Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 8)

NWP 2-01

4.2.1.6 National Reconnaissance Office

The Director, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), reports to both the DNI and the SECDEF. NRO is

responsible for integrating unique and innovative space-based reconnaissance technologies and the engineering,

development, acquisition, and operation of space reconnaissance systems. NRO activities provide support to

I&W, monitoring arms control agreements, enabling spaceborne access to denied areas, and the planning and

execution of military operations.

4.2.2 Nonmilitary Members of the Intelligence Community

4.2.2.1 Director of National Intelligence

The DNI serves as the head of the IC. The DNI also acts as the principle advisor to the President, the National

Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for matters related to national security. Recognizing the

heightened role of DOD as both a producer and primary consumer of intelligence, the DNI subsequently

appointed the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) as his Deputy Director for Intelligence. The

DNI is responsible for the performance of the nation’s intelligence capability, even though it is dispersed across

six governmental departments.

4.2.2.2 Central Intelligence Agency

The CIA’s primary areas of expertise are in HUMINT collection, all-source analysis, and the production of

political and economic intelligence. The Director, CIA, also serves as the national HUMINT manager and the

National Clandestine Service Director. The CIA has three Deputy Directors: Deputy Director for Intelligence,

Deputy Director for Science and Technology (S&T), and Deputy Director for Support. CIA is the largest producer

of all-source national security intelligence to senior U.S. policymakers and provides extensive political and

economic intelligence to DOD senior decision makers. CIA also oversees the Open Source Intelligence Center.

4.2.2.3 Department of State

The State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) performs intelligence analysis and produces

studies on a wide range of political and economic topics essential to foreign policy determination and execution.

The INR coordinates programs for intelligence, analysis, and research and produces intelligence studies and

current intelligence analyses for the Secretary of State and other State Department policymakers, including

ambassadors, special negotiators, country directors, and desk officers. INR is also responsible for policy and

coordination of intelligence activities in support of diplomacy and conducts open source public opinion surveys,

polls, and media trend analyses.

4.2.2.4 Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is an intelligence and law enforcement agency. It is responsible for

understanding threats to our national security and penetrating national and transnational networks that desire and

are capable of harming the United States. The FBI coordinates these efforts with its IC and law enforcement

partners. It focuses on terrorist organizations, foreign intelligence services, WMD proliferators, and criminal

enterprises. The principal investigative arm of the Department of Justice, the FBI has primary responsibility for

CI and counterterrorism operations conducted in the United States. CI operations contemplated by any other

organization in the United States must be coordinated with the FBI. Any overseas CI operation conducted by the

FBI must be coordinated with the CIA.

4.2.2.5 Department of Treasury

The Department of Treasury analyzes foreign intelligence related to U.S. economic policy and participates with

the Department of State in the overt collection of general foreign economic information.

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4.2.2.6 Department of Energy

The Department of Energy (DOE) analyzes foreign information relevant to U.S. energy policies and

nonproliferation issues and the national science laboratories under its authority. The DOE formulates energy

policy for the United States and has a system of national laboratories and technical centers which conduct energy-

related research in the national interest. The Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence directs the

development of the DOE’s policy, plans, and procedures relating to arms control, nonproliferation, export

controls, and safeguard activities. It provides access to the DOE’s energy information and technical expertise to

the rest of the IC. Additionally, this office is responsible for managing the Department’s research and

development (R&D) program for verifying and monitoring arms implementation and compliance activities and

for providing threat assessments and support to HQ and field offices.

4.2.2.7 Department of Homeland Security

The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis provides I&W support to the

Homeland Security Advisory System, assesses the scope of terrorist threats to the U.S. homeland, and integrates

terrorist-related information from DHS components, OGAs, and private sector entities. The Office of Intelligence

& Analysis focuses on threats related to border security; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear issues, to

include explosives and infectious diseases; critical infrastructure protection; extremists within the homeland; and

travelers entering the homeland.

4.2.2.8 United States Coast Guard

The United States Coast Guard (USCG), a component of the DHS, operates as both an armed force and a law

enforcement organization. The USCG’s Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers Atlantic and Pacific operate under

the direction of the Assistant Commandant for Intelligence and serve as the central hub for collection, fusion,

analysis, and dissemination of maritime intelligence and information to Coast Guard operating units, DHS, and all

members of the IC including DOD and key decision makers at the national level.

The USCG has unique missions and responsibilities that make it a significant player in several national security

issues. To accomplish these diverse objectives, the USCG intelligence program consists of two distinct elements

— the National Intelligence Element and the Law Enforcement Intelligence Program. The National Intelligence

Element conducts activities as described in Executive Order 12333 and the National Security Act of 1947 and is a

part of the IC. USCG intelligence efforts support counterdrug operations, alien migration interdiction operations,

living marine resource enforcement, MIO, port safety, counterterrorism, coastal and harbor defense operations,

and environmental protection.

The United States Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC) is a tenant command within theUSN’s

National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC) in Suitland, MD and maintains a 24-hour intelligence watch,

providing I&W input to the NMIC. The ICC acts as the strategic center with ties to both national intelligence

agencies and the HQ-level law enforcement intelligence activities. The ICC supports strategic analysis, manages

Coast Guard collection, and provides national imagery exploitation support, including tactical support to

operational commanders.

The United States Coast Guard Investigative Service (CGIS) is a federal investigative and protective agency

chartered to conduct internal and external criminal and personnel security investigations, assist in providing

personal security protection, and conduct CI investigations. Responsibilities include criminal investigations of

maritime crimes, investigating fraud, personal protection services, and security backg5round investigations. CGIS

CI and intelligence operations focus on drug smuggling, environmental crimes, illegal immigration by sea, and

assistance as required by other federal law enforcement agencies.

The National Response Center (NRC) serves as the central national point of contact for reporting environmental

intelligence data for all oil, chemical, radiological, and biological discharges into the environment in the United

States and its territories. The NRC gathers and distributes intelligence data for federal onscene coordinators and

serves as the communications and operations center for the deployable National Response Team.

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4.2.2.9 Drug Enforcement Administration

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) enforces laws and regulations governing narcotics and controlled

substances, chemical diversion, and trafficking. It is also the lead agency overseas for counterdrug law

enforcement activities and investigations. DEA makes ancillary contributions to the national IC via efforts to

build legal cases against narcotics traffickers. DEA-collected and produced information is valuable in homeland

security efforts due to the traditional close association between narcotics trafficking and illegal alien smuggling.

This results in DEA information potentially having significant value in counterterrorism applications.

4.3 THEATER-LEVEL SUPPORT

Joint intelligence organizations are directly responsible for providing the combatant command and subordinate

joint force with a common, coordinated intelligence picture by fusing national and theater intelligence and law

enforcement/CI information into all-source estimates and assessments. The JIOCs are charged with providing

operational- and tactical-level support to all components and subordinate units. Naval assets should expect and

receive I&W support, general military intelligence, targeting materials, NEO support, terrorism analysis, and

collection management support. Additionally, the joint community has established other support centers

specializing in one core area that provide the commander with focused information and products.

4.3.1 Combatant Command J2

The combatant command J2 assists the commander and staff in developing strategy, planning theater campaigns,

and organizing the command relationships of theater intelligence assets for effective joint and multinational

operations. Additionally, the J2 is responsible for determining the requirements and direction needed to ensure

unity of the intelligence effort supporting the commander’s objectives. The J2 provides higher echelons, up to and

including the NJOIC, and subordinate commands with a common, coordinated, all-source intelligence picture in

the form that the primary user of the information requires and at the point in time that it is needed. The J2

accomplishes this by employing joint force intelligence resources and identifying and integrating intelligence

from additional intelligence resources such as national intelligence capabilities and component command

intelligence assets. The J2 also fuses information into the all-source picture that is derived from law

enforcement/CI organizations.

4.3.2 Combatant Command Joint Intelligence Operations Center

Each combatant command and United States Forces Korea, a subunified command under USPACOM, operate

JIOCs to focus the application of theater and national intelligence capabilities in support of the command mission.

The JIOC is the focal point for the combatant command’s intelligence planning, collection management, analysis,

and production effort, and is organized in a manner best suited to satisfy the CCDR’s intelligence requirements.

The combatant command JIOC is the first stop for component or subordinate JTFs seeking intelligence support. If

the JIOC cannot meet the CCDR’s requirements, the JIOC forwards an RFI to the DIOCC, or to subordinate

command levels using the Community Online Intelligence System for End Users and Managers RFI management

system. In some cases, the JIOC may also seek to ensure timely support by submitting requests to IC production

centers through the national agency representatives to the command.

4.3.3 Cruise Missile Support Activity

Cruise Missile Support Activity (CMSA) Atlantic and Pacific (PAC) are joint activities subordinate to

USPACOM and USJFCOM, respectively. CMSAs were created to conduct Tomahawk-land attack missile

(TLAM) mission feasibility, weaponeering, and route planning for the JCS and CCDRs. CMSAs rapidly respond

to emergent tasking and ensure updated/new missions are transmitted to afloat launch platforms. Both CMSAs

work closely with the Navy’s undersea and surface warfare communities and with the TLAM program

management office to ensure weapons tactics and communications systems meet joint requirements.

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4.3.4 Joint Warfare Analysis Center

A component of USJFCOM, Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) is a science and engineering institution that

uses social and physical science techniques and engineering expertise to assist warfighters in support of our

national security. JWAC provides CCDRs, the JCS, and others with effects-based, precision targeting options for

selected networks and nodes. Areas of expertise include analysis of a threat country’s C2; lines of

communication; and petroleum/oil/lubricant, electrical, and telecommunications infrastructure. Additionally,

JWAC uses target data and weapons capability to determine BDA and the potential for collateral damage. JWAC

supports current military operations, OPLAN/concept plan (CONPLAN) development, and major exercises.

4.3.5 Missile and Space Intelligence Center

The Missile and Space Intelligence Center is DIA’s center of excellence for S&T intelligence on guided missiles,

directed energy weapons, selected space programs/systems, and related C2 systems. Its missile focus is on

surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), short-range ballistic missiles with ranges less than 1,000 kilometers, antitank

guided missiles, and missile defense systems.

4.3.6 Joint Information Operations Warfare Center

The Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC) plans, integrates, and synchronizes IO in direct

support of JFCs and serves as the USSTRATCOM lead for enhancing IO across the DOD. JIOWC’s mission is to

assist in planning, coordinating, and executing IO. The center deploys IO planning teams worldwide to deliver

tailored support and sophisticated models and simulations to JFCs and the Joint Staff.

The JIOWC provides direct command and control warfare tactical and technical analytical support to operational

commanders. It supports the integration of IO throughout the planning and execution phases of operations. Direct

support is provided to unified commands, JTFs, the Services, and subordinate commanders. Support is also

provided to the SECDEF, the Joint Staff, the Services, and other government agencies. The JIOWC maintains

specialized expertise in command and control warfare systems engineering, operational applications, capabilities,

and vulnerabilities.

4.3.7 Joint Personnel Recovery Agency

The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) is charged with coordinating and advancing capabilities for

military, civil, and diplomatic efforts to obtain the release or recovery of captured, missing, or isolated U.S.

personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas. JPRA is a subordinate activity of USJFCOM.

The goals of the JPRA include returning isolated U.S. personnel to friendly control, denying enemies of the

United States a potential source of intelligence, preventing the exploitation of captured U.S. personnel in

propaganda programs, and maintaining the morale of U.S. fighting forces and the national will. JPRA’s core

capabilities consist of providing personnel recovery guidance; developing, conducting, and supporting personnel

recovery education and training; providing support to operations, exercises, and deploying forces; and ensuring

that personnel recovery remains viable through the adaptation of lessons learned, R&D, and other validated

inputs.

4.4 JOINT TASK FORCE SUPPORT

JTFs may take many forms and sizes and may be employed across the ROMO in air, land, and maritime

environments. The specific organization and staffing of a JTF varies based on the mission assigned, the operating

environment, the makeup of enemy forces, and the time available to reach the desired end state. When fully

formed, the JTF staff is composed of appropriate members in key positions of responsibility from each Service or

functional component having significant forces assigned. The CJTF makes the final decision on the composition

of the JTF HQ to include the establishment of boards, centers, cells, and bureaus.

In the past, CCDRs designated naval commanders as CJTFs. Numbered fleet and CSG/ESG/ARG N2s must

prepare to function as a JTF J2.

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4.4.1 Joint Task Force J2

The JTF J2 assists the JFC in developing strategy, planning operations and campaigns, and tasking intelligence

assets for effective joint and unified operations. Additionally, the J2 is responsible for determining the

requirements and direction needed to ensure unity of the intelligence effort and to support the commander’s

objectives. The JTF J2 provides higher echelons and subordinate commands with a single, coordinated

intelligence picture by fusing national and theater intelligence into all-source estimates and assessments. The J2’s

responsibility also includes applying national intelligence capabilities, optimizing the utilization of joint force

intelligence assets, and identifying and integrating additional intelligence resources. The scope of needs,

resources, and procedures depends on the mission, nature, and composition of the force. To plan, coordinate, and

execute required intelligence operations, JTF J2s are responsible for the following:

1. Provide threat assessments and warning. The J2 is responsible for analyzing all relevant aspects of the

operational environment, determining adversary capabilities, and estimating adversary intentions. The J2

provides the resulting threat assessments and warning to the joint force and its components.

2. Participate in all decisionmaking and planning. Using IPOE as a basis, the J2 participates in the JFC’s

decision-making and planning processes from the time that operations are first contemplated or directed

until the completion of the operation. The JFC and the J2 must conduct continuous dialog concerning the

adversary’s relative strengths, weaknesses, and ability to prevent the joint force from accomplishing its

mission.

3. Synchronize intelligence with operations and plans. The J2 must ensure that intelligence collection,

processing, exploitation, analysis, and dissemination activities are planned, sequenced, and timed to

support the commander’s decision-making process and to meet the requirements of planners.

4. Formulate concept of intelligence operations. To communicate guidance and requirements to higher and

lower echelons of command, the JTF J2 develops and disseminates a concept of intelligence operations.

5. Develop detailed intelligence annexes. The JFC’s PIRs and the results of wargaming serve as the basis for

the intelligence annex of each directed OPLAN and CONPLAN. The annex lists the JFC’s PIRs and

supporting information requirements, identifies the intelligence forces available for the operation, resolves

shortfalls, and assigns or recommends tasks.

6. Integrate national and theater intelligence support. The J2 must plan for integrating national and theater

intelligence elements and products into the joint force intelligence structure. National and theater

intelligence organizations make operations feasible that could not be accomplished without their access,

capability, capacity, or expertise.

7. Exploit combat reporting from operational forces. Forward and engaged combat forces have a

responsibility to report information that can be integrated with intelligence obtained from reconnaissance

and surveillance assets.

8. Organize for continuous operations. Intelligence organizations should be structured for continuous

day/night and all-weather operations. The J2’s concept of intelligence operations should provide for

continuity of support even if communications are severely stressed or temporarily lost.

9. Ensure accessibility of intelligence. The J2 must ensure that intelligence is readily accessible throughout

the joint force while still adhering to security standards (e.g., security clearance and need-to-know

requirements).

10. Establish a joint intelligence architecture. A truly joint intelligence infrastructure must be created to

provide the best possible intelligence to the JFC. It must be constructed to ensure protection of information

and intelligence from inadvertent disclosure and guarantee integrity of the data and assured access to all

sources.

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4.4.2 Joint Intelligence Support Element

At the discretion of the JFC, a JISE may be established during the initial phases of an operation to augment the

joint force J2 element. Under the direction of the joint force J2, a JISE normally manages the intelligence

collection, production, analysis, and dissemination for a joint force. The joint force J2 defines the JISE functions,

responsibilities, and its relationship with the J2 staff. In many cases, specific responsibilities may be shared

between the J2 staff and the JISE.

The size and organization of the JISE is determined by the JFC based upon the recommendation of the J2 and

available resources. Personnel and equipment requirements for the JISE, including augmentation, are submitted to

the combatant command. Resources are provided through the RFF process.

When formed, the JISE may be collocated with the joint force J2 element in the joint operations area (JOA) or

may operate in a “split base” mode. In this mode, the JISE operations and personnel are divided between two

locations: with the joint force J2 in the JOA and at a location outside the JOA, possibly at the joint force’s home

base. Split base operations may reduce the number of personnel deployed in the JOA, thus reducing the attendant

communications systems infrastructure required.

At the operational level, a JISE is normally established; however, a JIOC may be formed at the direction of the

JFC based on the scope, duration, and mission of the unit or JTF. The decision to establish a fully-manned JIOC

may require augmentation and should be approved by the CCDR.

4.4.3 Joint Force Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Staff Element

During joint operations, CI and HUMINT efforts both complement each other and overlap to some degree. To

help ensure that these staff elements are in a position to accomplish their necessary goals, the JFC normally

establishes a joint force counterintelligence and human intelligence staff element (J2X). The mission of the J2X is

to coordinate, synchronize, leverage, manage, and deconflict all DOD CI, protection activities, HUMINT, and

other activities involving human sources in the JOA throughout all phases of operations. A J2X should be

established in joint force structures at every echelon including combined and multinational force commands. All

DOD CI and HUMINT elements conducting activities occurring in, transiting through, or impacting upon the

operating area must coordinate and deconflict these activities directly with the force J2X.

4.4.4 National Intelligence Support Team

At the request of a CCDR, the DIOCC coordinates the deployment of a national intelligence support team (NIST)

to support a JTF commander. The NIST is a nationally sourced team composed of intelligence analysts and

communications experts from DIA, CIA, NGA, NSA, and other IC agencies as required. During crisis or

contingency operations, it provides commanders with a tailored, national-level, all-source intelligence team,

ranging from a single agency element with limited ultra-high frequency voice connectivity to a fully equipped,

multiagency team with Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) and JWICS video-teleconferencing

capabilities.

A NIST typically supports intelligence operations at the JTF HQ and is traditionally collocated with the JTF J2;

however, the DIOCC portion of the NIST has the capability to go forward as required. Current modes of

operation rely on both agency and command-provided communications (equipment and bandwidth) to support

deployed NIST elements.

The NIST provides commanders with analytical expertise, I&W, and special assessments. Targeting support is

also available when the USJFCOM Quick Reaction Team is present. In direct support of the JTF, the NIST

performs functions as designated by the JTF J2, provides access to national databases, and facilitates RFI

management.

For further information on JTF Support, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, and JP 3-32, Command and Control for

Joint Maritime Operations, Change 1.

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4.5 SERVICE COMPONENT SUPPORT

With the advent of the JIOCs, Service intelligence centers were directed by Congress to concentrate on S&T

analysis of potential threat systems, long term trend analysis, and weapons tactics. The Service centers’

assessments of foreign threats or weapons capabilities are used to improve existing U.S. weapons capabilities or

to justify the development of an entirely new weapons platform. By their nature, however, the Service S&T

centers retain areas of expertise that can be used to support operational forces, both individually and in a joint

environment.

4.5.1 United States Navy

The Director of Naval Intelligence is the Navy’s intelligence executive to the CNO and the OPNAV staff. As

such, he exercises overall authority through the Department of the Navy (DON) on matters pertaining to

intelligence, cryptology, CI, and special security. The Director of Naval Intelligence manages the Navy portion of

the NFIP, sets Naval Intelligence policy, and directs Naval Intelligence planning and programs.

4.5.1.1 Office of Naval Intelligence

ONI, located within the NMIC in Suitland, MD, is the nation’s center of excellence for maritime-related

intelligence. ONI’s primary mission is to provide maritime intelligence to key strategic, operational, and tactical

decision makers. This mission includes intelligence production on seaborne terrorism, weapons and technology

proliferation, and narcotics and smuggling activities that directly supports joint warfighters, the Navy, and civil

and national decision makers and agencies.

4.5.1.1.1 Nimitz Operational Intelligence Center

The Nimitz Operational Intelligence Center functions to meet the increasing demand for rapid access to

OPINTEL by aligning with globally-netted MOCs. The Nimitz center is composed of cells and detachments that

support numbered fleets and naval warfare enterprises.

The Nimitz center performs the nation’s substantive analysis on worldwide maritime weapons systems. Areas of

interest include characteristics and performance data, tactics, and operational doctrine on non-U.S. maritime

platforms and systems that U.S. forces may encounter around the world. Inside the Nimitz center are three

specialized divisions to assess adversary capabilities, doctrine, and TTPs: SPEAR (air warfare), SWORD

(undersea warfare), and SABER (surface/littoral operations).

During the FRTP and deployment, Nimitz Operational Intelligence Center can provide the following type of

support to naval operations:

1. ONI overview briefing. This briefing provides CSG/ESG/ARG commanders and senior intelligence

personnel with an overview of ONI capabilities and the support that it can provide to the force.

2. SPEAR/SWORD/SABER briefings. Briefings consist of operations and tactics in the air, undersea, and

surface environments. SPEAR/SWORD/SABER divisions are manned with warfare specialists and

intelligence personnel to more realistically analyze platform capabilities and tactics.

3. Naval Intelligence Task Force-Maritime Security (NITF-MS). The nation’s premier analytical cell for civil

maritime trade and smuggling, NITF-MS is actively involved with the USCG on issues related to U.S. port

security including the tracking of suspicious cargo and analyzing shipping/trading companies and vessels

for terrorist links. NITF-MS also analyzes alien smuggling, fishery operations, arms smuggling and

weapons proliferation, piracy, and port capabilities. NITF-MS maintains the SEAWATCH database,

providing merchant ship locations and movements, the Merchant Ship Characteristics Database, and

AMIDSHIPS, an extensive database of merchant ship blueprints and photography. NITF-MS databases and

analysts are essential for naval forces conducting MIO.

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4. MIO briefings. These briefings provide tailored information about maritime sanctions enforcement to

include current policy, smuggling activity/patterns, and intelligence support available to the

CSG/ESG/ARG or DESRON while underway.

5. Driftnet fishing briefings. ONI can provide briefing material on illegal driftnet fishing activity, recognition

features, fishing vessel characteristics, and DOD reporting criteria. ONI can also provide hardcopy briefing

books for specific Pacific and Mediterranean areas.

6. IO/C4ISR threat briefings. Briefings include detailed information on threats to DON computer networks

and EW systems, satellite communications vulnerabilities, Global Positioning System jamming capability,

and all-source analysis on select target countries.

7. Naval forces modernization briefing. These briefings provide a broader analysis of select threat countries.

Briefers provide analysis of the country’s doctrine and strategy, its military capabilities and vulnerabilities,

and the country’s leadership and make projections and estimates about the target country’s potential threat

to U.S. interests.

8. Country and regional political/military briefings. These briefings provide “scene setters” for deploying

commanders and intelligence personnel. Briefings cover long term and current political/military

developments, naval modernization, and trends in all fleet AOs.

9. Cryptologic Services Group. The Cryptologic Services Group coordinates all ONI requests for SIGINT

data and assists and advises the ONI Global Maritime Watch.

10. ONI Detachment, Newport. The Newport Detachment provides wargaming support to the Naval War

College through scenario and opposition force development.

4.5.1.1.2 Farragut Technical Analysis Center

The Farragut Technical Analysis Center is focused on foreign S&T research, development, and proliferation. The

Farragut center’s mission is to deliver knowledge of current and future foreign navy capabilities to enable long

range planning and research, guide future acquisitions, and prevent technological surprise. The Farragut center

consists of the following departments and services:

1. Strategic Assessments (TAC-01). TAC-01 leads ONI’s foreign naval capabilities projections efforts and

coordinates across the IC on relevant issues in support of many customer sets, primarily those in the DON

R&D, test and evaluation, acquisition, plans, and policy communities.

2. Platforms (TAC-02). TAC-02 monitors surface, subsurface, and aircraft developments around the world

and produces the Navy’s platform databases and recognition guides.

3. Weapons (TAC-03). TAC-03 monitors worldwide naval-specific weapons development to include naval

ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and SAM systems. Additionally, they monitor naval guns, torpedoes,

mines, rockets, and the potential transfer of these weapons systems around the world. TAC-03 also

maintains a foreign material exploitation laboratory to analyze these materials.

4. Information Dominance (TAC-04). TAC-04 provides all-source threat analysis of foreign CNA and CNE

capabilities against Navy networks and networked systems in support of long term information assurance

and CND.

5. C4ISR/IO (TAC-05). TAC-05 has three divisions that monitor and analyze naval radars, electro-optical

devices, underwater sensors, and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I)

systems.

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6. Acoustic Intelligence (ACINT) Shipriders (TAC-06). TAC-06 can provide subsurface and surface ships

with highly skilled ACINT specialists for critical evolutions during the FRTP and deployment. TAC-06

ACINT specialists provide assistance to sonar watchstanders, real time assessments of acoustic signatures,

and recommendations on sonar operations.

4.5.1.1.3 Kennedy Irregular Warfare Center

The Kennedy Irregular Warfare Center functions to meet the expanding demands of NSWC and NECC. It is

comprised of two cells: a deployed forces cell which embeds into NSWRONs and a global analysis cell which

provides all-source OPINTEL reachback and imagery services to expeditionary forces.

4.5.1.1.4 Hopper Information Services Center

The Hopper Information Services Center provides mission-related IT services and ensures the rapid and reliable

delivery of intelligence to operational forces and intelligence customers worldwide through service oriented

architecture. The Hopper center manages naval SCI networks and provides program management of the JDISS.

For further information on ONI, refer to ONI Customer Handbook 2010.

4.5.1.2 Navy Expeditionary Intelligence Command

To optimize NECC’s ability to execute its MT&E responsibilities, specialized tactical intelligence and tactical IO

capabilities are assigned to NEIC. NEIC is an echelon IV command assigned to NECC providing tactically-

focused intelligence and IO capabilities to CCDRs, JFMCC and coalition force maritime component commanders

(CFMCCs), NCCs, numbered fleet commanders, and the NECC force. NEIC capabilities are organized, trained,

equipped, and deployed as cohesive units of action, providing specific, specialized services. NEIC provides the

following specific capabilities:

1. Navy tactical HUMINT capabilities. Tactical HUMINT capabilities are a managed activity under the

direction of the NEIC CO. Authority to conduct tactical HUMINT operations is derived from USD(I)

direction. Oversight, policy, guidance, and authorities are provided or delegated through SECNAV, the

Director of Naval Intelligence Deputy Director for Human-Derived Information (OPNAV N2X), USFF,

and NECC. Operational authority is derived from the supported CCDR through the existing command

structure. Tactical HUMINT collectors are DOD-certified to supervise and conduct HDI/Human-Enabled

Information collection operations. HUMINT collectors are one of the primary means for interaction with

local populations in support of the commander’s requirements.

2. Maritime interception operations-intelligence exploitation team (MIO-IET). MIO-IET capabilities are a

managed activity under the direction of the NEIC CO. Authority to operate MIO-IETs is derived from

USD(I) direction. Oversight, policy, guidance, and authorities are provided through SECNAV, OPNAV

N2X, USFF, and NECC. Operational authority is derived from the supported CCDR through the existing

command structure. The MIO-IET program was established to provide fleet MIO boarding teams with the

requisite expertise to recognize and exploit intelligence opportunities using a variety of techniques in

collaboration with theater and national intelligence centers to support CCDR, JFMCC, CFMCC, NCC, and

numbered fleet commander operational requirements. MIO-IET intelligence and tactical IO personnel are

certified to conduct visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) level II/III boardings and are trained to

integrate into fleet VBSS parties.

3. Expeditionary intelligence support element (EISE). EISE is a managed activity under the direction of the

NEIC CO. EISE provides qualified naval intelligence officers and IS-3912s to deploy in support of the full

range of expeditionary missions. EISE personnel complete baseline expeditionary intelligence training and

enhance organic intelligence capability to facilitate expeditionary operations.

4. Expeditionary tactical information operations support (ETIOS). ETIOS capabilities are a managed activity

under the direction of the NEIC CO. ETIOS personnel conduct real time or near real time collection

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operations enabling force protection and I&W and provide analytic support to deployed forces. ETIOS

personnel search, intercept, identify, exploit, and direction-find communications and noncommunications

transmissions. ETIOS personnel are trained and equipped to exploit the EM spectrum in the expeditionary

and fleet operating environments.

4.5.1.3 Fleet Cyber Command/COMTENTHFLT

FLTCYBERCOM and COMTENTHFLT were created as part of the CNO’s vision to achieve information

integration and innovation necessary for warfighting superiority across the full spectrum of military operations in

the maritime and cyberspace domains. This initiative supports the Navy’s move from platform-centric to

information-centric processes. The new FLTCYBERCOM and COMTENTHFLT are headquartered at Fort

George G. Meade, MD, taking advantage of existing infrastructure, communications support, and expertise.

FLTCYBERCOM serves as the NCC to United States Cyber Command. Its mission is to direct Navy cyberspace

operations globally to deter and defeat aggression and to ensure freedom of action to achieve military objectives

in and through cyberspace; to organize and direct Navy cryptologic operations worldwide and support IO and

space planning and operations; to deliver integrated cyber, IO, cryptologic, and space capabilities; and to deliver

global Navy cyber network common operational requirements.

The mission of COMTENTHFLT is to serve as the numbered fleet for FLTCYBERCOM and operationally

employ Navy cyber, IO, and SIGINT forces and to coordinate with coalition naval forces and JTFs to execute the

full spectrum of cyber, IO, and SIGINT capabilities and missions across the cyber, EM, and space domains.

4.5.1.3.1 Naval Network Warfare Command

Subordinate to United States Cyber Command, Naval Network Warfare Command (NNWC) directs the

operations and security of the Navy’s portion of the Global Information Grid. NNWC ensures the delivery of

reliable and secure net-centric and space warfighting capabilities in support of strategic, operational, and tactical

missions across the Navy.

4.5.1.3.2 Navy Information Operations Commands

NIOCs provide SIGINT and IO expertise and equipment to fleet air, surface, subsurface, expeditionary, and

special warfare forces. Where applicable, they are collocated with NSA/Cryptologic Support System components.

The NIOCs, Navy information operations detachments, and theater-focused FIOCs support a myriad of maritime,

joint theater, and national missions within the SIGINT and IO arenas, providing reachback support to maritime

commanders.

4.5.1.3.3 Navy Cyber Forces

CYBERFOR is the TYCOM for cryptology, SIGINT, cyber, IO, intelligence, networks, and space disciplines.

CYBERFOR reports to COMUSFLTFORCOM.

As the TYCOM, CYBERFOR’s mission is to manage the manpower, training, modernization, and maintenance of

C2 architecture and networks, cryptologic and space-related systems, and intelligence and IO activities.

CYBERFOR is headquartered at Joint Expeditionary Base, Little Creek-Fort Story in Virginia Beach, VA.

Location in a fleet concentration area ensures CYBERFOR’s close linkage with those it supports. CYBERFOR

coordinates with COMUSFLTFORCOM, COMUSPACFLT, and the platform TYCOMs for surface, air, and

subsurface forces to coordinate MT&E issues such as IA and DS requirements, CCOP equipment installation,

Navy tactical task list generation and maintenance, and personal qualification standards and job qualification

requirements review and maintenance.

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4.5.1.4 Naval Criminal Investigative Service

Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) is a federal law enforcement agency that protects and defends the

DON against terrorism and foreign intelligence threats, investigates major criminal offenses, enforces the criminal

laws of the United States and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, assists commands in maintaining good order

and discipline, and provides law enforcement and security services to the Navy and Marine Corps on a worldwide

basis. NCIS programs and operational activity complement other efforts within the DON to defend against

espionage, terrorism, subversion, sabotage, criminal activity, and major security violations.

With over 150 offices worldwide and agents assigned to interagency task forces, CCDR and joint staffs, selected

USN ships and staffs, and Marine Corps elements, NCIS activities keep the supported commanders apprised of

potential threats. NCIS leverages organic investigative and analytic capabilities as well as liaison relationships to

identify, neutralize, and/or exploit potential breaches of security. NCIS also provides a comprehensive briefing

program to educate military and civilian personnel on threats posed by foreign intelligence and security services

(FISS) and terrorist groups.

4.5.1.4.1 Combating Terrorism

The NCIS Combating Terrorism Program includes offensive (counterterrorism) and defensive (antiterrorism/force

protection) capabilities employed to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Activities also

include the collection, processing, and analysis of information that is further integrated with theater and national

sources to produce all-source intelligence products that support naval force commanders and their staffs. NCIS

special agents and analysts work closely with operational planning staffs within the Navy, Marine Corps, and

joint commands. To facilitate this strategy, NCIS assigns trained personnel to other law enforcement and

intelligence agencies to include the FBI, CIA, and NSA.

Naval forces in transit are supported by agents assigned to OCONUS NCIS field offices or force protection

detachments which are manned jointly by NCIS, Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), and Army

Criminal Investigations Command.

4.5.1.4.2 Counterintelligence

Within the DON, NCIS has primary jurisdiction for CI and investigative matters with the exception of combat and

contingency-related CI responsibilities of the Marine Corps. NCIS provides a full range of CI services

encompassing four primary mission areas: collection, analysis and production, operations, and investigations.

NCIS accomplishes its mission through proactive and reactive programs in support of DON and national-level

requirements. NCIS also provides personnel to develop and implement CI plans in support of DON, theater, and

DOD CI objectives during wartime, contingencies, and exercises. NCIS is responsible for providing CI support to

the DON R&D and acquisition community. NCIS has dedicated CI assets and programs in support of R&D,

technology protection, critical program information, and infrastructure protection.

4.5.1.4.3 Multiple Threat Alert Center

The Multiple Threat Alert Center (MTAC) serves as the focal point within the DON for single-source evaluation,

all-source analysis, and dissemination regarding asymmetric terrorist, FISS, cyber, and criminal threats impacting

the DON. Additionally, MTAC serves as the 24/7 operations center for NCIS activities worldwide. MTAC

maintains awareness of Navy and Marine Corps operations and liaises with national, theater, and tactical

operations and intelligence watch centers to identify and warn of location-specific threats.

4.5.1.4.4 Human-Derived Information

HDI is defined as the “activities related to the conduct of the collection of intelligence information through

humans. It includes the following forms of information: CI, force protection, research and technology protection,

and law enforcement.” HDI encompasses all information derived from individuals.

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Deputy CNO for Information Dominance (OPNAV N2/N6) has designated NCIS the mission manager for Navy

HDI. This designation does not extend to tactical control of Navy and Marine Corps tactical HUMINT/CI teams.

4.5.2 United States Marine Corps

HQ, United States Marine Corps Intelligence Department is responsible for policy, plans, programming, budgets,

and staff supervision of intelligence and supporting activities within the United States Marine Corps. The

department supports the Commandant of the Marine Corps in his role as a member of the JCS, represents the

Service in joint and IC matters, and exercises supervision over the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA).

The department has Service staff responsibility for GEOINT, advanced geospatial intelligence, SIGINT,

HUMINT, MASINT, and CI and ensures there is a single synchronized strategy for the development of the

Marine Corps ISR Enterprise.

4.5.2.1 Marine Corps Intelligence Activity

The MCIA is the United States Marine Corps’ Service intelligence center. It is primarily located at Quantico, VA

and Fort Meade and Suitland, MD and has a detachment at the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) in

Charlottesville, VA. Unique among Service production centers, tailored products are the largest percentage of

MCIA’s efforts that support operating forces.

MCIA strives to tailor its intelligence production toward specific operational needs through its more than 25 types

of intelligence products and services. MCIA leverages the analysis of other national or defense intelligence

agencies or organizations to meet the needs of more than 570 customers including all branches of Service,

government entities, and coalition partners. MCIA provides HQ, Marine Corps; USMC components; and other

customers with the following types of support: threat assessments, estimates, and intelligence for planning and

decisionmaking; intelligence support for doctrine and force structure development; systems and equipment

acquisition; wargaming; training; predeployment planning; and exercise support.

4.5.3 United States Air Force

HQ, United States Air Force is the focal point for the end-to-end functional management of all Air Force ISR

capabilities. The Air Force participates in the preparation of joint and national intelligence estimates and develops

and implements the Air Force policies and guidance for developing, managing, and operating Air Force ISR

activities.

4.5.3.1 Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Agency

The Air Force ISR Agency’s mission is to organize, train, equip, and present assigned forces and capabilities to

conduct ISR for CCDRs and the nation. The agency also implements and oversees execution of Air Force HQ

policy and guidance to expand Air Force ISR capabilities to meet current and future challenges.

The 480th ISR Wing, 70th ISR Wing, 361st ISR Group, National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), and

the Air Force Technical Applications Center are aligned under the Air Force ISR Agency. The agency is also

responsible for mission management and support of SIGINT operations for 24th Air Force and the 12th Air

Force’s 55th Wing. In addition, the agency provides guidance to 22 Air National Guard units with ISR

responsibilities. The Air Force ISR Agency further supplies mission management and support for specific

intelligence operations within all of these organizations. Mission support includes organizing, training, and

equipping the Service’s cryptologic elements.

4.5.3.2 National Air and Space Intelligence Center

NASIC, headquartered at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (AFB), OH, is the primary DOD producer of foreign

air and space intelligence. NASIC develops its products by analyzing all available data on foreign aerospace

forces and weapons systems to determine performance characteristics, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions.

NASIC assessments are often an important factor in shaping national security and defense policies. As the DOD

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experts on foreign aerospace system capabilities, the center also supports weapons treaty negotiations and

verification. Since 1961, the center’s mission and resources have expanded to meet the challenge of worldwide

technological developments and the accompanying national need for aerospace intelligence. In recent years, the

emphasis has increasingly shifted toward evaluation of worldwide aerospace systems and the production of

tailored, customer-specific products.

4.5.3.3 Air Force Office of Special Investigations

AFOSI provides professional investigative service to commanders of all Air Force activities. AFOSI identifies,

investigates, and neutralizes criminal, terrorist, and espionage threats to Air Force and DOD personnel and

resources.

The command focuses on five priorities: develop and retain a force capable of meeting Air Force needs, detect

and provide early warning of worldwide threats to the Air Force, identify and resolve crime that threatens Air

Force readiness or good order and discipline, combat threats to information systems and technologies, and detect

and defeat fraud impacting force acquisitions and base-level capabilities.

In addition to HQ, AFOSI has eight field investigations regions, seven of which are aligned with Air Force major

commands. While the regions serve the investigative needs of those aligned major commands, all AFOSI units

and personnel remain independent of those commands, and their chains of command flow directly to AFOSI HQ.

Such organizational independence ensures unbiased investigations. The single region not aligned with a major

command provides CI and security program management for special access programs under the Office of the

Secretary of the Air Force.

4.5.4 United States Army

The Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) is responsible to the Chief of Staff, Army, for long-

range planning and policy guidance on all matters relating to Army intelligence, including CI and many aspects of

security policy. The DCSINT manages the Army’s portion of the NIP, all Military Intelligence Program funding,

Army departmental-level general military and S&T intelligence production missions, intelligence readiness

training, the Army language program, and the Army Foreign Material Program. The DCSINT also serves as the

DOD executive agent for commercial linguist support to the Services/CCDRs. The DCSINT supervises the

Army’s Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) and has operational control over its departmental

production resources.

4.5.4.1 United States Army Intelligence and Security Command

INSCOM, headquartered at Fort Belvoir, VA, is the Army’s principal intelligence command. All intelligence

disciplines and capabilities not assigned to Corps and below are assigned to INSCOM. The command provides

multidiscipline intelligence and IO support to Army commanders at all echelons. As the Army’s force projection

intelligence command, INSCOM provides a Theater Intelligence Brigade that directly supports each Army

component commander in each of the GCCs. These brigades perform continuous IPOE to ensure Army

commanders’ situational awareness of potential adversaries in the theaters in which they operate or to which it

might deploy forces. In addition, INSCOM serves as the Army’s Service Cryptologic Authority and provides

Army personnel in direct support of NSA and the regional SIGINT operations centers. The 902nd MI Brigade, Ft.

Meade, MD, provides CI support to Army forces, combat support agencies, installations, and designated

contractor facilities throughout the CONUS. The 1st Information Operations Command, Ft Belvoir, VA, provides

IO support to Army communications networks and Army commands across the tactical to strategic spectrum.

4.5.4.2 National Ground Intelligence Center

NGIC is the Army’s S&T intelligence center and is subordinate to INSCOM. NGIC produces all-source

intelligence on foreign ground force systems, technology, organization, doctrine, strategy, and tactics in

accordance with DIA’s delegated production program. Like the other Service S&T centers, NGIC supports

national decision makers, the acquisition community, and operational forces and executes the Army portion of the

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DOD Foreign Material Acquisition Program. Although primarily located in Charlottesville, VA, NGIC also has

satellite facilities at the Washington Navy Yard, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, and Fort Meade, MD. It also

maintains strategic military intelligence detachments located around the country composed of Army reservists

who contribute to the Army analysis and production program. To facilitate sharing of information, the MCIA

maintains a contingent at NGIC.

4.6 INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND COOPERATION

Operations with a wide variety of partners, both United States and multinational, are becoming the norm, making

intelligence sharing with interagency and multinational allies and partners increasingly important. In operations

involving interagency, intergovernmental, nongovernmental, or multinational partners, one of the most critical

functions of the JTF is establishing a common view of the problem and shared situational awareness among all

partners. Although intelligence sharing is accomplished at all levels during crises, in most operations the

requirement expands with proximity to the operational forces. For this reason, it is imperative that the JFC and his

subordinate forces understand the limits and restrictions on information sharing.

The majority of operations conducted today involve intelligence sharing to some degree. The required amount of

intelligence shared varies widely based on the nature of the military operation. In general, combat operations with

multinational military coalitions require much more robust intelligence sharing than humanitarian or

peacekeeping operations. The J2 must scale the organization’s capability to provide intelligence sharing

accordingly.

The foreign disclosure officer (FDO) of the combatant command is the key element in any intelligence sharing

plan with interagency, intergovernmental, nongovernmental, or multinational partners. The FDO is versed in all

relevant national disclosure policy and can guide the JFC and staff in information releasability and proper

intelligence sharing procedures. The FDO provides staff review and advises the JFC on the approval of sanitized

or downgraded military intelligence products. In the absence of an onsite FDO, intelligence products that require

sanitization or downgrading for release to third parties are referred to the producing agency or coordinated

through the RFI process. Since the process is time consuming, the JFC should request deployed FDO support to

satisfy timely intelligence sharing requirements.

Intelligence and cryptologic professionals must coordinate with an FDO via their chain of command for policy

and guidance on sanitizing and downgrading classified products. Writing for release is a critical step in expediting

the downgrading or sanitization of intelligence products. Prepare products at an uncaveated level to the greatest

extent possible. Cleary indentify material not authorized for release utilizing portion marking, fully footnote all

derived classified information, and provide tear line information at a releasable level.

For further information on foreign disclosure policy and writing for release, refer to the DON Foreign Disclosure

Manual.

4.7 NEW CHALLENGES IN THE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

The advent of the information age presents new challenges for the U.S. intelligence apparatus. While it allows

sharing of information and analysis promptly and in large quantities, it also complicates the quest for relevant,

accurate intelligence in a timely fashion. The sheer volume of available information alone can overwhelm even

the most advanced collection mechanisms and associated workforce. Thus, the imperative for the professional is

to develop and employ sophisticated approaches to gathering and providing pertinent intelligence in support of

commander’s guidance and intent. Just as importantly, the speed by which assessments reach the right

commanders and decision makers is the backbone of ID and knowledge superiority.

As new capabilities are fielded and legacy capabilities are upgraded, the IC must determine methods to

incorporate and synergize information from the various sensors towards a holistic assessment. This especially

includes the incorporation and employment of unmanned vehicles and systems in the physical domains alongside

capabilities in the virtual domain of cyberspace. While these new and improved sensors bolster the collection

manned systems provide, it is critical to the successful intelligence operation that collected data is merged with

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intelligence at the MOC to ensure the most complete intelligence available is accessible for the commander’s

consumption and utilization. The increased amount of available information necessitates the MOC as a focal point

for its analysis and synthesis into finished intelligence products.

Perhaps now, more than ever, in this era of globalization, there must be a significant investment in cultural

intelligence and awareness. In consonance with “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,”

partnerships and relationships with foreign nations is at the crux of success. These associations largely hinge on

the U.S. forces respect and understanding of a state’s people and its culture and sensitivities. The function of

intelligence for this mission is to support the accuracy and provision of this awareness. Additionally, it must

furnish assessments of the interactions to ensure the U.S. approach is effective and its objectives are obtained.

This role is squarely aligned with the duties of the IC and elemental to success in this regard.

This constraint becomes most evident when confronting irregular challenges ashore, in the littorals, and on the

open ocean. The rapidity with which these sorts of threats can materialize and deploy drastically shortens the

timeline normally associated with traditional nation-state force-on-force conflicts. As such, the intelligence

required to support understanding of the irregular environment must be quickly aggregated with a speed

uncommon to traditional processes. Additionally, the provided intelligence must extend beyond the military

capabilities of the adversary and into the ethnic and cultural sensitivities of the combatant and populace alike to

support nonkinetic and IO tactics.

The advances in warfare and technology present a wealth of new challenges for the IC; however, each challenge

is an opportunity to evolve the intelligence profession to meet the requirements of the changing security

environment. These opportunities must be met head-on by a trained cadre of professionals that make best use of

the emerging sensor systems, increased collection capabilities, and innovative Navy organizational structures such

as the MOC and the IDC. It is only through the effective employment of all facets of the intelligence mechanism

that Naval Intelligence can remain preeminent in its contribution to meeting national objectives.

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REFERENCES

JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations, (Incorporating Change 1, 27 May 2008), 8 August

2008

JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, 16 February 2007

NTRP 3-20.6.06, CV/CVN Class Tactical Publication (U), July 2005

NTTP 1-10.1, Force Tactical Action Officer (FTAO) (U), March 2005

TACMEMO, CLF/CPF 3-03.1-03, Strike Planning Cell, 4 April 2003

NWP 3-51.1, Navy Electronic Warfare (U), February 2006

NTTP 3-13.2, Navy Information Operations Warfare Commander’s Manual (U), May 2006

SECNAVINST 5430.107, Mission and Functions of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, 28 December 2005

SECNAVINST 3850.2C, Department of the Navy Counterintelligence, 20 July 2005

DIRNAVCRIMINVSERV WASHINGTON DC, 161801Z APR 2009, HUMAN DERIVED INFORMATION

STRATEGY

NAVADMIN 169/08, 161250Z JUN 08, STAND-UP OF INTELLIGENCE TYCOM FUNCTIONS WITHIN

NAVAL NETWORK WARFARE COMMAND (NETWARCOM)

CNO MEMO, Fleet Cyber Command/Tenth Fleet and Navy Cyber Forces Implementation Plan and Command

Relationships Directive, 29 January 2010

NAVADMIN 159/09, 280239Z MAY 09, INTELLIGENCE MANPOWER ALIGNMENT

COMNAVNETWARCOM, 021248Z OCT 09, FLEET INTELLIGENCE MANPOWER DISTRIBUTION

POLICY FOR INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT TEAMS

The Concept of Operations for Fleet Maritime Domain Awareness (Fleet MDA CONOPS), 13 March 2007

Navy Maritime Domain Awareness Concept 2007, 29 May 2007

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power, October 2007

TACMEMO 3-13.3-05 Communications Electronic Warfare for Surface Units (U), December 2005

Navy Enlisted Manpower and Personnel Classifications and Occupational Standards, July 2010

COMUSFLTFORCOM, 232017Z OCT 09, INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO) AND CRYPTOLOGIC

GLOBAL AUGMENTATION POLICY (GAP)

CNO WASHINGTON DC, 300017Z MAR 07, CRYPTOLOGIC CARRY-ON PROGRAM (CCOP)

FUNCTIONAL MANAGER DESIGNATION

Reference-1

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Cryptologic Carry-On Program (CCOP) Business Plan, Version 1.0 (U), May 2007

JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 June 2007

JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Joint Operations (U), 13 June 2006

U.S. Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. Tenth Fleet Web site, http://www.fcc.navy.mil/

United States Navy Web site, http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=50853

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Department Web site,

http://hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/dirint/default.html

Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Web site (U),

http://www.mcia.ic.gov/portal/page/portal/CommandPortalV1/CommandInformation/CommandHistory

Headquarters, U.S. Air Force DCOS for ISR Web site (U),

http://www.intelink.ic.gov/sites/a2/aboutus/Shared%20Documents/mission.aspx?PageView=Shared

United States Air Force official Web sites, http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=9438 and

http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=145

NWP 3-32, Maritime Operations at the Operational Level of War (with Erratum 11/18/2008), October 2008

NTTP 3-32.1, Maritime Operations Center (thru Change 1 February 2010), October 2008

OPNAVINST 5450.77, Missions, Functions, and Tasks for U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFLTFORCOM), 16

July 2007

OPNAVINST 5450.337, Missions, Functions, and Tasks of Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, 19 November 2007

OPNAV Notice 5400.7407, “Establishment of U.S. Fleet Cyber Command and Recommissioning of U.S. Tenth

Fleet” at Fort George G Meade, MD, 19 January 2010

JP 3-13, Information Operations, 13 February 2006

United States Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Force Operational Concept, 1 August 2007

Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Expeditionary Intelligence Concept of Operations, 26 November 2007

COMNECC INST 3880.1, NECC Force Management of Expeditionary Intelligence and Tactical Information

Operations Capabilities, 1 September 2009

Memo for the Information Dominance Corps, 2 November 2009, VADM Dorsett

NAVADMIN 316/09, 292237Z OCT 09, ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL

OPERATIONS FOR INFORMATION DOMINANCE (N2/N6)

Information Dominance: A Vision for the U.S. Navy, 30 October 2009, CNO

OPNAVINST 5300.12, The Information Dominance Corps, 6 October 2009

Taking Joint Intelligence Operations to the Next Level, Joint Force Quarterly, December 2007, Tyler Akers

JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, 16 June 2009

NOV 2010

Reference-2

NWP 2-01

JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 7 October 2004

JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, 13 April 07

NDP 2, Naval Intelligence, 30 September 1994

JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Incorporating Change 2, 22 March 2010), 17 September 2006

JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, 26 December 2006

JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (Incorporating Change 1, 20 March 2009), 14 May 2007

Navy Enlisted Manpower and Personnel Classifications & Occupational Standards, NAVPERS 18068F,

http://www.npc.navy.mil/ReferenceLibrary/NEOCS/

OPNAVINST C3501.2K, Mission Areas and Required Operational Capability/Projected Operational

Environment Statements (U), 22 January 2010

NWP 3-56, Composite Warfare Commander’s Manual, August 2001

ONI Handbook 2010, Office of Naval Intelligence, 2010

Department of the Navy Foreign Disclosure Guide (Incorporating Change Transmittal 1), September 2007

COMUSFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA, 132118Z JAN 09, EXPEDITIONARY STRIKE GROUP (ESG) WAY

AHEAD (U)

COMUSFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA, 092342Z MAR 09, EXPEDITIONARY STRIKE GROUP (ESG) WAY

AHEAD SECOND IN A SERIES (U)

Naval Network Warfare Command Web site, http://www.netwarcom.navy.mil/

National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness for the National Strategy for Maritime Security, October

2005

The U.S. Navy’s Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges, January 2010

Reference-3

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NWP 2-01

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACINT

acoustic intelligence

AFB

Air Force Base

AFOSI

Air Force Office of Special Investigations

aerographer’s mate (USN rating)

air intelligence officer

AMDC

air missile defense commander

AMW

amphibious warfare

area of operation

AOR

area of responsibility

AQD

additional qualification designator

ARG

amphibious ready group

ASW

antisubmarine warfare

ASWC

antisubmarine warfare commander

ATF

amphibious task force

ATO

assistant targeting officer

air warfare

BDA

battle damage assessment

BHA

bomb hit assessment

command and control

C4I

command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence

C4ISR

command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance

CAG AI

CVW intelligence officer

CCDR

combatant commander

CCIR

commander’s critical information requirement

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CCOP

cryptologic carry-on program

CDC

combat direction center

CDIO

collateral duty intelligence officer

command element

CFMCC

coalition force maritime component commander

CGIS

United States Coast Guard Investigative Service

counterintelligence

CIA

Central Intelligence Agency

CIC

combat information center

CJCS

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CJTF

commander, joint task force

CMSA

cruise missile support activity

CNA

computer network attack

CND

computer network defense

CNE

computer network exploitation

CNO

Chief of Naval Operations

commanding officer

COA

course of action

COG

center of gravity

COMTENTHFLT

Commander, Tenth Fleet

COMUSFLTFORCOM

Commander, United States Fleet Forces Command

COMUSNAVAF

Commander, United States Naval Forces, Africa

COMUSNAVCENT

Commander, United States Naval Forces, Central Command

COMUSNAVEUR

Commander, United States Naval Forces, Europe

COMUSNAVSO

Commander, United States Naval Forces, Southern Command

COMUSPACFLT

Commander, United States Pacific Fleet

CONOPS

concept of operations

CONPLAN

concept plan

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CONUS

continental United States

CPRG

Commander, Patrol and Reconnaissance Group

CPRW

commander, patrol and reconnaissance wing

CRC

cryptologic resource coordinator

CSG

carrier strike group

CSS

Central Security Service

cryptologic technician

CTF

task force commander

CTG

task group commander

CTI

cryptologic technician - interpretive

CTM

cryptologic technician - maintenance

CTN

cryptologic technician - networks

CTR

cryptologic technician - collection

CTT

cryptologic technician - technical

CVIC

carrier intelligence center

CVN

aircraft carrier, nuclear

CVW

carrier air wing

CWC

composite warfare commander

CYBERFOR

Navy Cyber Forces

DCSINT

[Army] Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence

DEA

Drug Enforcement Administration

DESRON

destroyer squadron

DFI

Director of Fleet Intelligence

DHS

Department of Homeland Security

DIA

Defense Intelligence Agency

DIOCC

Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center

DIWC

deputy information warfare commander

DNI

Director of National Intelligence

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DOD

Department of Defense

DOE

Department of Energy

DON

Department of the Navy

direct support

electronic attack

EEFI

essential elements of friendly information

EEI

essential element of information

EISE

expeditionary intelligence support element

ELINT

electronic intelligence

electromagnetic

EMCON

emission control

electronic protection

electronic warfare support

ESG

expeditionary strike group

ETIOS

expeditionary tactical information operations support

electronic warfare

EXPLOT

expeditionary plot

EXW

expeditionary warfare

FBI

Federal Bureau of Investigation

FCC

functional component commander

FDNF

forward deployed naval forces

FDO

foreign disclosure officer

FIAF

Fleet Intelligence Adaptive Force

FID

fleet intelligence detachment

FIOC

fleet information operations center

FISS

foreign intelligence and security services

FLTCYBERCOM

Fleet Cyber Command

FOS

family of systems

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FRTP

fleet readiness training plan

GCC

geographic combatant commander

GEOINT

geospatial intelligence

HA/DR

humanitarian assistance/disaster relief

HDI

human-derived information

host nation

headquarters

HUMINT

human intelligence

I&W

indications and warning

individual augmentee

Intelligence Community

ICC

United States Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center

information dominance

IDC

Information Dominance Corps

IDIS

independent duty intelligence specialists

IMDP

Intelligence Manpower Distribution Plan

IMINT

imagery intelligence

INR

State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research

INSCOM

US Army Intelligence and Security Command

information operations

ION

interactive ON-NET

IPIC

imagery processing interpretation center

IPOE

intelligence preparation of the operational environment

IRTPA

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act

intelligence specialist

ISR

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

information technology

ITO

integrated tasking order

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irregular warfare

IWC

information operations warfare commander

J2X

joint force counterintelligence and human intelligence staff element

JAOC

joint air operations center

JATF

joint amphibious task force

JCS

Joint Chiefs of Staff

JDISS

Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System

JFACC

joint force air component commander

JFC

joint force commander

JFCC-ISR

Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance,

and Reconnaissance

JFE

joint fires element

JFMCC

joint force maritime component commander

JIC

joint intelligence center

JIOC

joint intelligence operations center

JIOWC

Joint Information Operations Warfare Center

JIPTL

joint integrated prioritized target list

JISE

joint intelligence support element

JMPS

Joint Mission Planning System

JOA

joint operations area

JPRA

Joint Personnel Recovery Agency

JTCB

joint targeting coordination board

JTF

joint task force

JTSG

joint targeting steering group

JWAC

Joint Warfare Analysis Center

JWICS

Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System

LHA

landing helicopter assault

LHD

landing helicopter dock

NOV 2010

LOAA-6

NWP 2-01

LOAC

law of armed conflict

LPD

landing platform dock

LSD

dock landing ship

MASINT

measurement and signature intelligence

MCIA

Marine Corps Intelligence Activity

MCM

mine countermeasures

MCMRON

mine countermeasures squadron

MDA

maritime domain awareness

MEA

munitions effectiveness assessment

METOC

meteorological and oceanographic

MEU

Marine expeditionary unit

MIO

maritime interception operations

MIOC

maritime intelligence operations center

MIO-IET

maritime interception operations-intelligence exploitation team

MIW

mine warfare

MIWC

mine warfare commander

MOC

maritime operations center

MPR

maritime patrol and reconnaissance

MSI

multisensor interpretation

MT&E

man, train, and equip

MTAC

Multiple Threat Alert Center

Navy intelligence

NALE

naval and amphibious liaison element

NASIC

National Air and Space Intelligence Center

NCC

Navy component commander

NCIS

Naval Criminal Investigative Service

NEC

Navy enlisted classification

NECC

Navy Expeditionary Combat Command

LOAA-7

NOV 2010

NWP 2-01

NEIC

Navy Expeditionary Intelligence Command

NEO

noncombatant evacuation operation

NFIP

National Foreign Intelligence Program

NGA

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

NGIC

National Ground Intelligence Center

NIC-C

National Intelligence Coordination Center

NIOC

Navy information operations command

NIP

National Intelligence Program

NIST

national intelligence support team

NITF-MS

Naval Intelligence Task Force-Maritime Security

NJOIC

National Joint Operations and Intelligence Center

NMAWC

Naval Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare Command

NMIC

National Maritime Intelligence Center

NMITC

Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center

NNWC

Naval Network Warfare Command

NRC

National Response Center

NRO

National Reconnaissance Office

NSA

National Security Agency

NSAWC

Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center

NSW

naval special warfare

NSWC

Naval Special Warfare Command

NSW MSC

Naval Special Warfare Mission Support Center

NSWRON

naval special warfare squadron

NTTP

Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures

NWP

Navy warfare publication

OGA

other government agency

OGO

other government organization

OIC

officer in charge

NOV 2010

LOAA-8

NWP 2-01

ONI

Office of Naval Intelligence

OPINTEL

operational intelligence

OPLAN

operation plan

OPNAV

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

OPNAV N2/N6

Deputy CNO for Information Dominance

OPNAV N2X

Director of Naval Intelligence Deputy Director for Human-Derived

Information

OPTASK

operational task

OTC

officer in tactical command

PHIBRON

amphibious squadron

PIR

priority intelligence requirement

R&D

research and development

RFF

requests for forces

RFI

request for information

ROE

rules of engagement

ROMO

range of military operations

S&T

science and technology

MEU intelligence

SAM

surface-to-air missile

SAPCO

special access program control officer

SBT

special boat team

SCCTV

secure closed-circuit television

SCI

sensitive compartmented information

SDV

SEAL delivery vehicle

SEAL

sea, air, and land

SECDEF

Secretary of Defense

SHARP

shared reconnaissance pod

SIAC

strike intelligence analysis cell

LOAA-9

NOV 2010

NWP 2-01

SIGINT

signals intelligence

SIWO

signals intelligence warfare officer

SIO

senior intelligence officer

SOF

special operations forces

SOMPE-M

Special Operations Mission Planning Environment-Maritime

SSEE

ship’s signals exploitation equipment

SSES

ship’s signals exploitation space

SSO

special security officer

STWC

strike warfare commander

SUPPACT

support activity

SUPPLOT

supplementary plot

SUWC

surface warfare commander

TAC

target analysis cell

TACRON

tactical air control squadron

TAD

temporary additional duty

TAO

tactical action officer

TDY

temporary duty

TET

targeting effects team

TFCC

tactical flag command center

TIC

target intelligence cell

TLAM

Tomahawk-land attack missile

TNL

target nomination list

targeting officer

TOC

tactical operations center

TSC

theater security cooperation

TSOC

theater special operations command

TST

time-sensitive target

TYCOM

type commander

NOV 2010

LOAA-10

NWP 3-05

CONTENTS

Page

No.

CHAPTER 1—EVOLUTION OF NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE

1.1

INTRODUCTION

1-1

1.2

NAVAL COMBAT DEMOLITION UNITS

1-1

1.3

UNDERWATER DEMOLITION TEAMS

1-2

1.4

SEA-AIR-LAND TEAMS

1-3

1.5

SPECIAL BOAT TEAMS

1-5

1.6

SEAL DELIVERY VEHICLE TEAMS

1-5

1.7

UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND ESTABLISHED

1-5

1.8

NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE FORCE REALIGNMENT

1-6

1.9

AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

1-7

1.10

GROWTH OF NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE

1-7

CHAPTER 2—NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE FORCES AND ORGANIZATION

2.1

NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE FORCES

2-1

2.2

NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMAND

2-1

2.3

NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE GROUPS

2-1

2.4

NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE GROUPS ONE AND TWO

2-2

2.4.1

SEAL Teams

2-3

2.4.2

Logistics Support Units ONE and TWO

2-3

2.4.3

Mobile Communications Team

2-4

2.5

NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE GROUP THREE

2-5

2.5.1

SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team ONE

2-5

2.5.2

Logistic Support Unit THREE

2-6

2.5.3

Training Detachment THREE

2-7

2.6

NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE GROUP FOUR

2-7

2.6.1

Special Boat Teams

2-7

2.6.2

Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School

2-7

2.7

NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE GROUP TEN

2-8

MAY 2013

NWP 3-05

Page

No.

2.7.1

Support Activity ONE and TWO

2-8

2.7.2

Naval Special Warfare Mission Support Center

2-9

2.7.3

Cultural Engagement Unit

2-9

2.7.4

Naval Special Warfare Anchor Teams

2-9

2.8

NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE GROUP ELEVEN

2-9

2.9

NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE UNITS

2-12

2.10

NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER

2-12

2.10.1

Basic Training Command

2-12

2.10.2

Advanced Training Command

2-12

2.11

NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE DEVELOPMENT GROUP

2-12

2.12

CENTER FOR SEAL TEAM AND SPECIAL WARFARE COMBATANT-CRAFT

CREWMAN

2-12

CHAPTER 3—COMMAND AND CONTROL

3.1

GLOBAL FORCE MANAGEMENT

3-1

3.1.1

Persistent and Episodic Requirements

3-1

3.1.2

Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercises

3-2

3.1.3

Contingency Plan Execution

3-2

3.1.4

Counterterrorism Execute Order

3-3

3.2

DEFINITIONS

3-3

3.2.1

Assigned Forces

3-3

3.2.2

Attached Forces

3-3

3.2.3

Allocated Forces

3-3

3.2.4

Geographic Combatant Commander Authority

3-3

3.2.5

United States Special Operations Command Authority

3-3

3.2.6

Combatant Command

3-4

3.2.7

Operational Control

3-4

3.2.8

Tactical Control

3-4

3.2.9

Administrative Control

3-4

3.2.10

Support Relationships

3-5

3.2.11

Coordinating Authority

3-5

3.2.12

Direct Liaison Authorized

3-5

3.3

NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE DEPLOYMENT ROTATION

3-5

3.4

NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE TASK ORGANIZATION CHAIN OF COMMAND

3-5

3.5

THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION EVENTS

3-7

3.6

NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE TASK ORGANIZATION COMPONENTS

3-7

3.7

COMMAND AND CONTROL

3-7

3.7.1

Naval Special Warfare Task Force

3-7

3.7.2

Naval Special Warfare Task Group

3-9

3.7.3

Naval Special Warfare Task Unit

3-9

MAY 2013

NWP 3-05

Page

No.

3.7.4

SEAL Delivery Vehicle Task Unit

3-9

3.7.5

Special Boat Task Element

3-9

3.7.6

Naval Special Warfare Task Element

3-9

3.8

COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

3-9

3.8.1

Headquarters Support

3-11

3.8.2

Indirect Support

3-11

3.8.3

Direct Support

3-11

3.8.4

Undersea Combat Service Support

3-11

3.8.5

Service-provided Support

3-11

3.9

COMBAT ELEMENTS

3-12

3.10

OTHER DEPLOYABLE NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE FORCES

3-12

3.11

GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDER ORGANIZATION

3-12

3.11.1

United States Pacific Command

3-13

3.11.2

United States European Command

3-13

3.11.3

United States Central Command

3-14

3.11.4

United States Southern Command

3-14

3.11.5

United States Africa Command

3-16

CHAPTER 4—NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE CHARACTERISTICS AND EMPLOYMENT

4.1

STRATEGIC CONTEXT FOR EMPLOYMENT

4-1

4.2

NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE OPERATORS

4-2

4.2.1

Navy SEAL Operator

4-2

4.2.2

SEAL Platoon

4-3

4.2.3

SEAL Delivery Vehicles

4-3

4.2.4

Special Warfare Combatant Craft-Crewman

4-3

4.2.5

Versatility

4-4

4.2.6

Multi-purpose Canine

4-4

4.3

DIRECT ACTION ORIENTATION

4-4

4.4

MARITIME FOCUS

4-5

4.4.1

Seabasing

4-5

4.4.2

Sea-based Command and Control

4-6

4.4.3

Afloat Forward Staging Base

4-6

4.5

TARGET ACCESS

4-6

4.5.1

Intelligence

4-6

4.5.2

Tactical Mobility

4-8

4.6

OTHER SUPPORT

4-8

4.6.1

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Platoon

4-8

4.6.2

Fires

4-8

4.6.3

Shore Basing

4-8

4.7

COMBINED ACTION

4-9

4.7.1

Combined Action Programs

4-9

MAY 2013

NWP 3-05

Page

No.

4.7.2

Joint Combined Exchange Training

4-9

4.7.3

Counternarco-Terrorism Training

4-10

4.7.4

Regional Specialists

4-10

4.7.5

Small Craft Training

4-10

4.8

NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE TASKS

4-11

4.8.1

Direct Action

4-11

4.8.2

Special Reconnaissance

4-11

4.8.3

Counterinsurgency

4-11

4.8.4

Counterterrorism

4-12

4.8.5

Preparation of the Environment

4-12

4.8.6

Security Force Assistance

4-12

4.8.7

Foreign Internal Defense

4-12

4.8.8

Information Operations

4-12

4.8.9

Unconventional Warfare

4-12

4.9

GUIDELINES FOR EMPLOYMENT

4-13

4.10

LIMITATIONS

4-14

APPENDIX A—TACTICAL MOBILITY

A.1

NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE TACTICAL MOBILITY

A-1

A.2

SUBSURFACE

A-1

A.2.1

Dry Deck Shelter

A-1

A.2.2

SEAL Delivery Vehicle

A-3

A.3

SURFACE

A-4

A.3.1

Special Boat Detachments

A-4

A.3.2

Combatant Craft-Heavy

A-4

A.3.3

Combatant Craft-Medium

A-4

A.3.4

Combatant Craft-Light

A-7

A.3.5

Master Mariner Program

A-7

A.4

AIR INSERTION

A-7

A.4.1

Maritime Craft Aerial Delivery System

A-7

A.4.2

Rotary Wing

A-7

A.5

TACTICAL GROUND MOBILITY

A-9

MAY 2013

NWP 3-05

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Page

No.

CHAPTER 2—NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE FORCES AND ORGANIZATION

Figure 2-1.

Naval Special Warfare Chain of Command

2-2

Figure 2-2.

SEAL Team (Active Duty)

2-3

Figure 2-3.

Mobile Communications Team

2-5

Figure 2-4.

SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team

2-6

Figure 2-5.

Special Boat Teams TWELVE and TWENTY

2-8

Figure 2-6.

Special Boat Team TWENTY-TWO

2-8

Figure 2-7.

Naval Special Warfare Group TEN

2-10

Figure 2-8.

Cultural Engagement Unit

2-10

Figure 2-9.

SEAL Teams SEVENTEEN and EIGHTEEN

2-11

CHAPTER 3—COMMAND AND CONTROL

Figure 3-1.

Naval Special Warfare Task Force Structure Example

3-6

Figure 3-2.

Naval Special Warfare Task Organization Components

3-8

Figure 3-3.

Sample Naval Special Warfare Task Unit/Group/Force

3-10

Figure 3-4.

Naval Special Warfare Task Organization in Pacific Command

3-13

Figure 3-5.

Naval Special Warfare Task Organization in European Command

3-14

Figure 3-6.

Naval Special Warfare Task Organization in Central Command

3-15

Figure 3-7.

Naval Special Warfare Task Organization in Southern Command

3-15

Figure 3-8.

Naval Special Warfare Task Organization in Africa Command

3-16

APPENDIX A—TACTICAL MOBILITY

Figure A-1.

Dual and Single Dry Deck Shelter

A-2

Figure A-2.

SEAL Delivery Vehicle Launch from Dry Deck Shelter

A-3

Figure A-3.

Sea Lion

A-5

Figure A-4.

11-meter Rigid Inflatable Boat

A-5

Figure A-5.

Combatant Craft-Assault

A-6

Figure A-6.

Special Operations Craft-Riverine

A-6

Figure A-7.

Kangaroo Duck

A-8

Figure A-8.

Maritime Craft Aerial Delivery System

A-8

Figure A-9.

H-60 Fast Rope Insertion

A-9

Figure A-10.

Light Tactical All-terrain Vehicle

A-10

Figure A-11.

Internally Transportable Vehicle

A-11

Figure A-12.

RG31 A3 Mine-resistant Ambush-protected Vehicle

A-11

MAY 2013

NWP 3-05

PREFACE

NWP 3-05 (MAY 2013), NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE, is intended for use by military planners and staff

officers and contains information on the nature, forces, organization, and employment of naval special warfare

forces.

Throughout this publication, references to other publications imply the effective edition.

Report administrative discrepancies by letter, message, or e-mail to:

COMMANDER

NAVY WARFARE DEVELOPMENT COMMAND

ATTN: DOCTRINE

1528 PIERSEY STREET BLDG O-27

NORFOLK VA 23511-2723

NWDC_NRFK_FLEETPUBS@NAVY.MIL

ORDERING PRINTED COPIES

Order printed copies of a publication using the print-on-demand (POD) system. A command may requisition a

publication using the standard military standard requisitioning and issue procedure (MILSTRIP) process on the

Naval Supply Systems Command Web site called the Naval Logistics Library (https://nll.ahf.nmci.navy.mil). An

approved requisition is forwarded to the specific Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) site at which the publication’s

electronic file is officially stored. Commands may also order publications through the Navy Doctrine Library

System Web site (https://ndls.nwdc.navy.mil) by visiting publication-specific metadata Web pages and selecting

the hyperlink on the stock number, which is linked to the Naval Logistics Library Web site. Users may be

prompted to create an account to complete the ordering process. Currently, three copies are printed at no cost to

the requester.

CHANGE RECOMMENDATIONS

Procedures for recommending changes are provided below.

WEB-BASED CHANGE RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommended changes to this publication may be submitted to the Navy Doctrine Library System, accessible

through the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) Web site at: http://ndls.nwdc.navy.smil.mil or

https://ndls.nwdc.navy.mil.

URGENT CHANGE RECOMMENDATIONS

When items for changes are considered urgent, send this information by message to the primary review authority,

info NWDC. Clearly identify and justify both the proposed change and its urgency. Information addressees should

comment as appropriate. See the sample for urgent change recommendation message format on page 15.

MAY 2013

NWP 3-05

ROUTINE CHANGE RECOMMENDATIONS

Submit routine recommended changes to this publication at any time by using the routine change recommendation

letter format on page 16. Mail it to the address below or post the recommendation on the Navy Doctrine Library

System site.

COMMANDER

NAVY WARFARE DEVELOPMENT COMMAND

ATTN: DOCTRINE

1528 PIERSEY STREET BLDG O-27

NORFOLK VA 23511-2723

CHANGE BARS

Revised text is indicated by a black vertical line in the outside margin of the page, like the one printed next to this

paragraph. The change bar indicates added or restated information. A change bar in the margin adjacent to the

chapter number and title indicates a new or completely revised chapter.

WARNINGS, CAUTIONS, AND NOTES

The following definitions apply to warnings, cautions, and notes used in this manual:

An operating procedure, practice, or condition that may result in injury or death if not

carefully observed or followed.

An operating procedure, practice, or condition that may result in damage to equipment

if not carefully observed or followed.

Note

An operating procedure, practice, or condition that requires emphasis.

WORDING

Word usage and intended meaning throughout this publication are as follows:

“Shall” indicates the application of a procedure is mandatory.

“Should” indicates the application of a procedure is recommended.

“May” and “need not” indicate the application of a procedure is optional.

“Will” indicates future time. It never indicates any degree of requirement for application of a procedure.

MAY 2013

NWP 3-05

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

NAME OF ACTIVITY

STREET ADDRESS

CITY, STATE XXXXX-XXXX

5219

Code/Serial

Date

FROM:

(Name, Grade or Title, Activity, Location)

TO:

(Primary Review Authority)

SUBJECT: ROUTINE CHANGE RECOMMENDATION TO (Publication Short Title,

Revision/Edition, Change Number, Publication Long Title)

ENCL:

(List Attached Tables, Figures, etc.)

1. The following changes are recommended for NTTP X-XX, Rev. X, Change X:

CHANGE: (Page 1-1, Paragraph 1.1.1, Line 1)

Replace “…the National Command Authority President and Secretary of Defense establishes

procedures for the…”

REASON: SECNAVINST ####, dated ####, instructing the term “National Command Authority”

be replaced with “President and Secretary of Defense.”

ADD: (Page 2-1, Paragraph 2.2, Line 4)

Add sentence at end of paragraph “See Figure 2-1.”

REASON: Sentence will refer reader to enclosed illustration.

Add Figure 2-1 (see enclosure) where appropriate.

REASON: Enclosed figure helps clarify text in Paragraph 2.2.

DELETE: (Page 4-2, Paragraph 4.2.2, Line 3)

Remove “Navy Tactical Support Activity.”

“…Navy Tactical Support Activity, and the Navy Warfare Development Command are is

responsible for…”

REASON: Activity has been deactivated.

2. Point of contact for this action is (name, grade or title, telephone, e-mail address).

(SIGNATURE)

NAME

Copy to:

COMUSFLTFORCOM

COMUSPACFLT

COMNAVWARDEVCOM

Routine Change Recommendation Letter Format

MAY 2013

NWP 3-05

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This navy warfare publication describes the nature, forces, organization, and employment of naval special warfare

(NSW).

Naval special warfare is a relatively small, maritime special operations force (SOF) consisting of approximately

9,250 personnel: 2,700 sea-air-land commandos (SEALS), 700 special warfare combatant-craft crewmen

(SWCCs), 750 Reservists, 4,000 combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) personnel, and more

than 1,100 civilians. NSW constitutes 11 percent of special operations forces and less than 2 percent of United

States Navy (USN) forces. NSW costs 3/10ths of one cent (0.3 percent) of every United States (U.S.) defense

dollar.

Naval special warfare origins go back to World War II (WWII) naval combat demolition units (NCDUs),

underwater demolition teams (UDTs), and other special-purpose maritime organizations. In 1962, the first SEAL

teams were established. Since 9/11, NSW has grown capacity and added substantial capability, including

intelligence gathering and analysis, logistical support, and tactical mobility.

The current NSW organization is based around eight SEAL teams, one SEAL delivery vehicle team (SDVT),

three special boat teams (SBTs), and several supporting organizations. These teams and supporting commands are

organized into six NSW groups, a training command, and a tactical development group.

NSW is a versatile, maritime-focused, direct action (DA)-oriented force that emphasizes innovation, stealth,

precision, and aggressive action. NSW capabilities are based on a rigorous all-volunteer training and selection

process stressing mental and physical toughness for SEAL and SWCC operators. NSW tactical mobility assets

include combatant craft, undersea combat submersibles, and tactical ground vehicles. Naval special warfare forces

also include intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); cultural engagement; and logistics support units

(LOGSUs). These forces combine into scaled and tailored force packages that integrate intelligence gathering and

analysis, a versatile portfolio of insertion and extraction techniques, flexible command and control (C2) options,

and a strike capability characterized by attention to detail, stealth, speed, precision, and a high density of

specialized skills.

NSW is an extreme-environment force operating deep at sea; through the surf; from the air; in jungles, deserts, or

high mountains; and in all weather, day or night. NSW operates in all terrain but is uniquely trained and equipped

to operate in maritime and riverine areas. The ability to operate over, under, on, and from the sea—as well as in

the air and on land—allows access to targets that may be inaccessible to other forces and is whence the acronym

SEAL originates.

Naval special warfare forces are employed in all scenarios from peacetime to conventional war. NSW capabilities

are particularly well-suited to irregular warfare conflicts involving violent extremist organizations,

counterinsurgencies, or other scenarios in which the U.S. interests are threatened by widely dispersed,

hard-to-locate, hard-to-get-to, high-priority targets that require precision assaults. NSW forces should be

employed when target characteristics include, or target engagement is facilitated by, one or more of the following.

1. Access. Target is hard to locate, hard to get to, or requires collaboration with a partner force.

2. Maritime or riverine.

3. Stealth. Small U.S. signature for political purposes and small tactical signature for military purposes.

4. Precision. Eyes-on, hands-on target discrimination and precise, measured application of force.

EX-1

MAY 2013

NWP 3-05

CHAPTER 1

Evolution of Naval Special Warfare

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Today’s naval special warfare personnel can trace their origins back to the amphibious scouts and raiders (S&Rs),

NCDUs, Office of Strategic Services Maritime Unit, and UDTs of World War II. While none of those early

organizations have survived to the present, their pioneering efforts are mirrored in the missions and

professionalism of present NSW operators.

1.2 NAVAL COMBAT DEMOLITION UNITS

In September 1942, 17 Navy salvage personnel arrived at Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, VA, for a 1-week

course on demolitions, explosive cable cutting, and commando raiding techniques. November 10, 1942, this first

combat demolition unit succeeded in cutting a cable and net barrier across the Wadi Sebou River during

Operation TORCH in north Africa. The unit’s actions enabled the USS Dallas (DD 199) to traverse the river and

insert United States Army Rangers to capture the Port Lyautey airdrome. During the same period at Little Creek,

the amphibious S&R (joint) were formed to participate in Operation TORCH to lead amphibious assault forces to

the beaches of north Africa. One of the S&R operators was Chief Petty Officer (later Captain) Phil Bucklew

(for whom the Naval Special Warfare Training Center is named).

May 14, 1943, the first phase of an NCDU project was established at Solomons, MD, to train six officers and 18

enlisted volunteers to participate in Operation HUSKY, the invasion of southern Italy. The second phase of the

project began with planning for a massive cross-channel invasion of Europe after intelligence indicated German

forces were arraying a barrier to invasion of underwater obstacles on the beaches at Normandy.

June 6, 1943, Lieutenant Commander Draper L. Kauffman, “the father of naval combat demolition”, established

the Naval Combat Demolition Unit Training School at Fort Pierce, FL, to train personnel specifically for Europe,

although others were deployed to the Pacific. The NCDUs, composed of six-man teams, were formed with

volunteers acquired from the Navy Construction Battalion (Seabee) training school at Camp Peary, Williamsburg,

VA. During November 1943, NCDU-2, under Lieutenant Junior Grade (LTJG) Frank Kaine (for whom the Naval

Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM) building is named), and NCDU-3, under LTJG Lloyd

Anderson, formed the nucleus of six NCDUs that served with the Seventh Amphibious Force from Biak to

Borneo, clearing boat channels after amphibious landings.

By April 1944, 34 NCDUs were deployed to England in preparation for Operation OVERLORD, the Allied

invasion of France on the beaches of Normandy. June 6, 1944, in the face of great adversity the NCDUs at Omaha

Beach managed to open eight complete and two partial gaps in the German defenses. The NCDUs suffered 31

dead and 60 wounded-a casualty rate of 52 percent. The NCDUs at Utah Beach met less intense enemy fire,

clearing 700 yards of beach in 2 hours and clearing another 900 yards by the end of the day. Casualties at Utah

Beach totaled six dead and 11 wounded. Not a single demolitioneer was lost to the improper handling of

explosives during OVERLORD.

Professional knowledge has a history, and some knowledge of that history is essential to professional

competence.

—The Soldier and the State, Samuel P. Huntington

1-1

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In August 1944, the NCDUs that operated at Utah Beach participated in the amphibious landings in southern

France, the last amphibious operation in the European Theater of Operations. The majority of NCDUs were then

transferred to the Pacific Theater of Operations and eventually absorbed into the UDTs.

The NCDUs at Omaha Beach were presented one of only three Presidential Unit Citations awarded for the

Normandy invasion, and the NCDUs at Utah Beach were presented the only Navy Unit Commendation awarded

for D-day.

1.3 UNDERWATER DEMOLITION TEAMS

Admiral Chester Nimitz’s “Granite Plan” for central Pacific Theater operations required a robust amphibious

force. Many of the targeted islands were formed of coral atolls with reefs that served as an obstacle to amphibious

assaults. November 23, 1943, problems with the United States Marine Corps (USMC) landing on Tarawa Atoll

made clear the need for hydrographic reconnaissance and underwater demolition of obstacles prior to the conduct

of amphibious landings. In response to this need, 30 officers and 150 enlisted volunteers were moved to

Waimanalo Amphibious Training Base, Oahu, HI, to form the nucleus of what later became UDT-1 and UDT-2.

UDTs first saw combat January 31, 1944, during Operation FLINTLOCK in the Marshall Islands. FLINTLOCK

was the catalyst for the formal establishment of a UDT training program in the Pacific Theater. In February 1944,

the Naval Combat Demolition Training and Experimental Base was established next to the Amphibious Base at

Kamaole at Kihei, Maui, HI.

A total of 34 UDTs were eventually established. Wearing swimsuits, fins, and face masks during combat

operations, these “naked warriors” saw action across the Pacific Theater in every major amphibious assault,

including Eniwetok, Saipan, Guam, Tinian, Angaur, Ulithi, Pelilui, Leyte, Lingayen Gulf, Zambales, Iwo Jima,

Okinawa, Labuan, Brunei Bay, and the July 4, 1945 operation in Balikpapan, Borneo, which was the last major

UDT operation of the war.

During the post-war period, the number of active duty UDTs was reduced to two on each coast with a

complement of seven officers and 45 enlisted men each. The senior UDT commanding officer (CO) on each coast

was also designated as commander, underwater demolition unit (COMUDU), or COMUDU ONE (COMUDO-1)

(Coronado, CA) and COMUDU TWO (COMUDO-2) (Little Creek, VA). COMUDU would be the single voice

addressing the respective Atlantic and Pacific amphibious force commanders. During the post-war period,

COMUDO-1 included UDT-1 and UDT-3; UDT-5 was established in 1952 to provide rotational relief to the

other teams rotating through Korea. COMUDO-2 included UDT-2 and UDT-4.

The Korean War began June 25, 1950. Initially, a detachment of 11 personnel from UDT-3 was committed into

action in Korea and later expanded to three teams of approximately 100 men each rotating into the Korean

Theater of Operations. UDTs, operating under the special operations group, conducted demolition raids against

railroad tunnels, bridges, and other targets along the Korean coast.

September 15, 1950, UDTs supported Operation CHROMITE, the amphibious landing at Inchon, Korea. UDT-1

and UDT-3 preceded the amphibious assault, scouting mud flats, marking low points in the channel, clearing

fouled assault craft propellers, and searching for mines. Four UDT personnel then acted as wave guides for the

subsequent Navy-Marine amphibious assault.

In October, 1950, UDTs supported mine-clearing operations in Wonsan Harbor, Korea, locating and marking

mines for clearance by minesweepers. October 12, 1950, UDTs rescued 25 sailors after two U.S. minesweepers

struck mines and sank. The next day, UDT operator William Giannotti conducted the first U.S. combat operation

using an aqualung when he dove to the sunken minesweeper USS Pledge to recover material. Additionally, UDTs

conducted beach and river reconnaissance, mine-sweeping operations, infiltrated guerrillas into enemy-held

territory from the sea, and participated in Operation FISHNET to cripple the North Korean fishing fleet.

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After Korea, UDT-2 and UDT-4 on the east coast were redesignated UDT-21 and UDT-22. The west coast

teams became UDT-11, UDT-12, and UDT-13. UDT-13 was disestablished in 1954 and UDT-22 in 1957.

UDT-22 would be reestablished when the SEAL teams were authorized in 1961.

The UDTs again saw combat in Vietnam supporting amphibious ready groups and, when attached to riverine

patrol groups, they conducted beach and river reconnaissance, destroyed Viet Cong bunkers, accomplished

numerous canal clearance operations, and conducted counterinsurgency (COIN) operations working from U.S.

and Vietnamese patrol boats. UDT personnel also served as advisors to the South Vietnamese navy.

In a series of 1970’s reorganizations, UDT-22 and UDT-13 were established and eliminated again.

1.4 SEA-AIR-LAND TEAMS

A June 5, 1961 letter from the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) to the commanders of the United States Atlantic

Fleet and United States Pacific Fleet outlined “concepts for naval operations in restricted waters, rivers, and

estuaries…[and] with particular reference to the conduct and support of paramilitary operations, it is desirable to

establish special operations teams as a separate component within Underwater Demolition Units ONE and TWO.

An appropriate cover name for such units is ‘SEAL’ units, being a contraction of SEA, AIR, and LAND.”¹

A CNO letter of October 31 read: “As a first step in improving naval unconventional warfare (UW) capabilities,

efforts are being exerted to obtain personnel and funds to activate the two SEAL Units for participation in the

water-borne aspects of unconventional warfare.”² An interesting aspect of this letter is that the narrative used the

term “naval special warfare”; this may have been the first, if not one of the earliest, use of the phrase.

SEAL teams were officially authorized in a December 11, 1961 CNO letter, the same letter that reestablished

UDT-22. SEAL Teams ONE and TWO, established in January, 1962, were formed entirely of personnel

transferred from UDTs.

The SEAL or NSW breast insignia was approved October 16, 1970. When first established, there were separate

UDT and SEAL insignia in both silver (enlisted) and gold (officer) versions; however, within several years it was

reduced to the existing and enduring gold trident. SEAL enlisted men were authorized to wear a gold insignia

because of the equality of warfare area qualification training found only in naval special warfare, gold insignia are

generally reserved only for naval officers.

Naval Operation Support Groups Atlantic and Pacific were established in the Atlantic and Pacific October 10,

1963, and were the predecessor of today’s naval special warfare groups (NSWGs). They supplanted COMUDU as

senior in the chain of command.

SEAL involvement in Vietnam began initially as advisors to the Vietnamese in the conduct of clandestine

maritime operations. SEALs also began a UDT-style training course for the Biet Hai (sea commandos) based in

Danang, Vietnam.

In February 1966, a small SEAL Team ONE detachment arrived in Vietnam to conduct direct-action missions out

of Nha Be in the Rung Sat Special Zone. This deployment would evolve into a steady state presence of eight

SEAL platoons for a number of years. Additionally, SEALs served as advisors for provincial reconnaissance units

and the Lien Doc Nguoi Nhia, the Vietnamese SEALs. Although small in size, SEALs were among the most

highly decorated units in the Vietnam War. Decorations included three Medals of Honor and five Navy Crosses.

The last SEAL platoon left Vietnam December, 7, 1971, and the last SEAL advisor left in March 1973.

NSW was reorganized several times during the 1970s, the size of the SEAL teams was dramatically reduced, and

the NSWGs were briefly replaced by other organizations.

¹ CNO letter, June 5, 1961.

² CNO letter, October 31, 1961.

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From 1982 thru 1993, NSW personnel served as trainers and advisors in El Salvador and maintained a small

advisor base in La Union, El Salvador.

May 1, 1983, UDT-11 was redesignated as SEAL Team FIVE, UDT-21 was redesignated as SEAL Team FOUR,

UDT-12 was redesignated as SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team ONE (SDVT-1), and UDT-22 was redesignated as

SDVT-2. A new team, SEAL Team THREE, was established October 1, 1983 in Coronado, CA.

In 1983, SEALs participated in Operation URGENT FURY, the invasion of Grenada. NSW forces conducted a

night beach reconnaissance in preparation for an amphibious assault, conducted a direct action against an enemy

controlled radio station, and fought off a large enemy force in a mission to protect the governor general and his

family.

SEALs participated in Operation EARNEST WILL in the Persian Gulf from 1987 to 1989. Two oil-servicing

barges, the Hercules and the Wimbrown VII, were converted into mobile sea bases from which NSW forces

conducted patrol and interdiction operations in the northern Persian Gulf to maintain the security of sea lines of

communication. Missions included interdiction of Iranian mine-laying operations, small-boat harassments, and

attacks on shipping, including the capture of the Iran Ajr, an Iranian minelayer.

SEAL Team EIGHT was established on October 1, 1988 at Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA.

In 1989, SEALs participated in Operation JUST CAUSE, the invasion of Panama to topple the Noriega

dictatorship. Operating out of Rodman Naval Station, Panama, NSW forces secured the Atlantic and Pacific

entrances to the Panama Canal, denied Noriega the use of his aircraft located at Paitilla Airfield, sank the

Panamanian patrol boat Presidente Poras, and conducted numerous reconnaissance and DA search and seizure

missions.

From August 1990 thru March 1991, SEALs participated in Operation DESERT SHIELD and Operation

DESERT STORM. They conducted beach and land border reconnaissance missions, 118 combat search and

rescue (CSAR) missions, and 92 mine countermeasures missions. SEALs liberated the first Kuwaiti territory,

captured the first enemy prisoners of war, and conducted a maritime CSAR operation. SEALs also conducted a

maritime deception mission, a feint that successfully drew Iraqi forces away from the point of the U.S. assault into

Kuwait.

From December 1992 thru March 1995, NSW forces participated in Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia.

They supported amphibious operations by performing amphibious and other special reconnaissance, riverine

operations, harbor and port surveys, convoy and personnel protection, and sniper operations.

From May thru September 1994, NSW forces (Naval Special Warfare Task Unit (NSWTU)-Wasp) conducted

amphibious reconnaissance and other special operations as part of Operation SUPPORT DEMOCRACY and

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti. In addition to supporting amphibious reconnaissance, NSW patrol

coastal ships participated in the enforcement of the United Nations embargo against Haiti by conducting maritime

interdiction operations.

From December 1995 thru June 1998, as part of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR and Operation JOINT GUARD

in Bosnia, NSW forces conducted reconnaissance and served as a quick reaction force for the Sava River bridging

operations. They also served as joint commission observers in Bosnia, six-man elements that facilitated

communications between formerly warring factions and the United Nations Stabilization Force commanders.

From April 7-20, 1996, personnel from Naval Special Warfare Unit TWO (NSWU-2) participated in Operation

ASSURED RESPONSE, during which they conducted a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) of more than

2,000 people from the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia, Liberia.

From September 21 thru October 10, 1998, NSWU-2 and NSWU-10 forces participated in Operation SHADOW

EXPRESS, a noncombatant evacuation operation in Monrovia, Liberia. A political settlement ended the

requirement for a full evacuation.

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1.5 SPECIAL BOAT TEAMS

Today’s special warfare combatant-craft crewmen trace their roots to the motor torpedo boat squadrons of WWII

and especially from the Vietnam-era mobile support teams (MSTs) of the NSW boat support units (BSUs). In

February 1964, Boat Support Unit ONE (BSU-1) was established under Naval Operations Support Group,

Pacific, to operate patrol torpedo fasts (naval attack craft) (PTFs) and other high-speed craft conducting special

operations and coastal patrol and interdiction (CP&I). Late in 1964, the first PTFs arrived in Danang, Vietnam. In

1965, BSU-1 began training Vietnamese patrol craft fast (Swift Boat) crews to conduct CP&I. As the Vietnam

mission expanded, additional NSW craft, tactics, and training evolved, including insertion, extraction, and fire

support for SEAL operations. BSU-1 crews formed into MSTs deployed with and supported every SEAL platoon

engaged in Vietnam.

NSW combatant craft units were reorganized twice in the 1970s and again in 1994. In 1994, the organizational

structure included Special Boat Units (SBUs) ELEVEN (SBU-11) and TWELVE (SBU-12) under Special Boat

Squadron ONE (SBR-1) (west coast), and Special Boat Units TWENTY (SBU-20) and TWENTY TWO

(SBU-22) (east coast) under Special Boat Squadron TWO (SBR-2) (east coast). SBU-11 was disestablished in

September 1997.

During Operation EARNEST WILL in the Persian Gulf from 1987 thru 1989, SBUs operated 65-foot patrol boat

(PB) MK III craft from the Hercules and Wimbrown VII. The PBs conducted extensive patrol and interdiction

operations in the northern Persian Gulf (see section 1.4 above).

April 1, 1994, the SWCC enlisted warfare specialty was established allowing the NSW force to retain highly

trained boat crews rather than have them return to the fleet after one tour. In 2001, the SWCC breast insignia was

approved, and in October 2006, the Navy established the special warfare boat operator (USN) rating allowing

boat crewman to stay in NSW for their entire career.

1.6 SEAL DELIVERY VEHICLE TEAMS

The SDVTs trace their roots to Office of Strategic Services maritime unit swimmer groups and their use of the

British submersible canoe, “Sleeping Beauty,” introduced to the post-war UDTs in 1947 at St. Thomas, U.S.

Virgin Islands. The UDTs aggressively pursued development of swimmer propulsion units and free-flooding

SEAL delivery vehicle (SDV) capabilities throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s with the fielding of the MK 7

Mod 0 SDV, the first reliable and deployable combatant submersible in the NSW inventory; MK 8 and 9 SDVs

were introduced in the late 1970s. Today, the MK 8 Mod 1 SDV represents the state of the art in special

operations underwater mobility.

May 1, 1983, UDT-12 was redesignated as SDVT-1, and UDT-22 was redesignated as SDVT-2. August 8,

2008, SDVT-2 was disestablished, leaving SDVT-1 as the only remaining SDV team. SDVT-1 moved from

Coronado, CA, to Pearl Harbor, HI, in 1994.

1.7 UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND ESTABLISHED

To ensure that special operations forces maintain a high state of readiness and to correct deficiencies accentuated

by the failed attempt to rescue American hostages in Iran in April 1980, a comprehensive program of SOF

revitalization began in 1981. Congress authorized significant budget increases between 1981 and 1986, but the

slow pace of the revitalization, lack of attention to special operations from the parent Services, limited career

opportunity for SOF personnel, difficulties in satisfying SOF-unique material requirements, and the absence of

any high-level spokesmen for special operations within the Department of Defense (DOD) prompted additional

congressional action.

The culmination of bipartisan congressional efforts to improve DOD special operations and low-intensity conflict

capability was the Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the 1987 Defense Authorization Act. This law directed

establishment of a new unified combatant commander (CCDR) in the commander, United States Special

Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM), and the civilian post of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special

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Operations and Low-intensity Conflict within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This legislation also created

Major Force Program 11 of the Future Years Defense Program, which consolidated all SOF resourcing under one

DOD Major Force Program budget account.

United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was formally established April 16, 1987, by Congress

as a unified command to provide special operations forces the funding and organizational relationships necessary

to field a professional U.S. special operations capability. CDRUSSOCOM exercises combatant command

(command authority) (COCOM) over all U.S.-based SOF. Operational control (OPCON) and administrative

control (ADCON) is exercised primarily through USSOCOM’s Service components. The naval component, also

established April 16, 1987, is NAVSPECWARCOM. Prior to that time, east and west coast NSW forces had been

assigned to their respective naval surface force commanders.

The establishment of USSOCOM gave NSW a dual higher headquarters (HQ) relationship. NSW was assigned to

USSOCOM as its naval component but retained strong ties to the Navy as its special operations component. On

Service-specific issues, such as personnel, administration, logistics, equipment, and individual training, Commander,

United States Special Warfare Command (COMNAVSPECWARCOM) communicates directly with the CNO,

keeping CDRUSSOCOM informed.

1.8 NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE FORCE REALIGNMENT

In 2001, COMNAVSPECWARCOM initiated a realignment/reorganization with the following objectives:

1. Deploy a force with improved capability for C2 of geographically dispersed operations

2. Deploy senior NSW leadership (e.g., SEAL team COs) forward to lead the forces they train and equip

3. Reduce administrative and logistics burdens on SEAL team commanders to allow them to better focus on

operations and training.

The strategy consolidated unit training under training detachments (TRADETs), consolidated logistics under

LOGSU, and consolidated qualification training under the Naval Special Warfare Center (NSWC). These

improvements helped standardize fundamental training and equipping functions. They also consolidated

resources, which enabled more rapid adaptations in advanced training such as tactical ground mobility and tactical

unmanned aircraft systems (UASs).

This realignment was accomplished over a period of several years. In 2001, NSWGs 1 and 2 and their respective

SEAL teams were realigned. Six SEAL teams were reorganized into eight SEAL teams with the establishment of

SEAL Team SEVEN, March 17, 2002; and SEAL Team TEN, April 19, 2002. The majority of the old SEAL

team administrative and CSS personnel were transferred to the new NSW LOGSUs; the majority of personnel

dedicated to training SEAL platoons were transferred to two TRADETs under NSWGs 1 and 2. To ensure

common training standards across the force, NSWC took responsibility for providing most individual training

courses for NSW.

Six months prior to deployment, a SEAL team is augmented with a Navy special operations forces (NAVSOF)

explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) platoon, a combat service support team from a LOGSU, a mobile

communications team (MCT), a cross-functional team (intelligence support), and other attachments as required by

the anticipated mission taskings. These SEAL teams with CS and CSS personnel are designated as a naval special

warfare task group (NSWTG). Deployed NSWTGs support the operational requirements of geographic combatant

commanders (GCCs).

To complete the reorganization, October 1, 2002 SBR-1 was redesignated as Naval Special Warfare Group

THREE and SBR-2 was redesignated as Naval Special Warfare Group FOUR. The three SBUs were redesignated

as special boat teams (SBTs), and SDVTs 1 and 2 were transferred to NSWGs 3 and 4. Two years later,

October 1, 2004, subsurface and surface craft responsibilities were split. Commander, Naval Special Warfare

Group (CNSWG) THREE (CNSWG-3) was designated the immediate superior in command of both SEAL

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delivery vehicle teams (consolidated into one team, SDVT-1, in 2008) and CNSWG-4 was designated the

immediate superior in command of the three SBTs. (Chapter 2 shows the current organization.)

1.9 AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

Immediately following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, NSW forces deployed to Afghanistan for Operation

ENDURING FREEDOM. Commander, Naval Special Warfare Group ONE (CNSWG-1), serving as

Commander, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force K-BAR, led a SOF task force (TF) of more than

2,500 personnel, including SOF from several coalition countries. In the first 6 months of ENDURING

FREEDOM, SEALs participated in 75 special reconnaissance (SR) and DA missions, including leadership

interdiction operations, and destroyed more than 500,000 pounds of captured explosives and weapons.

As the war in Afghanistan progressed, NSW continued operations to interdict Taliban networks with increasing

emphasis on combined operations with Afghan National Security Force partners. Starting in 2009, NSW forces

from Task Unit Trident in southern Afghanistan conducted village stability operations to provide a persistent

presence within the local population and support to the Afghan Local Police.

From March 2003 thru September 2010, SEAL and SWCC forces participated in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

In March 2003, NAVSOF captured the southern oil facilities of the Al-Faw Peninsula, including off-shore gas and

oil terminals. NSW SEAL and SWCC forces cleared the Khor Al Abdullah and Khor Az Zubayar waterways,

enabling humanitarian aid delivery to the vital port city of Umm Qasr. SEALs also conducted the first successful

U.S. prisoner of war rescue since WWII. As the war progressed, NSW forces conducted many COIN/terrorism

operations in Iraq, including DA, SR, foreign internal defense (FID)/combat advisor, and personal security

detachment operations for Iraqi civilian government senior leadership.

NSW forces remained in Iraq through 2011, advising and assisting Iraqi security forces during Operation NEW

DAWN.

1.10 GROWTH OF NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE

The end of the Cold War in 1989 and the terrorist attacks on the United States September 11, 2001, prompted

growth in all special operations forces and resulted in a more-than-50-percent growth in the size of the NSW

force. Between 2001 and 2011, four new captain (O-6)-level commands—NSWGs 10 and 11, NSWU-10, and

the Center for SEAL Team and Special Warfare Combatant-Craft Crewmen (CENSEALSWCC)—and 11 new

commander (O-5)-level NSW commands were established: SEAL Teams SEVEN and TEN, Reserve SEAL

Teams SEVENTEEN and EIGHTEEN, Support Activity ONE (SUPPACT-1) and TWO (SUPPACT-2), the

Basic Training Command (BTC) and the Advanced Training Command (ATC), and three new LOGSUs. These

changes significantly improved NSW’s ability to support commanders overseas.

In 2001, LOGSUs ONE (LOGSU-1) and TWO (LOGSU-2) were created as subordinate commands to NSWGs 1

and 2 to provide logistics support for training and to deploy combat service support teams to support NSW forces

overseas. TRADET-3 and LOGSU THREE (LOGSU-3), both subordinate to NSWG-3, were commissioned in

January 2010 and 2011, respectively. LOGSU-3 specializes in undersea combat service support (UCSS).

SUPPACTs 1 and 2, established in December 2006 and July 2007, respectively, are tasked to increase the

“find and fix” capabilities of the force by conducting preparation of the environment (PE) and ISR. NSWG-10

was commissioned May 25, 2011 to consolidate command of the support activities. NSWG-10 also took

command of the NSW mission support center (MSC) and the NSW cultural engagement unit (CEU). The MSC

provides a central reachback capability for time-sensitive intelligence analysis to support forward-deployed NSW

forces and also serves as a repository of intelligence information for mission planning. The CEU deploys

native-born and female enablers to support forward-deployed NSW forces

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was a catalyst for refinement of the find, fix, finish, exploit, and analyze (F3EA)

targeting methodology. At the beginning of the Iraq War, rudimentary techniques yielded sporadic results.

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Refinement and professionalization of intelligence synthesis by the support activities during the war improved

performance so that a “jackpot” (successful capture or kill of a high-value individual (HVI)) became routine.

In October 2005, CENSEALSWCC was established to support career management, warrior development, and

professional military education.

NSWG-11 and its two subordinate commands, SEAL Teams SEVENTEEN and EIGHTEEN, were established

August 22, 2008. NSWG-11 commands NSW Reserves.

NSWU-10 was reestablished April 8, 2011 and supports United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM).

NSWUs 1, 2, and 3 had been previously established providing forward-based, persistent NSW presence in United

States Pacific Command (USPACOM), United States European Command (USEUCOM), and United States

Central Command (USCENTCOM).

NSWU-4 was reestablished in 2011 as an officer in charge (OIC) reporting to NSWG-2 and supports United

States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM).

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CHAPTER 2

Naval Special Warfare Forces and

Organization

2.1 NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE FORCES

This chapter deals with the administrative, in-garrison organization of NSW. Deployed organization is described

in chapter 3 and capabilities are discussed in chapter 4. Note that the terms “NSW forces” and “NAVSOF” are

used interchangeably. NSW is the traditional Navy term, but NAVSOF is often used in the joint arena and is

consistent with the usage in other Services: ARSOF for Army special operations forces and MARSOF for Marine

special operations forces.

NSW is a relatively small maritime special operations force consisting of approximately 9,200 personnel: 2,700

SEALs, 700 SWCC, 700 Reserves, 4,000 CS and CSS personnel, and more than 1,100 civilians. NSW constitutes

11 percent of U.S. special operations forces (USSOF) and less than 2 percent of Navy forces.

NSW is organized around eight SEAL teams, one SDVT, three special boat teams, and supporting commands

which deploy forces worldwide to meet the requirements of theater commanders. These commands are organized

into six naval special warfare groups and a training command, Naval Special Warfare Center (figure 2-1).

2.2 NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMAND

Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command, a two-star rear admiral headquartered in Coronado, CA, exercises

OPCON and ADCON of all active and Reserve NSW forces stationed in the United States. The

NAVSPECWARCOM mission is to man, train, equip, deploy, and sustain NSW forces for operations and

activities abroad in support of combatant commanders and U.S. national interests.

COMNAVSPECWARCOM is an echelon II command assigned under the combatant command of USSOCOM.

As a Navy commander, COMNAVSPECWARCOM reports to the CNO for Navy-specific issues, including

funding for Service-common systems, services, equipment, training, munitions, and materiel. Details of the

responsibilities and relationships are delineated in a memorandum of agreement between the Navy and

USSOCOM (see References section).

2.3 NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE GROUPS

Deployable NSW forces are assigned to one of the six NSWGs. SEAL teams are assigned to NSWG-1 or

NSWG-2, undersea combat submersibles to NSWG-3, surface combatant craft to NSWG-4, intelligence support

to NSWG-10, and Reserves to NSWG-11. An NSWG is an echelon III command under the OPCON and

ADCON of NAVSPECWARCOM (echelon II). NSWGs exercise OPCON and ADCON of subordinate

commands and assigned forces for COMNAVSPECWARCOM. The mission of the NSWG is to organize, train,

equip, deploy, and sustain assigned NSW forces. NSWG commanders are Navy SEALs who hold the rank of

captain and are accorded the traditional Navy honorific title of commodore.

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