises ammunition and explosives. Class 1 is divided into six divisions. The hazard division

indicates the primary type of hazard to be expected in the event of an accident: mass explosion

(Division 1.1), projection but not mass explosion (Division 1.2), fire and radiant heat (Division 1.3),

no significant hazard (Division 1.4), mass explosion with very low probability of initiation of

substance (Division 1.5) and explosion of a single article, with low probability of initiation (Division

1.6). Ammunition and explosives must be classified in accordance with STANAG 4123. Guidance

and Safety Principles for the hazard classification of military ammunition and explosives, and

National Authorities competent for the classification of ammunition and explosives are given in

AASTP-3.

1.2.1.2.

Definitions of the Hazard Divisions (definitions taken from AASTP 3 Edition 1):

Hazard Division 1.1

Substances and articles which have a mass explosion hazard

The major hazards of this division are blast, high velocity projections and other

projections of relatively low velocity.

The explosion results in severe structural damage, the severity and range being

determined by the amount of high explosives involved. There may be a risk

from heavy debris propelled from the structure in which the explosion occurs

or from the crater.

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Hazard Division 1.2

Substances and articles which have a projection hazard but not a mass explosion hazard

The explosion results in items burning and exploding progressively, a few at a

time. Furthermore fragments, firebrands and unexploded items may be projected

in considerable numbers; some of these may explode on or some time after impact

and cause fires or explosions. Blast effects are limited to the immediate vicinity.

For the purpose of determining quantity-distances a distinction, depending on the

size and range of fragments, is made between those items which give fragments of

moderate range (classified as SsD 1.2.2) and those which give fragments with a

considerable range

(classified as SsD

1.2.1). SsD

1.2.2 items include HE

projectiles (with or without propelling charges) with an individual NEQ less than

or equal to 0.73 kg and other items not containing HE such as cartridges, rounds

with inert projectiles, pyrotechnic items or rocket motors. SsD 1.2.1 items are

generally HE projectiles (with or without propelling charges) with an individual

NEQ greater than 0.73kg.

A special storage subdivision, SsD 1.2.3, with its own unique set of quantity-

distances, is applicable to munitions that exhibit at most an explosion reaction in

sympathetic reaction testing as per STANAG 4396 and a burning reaction in bullet

impact, slow heating, and liquid fuel / external fire testing as per STANAGs 4241,

4382 and 4240, respectively.

Hazard Division 1.3

Substances and articles which have a fire hazard and either a minor blast hazard or a

minor projection hazard or both, but not a mass explosion hazard.

This division comprises substances and articles:

(a)

which give rise to considerable radiant heat, or

(b)

which burn one after another, producing minor blast or projection

effects or both.

This division includes some items, which burn with great violence and intense

heat emitting considerable thermal radiation (mass fire hazard) and others,

which burn sporadically. Items in this division may explode but do not usually

form dangerous fragments. Firebrands and burning containers may be

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projected. For the purpose of determining quantity-distances and defining

mixing and aggregations rules, a distinction is made between the more

hazardous propellant explosives of HD 1.3 (classified as SsD 1.3.1) and the

less hazardous items and substances of HD 1.3 (classified as SsD 1.3.2).

Hazard Division 1.4

Substances and articles which present no significant hazard

This division comprises substances and articles which present only a small

hazard in the event of initiation. The effects are largely confined to the package

and no projection of fragments of appreciable size or range are to be expected.

An external fire shall not cause virtual instantaneous explosion of almost the

entire contents of the package.

Note: Substances and articles of this division are in Compatibility Group S if

they are so packaged or designed that any hazardous effects arising from

accidental functioning are confined within the package unless the package has

been degraded by fire, in which case all blast or projection effects are limited

to the extent that they do not significantly hinder fire-fighting or other

emergency response efforts in the immediate vicinity of the package.

Hazard Division 1.5

Very insensitive substances which have a mass explosion hazard

This division comprises substances which have a mass explosion hazard but are so

insensitive that there is very little probability of initiation or of transition from burning to

detonation under normal conditions.

NOTE 1: The probability of transition from burning to detonation is greater when large

bulk quantities are transported or stored.

NOTE 2: For storage purposes, such substances are treated as Hazard Division 1.1 since,

if an explosion should occur, the hazard is the same as for items formally

assigned to Hazard Division 1.1 (i.e. blast).

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Hazard Division 1.6

Extremely insensitive articles which do not have a mass explosion hazard.

This division comprises articles which contain only extremely insensitive detonating

substances and which demonstrate a negligible probability of accidental initiation or

propagation.

NOTE: The risk from articles of Hazard Division 1.6 is limited to the explosion of a

single article.

1.2.1.3.

Information necessary for hazard classification of ammunition and explosives will be found

in AASTP-3. Ammunition which does not contain any explosive or other dangerous goods (for

instance dummy bombs, cartridges and projectiles) is excluded from the system of hazard

classification.

1.2.1.4.

Depleted Uranium (DU) Ammunition

Ammunition containing DU in the form of a penetrator or projectile is assigned to the

Hazard Classification appropriate to the explosives content of the ammunition only. The normal

storage rules associated with the Hazard Classification may need to be modified to take account of

the slight radioactivity and chemical toxicity of DU and therefore rules may be prescribed for DU

ammunition as a separate class of ammunition, or for specific types of DU ammunition (see Part I,

Chapter 9).

1.2.1.5.

Effect of Package on Classification

As the packaging may have a decisive effect on the classification, particular care must be

taken to ensure that the correct classification is determined for each configuration in which

ammunition and explosives are stored or transported. Therefore every significant change in the

packaging (e.g. degradation) may well affect the classification awarded.

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Section II - Compatibility Groups

1.2.2.1.

General Principles

Ammunition and explosives are considered to be compatible if they may be stored

together without significantly increasing either the probability of an accident or, for a

given quantity, the magnitude of the effects of such an accident.

Ammunition and explosives should not be stored together with other goods which can

hazard them. Examples are highly flammable materials, acids and corrosives.

The safety of ammunition and explosives in storage would be enhanced if each kind was

kept separate. However, a proper balance of the interests of safety against other factors

may require the mixing of several kinds of ammunition and explosives.

The principles of mixing compatibility groups may differ in storage and transport

circumstances. Detailed information on mixing compatibility groups is to be found in

AASTP-3.

1.2.2.2.

Determination of Compatibility Groups

On the basis of the definitions in paragraph 1.2.2.3. ammunition and explosives are formally

grouped into thirteen Compatibility Groups: A to H, J, K, L, N and S.

1.2.2.3.

Definitions of the Compatibility Groups (definitions taken from AASTP 3

Edition 1):

Group A

Primary explosive substance.

Group B

Article containing a primary explosive substance and not containing

two or more effective protective features.

Group C

Propellant explosive substance or other deflagrating explosive

substance or article containing such explosive substance.

Group D

Secondary detonating explosive substance or black powder or article

containing a secondary detonating explosive substance, in each case

without means of initiation and without a propelling charge, or article

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containing a primary explosive substance and containing two or more

effective protective features.

Group E

Article containing a secondary detonating explosive substance, without

means of initiation, with a propelling charge (other than one containing

a flammable liquid or gel or hypergolic liquids).

Group F

Article containing a secondary detonating explosive substance with its

own means of initiation, with a propelling charge

(other than one

containing a flammable liquid or gel or hypergolic liquids) or without a

propelling charge.

Group G

Pyrotechnic substance, or article containing a pyrotechnic substance, or

article containing both an explosive substance and an illuminating,

incendiary, tear- or smoke-producing substance (other than a water-

activated article or one containing white phosphorus, phosphides, a

pyrophoric substance, a flammable liquid or gel, or hypergolic liquids).

Group H

Article containing both an explosive substance and white phosphorus.

Group J

Article containing both an explosive substance and a flammable liquid

or gel.

Group K

Article containing both an explosive substance and a toxic chemical

agent.

Group L

Explosive substance or article containing an explosive substance and

presenting a special risk (e.g. due to water activation or presence of

hypergolic liquids, phosphides or a pyrophoric substance) and needing

isolation of each type.

Group N

Articles which contain only extremely insensitive detonating

substances.

Group S

Substances or articles so packed or designed that any hazardous effects

arising from accidental functioning are confined within the package

unless the package has been degraded by fire, in which case all blast or

projection effects are limited to the extent that they do not significantly

hinder or prohibit fire-fighting or other emergency response efforts in

the immediate vicinity of the package.

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Section III - Mixing of Ammunition and Explosives in Storage

1.2.3.1.

Mixed Storage

Ammunition and explosives of different hazard divisions may be stored together if

compatible. The required quantity-distances and the permitted quantities for above ground storage

must be determined in accordance with Part I Chapter 3 of this Manual.

1.2.3.2.

Storage Limitations

The rules which apply to the mixing of hazard divisions and compatibility groups in above

ground storage are detailed below. Special rules apply to underground storage (see Part III). The

basic rules are given in the form of two tables as follows which have been taken from AASTP-3

Edition 1:

TABLE 4: Aboveground Storage

- Mixing and Aggregation Rules for Hazard

Divisions and Storage Sub-Divisions.

TABLE 5: Mixing of Compatibility Groups in Aboveground Storage.

Special circumstances are addressed at paragraph 1.2.3.3. and suspect ammunition and

explosives at paragraph 1.2.3.4.

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Mixed hazard divisions (HD) and Storage Sub-divisions should be aggregated as shown in

the following table:

Table 4 - Aboveground Storage - Mixing and Aggregation Rules for Hazard Divisions

and Storage Sub-Divisions

HD/

1.1

1.2.1

1.2.2

1.2.3

1.3.1

1.3.2

1.4

1.5

1.6

SsD

1.1

2), 6)

1.2.1

2), 6)

1.2.2

1.2.3

2), 6)

1.3.1

1.1

1.3.1

1.1

2), 6)

1.3.2

1.1

1.3.2

1.1

1.4

1.5

1.1

1.6

1.1

1.6

NOTES:

1) Select the larger QD associated with the following:

a) Aggregate the NEQ for the HD 1.1 or HD 1.5 material and the HD 1.2 material and treat

as HD 1.1.

b) Consider only the HD 1.2 NEQ and apply appropriate HD 1.2 criteria.

2) The NEQ of the mixture is the NEQ of the sub-division requiring the largest QD. Do not

aggregate the various SsD present, but determine QD for each individually.

3) HD 1.4 may be stored with any other HD without aggregation of the NEQ.

4) Treat the HD 1.6 material as SsD 1.2.3 and apply Note 2.

5) Sum the NEQ and use the larger QD associated with the following:

a) Treat as SsD 1.3.1.

b) Treat as SsD 1.3.2.

6) There is a significant risk that, in certain circumstances, a mix of SsD 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 and

HD 1.3 will behave as an aggregated quantity of HD 1.1.

If any of the following circumstances exists the mix must be aggregated as HD 1.1 unless relevant trials or

analyses indicate otherwise:

a) The presence of HD 1.2 shaped charges

b) High energy propellants (e.g., as used in some tank gun applications)

c) High loading density storage of HD 1.3 in conditions of relatively heavy confinement

d) HD 1.2 articles with an individual NEQ > 5 kg

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Compatibility groups may be mixed in aboveground storage as shown in

the

following table:

Table 5 - Mixing of Compatibility Groups in Aboveground Storage

Compatibility

Group

2), 3)

LEGEND:

Mixing permitted

NOTES

Compatibility Group B fuzes may be stored with the articles to which they will

be assembled, but the NEQ must be aggregated and treated as Compatibility

Group F.

Storage in the same building is permitted if effectively segregated to prevent

propagation.

Mixing of articles of Compatibility Group G with articles of other compatibility

groups is at the discretion of the National Competent Authority.

Compatibility Group L articles must always be stored separately from all articles

of other compatibility groups as well as from all other articles of different types

of Compatibility Group L.

Articles of compatibility N should not in general be stored with articles of other

Compatibility Groups except S. However if such articles are stored with articles

of Compatibility Groups C, D and E, the articles of Compatibility Group N

should be considered as having the characteristics of Compatibility Group D and

the compatibility groups mixing rules apply accordingly.

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A mixed set of munitions HD 1.6N and HD 1.4S may be considered as having

the characteristics of Compatibility Group N.

It is allowed to mix HD l.6N ammunition. The Compatibility Group of the

mixed set remains N if the ammunition belongs to the same family or if it has

been demonstrated that, in case of a detonation of one munition, there is no

instant transmission to the munitions of another family (the families are then

called “compatible”). If it is not the case the whole set of ammunition should be

considered as having the characteristics of Compatibility group D and the

compatibility groups mixing rules apply accordingly.

1.2.3.3.

Mixed Storage - Special Circumstances

There may be special circumstances where the above mixing rules may be modified by

the National Competent Authority subject to adequate technical justification based on

tests where these are considered to be appropriate.

Very small quantity HD 1.1 and large quantity HD 1.2.

It should be possible to arrange storage in such a manner that the mixture will behave as

HD 1.2.

Mixing of HD 1.1, HD 1.2 and HD 1.3

The quantity distance to be applied in these unusual circumstances is that which is the

greatest when considering the aggregate NEQ as HD 1.1, HD 1.2 or HD 1.3.

With the exception of substances in Compatibility Group A, which should not be mixed

with other compatibility groups, the mixing of substances and articles is permitted as

shown in Table 5.

1.2.3.4.

Suspect Ammunition and Explosives (Mixed storage)

Suspect ammunition and explosives must not be stored with any other ammunition and

explosives.

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MANUAL OF NATO SAFETY PRINCIPLES FOR THE STORAGE OF MILITARY AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES (May 2010) - page 1