Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 8)

Contents

Figure A-1. Possible NIMS Framework

A-5

Figure A-2. Flow of Initial National-Level Incident Management Actions

A-7

Figure A-3. CBRN Incident Timeline

A-8

Figure A-4. CBRN Incident Response Model

A-9

Figure A-5. CBRN Incident Response Planning

A-10

Figure A-6. CBRN Incident Response Preparation

A-11

Figure A-7. CBRN Incident Response

A-12

Figure A-8. CBRN Incident Management

A-13

Figure A-9. Notification and Resource Activation Process for Domestic CBRN Events

A-21

Figure A-10. Site Management Operations

A-25

Figure B-1. MSA 4500 SCBA Rebreather

B-5

Figure B-2. 3M Power-Flow PAPR With FR 64 Cartridge

B-6

Figure B-3. JSLIST Ensemble

B-8

Figure B-4. DTAPS

B-8

Figure B-5. Level B TYCHEM Suit

B-9

Figure B-6. TYVEK F Suit

B-10

Figure B-7. Kleenguard Coveralls (Recycled Kleenguard Extra Suits)

B-10

Figure B-8. CPU

B-11

Figure B-9. JSB1GU Gloves

B-12

Figure B-10. Label for SERPACWA

B-13

Figure E-1. Sample TEO Memorandum

E-2

Figure E-2. Sample Trip Report for Air Escort

E-6

Figure E-3. Sample Trip Report for Ground Team Escort

E-10

Figure E-4. Sample Toxic Pickup Team Equipment Checklist

E-13

Figure E-5. Risk Assessment Matrix/Worksheet

E-18

Figure E-6. Aircraft Commander’s/Ship Captain’s Briefing

E-19

Figure E-7. Off-Post Mission Worksheet

E-20

Figure E-8. Mission Planning/Briefing Worksheet

E-24

Figure E-9. Sample Log

E-26

Figure E-10. Site Diagram

E-27

Figure E-11. Sample Label

E-28

Tables

Table 2-1. Sample FHP Checklist

2-13

Table 6-1. Surety Threshold Levels for Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation

Dilute Solutions

6-4

Table 6-2. Surety Threshold Levels for Neat Research Chemical Agents

6-4

Table 9-1. Initial Exclusion Areas

9-4

Table A-1. Suggested Frequency of Physiological Monitoring for Fit and Acclimatized

Workers

A-29

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Preface

Field Manual (FM) 3-11.20 provides doctrine for planning and conducting technical escort (TE) operations. It

describes—

• Mission analysis.

• Hazard and site characterization.

• Sampling.

• Monitoring.

• Mitigation.

• Decontamination.

• Disablement.

• Elimination.

• Munitions assessment.

• Emergency response.

• Sensitive-site exploitation (SSE).

This manual specifically targets TE battalion commanders and staffs and key agencies with the tools and

information necessary to plan and execute TE operations. It also provides reference information for chemical,

biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) personnel.

FM 3-11.20 is to be used in conjunction with appropriate surety regulations and military and civilian

publications that govern the actions taken in dealing with CBRN hazards. Personnel who have not received

specialized training should not attempt to conduct the operations outlined in this manual, but should use this

manual as a reference for TE battalion capabilities.

This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG), the Army National Guard of

the United States, and the United States (U.S.) Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent for this publication is the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Send

comments and recommendations on Department of the Army (DA) Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to

Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commandant, U.S. Army Chemical School, 464 MANSCEN Loop,

Suite 2617, ATTN: ATSN-TD, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473-8926.

Unless stated otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Chapter 1

Employment Fundamentals

During deliberate and crisis action planning, leaders must conduct assessments that

analyze the impact of CBRN hazards during full-spectrum operations and various

courses of action

(COAs). TE battalions support military, civilian, and joint

operations across the full range of CBRN hazards—weapons of mass destruction

(WMD) and toxic industrial materials

(TIM). They integrate the Army’s six

warfighting functions with CBRN sense, CBRN shape, CBRN shield, and CBRN

sustain.

MISSION

1-1. TE battalions—

Deploy task-organized teams in the continental United States

(CONUS) and outside the

continental United States

(OCONUS) to conduct TE and CBRN hazard characterization,

monitoring, disablement, and elimination support operations.

Provide WMD and CBRN incident emergency response, homeland defense, and contingency

support operations to combatant commanders (CCDRs) and lead federal agencies (LFAs).

Provide site remediation and restoration support operations for the Department of Defense

(DOD).

1-2. The five TE battalion mission sets include—

Emergency response (see Chapter 4).

Remediation and restoration (see Chapter 5).

TE of CBRN material (see Chapter 6).

Technical CBRN support to COCOMs (see Chapter 7).

Homeland security (see Chapter 8).

ORGANIZATION

1-3. TE battalions are organized into CBRN teams and remediation and restoration teams (RRTs).

CBRN teams provide—

Support to joint task forces (JTFs) and CCDRs.

Forward employment in nonpermissive environments.

Complete unit core capabilities to supported elements.

Domestic crisis management support for chemical-biological (CB) devices

to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), DOD, and local responders.

CBRN advice, secure reach-back, CBRN assessment, and chemical

expertise to other emergency response teams worldwide.

RRTs are stewards of the environment. They provide—

Remediation and response for CBRN material to the Army Corps of

Engineers (COE), the product manager for nonstockpile chemical material,

the Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA), and state and local

governments.

Complete unit core capabilities to supported elements.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

1-1

Chapter 1

CAPABILITIES

1-4. The core capabilities of TE battalions are—

Technical CBRN advice.

Sampling.

Detection.

Monitoring.

Limited decontamination.

Initial hazards mitigation.

Packaging.

TE.

Render-safe procedures (RSPs).

Elimination.

Disablement.

Presumptive analysis.

Munitions assessment.

Note. See Chapter 2 for detailed descriptions.

LIMITATIONS

1-5. TE battalions are limited in the following ways:

They cannot provide operational or thorough decontamination to other units; they can only

decontaminate their own equipment and the personnel used to support the assigned mission.

They cannot support obscuration operations.

They cannot provide complete explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) support to other units due to

the size of the EOD teams; they can only perform simple CBRN EOD render-safe missions.

There are special maintenance requirements for the commercial, off-the-shelf

(COTS)

equipment used by TE battalions. See Chapter 3 for external logistic support considerations.

Their limited transportation assets require coordination for operational support. See Chapter 2

for support requirements.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

1-6. CBRN teams function in the following types of operational environments (see Figure 1-1).

Permissive. Operations within permissive environments require little or no outside support.

Uncertain. Operations within uncertain environments require area security support.

Hostile. CBRN teams cannot perform missions in a hostile environment; they operate as a

support asset to a CCDR or force in such an environment.

CBRN hazard. CBRN teams conduct and support operations nationally and internationally

under certain operational environments.

CONUS. They provide emergency response and operational support

anywhere within CONUS.

OCONUS. They deploy overseas to support operations that require their

core capabilities.

Military-supporting. CBRN teams support DOD CCDRs and multinational forces under

certain operational environments.

1-2

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Employment Fundamentals

Civilian-supporting. CBRN teams support federal, state, local, and host nation (HN) civil

authorities, as directed by the Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS) or according to

standing response plans.

Hostile

Support asset to

CCDR

Security support

TE BN

required

CBRN Tm

Unilateral

operations

Permissive

Figure 1-1. Employment Within Operational Environments

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1-7. The roles and responsibilities of TE battalions vary with the operation and the agency supported.

They are based on the core capabilities listed in paragraph 1-4.

1-8. Requests for support from TE battalions must be routed through appropriate approving authorities

prior to the support being provided. The approval route is determined by the origin of the request. Common

requests for TE battalion support are described below. For more information, see Joint Publication

(JP) 3-26.

DOD. TE battalions provide core capabilities in support of DOD agencies. Requests for support

are routed through JDOMS for validation and authorization. Emergency response situations may

require an initial vocal order

(VOCO) so that teams may respond while awaiting written

authorization.

Interagency. TE battalions provide support to various government agencies for special events,

emergency response, remediation and restoration projects, TE, and homeland defense. Requests

for support are routed through JDOMS for validation and authorization.

Multiservice. TE battalion teams follow CCDR orders when providing support that involves

more than one service. Requests for support are routed through operational channels.

Multinational. Requests for support from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or other

allied forces are also processed through JDOMS for validation and authorization. Lines of

authority are coordinated and established through the validation process. CBRN teams follow

CCDR orders when providing support to a multinational operation.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

1-3

Chapter 2

Planning and Operations

This chapter implements Standardization

Agreement (STANAG) 4359 and STANAG 4590.

This chapter outlines command and support relationships, core capabilities, planning

considerations, and operational phases of TE battalions. It also discusses requests for

support.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIP

2-1. Due to their mission, TE battalions use task-organized teams to support specific operations within

the range of their core capabilities. The teams—

Will not be assigned to other units for supported operations.

May be attached to other units for operational support, depending on the time frame that the

support is required.

May be placed under operational control (OPCON) in support of a mission for a specific amount

of time.

SUPPORT RELATIONSHIP

2-2. TE battalions may be required to support CONUS and OCONUS civil authorities following the use

of CBRN weapons or materials. Commanders must prepare an appropriate response to meet the full

spectrum of CBRN incidents (intentional or unintentional) to support civilian, HN, and military installation

recovery efforts. Support to civil authorities is to be provided according to applicable federal emergency

plans and is likely to require coordination and cooperation with agencies, organizations, and individuals

outside the military chain of command or direct control. Responding CBRN teams are normally under the

command and control (C2) of the senior DOD official on site.

2-3. TE battalions have unique support requirements for their missions and technical equipment. Much of

the equipment used consists of COTS items that have maintenance requirements which cannot usually be

provided by military maintenance personnel. Special equipment and maintenance requirements should be

identified and agreed upon with the supported agency prior to the support of an operation; failure to do so

could delay operational support. See Chapter 3 for the external logistic support requirements of a technical

CBRN unit.

DOMESTIC

2-4. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the LFA for crisis and consequence management.

DOD support to DHS includes (1) identifying, assessing, dismantling, transferring, and disposing of a

contaminant and (2) conducting decontamination operations. Additionally, incidents involving CBRN

environments often require a response according to a specific federal emergency operations plan, such as

the National Response Plan (NRP), the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency

Plan (commonly referred to as the National Contingency Plan

[NCP]; Title

40, Code of Federal

Regulations [CFR] 300), or the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP). These plans

designate an LFA to coordinate the federal response, and the type of emergency determines the LFA. In

general, an LFA establishes operational structures and procedures to assemble and work with agencies

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

2-1

Chapter 2

providing direct support. (Appendix A lists the LFA for each of the emergency support functions [ESFs]

designated in the NRP.)

FOREIGN

2-5. The primary responsibility for managing and mitigating the effects of a foreign incident resides with

the HN government. When an HN government requests U.S. assistance, the Department of State (DOS)

serves as the LFA. DOD support could be a part of the U.S. response, and it is coordinated through the

appropriate chief of mission and country team. DOD assets are under the command of the applicable

geographic CCDR, and the resident chief of mission and country team coordinate all U.S. Government

(USG) support.

CORE CAPABILITIES

2-6. TE battalion core capabilities consist of—

Technical CBRN advice.

Sampling.

Detection.

Monitoring.

Limited decontamination.

Initial hazard mitigation.

Packaging.

Technical escort.

RSPs.

Elimination.

Disablement.

Presumptive analysis.

Munitions assessment.

TECHNICAL CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR ADVICE

2-7. Team members can provide CBRN technical advice to support CCDRs, incident commanders (ICs),

and on-scene commanders by using real-time, reach-back capabilities. Information provided includes—

Physical characteristics of an agent and locations to which it may spread.

Packaging and transportation requirements.

Recommended level of PPE required to enter a contaminated area.

Appropriate decontaminants.

SAMPLING

2-8. Sampling is the process or technique of selecting, collecting, packaging, and documenting the

collection of CBRN material. Sampling team members take samples from munitions (which have been

rendered safe by EOD personnel), devices, materials, and the environment for laboratory analysis and

further identification. Correct techniques are critical for accuracy in the analysis of environmental samples

and medical specimens. The quality of an analytical evaluation is directly related to the quality of the

sample or specimen and the degree of postcollection degradation that occurs before testing. Sampling

procedures must comply with STANAG 4359 and STANAG 4590.

Sampling Terms of Reference

2-9. Sampling terminology is directly related to the source of the sample or specimen.

2-2

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Planning and Operations

Environmental Sample

2-10. Environmental samples contain soil, plants, grass, water, or air. They may be collected by anyone

with the appropriate collection training and material.

Biomedical Sample

2-11. Biomedical specimens contain human or animal material (blood, urine, sputum, tissue). Only

medically trained individuals collect specimens. Each scenario, geographic region, population base, and

suspect agent affect the collection process and the type and amount of specimens required. During all

operations, express permission is required before collecting specimens from civilians because of religious

or sociological beliefs in many cultures. Some nations and religious groups do not permit the collection of

human components except by medical personnel and with the approval of the appropriate authority.

Obtaining such specimens without permission could result in unnecessary mission complications.

Toxic Industrial Material Sample

2-12. TIM samples contain hazardous material (HAZMAT) that is used in everyday activities; such as,

benzene, acids, chlorine, ammonia, medical waste, and radiological substances used in medical facilities

and industrial plants.

Presumptive Identification

2-13. Presumptive identification is the identification of a suspect biological warfare agent by means of

devices, materials, or technologies based on detecting biomarkers using a single methodology. The

accuracy of biomarkers and methodologies used at this level of testing are significantly limited. Agent

identification to species level or differentiation among a family of similar agents may not be possible (see

FM 1-02 and FM 4-02.7).

Field Confirmatory Identification

2-14. Field confirmatory identification is the identification of a suspect biological warfare agent by means

of devices, materials, or technologies that are based on detecting biomarkers using two or more

independent results (see FM 1-02 and FM 4-02.7).

Definitive Confirmatory Identification

2-15. Definitive confirmatory identification is the specific identification of a suspect biological agent as to

genus and species, serological type, or toxin. Identification at this level is by means of devices, materials,

and technologies that are based on two or more independent biomarker results and using different

methodologies. Highly skilled testing personnel with a broader variety of methodologies available perform

this level of identification in a reference laboratory, thus providing the highest level of accuracy (see

FM 1-02 and FM 4-02.7).

Medium

2-16. Laboratory analytical findings depend on sample material that can produce viable agent

presentations. Sample mediums include, but are not limited to—

Neat agent. A neat agent is the best medium for producing desired laboratory results.

Air and vapor. The collection of air and vapor requires specialized equipment.

Surface water. This includes samples of water, along with discolorations, oily films, and

floating debris. Samples may also be collected from a few inches below the water surface.

Soil. Most soil samples should be obtained from the top ½ inch, and the depth should be

identified on the documentation. The sample should include discolorations and liquids, if

present. Several small samples are better than one large sample.

Plants. Plant leaves coated with liquid agent provide the best medium.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

2-3

Chapter 2

Grass. Grass clippings taken from open areas and at the drip line of overhead trees provide the

best source.

Weapon components. Weapon components can consist of container fragments or the entire

projectile. Authorized personnel must have rendered the projectile safe.

Paint scrapings. Paint scrapings near indentations in a painted surface produce the best

samples.

Swipes. Swipe samples are collected from smooth, nonporous surfaces. They should be taken by

using a cotton gauze pad to pick up traces of the contaminant.

Sediment. Sediment from containers and small impressions in the ground can produce viable

samples.

Waste. Waste such as used syringes, laboratory culture dishes, contaminated clothing, and

wastewater are viable sample sources.

Medical specimens. Blood, urine, sputum, nasal swabs, and tissue specimens are viable media.

Methodology

2-17. Sampling methodology is as varied as the type of samples and specimens to be collected. Procedures

are as simple as collecting soil or water samples using clean instruments and containers and as diverse as

collecting liver biopsies in a medical or forensic facility (see FM 3-11.19, FM 3-11.86, and FM 4-02.7).

Site Sketch

2-18. Sampling teams develop a site sketch (Figure 2-1) depicting the locations and types of specific

hazards. The sketch contains, at a minimum, the following information:

Hazard areas (cold zone, warm zone, hot zone, and minimum safe distances).

Site terrain.

Ingress and egress routes.

Site accessibility by vehicle and afoot.

Off-site populations or environments at risk.

Pertinent weather information (wind conditions, temperature, forecast).

Figure 2-1. Sample Site Sketch

2-4

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Planning and Operations

Chain of Custody

2-19. The individual or unit collecting samples must begin the chain-of-custody documentation when the

samples are collected. The chain of custody is recorded on Department of Defense (DD) Form 1911

(Materiel Courier Receipt) or DA Form 4137 (Evidence/Property Custody Form) (see FM 3-11.86.)

Transfer Procedures

2-20. When the samples or specimens are transferred from one individual to another, the receiving

individual signs the chain-of-custody document. This process continues until the samples are delivered to

the final destination laboratory. The final destination laboratory forwards the document with definitive

identification of the suspect agent or material to the appropriate authorities for analysis and decision

making.

Coordination with Confirmatory Laboratory

2-21. To ensure that samples or specimens are delivered to an appropriate confirmatory

laboratory, coordination should occur as the field laboratory mission is being established. An

OCONUS confirmatory laboratory may be a U.S. Army area medical laboratory, a Navy environmental

and preventive medicine unit, an HN laboratory, or a coalition force laboratory. A CONUS laboratory may

be a local, state, or federal laboratory. In CONUS, confirmatory testing of biological threat agents

is usually done via the laboratory response network (LRN), including many DOD LRN reference and

national laboratories. The confirmatory laboratory should have, at a minimum, Biosafety Level 3 (BSL 3)

containment. The appropriate authority (theater commander, area of operation [AO] commander, country

team, or FBI) designates the confirmatory laboratory.

DETECTION

2-22. Detection team members can perform presumptive identification for various CBRN materials.

Technological advances in detection equipment occur at such a pace that it is not prudent to list the

detection equipment currently used by the teams. While CBRN teams use military detection equipment,

most of their detection equipment consists of COTS items that detect CBRN material at a lower level than

military standard detection equipment. Unit standing operating procedures (SOPs) and equipment user

manuals should be used to identify maintenance and operational procedures for the equipment on hand.

MONITORING

2-23. Unit monitoring equipment includes highly sensitive monitors that detect specific CBRN agents in

near real time at levels far below that deemed harmful by the Surgeon General. Monitoring technology—

like detection technology—changes frequently, so the unit must ensure that equipment is available to

provide the best results possible. Unit SOPs and equipment user manuals should be used to identify

maintenance and operational procedures for the equipment on hand.

LIMITED DECONTAMINATION

2-24. CBRN teams provide decontamination for their equipment and team members. They do not provide

decontamination for other unit equipment, personnel, or terrain.

INITIAL HAZARD MITIGATION

2-25. CBRN teams are trained to mitigate initial CBRN hazards for the purpose of limiting or containing

the spread of contamination from the source.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

2-5

Chapter 2

PACKAGING

2-26. CBRN teams are trained to package and seal CBRN material for transportation within the guidelines

of 49 CFR .

TECHNICAL ESCORT

2-27. CBRN units have personnel trained and certified to accompany shipments of surety and nonsurety

CBRN material. They can safely transport and secure items while maintaining the chain of custody and

integrity of the items.

RENDER-SAFE PROCEDURES

2-28. EOD-trained personnel assigned to CBRN units perform RSPs on CBRN munitions to ensure safe

handling prior to mitigation.

ELIMINATION

2-29. CBRN team personnel safely dispose of munitions, devices, and agents with reliable techniques,

equipment, and decontaminants. These procedures render the material ineffective, hindering its use by

enemy forces.

DISABLEMENT

2-30. CBRN team personnel are trained to perform disablement operations on potential CBRN

manufacturing facilities, rendering them inoperable for enemy use. Higher headquarters (HQ) determines

the length of time that a facility or process is disabled.

PRESUMPTIVE ANALYSIS

2-31. CBRN teams perform presumptive CBRN analysis based on information gathered from an incident

and provide the supported command with information necessary to protect personnel.

MUNITIONS ASSESSMENT

2-32. Chemical and EOD personnel assigned to technical CBRN units assess suspect CBRN munitions and

provide information regarding disposition.

PERSONNEL TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

2-33. TE unit personnel receive unique civil and military training in order to perform their individual and

unit missions.

QUALIFICATIONS

2-34. Personnel assigned to a TE unit must be qualified in—

Technical escort.

Hazardous waste operations.

HAZMAT.

HAZMAT transportation.

Confined-space rescue.

Technical Escort

2-35. Since their duties require close contact with CBRN materials, personnel assigned to a technical

CBRN unit must obtain the additional skill identifier (ASI) L3.

2-6

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Planning and Operations

Hazardous Waste Operations

2-36. An initial 40 hours of hazardous waste operations training and 8 hours of refresher training each year

are required to maintain the hazardous waste operations qualification, which is mandatory for personnel

working at remediation sites. The training must be done according to 29 CFR 1910.120(e).

Hazardous Material

2-37. HAZMAT training is required for all personnel on emergency response operations for releases of, or

substantial threats of releases of, hazardous substances without regard to the location of the hazard. The

training must be conducted according to 29 CFR 1910.120(q). At a minimum, HAZMAT technicians must

receive 24 hours of initial training and have competency in the following areas:

Emergency response procedures contained in the unit SOP.

The use of organic field survey instruments and equipment to classify, identify, and verify

known and unknown materials.

Ability to function within an assigned role in the Incident Command System (ICS).

The selection and use of proper specialized chemical personal protective equipment (PPE).

Hazard and risk assessment techniques.

Advance control, containment, and confinement operations, based on the resources and PPE

available to the unit.

Decontamination procedures.

Termination procedures.

Basic chemical and toxicological terminology and behavior.

They must also complete refresher training of sufficient content and duration to maintain their

competencies or demonstrate competency in these areas at least annually.

Hazardous Material Transportation

2-38. The 2-week Defense Packaging of HAZMAT for Transportation training course focuses on the

regulatory requirements for properly transporting HAZMAT using any mode of transportation. The course

also qualifies personnel to prepare HAZMAT for shipment. A biannual, 1-week refresher is required to

maintain this qualification (29 CFR 1910.120).

Confined-Space Rescue

2-39. Due to the likelihood of operations in confined spaces, as defined in 29 CFR 1910.146(b), personnel

must receive the training specified in 29 CFR 1910.146 and National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

1006. Rescue teams must be trained according to 29 CFR 1910.146(k)(2).

CERTIFICATIONS

2-40. In addition to training requirements, TE personnel are required to complete regulatory certification.

Chemical Personnel Reliability Program

2-41. Army Regulation (AR) 50-6, Chapter 2, establishes the Chemical Personnel Reliability Program

(CPRP). The CPRP ensures that each person who performs duties involving surety chemical agents meets

the highest possible standards of reliability. Reliability is determined through initial and continuing

evaluations of individuals assigned to CPRP duties.

Equipment Certification

2-42. Any analytical or assessment equipment certification deemed necessary by the manufacturer of the

equipment or the unit requiring the training is to be conducted according to manufacturer specifications

and the unit SOP.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

2-7

Chapter 2

REQUESTS FOR SUPPORT

2-43. TE support missions must be consistent with policy, regulatory guidance, and unit procedures.

TECHNICAL ESCORT

2-44. All movement of surety material must be conducted according to AR 50-6. The Edgewood Chemical

and Biological Center (ECBC) Surety Office is the primary contact for requests to move chemical surety

material. The Surety Office coordinates with the technical CBRN headquarters for TE team availability.

The TE battalion then coordinates the movement with all participating agencies.

2-45. The Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) coordinates with the TE battalion to move stockpile and

nonstockpile munitions or agents for analysis. Due to the frequency of movement requirements, the Army

Materiel Command (AMC) authorizes direct coordination of movements between the TE battalion and the

U.S. Army Research Development and Engineering Command. Requests should be submitted at least 14

days prior to the requested transport date for domestic escorts and 60 days in advance for overseas escorts.

HAZARDOUS MATERIAL ESCORT

2-46. HAZMAT transported by TE battalion personnel must be moved according to all appropriate

military and federal regulations, including 49 CFR.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR RESPONSE

2-47. TE battalions are usually asked to respond anytime chemicals are found. When chemical warfare

materiel (CWM) is recovered during a response, TE battalions coordinate with the CMA. When the

response is for munitions, EOD personnel respond first. If the EOD team suspects that the munitions are

CB, it requests support from a TE battalion through the 20^th Support Command (SUPCOM).

2-48. Requests for CBRN teams to respond to locations off an installation are directed through the Joint

Forces Command (JFCOM). JFCOM validates the need for response and then, if appropriate, authorizes

the TE battalion to respond.

REMEDIATION PROJECTS

2-49. Remediation projects result from recovered CWM (RCWM) and work required by the CMA. RRTs

work with the COE and CMA during remediation projects. All recovered CWM found at formerly used

defense sites (FUDS) must be transported by TE teams.

COMBATANT COMMANDER SUPPORT

2-50. JFCOM is the approving authority for TE battalion support to CCDRs. Requests should identify

which TE battalion core capabilities are required. Support provided to the U.S. Special Operations

Command is identified in the standing concept plan with the TE battalion.

MISSION TASKINGS

2-51. DOD organizations request support through JDOMS, who validates the request with the

20^thSUPCOM (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives [CBRNE]) and

subordinate TE battalions. JDOMS then authorizes the deployment, if appropriate, with a fund cite and an

executive order.

2-52. Other organizations request support through DOD channels. DOD provides assistance upon a

validated request from the LFA. The commanders of the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the

U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) serve as supported commanders within their areas of responsibility

(AORs) for CBRNE consequence management activities. For large CBRNE consequence management

events within CONUS, NORTHCOM may deploy JTF-Civil Support, which exercises OPCON over

designated DOD forces. The Defense Coordinating Office is the single point of contact in the Joint Field

2-8

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Chapter 2

CBRN

incident

Figure 2-3. Operational Phases

PREINCIDENT

2-54. During the preincident phase, the TE battalion conducts planning, training, maintenance, and

exercises to prepare for operations. Commanders ensure that—

Actions are based on the mission and support the decision-making process.

Missions, taskings, priorities, and command or support relationships are established and

coordinated.

Personnel are trained, certified, and evaluated for all operations they perform.

Equipment checks and services are complete and equipment is ready to use.

All consumables required for missions are stocked to a level that renders equipment serviceable.

All personnel have a predeployment health threat briefing and a completed DD Form 2795

(Predeployment Health Assessment).

ALERT

2-55. The alert phase includes specific actions needed to notify commanders and the primary staff of a

potential deployment, such as—

Personnel are notified to report to the unit HQ for mission instructions and preparations.

The accountability of all required personnel and equipment is identified.

The CBRN or RRT team leader is assigned a mission.

Equipment and supplies are checked and verified.

DEPLOY

2-56. During the deploy phase, the CBRN or RRT team receives a deployment order and deploys to its

designated location. When deploying for an emergency response, the CBRN team reports to the incident

site and the team leader coordinates with the IC for support. When deploying for support, the CBRN team

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FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Planning and Operations

leader reports to the supported commander. Follow-on directives are given by either the TE battalion or the

combatant commander to which the team is attached.

RESPONSE

2-57. During the response phase, tasks may range from technical CBRN advice to disablement and

elimination operations. The team provides advice, assistance, and assessment support; executes reach-back

capabilities; and receives updates on priorities and missions through the supported unit. Follow-on CBRN

or RRT team missions may be directed by higher HQ.

POSTINCIDENT

2-58. During the postincident phase—

Redeployment to the home station is conducted.

Personnel receive medical treatment as necessary.

Equipment is recovered and scheduled maintenance procedures are performed.

After-action reviews (AARs) are conducted to identify lessons learned and improve future

operations.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

2-59. Key planning considerations for TE operations include—

Administrative.

Equipment acquisition and certification.

Intelligence.

Operational.

Logistics.

Health requirements and services.

Communications.

Supporting technologies.

Safety.

Security.

Public affairs.

ADMINISTRATIVE

2-60. Personnel training, qualification, and certification requirements for operations conducted by the TE

unit on a CBRN team or RRT need to be completed before the mission begins. Regulatory and internal

training and certifications must be monitored to ensure that unit personnel are qualified to participate in

certain missions. The battalion operations section ensures that all required individual training and

certifications are properly documented and up to date.

EQUIPMENT ACQUISITION AND CERTIFICATION

2-61. Advancing technology provides more effective equipment for operational use. It takes time to

acquire and validate new equipment before it can be used for missions. Once the new equipment is

approved for acquisition, training and certification for the user must be completed before implementation

in an operational environment.

INTELLIGENCE

2-62. Gathering pertinent and valuable information to conduct an operation is essential for a TE battalion.

Information obtained before arriving on the scene better prepares the CBRN or RRT team for its mission.

Basic information is required when deploying to a CBRN incident. Weather conditions affect the

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

2-11

Chapter 2

contaminated area and the avenues of approach (AAs), so knowing the location of the contamination and

the current weather conditions enables the team to safely approach the site and set up in a clean area.

Operations in a hostile environment require knowledge of the enemy, friendly forces, security forces, and

the surroundings.

OPERATIONAL

2-63. The established command and support relationships must be understood because they impact several

factors, such as reporting and logistics. Transportation for technical CBRN teams must be planned well in

advance so that operations are not hindered. Environmental considerations for the AO and the type of

mission need to be considered to ensure compliance. The cost of consumables must always be deliberately

planned.

LOGISTICS

2-64. CBRN and RRT teams must have backup sets of PPE when conducting operations in CBRN

environments because the limitations of air supply and filter saturation can prohibit mission

accomplishment with one entry. A dry decontamination mixture is not as effective as a wet one, so access

to a water source is beneficial.

HEALTH REQUIREMENTS AND SERVICES

2-65. Health requirements and the provisions of force health protection (FHP) for unit personnel must

always be included in operational planning. Table 2-1 provides a sample FHP checklist (see FM 4-02.7 and

FM 8-55).

2-66. Individuals responding to events such as CBRN incidents, leaking weapons, and radioactive material

must meet strict health requirements. The individual must be able to assume full mission-oriented

protective posture (MOPP) and Level A and B protection without causing a major health risk. Individuals

suffering respiratory problems, high blood pressure, previous heat stroke, elevated body temperatures, or

other physical or medical degrading conditions should not assume Level A or B protection (see FM 8-500).

2-67. Individuals responding to a radiological incident must also consider the hazards of the radioactivity.

Plans must be made to limit the time an individual is allowed in the radioactive area or is exposed to

radiation (see FM 3-11.4, FM 3-11.22, and FM 4-02.7).

2-68. Provisions for FHP must also be planned. Since TE battalions do not have organic FHP and CBRN

and RRT teams respond without full support in the response area, FHP must be obtained by area support

(see FM 4-02, FM 4-02.1, FM 4-02.4, FM 4-02.6, FM 4-02.7, FM 4-02.10, FM 4-02.18, and FM 4-02.24).

COMMUNICATIONS

2-69. Communication between the downrange team and the command post is an essential part of an

operation. The lack of communication can be a reason to abort the mission for the safety of the team

members in the hot zone. Proper maintenance and frequent communications checks ensure that

communications equipment is readily available for future missions. Backup communications should be

available in the event that one of the mission radios becomes inoperable. When supporting other agencies,

the compatibility of communications equipment should be ensured. If the equipment is incompatible,

interaction with the supported agency is not possible.

SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES

2-70. Technology and technological systems provide supporting capabilities essential to implementing and

continuously refining TE battalion operations. Such technologies include voice and data communications,

information management, and data display systems. Also included are specialized technologies that

facilitate ongoing operations and incident management activities in situations that call for unique

technology-based capabilities.

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29 August 2007

Planning and Operations

Table 2-1. Sample FHP Checklist

FHP asset

Required services

Available

Preventive medicine

Water supply monitoring/sampling

services

Medical surveillance

Occupational environmental health/food service facility

surveillance

Veterinary services

Food surveillance and sampling

Government-owned animal care and specimen

collection

Combat and operational

Monitoring of response personnel

stress control

Monitoring of casualties

Debriefing of response personnel

Medical treatment

Care for TE battalion personnel/victims

Supervision of patient decontamination

Collection of medical specimens

Preparation of patients for evacuation

Medical evacuation

Evacuation of patients from incident sites to supporting

MTFs

Medical logistics

General medical logistic support to FHP personnel

Provision of medical supplies for CBRN team sample

collection kits

Hospitalization

Hospitalization support for TE battalion personnel

Hospitalization for incident patients

Medical laboratory

Medical laboratory support for in-theater/response area

support

confirmatory identification of suspect CBRN

samples/specimens

SAFETY

2-71. The risk management process provides leaders and individuals with a method with which to identify

the optimum COA. Risk management must be fully integrated into planning, preparation, and execution.

2-72. The first priority during a CBRN incident is personnel safety. The minimum amount of personnel

necessary to accomplish the mission should always be used. A risk assessment provides enhanced

awareness and understanding of the situation; therefore, a risk assessment should be conducted for each

operation and updated as the situation changes (see FM 3-100.12).

2-73. A site safety and health plan must be kept on site. The plan addresses the safety and health hazards

of each phase of the operation and includes the requirements and procedures for personnel protection (see

29 CFR 1910.120).

SECURITY

2-74. Prevention and protection are the two primary concerns of physical security. Both apply to the

security of people, equipment, and property. These interests must be supported at all staff and command

levels; and this support must be unified in joint, multinational, and interagency operations

(see

FM 3-19.30).

2-75. All personnel (regardless of rank, grade, title, or position) have a personal, individual, and official

responsibility to safeguard information. This responsibility cannot be waived, delegated, or in any other

respect, excused (see AR 380-5).

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FM 3-11.20

2-13

Chapter 3

External Logistic Support

This chapter addresses the unique support considerations for units requesting support

from a TE battalion.

MAINTENANCE

3-1. TE battalions require maintenance support for—

Respiratory protection equipment.

Detection and monitoring equipment.

Assessment equipment.

Decontamination equipment.

Consumables.

Respiratory protection equipment.

RESPIRATORY PROTECTION EQUIPMENT

3-2. There are specific maintenance requirements for the COTS respiratory protection equipment utilized

by technical CBRN teams. The self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) is an open-circuit breathing

system that uses Grade D or better compressed air as breathing air. SCBA air bottles last 20 to 60 minutes,

depending on the bottle capacity, user, weather conditions, and work intensity. The SCBA system requires

a means to refill the air bottles to remain operable. While TE battalions are able to refill air bottles on site,

this capability may not be available to all teams. In these cases, the supported units must make

arrangements for refilling SCBA bottles.

DETECTION AND MONITORING EQUIPMENT

3-3. There are specific maintenance requirements for COTS detection and monitoring equipment to

remain operable. Identifying those requirements through manufacturer operations and maintenance

manuals is imperative.

ASSESSMENT EQUIPMENT

3-4. There are specific maintenance requirements for COTS assessment equipment. Identifying those

requirements through manufacturer operations and maintenance manuals is imperative.

DECONTAMINATION EQUIPMENT

3-5. The resupply of decontaminants must be addressed in the planning stages of an operation. Special

transportation documentation and requirements may be necessary.

CONSUMABLES

3-6. Some items are designed for a single use and cannot be used for follow-on missions. Determining

the mission load and estimating the maximum consumable products required help increase efficiency.

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3-1

Chapter 3

TRANSPORTATION

3-7. TE battalions may require transportation support as follows:

Air. Air transportation is coordinated through the Air Mobility Command.

Ground. While TE battalions have organic ground transportation, mission requirements may

overload their available assets. In addition, coordination with the HN for the movement of

International Organization for Standardization or container express containers may be required.

CONTRACTOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT

3-8. TE battalions require contractor logistic support (CLS) as an integrated element of their support and

deployment package.

PRINCIPLES

3-9. The use of CLS for military operations must be executable from operational and logistic

perspectives. The following principles provide a framework for the use of CLS:

Risk assessment. Commanders must assess risk, evaluate factors (such as the impact of the

threat on contractor safety), and determine where CLS can safely operate. The survival training

and equipment required during the mission must be identified.

Force structure augmentation. CLS is an integral support requirement for technical CBRN

units. It provides a force structure augmentation that may not be part of military core

capabilities; for example, a military unit may not be available to perform the required

maintenance on COTS equipment.

Mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and

civil considerations (METT-TC). METT-TC factors help determine when and where to use

CLS. For example, a commander must consider the time required for CLS to repair a component

using a centrally located facility.

Integrated planning. CLS leaders must participate in the logistic planning process, and CLS

representatives must be present at planning sessions. CLS representatives can provide useful

input on the logistic feasibility of COAs and the preparation of administrative and logistic

annexes.

Customer support. Links between the technical CBRN team and CLS must not place additional

burdens or requirements on the supported unit. CLS can use whatever internal systems or

procedures they choose; however, they must use military systems and procedures when

interfacing with the military.

International agreements. International agreements and HN laws that apply to the AO directly

affect the use of CLS. The use of CLS may incur legal obligations to the HN (customs, taxes,

vehicle registration and licensing, communications, support, passports or restrictions, and inter-

or intracountry travel). These agreements must be considered when preparing contracts,

operation plans (OPLANs), and operation orders (OPORDs).

Habitual relationships. A habitual relationship is a long-term relationship between CLS and

the technical CBRN team. The nature of this relationship is established through the terms and

conditions of a contract and extends beyond that of the organization, to include the individual

contractor, employee, and supported unit.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

3-10. Planning for CLS support is integral to any operation, and it involves several critical decisions

concerning the integration of CLS capabilities. Key CLS planning considerations are as follows:

Responsibilities. Unit planning responsibilities ensure that the right resources are deployed to

support a mission.

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FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

External Logistic Support

OPLAN. The combat service support (CSS) section of the OPLAN addresses the use and

employment of CLS. The level of detail in the OPLAN varies depending on the level of

command.

Risk assessment. Risk assessment evaluates the ability of CLS to support missions during the

transition from peace to conflict. As mission requirements increase, CLS must still respond with

the same required support.

Responsiveness of support. The nature of the operational environment (for example, operations

in multiple AOs and theaters of operation [TOs]) may require CLS to support deployed assets;

however, uninterrupted sustainment support is still required. CLS must be prepared to task-

organize its assets to meet unanticipated requirements.

Transition from peace to war. The risk of using CLS during peacetime is normally low,

increasing as operations transition from peace to war. The supported force must protect CLS

personnel in hostile areas, and the CLS contractor and his employees must be trained and ready

to operate and survive in a CBRN environment.

Communication. The CLS contract describes the scope of CLS support. The contractor is not

legally obligated to meet any requirement that is not in the contract. Without a requirement

specified in the contract, the government has no basis for directing or requiring any contractor

action. All requirements for CLS are communicated to the contractor through the contract.

Coordination. The supporting and gaining combatant commands, the technical CBRN unit, and

the CLS contractor plan in coordination. CLS planning and coordination must address the

responsibility of the chain of command to feed, house, and protect contractor employees

operating on the battlefield. It must also include predeployment training and integrated, time-

phased force deployment planning. Effective coordination and deployment planning ensures that

deploying CLS teams receive advance notification of deployment and time to prepare for

movement.

Task monitor. Within the scope of the existing contract, the major command contracting office

should appoint a CLS task monitor. The appointed task monitor must be familiar with CLS

operations and technical CBRN operations. An appointment letter outlines the task monitor’s

responsibilities.

Attachment. CLS must be attached to a military support element for life support and personnel

accountability. For example, a logistic support element coordinates life support services for CLS

personnel, but the element may not be within the AOR initially. In its absence, a designated unit

or HQ element coordinates the life support effort. An HN, another service, or another Army unit

could also furnish actual life support services.

EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

3-11. The following are key employment considerations:

Obtaining information on the safety zone requirements. The safety zone is a force protection

control measure for CLS operations. The boundaries are determined by the CCDR based on

threat and mission considerations.

Locating CLS near the technical CBRN C2 element.

Informing the gaining command of CLS facility requirements and conducting coordination to

ensure that required assets are furnished.

Locating CLS near main supply routes, airfields, or ports of debarkation (air or sea) to facilitate

the movement of supplies and equipment.

Recognizing the requirement for permits or authorizations to move CLS teams across

international borders.

RESPONSIBILITIES

3-12. Managing and maintaining visibility over CLS requires the involvement of commanders and their

staffs at all levels. In planning and execution, responsibilities or the integration of CLS range from the

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FM 3-11.20

3-3

Chapter 3

strategic to the tactical level. It is necessary to ensure that CLS is integrated into the decision-making

process.

Combatant Commander

3-13. The supporting CCDR responsibilities include—

Providing contracting office support for the CLS effort.

Validating force requirements to support an OPLAN.

Ensuring that the OPLAN addresses CLS requirements.

Preparing forces for commitment in support of OPLAN execution.

Coordinating movement with and deploying forces as scheduled by the U.S. Transportation

Command.

Coordinating deployment changes with the supported CCDR and the U.S. Transportation

Command.

Coordinating and supporting deployment requirements for technical CBRN units and CLS

assets.

Notifying the CLS contracting office of deployment requirements.

Installation

3-14. Installation responsibilities include supporting personnel, medical, logistic, and deployment

operations.

Deployment. An installation may be designated as a mobilization station and aerial port of

embarkation. Its primary responsibilities are to receive, house, command, support, share assets

with, train, validate, and deploy units and CLS. The installation staff physically processes

military units and supporting CLS elements for deployment according to the installation

readiness SOP.

Other. Other support includes conducting military and civilian readiness processing

verification. This procedure can include medical and dental processing, chemical defense

equipment issue, individual equipment issue, and organizational clothing issue. The installation

transportation office may—

Provide guidance and help units prepare, maintain, and execute movement

plans.

Coordinate and monitor unit movement.

Provide assistance to units within or traversing the installation support area.

Coordinate commercial transportation support.

Prepare movement reports.

Process convoy clearances and special hauling permits.

Approve unit movement plans and associated data.

Continental United States Replacement Center

3-15. A CONUS replacement center—

Receives, processes, trains, equips, validates, and deploys reserve Soldiers and contractor

employees and provides theater-specific equipment.

Coordinates equipping, transporting, training, validating, and staging personnel for movement to

a TO.

Becomes a CONUS demobilization center upon redeployment.

Certifies Soldier and civilian contractor readiness processing qualifications.

Coordinates installation processing requirements, when needed.

Coordinates the equipping of military personnel, government civilians, and

contractor employees.

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FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

External Logistic Support

Coordinates theater-specific briefings and training requirements.

Coordinates movement around the installation and to the port of

embarkation.

Creates and provides manifests.

Coordinates outprocessing procedures.

Supported Geographic Combatant Commander

3-16. The supported geographic CCDR—

Prepares an OPLAN that addresses CLS requirements. It includes time-phased force and

deployment data (for technical CBRN and CLS assets), non-unit-related cargo and personnel

data, and movement data.

Provides facilities to support CLS requirements.

Requests CLS assets.

Approves time-phased force and deployment list requirements for the technical CBRN unit and

supporting CLS assets.

Ensures the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of CLS assets.

Service Component Command

3-17. The service component command—

Develops the time-phased force and deployment data.

Develops supporting plans for OPLANs.

Ensures that supporting plans are consistent with the unified command OPLAN.

Trains and prepares assigned forces for deployment.

Maintains accurate unit movement data for assigned units.

Prescribes procedures, requirements, and responsibilities for deployment planning and

execution.

Coordinates deployment activities as scheduled by the U.S. Transportation Command.

Receives and supports forces deployed to the AO.

Senior Theater Logistics Command

3-18. The senior theater logistics command performs the following functions, which are not related to

contract compliance:

Synchronizes logistic and support operations.

Integrates CLS into the overall support structure.

Assumes responsibility for the visibility of CLS elements in the theater.

Maintains visibility over who is in the theater, what support functions they are performing, when

they are providing support, and where they are operating.

United States Transportation Command

3-19. The major transporter of CLS equipment and supplies is the U.S. Transportation Command and its

transportation component commands—Military Traffic Management Command, Military Sealift

Command, and AMC. The U.S. Transportation Command—

Provides strategic air, land, and sea transportation.

Provides centralized global transportation management to ensure in-transit asset visibility.

Transports CLS personnel and equipment.

Furnishes transportation assets for the resupply of consumables and replacement personnel.

Transports CLS assets between AORs.

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FM 3-11.20

3-5

Chapter 3

Contractor Logistic Support Program Manager and Team

3-20. The CLS program manager supervises CLS team activities and ensures that CLS elements are ready

to support technical CBRN unit requirements. The CLS team—

Provides CLS planning.

Provides CLS load planning data.

Establishes work priorities.

Reviews work and supply requests.

Ensures that CLS team personnel remain ready for deployment (for example, monitors training,

medical, and dental requirements).

Contracting Office Representative or Task Monitor

3-21. The contracting office representative (COR) or task monitor assists in the technical monitoring and

administration of a contract. He is the supported unit’s link to the contractor. The COR or task monitor is

designated, in writing, to perform the duties and responsibilities delegated by the contracting office.

3-22. The COR or task monitor and the administrative officer’s representative are given specific duties and

responsibilities that are delegated, in writing, by the contracting office. Typically, a COR—

Maintains liaison and direct communication with the contractor and the contracting office.

Monitors contractor performance and notifies the contracting office of deficiencies.

Recommends appropriate corrective action.

Verifies that the contractor has performed the technical and managerial requirements of the

contract.

Performs all necessary inspections.

Verifies that the contracting office has corrected all deficiencies.

Accepts supplies and services.

3-23. Although the COR provides a vital link between the military and the contractor, there are limits to

his authority. The COR, task monitor, and administrative officer’s representative are prohibited from—

Making an agreement with the contracting office that requires the obligation of public funds.

Making commitments or changes that affect price, quality, quantity, delivery, or other terms and

conditions of the contract.

Discouraging the contracting office from undertaking new work.

Extending existing work beyond the contract period by words, actions, or failure to act.

Authorizing a contractor to obtain property for use under a contract.

Interfering with the contractor’s management by supervising contractor employees or otherwise

directing their work efforts.

Modifying the tour of duty or hours.

3-24. The task monitor—

Monitors contractor performance.

Notifies the COR of deficiencies observed.

Makes recommendations for corrective action.

Receives feedback from technical CBRN and CLS leaders on sustainment operations.

Coordinates with the contractor on changes in contract requirements as directed by the

contracting office or the COR.

TEAM ASSESSMENT

3-25. CLS teams must be responsive to short-notice deployment requirements. The contracting office or

COR may assess the preparedness of CLS to respond.

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FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

External Logistic Support

3-26. Upon notification to deploy, negotiation between the CLS contractor and the contracting office

results in an agreement or certification that the contractor fulfill the requisite contractual requirements.

Additionally, the COR receives reports or assessments from task monitors on the CLS team’s preparation

for deployment. The task monitor coordinates with units such as the on-site CLS team, the technical CBRN

team, and applicable installation level points of contact (POCs). The following are examples of key

information that the task monitor may report during deployment processing:

Satisfactory completion of readiness processing by CLS personnel, to include required training.

Results of CLS vehicle technical inspections.

Receipt of required organizational clothing and equipment.

Packing of specified line replacement units, consumables, spare parts, and other necessary items.

Responsiveness of CLS.

CONTROL

3-27. Planning for CLS addresses the military responsibility to feed, house, equip, and protect contractor

employees operating on the battlefield. It also includes predeployment training and time-phased, force

deployment planning. Overall, the CLS planning effort must address the following:

C2. When coordinating CLS, the contract addresses the relationship between the CLS team and

the support of the CLS team as a system contractor to the military. This is a crucial point since

commanders cannot order contractors to provide services; they must use the COR to direct work

within the scope of the existing contract. Additionally, the government CLS contracting office

can appoint, in writing, a military unit commander or his designated representative as a task

monitor. The task monitor has the authority to monitor CLS operations. He provides general

guidance and furnishes missions and priorities to the supporting CLS team. The appointed task

monitor should be familiar with CBRN CLS operations.

Deployment. Deploying CLS teams require early notification of deployment to allow adequate

preparation time for movement to become an integral part of the deployment package.

Location. Determining the location of a CLS team on the battlefield requires the consideration

of several factors, including—

Geographical limits of the contractor safety zone and physical security

requirements. The safety zone is a force protection control measure for CLS

operations. The boundaries are determined by the CCDR, based on threat

and mission considerations.

The location of CLS teams near the technical CBRN asset for

responsiveness, access to communications and logistic information, and

daily coordination.

The location of CLS teams near main supply routes or points of debarkation

(air or sea) to expedite the receipt or transport of supplies, components, or

CLS teams to other locations within or outside the theater.

Requirements to move CLS teams across international borders and the

corresponding requirements for permits and authorizations.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

3-7

Chapter 4

Emergency Response

One of the main missions conducted by a TE battalion is providing emergency response to

incidents involving the full spectrum of CBRN. This chapter outlines the unit response capability.

MISSION CHARACTERISTICS

4-1. Each response effort is different based on the type of CBRN incident and the scope of response. TE

battalions—

Isolate the hazard from the general populace.

Characterize the hazard.

Confine and contain the hazard.

Forward samples to the transfer site or laboratory for further analysis.

TYPES OF INCIDENTS

4-2. There are two general types of CBRN incidents that require emergency response from a CBRN team.

They are—

A nondeliberate act that requires emergency response to protect life or property. When

responding to this type of incident, safety is one of the primary concerns.

A deliberate act (terrorism or a crime) that requires emergency response to protect life or

property. When responding to this type of incident, security is one of the primary concerns.

COMMON TERMINOLOGY

4-3. The ICS establishes common organization and structure that allow diverse incident management and

support entities to work together across a wide variety of incident management functions and hazard

scenarios. ICS is an integral part of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the NRP. Some

common terminology is as follows:

Organizational functions. Major functions or functional units with domestic incident

management responsibilities are named and defined. Terminology for organizational elements

involved is standard and consistent.

Resource descriptions. Major resources (including personnel, facilities, and major equipment

and supply items) used to support incident management activities are given common names and

categorized with respect to their capabilities to help avoid confusion and to enhance

interoperability.

Incident facilities. These are facilities in the vicinity of the incident that are to be used in the

course of incident management activities.

Note. See Appendix A for a comprehensive look at common terminology as outlined in the NRP.

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Chapter 4

HAZARD CHARACTERIZATION

4-4. Hazard characterization can be conducted as a stand-alone procedure or as a component of risk

assessment. It is the process of—

Detecting and identifying CBRN.

Obtaining information on the properties of CBRN material in order to predict a likely outcome

of an incident.

Using available information to formulate an initial defensive action plan.

4-5. Characterizing hazards at an emergency response site helps determine the—

Initial isolation zone. The initial isolation zone defines an area surrounding the incident where

persons may be exposed to dangerous or life-threatening concentrations of material. Personnel

in the initial isolation zone should be considered for evacuation.

Protective-action distance. The protective-action distance determines an area downwind from

the incident where personnel may become incapacitated and unable to take protective action or

may incur serious or irreversible health effects. The protective-action distance is based on the

material in question and the existing weather conditions.

Control zones. The designation of control zones (Figure 4-1) is based on safety and the degree

of hazard. Common control zones are—

Hot zone. This is the area immediately surrounding an incident where

personnel may experience adverse effects.

Warm zone. This is the area where personnel and equipment

decontamination and hot zone support takes place.

Cold zone. This area contains the command post and necessary support

functions.

Access control points. Access control points are used to deny entry to unauthorized personnel.

Incident site

Hot zone

Warm zone

Cold zone

Figure 4-1. Control Zones

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FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Emergency Response

REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

4-6. CBRN accidents or incidents within the United States should be reported as soon as possible in order

to mitigate the situation.

Note. See AR 50-6 for further information on reporting procedures.

National Response Center

4-7. The National Response Center (NRC) is operated by the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). It receives

reports when dangerous goods or hazardous substances are spilled. After receiving notification of an

incident, the NRC immediately notifies the appropriate federal on-scene coordinator and concerned federal

agencies. Federal law requires that anyone who releases into the environment a reportable quantity of a

hazardous substance (including oil when water is or may be affected) or a material identified as a marine

pollutant must immediately notify the NRC at (800) 424-8802 (toll-free in the United States, Canada, and

U.S. Virgin Islands) or (202) 267-2675 in the District of Columbia. When in doubt as to whether the

amount released equals the required reporting levels, NRC should be notified.

Military Shipments

4-8. For assistance at incidents involving materials being shipped by, for, or to the DOD, one of the

following agencies should be contacted:

U.S. Army Operations Center, (703) 697-0218 (call collect), for incidents involving explosives

or ammunition.

Defense Logistics Agency,

(800)

851-8061 (toll-free in the United States), for incidents

involving dangerous goods other than explosives or ammunition.

PREPAREDNESS

4-9. Preparedness involves an integrated combination of planning, training, exercises, personnel

qualification and certification standards, equipment acquisition and certification standards, and publication

management processes and activities.

PLANNING

4-10. Plans describe how personnel, equipment, and other resources are used to support CBRN incident

management and emergency response activities. Plans provide mechanisms and systems for setting

priorities, integrating multiple entities and functions, and ensuring that communications and other systems

are available and integrated in support of full-spectrum CBRN incident management requirements.

TRAINING

4-11. Training involving standard courses on the ICS, unified command, and operational coordination

processes, as well as courses focused on discipline- and agency-specific subject-matter expertise, helps

ensure that personnel at all jurisdictional levels and across disciplines can function together effectively

during an incident. CBRN awareness training is available for every Soldier, DOD civilian, contractor,

appropriate family member, and local national hired by the DOD—regardless of rank. These personnel

should be aware of CBRN actions and effects, the need to maintain vigilance for possible CBRN actions,

and the methods for employment of CBRN tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).

EXERCISES

4-12. Incident management organizations and personnel must participate in realistic exercises (involving

multidisciplinary, multijurisdictional, and multisector interaction) to improve integration and

interoperability and to optimize the use of resources during incident operations.

29 August 2007

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Chapter 4

PUBLICATIONS MANAGEMENT

4-13. Publications management refers to developing forms, ensuring form standardization, developing

publication materials, administering publications

(establishing naming and numbering conventions),

managing the publication and promulgation of documents, and exercising control over sensitive

documents.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

4-14. NIMS defines standardized mechanisms and establishes requirements for processes to describe,

inventory, mobilize, dispatch, track, and recover resources over the life cycle of an incident.

COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

4-15. NIMS identifies the requirement for a standardized framework of communications, information

management (collection, analysis, and dissemination), and information sharing at all levels of incident

management.

Incident management communications. CBRN teams must ensure that effective, interoperable

communications processes, procedures, and systems exist to support a wide variety of incident

management activities across agencies and jurisdictions.

Information management. Information management processes, procedures, and systems help

ensure that information

(including communications and data) flows efficiently through a

commonly accepted architecture supporting numerous agencies and jurisdictions responsible for

managing or directing domestic incidents, those impacted by the incident, and those contributing

resources to the incident management effort. Effective information management enhances

incident management and response and helps ensure better decision making during crises.

ONGOING MANAGEMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF THE NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT

SYSTEM

4-16. The process for managing and maintaining NIMS ensures that all users and stakeholders (including

various levels of government, functional disciplines, and private entities) are given the opportunity to

participate in NIMS Integration Center activities. The NIMS management and maintenance process relies

heavily on lessons learned from actual incidents, domestic incident management training and exercises, and

recognized best practices across jurisdictions and functional disciplines.

4-17. The Secretary of Homeland Security is to establish and administer the NIMS Integration Center.

Proposed changes to the NIMS are to be submitted to the NIMS Integration Center for consideration,

approval, and publication.

INCIDENT PRIORITIES

4-18. Incident priorities include life safety, incident stabilization and mitigation, and environmental and

property conservation.

LIFE SAFETY

4-19. The first priority is always the life safety of emergency responders and the public. The lives of

emergency responders should not be jeopardized when there is little or no chance of saving a victim. FHP

response to a CBRN incident is directed at identifying the health hazards and effects of an incident,

including, but not limited to—

Preventive medicine.

Monitoring water supplies and collecting water samples in the affected area.

Conducting medical surveillance activities.

Conducting occupational and environmental health surveillance.

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FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Emergency Response

Providing recommendations on preventive/corrective actions for site health

and safety concerns and injury prevention.

Monitoring food service facilities for possible contamination.

Monitoring waste disposal procedures to ensure minimal effects of

contamination on personnel and the environment.

Collecting water samples, preparing chain-of-custody documents,

packaging samples for shipment, and delivering samples to a courier for

transport to the supporting laboratory.

Note. See FM 4-02.7 and FM 4-02.17 for detailed information.

Veterinary.

Monitoring food supplies and government-owned animals for effects of the

CBRN incident.

Recommending decontamination procedures and/or disposal of

contaminated food.

Providing care for affected government-owned animals.

Collecting food samples, preparing chain-of-custody documents, packaging

samples for shipment, and delivering samples to a courier for transport to

the supporting laboratory.

Collecting medical specimens from affected animals, preparing chain-of

custody documents, packaging specimens for shipment, and delivering

specimens to a courier for transport to the supporting laboratory.

Providing guidance on the protection of food supplies and animals at the

incident site and downwind of the incident.

Note. See FM 4-02.7 and FM 4-02.18 for detailed information.

Medical treatment.

Providing medical support and monitoring the health of response personnel.

Ensuring that all medical personnel wear the appropriate level of PPE.

Note. Medical personnel operating in the warm zone and receiving casualties from the hot zone

must be at a comparable level of protection to ensure their own health and safety.

Providing medical treatment at the incident site.

Providing guidance to response personnel on the safe removal of injured

victims from the hot zone.

Receiving victims from the hot zone and providing emergency medical

treatment before and during patient decontamination procedures, as

required.

Supervising patient decontamination procedures, as required.

Preparing and evacuating patients to the supporting medical treatment

facility (MTF).

Collecting medical specimens from affected patients, preparing chain-of

custody documents, packaging specimens for shipment, and delivering

specimens to a courier for transport to the supporting laboratory.

Note. See FM 4-02, FM 4-02.4, FM 4-02.6, FM 4-02.7, FM 4-02.10, and FM 4-02.24 for

detailed information.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

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Chapter 4

Medical logistics.

Providing medical logistic support to responding medical units and

personnel.

Providing medical components of sample and specimen collection kits to

responding units and personnel.

Providing sample and specimen analysis and identification through

laboratory personnel support.

Note. See FM 4-02.1 and FM 4-02.7 for detailed information.

INCIDENT STABILIZATION AND MITIGATION

4-20. The second priority is two-fold: minimizing the effect on the surrounding area and maximizing the

response effort while using resources efficiently. The size and complexity of the command system that the

IC develops should be in keeping with the complexity of the incident (level of difficulty of the response),

not the size of the geographic area or the number of resources.

ENVIRONMENTAL AND PROPERTY CONSERVATION

4-21. The third priority is minimizing damage to property while achieving the incident objectives. As

incidents become more involved, the IC can activate additional general staff sections (planning, operations,

logistics, finance, and administration) as necessary.

SITE SAFETY AND SECURITY

4-22. Site safety and security are essential to response personnel and to those in need of assistance. The so-

called “worried well” after an incident can overwhelm care providers and decontamination lines and may

cause more harm to response personnel. Therefore, site security personnel at these locations should be

trained, certified, and tested routinely.

SAFETY

4-23. According to 29 CFR 1910.120, employers shall develop and implement a written safety and health

program for employees who are involved in hazardous waste operations and emergency response

(HAZWOPER). The program shall identify, evaluate, and control safety and health hazards and provide for

emergency response to hazardous waste operations. While not always operationally feasible, efforts should

be made to medically monitor personnel before, during, and after a HAZMAT incident.

HEALTH

4-24. Workers handling hazardous substances may be exposed to toxic chemicals, safety hazards,

biological hazards, or radiation. Therefore, a medical surveillance program is essential to—

Assess and monitor workers’ health and fitness for employment in HAZWOPER and during the

course of work.

Provide emergency medical treatment as needed.

Keep accurate records for future reference.

Note. See 29 CFR 1910.120 for further information.

4-25. The senior officer or IC must ensure that health and safety measures are established. Medical and

safety personnel must ensure that precautions are taken to reduce health risks and prevent injury to

response personnel. The on-scene medical staff must monitor the health of personnel for conditions that

could cause harm when wearing PPE and for CBRN agent or material effects. The number of personnel

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FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Emergency Response

allowed in the hot and warm zones must be restricted to only those required to accomplish the incident

response actions.

4-26. Initial health and safety efforts should focus on actions to detect, prevent, or reduce the impact to

public health and safety. Such actions can include—

Environmental analysis.

Plume modeling.

Evacuations.

Emergency sheltering.

Air monitoring.

Decontamination.

Tracking of emerging infectious diseases.

Emergency broadcasts.

Public health education.

Site and public health surveillance and testing procedures.

Immunizations, prophylaxis, and quarantine.

Restriction of movement for biological threats.

Coordination with coalition forces; country teams; HNs; and federal, state, and local public

health officials to enhance the safety of victims, responders, and local populations.

Immediate alerts of downwind hazard areas.

Note. See AR 385-10, FM 4-02.7, FM 4-02.17, FM 4-02.33, FM 8-284, and the NRP for

additional information.

4-27. The safety and health of responders is also a priority. Actions essential to limit their risks include the

full integration of deployed health and safety assets and expertise, risk assessments based on timely and

accurate data, and situational awareness of the safety and health of responder and recovery personnel. A

comprehensive description of location and an operational response safety and health plan are key to

mitigating the hazards faced by responders. Efforts include—

Incident hazard identification and characterization.

Implementation and monitoring of PPE selection, use, and decontamination.

Exposure sampling and analysis.

Personnel health and safety risk analysis.

Health and safety monitoring.

Development/ongoing evolution of site-specific safety and health plans.

Note. See FM 3-100.4; FM 4-02.7; FM 100-14; and the Worker Safety and Health Support

Annex, NRP, for additional information.

SECURITY

4-28. The safety and security of response personnel and others in the area of an emergency response

incident site should be of primary concern to the IC. A site safety and control plan will help ensure the

safety and health of personnel on the site. A comprehensive plan should contain or discuss the following:

Summary analysis of hazards on the site and a risk analysis of those hazards.

Site map or sketch.

Site work zones (clean zone, transition or decontamination zone, work or hot zone).

Buddy system.

Site communications.

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FM 3-11.20

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Chapter 4

Command post or center.

SOPs and safe work practices.

Medical assistance and triage area.

Hazard monitoring plan.

Decontamination procedures and area.

Other relevant areas.

4-29. Security personnel must establish a boundary around the incident site and ensure that only authorized

personnel are allowed entry into the warm and hot zones. Responders in the cold zone must stay upwind

and away from the warm zone boundary to protect their health and prevent injury.

Note. See FM 3-11.21 and FM 3-11.22 for additional information.

DECONTAMINATION

4-30. The decontamination of personnel and equipment requires established procedures to ensure proper

personnel training and the accomplishment of desired results. CBRN teams are trained to utilize different

decontamination setups depending on the mission scenario and type of contamination. The type of

equipment used and the procedures for processing personnel through decontamination stations can differ

with each group of contaminants, the operational environment, and the PPE. CBRN teams follow unit

SOPs for decontamination setup and operational procedures.

CONTAMINATION REDUCTION AREA

4-31. The contamination reduction area (CRA) is an uncontaminated area near the exclusion zone, upwind

from the hotline. It is usually 50 by 50 meters in size and used to set up a decontamination site to process

personnel returning from the hot zone. This area contains several stations and various items of equipment

and supplies used to neutralize, eliminate, or reduce personnel contamination to an acceptable level.

Although the CRA is established on a clean site, it does become contaminated during operations. For this

reason, the area is considered contaminated and personnel not wearing proper protective clothing are not

allowed in the CRA after decontamination procedures begin.

CONTAMINATION CONTROL LINE

4-32. The contamination control line is an arbitrary line separating the CRA from the clean redress area. It

is used to prevent personnel from entering the CRA without proper protective clothing.

EMERGENCY PERSONNEL DECONTAMINATION STATION

4-33. An emergency personnel decontamination station

(EPDS) allows the setup of minimal

decontamination equipment to provide immediate decontamination of personnel in the hot zone if an

emergency occurs. The EPDS is designed for limited decontamination of a few individuals. When setting

up an EPDS, items that provide an immediate capability to decontaminate and evacuate casualties

(stretchers, decontaminants, water, scissors) should be used.

PATIENT DECONTAMINATION STATION

4-34. A patient decontamination station (PDS) setup provides for a more thorough decontamination and is

essential when the decontamination team is required to decontaminate more than one team returning from

the hot zone. After down-range operations at the CBRN event site are complete and all personnel have

processed through the PDS, the decontamination team dismantles the PDS and contains all liquid and solid

contamination for disposal. Figure 4-2 shows a sample PDS layout.

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FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Emergency Response

Entry Point

Gross

Emergency

Equipment

removal

decontamination

drop

Decon

application

Rinse

Suit

removal

Liquid control line

Clothing

Respirator

removal

drop

Vapor control line

Shower

Medical

Postmedical screening

and

support

redress

Figure 4-2. Layout of a PDS

CONTAMINATION CONTROL

4-35. Contamination control is a procedure to temporarily or permanently avoid, reduce, or remove CBRN

contamination or to render it harmless for the purpose of maintaining or enhancing the efficient conduct of

military operations. Controlling the spread of contamination during decontamination operations is

imperative to maintaining personnel safety and limiting the spread of contamination. Contamination

control also reduces the size of the area to be cleaned after decontamination is complete.

4-36. The runoff from decontaminant and water used during decontamination operations must be

controlled and contained for disposal. The use of liquid containment drums for runoff and solid

containment drums for PPE and decontamination equipment helps control the spread of contamination.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

4-37. TE battalions must identify ways to protect the natural environment while executing the full range of

their missions. They must—

Consider the environment in planning and decision making.

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FM 3-11.20

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Chapter 4

Protect the environment of home stations and training areas as a means of retaining resources for

mission purposes.

Use environmental risk assessments and environmental management principles to integrate

environmental considerations into mission performance.

Instill an environmental ethic in personnel.

Understand the links between environmental protection issues and their associated impact on

safety, force protection, and FHP.

Note. See FM 3-100.4 for more information.

CONFINED-SPACE OPERATIONS

4-38. Monitoring for CBRN hazards before and during operations in confined spaces is essential to the

health and safety of all entrants. Operations are conducted according to unit SOPs and 29 CFR 1910.146,

which contains requirements for practices and procedures to protect employees in general industry from the

hazards of entry into confined spaces. There are two different types of confined spaces:

A confined space is an area large enough and configured in such a way that one can bodily enter

and work in it, but has a restricted means of access or egress. It is not designed for continuous

occupancy. A confined space is not necessarily a subterranean space; it can be aboveground,

such as in a supported overhead tank or a railcar.

A permit-required confined space is also not designed for continuous occupancy, and it also has

a restricted means of egress or access. In addition, it has other dangerous characteristics that

require consideration, such as containing or having the potential to contain a hazardous

atmosphere, converging walls, sloping floors, engulfment possibility, or other recognized

serious safety or health hazards.

4-39. Since CBRN teams may be required to respond to an incident involving confined spaces, they must

have confined-space operations training according to 29 CFR 1910.146. Furthermore, CBRN teams must

be trained at the confined-space rescue operations level to rescue their team members in case an emergency

occurs during the mission.

HAZARD CONTROL

4-40. Hazards specific to a confined space are dictated by the—

Material stored or used in the confined space. (For example, damp, activated carbon in a

filtration tank absorb oxygen, thus creating an oxygen-deficient atmosphere.)

The activity carried out. (For example, the fermentation of molasses creates ethyl alcohol vapors

and decreases the oxygen content of the atmosphere.)

The external environment. (For example, sewer systems may be affected by high tides, gases

that are heavier than air, or flash floods.)

PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

4-41. Entry into confined spaces may require harnesses and lowering devices to access the space, and

proper training on the use of this equipment ensures the safety of entrants. The configuration of confined

spaces could also require the use of hardhats, protective footwear, and protective gloves to ensure the

health and safety of personnel entering the space. Confined spaces that contain a hazardous environment

also require the use of PPE.

EMERGENCY RETRIEVAL

4-42. Each authorized entrant uses a chest or full-body harness with a retrieval line attached at the center

of the entrant’s back, near shoulder level, above the entrant’s head, or at another point which presents a

profile small enough for the successful removal of the entrant. The other end of the retrieval line is

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FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Emergency Response

attached to a mechanical device or fixed point outside the confined space in such a manner that rescue can

begin as soon as the rescuer becomes aware that rescue is necessary. A mechanical device shall be

available to retrieve personnel from vertical spaces more than 5 feet deep. If entry is required to perform

emergency retrieval, entry is conducted by a trained rescue team. All other operations cease until

emergency retrieval is complete and the space is evaluated for the cause of the emergency.

TERMINATING THE INCIDENT

4-43. An incident is considered terminated when the IC determines that a state of emergency no longer

exists and normal operations may resume, with the exception of structures that may remain closed for an

extended period for repair. Termination activities should concentrate on funneling accurate information to

the people who need it most. Initially, this group is a small number of emergency responders who may be

briefed on the signs and symptoms of a particular product or on special decontamination procedures. In

larger incidents, the number of people with a need to know expands and may even include contractors or

other agencies. The release of inaccurate information may have many long-reaching effects. Incorrect

hazard data could result in illnesses, improper cleanup techniques, and unsafe disposal procedures. Failure

to properly manage termination activities may also result in inaccurate assessments from the public and

news media.

DEBRIEFING

4-44. Debriefings should begin as soon as the emergency phase of an operation is complete, ideally, before

first responders leave the scene. They should include the sector officers and other key players, such as

public affairs officers and agency representatives, who the IC determines have a need to know. Debriefings

should cover the following subjects:

Health information. The substances that each emergency response person was exposed to

should be identified and the signs and symptoms of oncoming illness described. Some signs and

symptoms may be delayed, appearing hours to days after exposure. When appropriate,

responsibilities for follow-up evaluations should be covered and exposure levels logged for

future reference.

Equipment and apparatus exposure review. Equipment and apparatuses that are unfit for

service must be clearly marked and arranged for cleaning or disposal, as required. Responsibility

for contaminated garments should be delegated and a follow-up date established.

Follow-up contact person. Anyone involved after the release of emergency response personnel

from the scene, such as cleanup contractors and investigators, should have access to a single

information source who can provide needed data. This contact person is also responsible for

collecting and maintaining all incident documents until their delivery to the appropriate

investigator.

Problems requiring immediate action. Equipment failures, safety, personnel issues, or

potential legal ramifications should be quickly reviewed on scene. If an issue is not crucial,

discussion should be saved for the critique.

POSTINCIDENT ANALYSIS

4-45. There are many agencies and individuals who have a legitimate need for information about any

significant CBRN incident. They may include manufacturing and shipping company representatives,

insurance companies, government agencies, or citizens’ groups. Postincident analysis is the reconstruction

of the incident to establish a clear picture of the events that took place during the incident. It is conducted

to—

Determine the level of financial responsibility.

Establish a clear picture of the emergency response for further study.

4-46. The postincident analysis differs from an investigation, which is usually conducted to establish the

probable cause of the incident for administrative, civil, or criminal proceedings. It begins with the

designation of one person or agency to collect information about the response during the debriefing. They,

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FM 3-11.20

4-11

Chapter 4

in turn, provide all available data to those who need to know. This method guarantees that sensitive or

unverified information is not released to the wrong organization or in an untimely manner.

4-47. The IC and the person conducting the postincident analysis should meet as soon as practical to

review key events of the incident and to identify subjects for immediate follow-up. A brief chronological

review of who did what, when, and where during the incident should be constructed. A simple timeline

placing the key players at specific locations at different times is a good start. Cooperation between the

postincident analysis team and other official investigators saves time and combines resources to reconstruct

the incident completely.

AFTER-ACTION REVIEW

4-48. Many injuries and fatalities have been prevented as a result of AAR sessions. An effective AAR

program is supported by leaders as a positive way to outline lessons learned. The more severe the incident,

the more important it is to share what was learned. A commitment to AARs for all CBRN responses

improves emergency responder performance by improving efficiency and pinpointing weaknesses.

Although every organization has a tendency to develop its own AAR style, an AAR should never be used

to assign blame—it should be used as a valuable learning experience. When practical, each individual

should keep notes of important points and sum up their lessons learned. A good critique mentality

promotes the following:

Trust in a self-correcting response system.

Willingness to cooperate through teamwork.

Continued training of skills and techniques.

Preplanning for significant incidents.

Sharing of information between response agencies.

4-49. The crucial player in this scenario is the AAR leader, who acts as a director of the entire

performance. The AAR leader should—

Monitor the AAR by introducing the players and procedures, keep it moving, and end it on

schedule.

Ensure that direct questions receive direct answers.

Ensure that all participants utilize the AAR guidelines.

Ensure that each operational group presents observations.

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FM 3-11.20

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Chapter 5

Remediation and Restoration

When CWM or biological warfare materiel (BWM) is discovered on active DOD

installations, on installations awaiting realignment or closure under the base

realignment and closure (BRAC) program, or at FUDS, remediation and restoration

operations must be conducted. As the DOD executive agent for CWM and BWM, the

Army is responsible for the safe, timely, and effective response to discoveries of this

type of materiel.

RECOVERED CHEMICAL WARFARE MATERIEL

5-1. RCWM refers to CWM that was previously discarded, fired, or buried and discovered either

unexpectedly or during planned environmental restoration operations. RCWM is classified based on the

requirements of 40 CFR 266, Subpart M (EPA Military Munitions Rule).

5-2. Upon discovery of munitions, the initial EOD or TE battalion responders conduct a preliminary

assessment. As soon as possible thereafter, the CBRN team conducts a detailed assessment by documenting

the circumstances of discovery, performing visual examinations, recording physical characteristics,

performing gross and low-level monitoring, and conducting other testing as appropriate. For example,

CBRN teams are capable of determining the explosive configuration and fill characteristics of unknown

recovered munitions through the use of such nonintrusive means as—

Portable X-rays. X-rays may be used to determine whether munitions contain liquid and,

consequently, whether they should be treated as conventional or chemical.

Portable isotopic neutron spectroscopy (PINS) systems. The PINS chemical assay system

(Figure 5-1, page 5-2) is a nonintrusive, nondestructive evaluation tool used to identify the

contents of munitions and chemical storage containers. Suspect items may be evaluated without

being opened, drilled, or even touched during the assessment process. The PINS system

employs neutron radiation as a probe, resulting in the production of gamma rays unique to each

chemical element encountered. A high-resolution, gamma-ray spectrometer is then used to

identify the chemical elements within the item undergoing testing. The actual fill of the item is

inferred from the list of chemical elements contained within. For example, the presence of

phosphorus indicates that the item contains organophosphorus nerve agents while the presence

of nitrogen is indicative of military high explosives.

The results of the detailed CBRN team assessment are presented in a written report which includes test

results and photographs.

5-3. An important goal of the detailed assessment is the identification of recovered munitions. Munitions

that are chemical in nature must not be prematurely dismissed as conventional munitions, but instead must

be handled with special care as required by public law. It is also important that conventional munitions not

be misidentified as chemical in nature, or they may be unnecessarily afforded the same special care.

Additionally, the proper identification of recovered munitions potentially reduces the likelihood of

incompatible storage. In the event that the contents of the unknown RCWM cannot be positively identified,

the items must be managed in accordance with procedures applicable to the most hazardous of potential

fills as determined by the circumstances associated with the discovery.

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FM 3-11.20

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Chapter 5

Fuze

HPGe

Neutron generator

detector

²⁵²Cf isotopic source

Gamma

Neutron

ray

Burster

CWA fill

Figure 5-1. PINS

5-4. CWM found buried must be managed in compliance with the following environmental laws and

regulations, as applicable: the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act

(CERCLA) (Public Law [PL] 96-510), the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA)

(PL 99-499), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) (PL 94-580). If the recovery

organization does not believe that the buried CWM is subject to management under the provisions of

CERLA, SARA, or RCRA, no off-site removal action is to be taken until the Office of the Assistant

Secretary of the Army (ASA) (Installations and Environment [I&E]) has reviewed the circumstances and

made a final determination. CWM discovered on firing ranges must be classified, transported, and disposed

of in accordance with 40 CFR 266, Subpart M.

5-5. The Materiel Assessment Review Board

(MARB) was established to assist with the safe

management of suspect RCWM. The board may be convened at the request of the 22d Chemical Battalion

(TE); the Product Manager for Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel (PMNSCM); the CMA; a Level II certified

radiographer; the Research, Development, and Engineering Command

(RDECOM); the Edgewood

Chemical and Biological Center

(ECBC); or the Idaho National Laboratory

(INL). The MARB is

composed of 10 voting members (appointed by the AMC, Director of the Chemical Materials Agency) and

several permanent nonvoting members who are chosen based on their expertise in the fields of chemical

history; nonintrusive assessment; radiography; handling, storage, transport, and treatment of chemical

munitions; EOD; and risk management. Ad hoc members and guests may also be appointed and invited to

specific MARB meetings as deemed necessary. Because MARB decisions are based on the detailed

assessments of the CBRN teams, proper assessment of the data is a critical step in the RCWM management

process.

5-6. Chemical munitions may be rendered safe by rendering the fuze safe without releasing the agent.

Alternatively, the agent and explosive components may be destroyed simultaneously, eliminating the need

for RSPs. The option chosen depends on factors such as munition type, fuzing, agent fill, and the specific

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29 August 2007

Remediation and Restoration

situation in which the munition is found. In no case are bursters to be removed from damaged or leaking

munitions.

5-7. In an accident or incident involving visible leakage of liquid chemical agents, items that have not

leaked should be moved away from those that have. Every attempt should then be made to stop or reduce

leakage from the remaining containers. Although sealing techniques vary depending on the type of

chemical agents present and the size of the holes in the containers, procedures should be carried out in

accordance with Technical Manual (TM) 60A-1-1-11. Additional information regarding leak-sealing

procedures may also be found in TM 3-250, Chapter 10.

5-8. The possibility of spreading contamination can be reduced by packing munitions at the incident site

in accordance with procedures outlined in TM 60A-1-1-11. Possible leak-sealing and packaging procedures

are illustrated in Figure 5-2.

Note. Final packaging should not involve filling containers with liquid (water or detergent), as

doing so could unnecessarily complicate handling and disposal.

Packing

material

1. Seal leak with

2. Confine entire munition

4. Place package in a

casting material.

inside a thick plastic

suitable container.

3. Seal bag with tape.

5. Stabilize munition, and

fill the container with

packing material.

6. Seal and decontaminate

container, and check for

leaks.

Figure 5-2. Sample Leak-Sealing and Packaging Procedures

5-9. If on-site treatment or disposal cannot be accomplished, TE teams must transport the RCWM to an

approved location in accordance with 50 U.S. Code (USC) 1512-1517; AR 75-15, paragraph 3-7; and

environmental and transportation laws and regulations, as applicable. The CMA is responsible for

coordinating the relocation of recovered munitions with federal and state regulatory agencies, as required.

RCWM, therefore, may not be removed from the site until the TE battalion receives verification from the

CMA that the storage destination has been approved and that the appropriate notifications have been made.

The TE battalion commander is responsible for deciding whether escort personnel should be armed during

transportation. RCWM that presents an emergency threat to public health or safety must be transported

under the emergency provisions of 50 USC 1517 and in accordance with applicable environmental and

transportation laws and regulations. RCWM that does not constitute an emergency threat to public health

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Chapter 5

or safety is transported under the general provisions of 50 USC 1512 and in accordance with applicable

environmental and transportation laws and regulations.

5-10. Once the RCWM has been transported to an installation with an active surety mission, it is afforded

the same safety and security measures that are in place for chemical surety material. The intent, though, is

not to reclassify RCWM as surety material.

5-11. Recovered chemicals that do not meet the definition of RCWM are considered and treated as

industrial chemicals or hazardous waste—not as RCWM. Standards for the recovery and disposition of

such substances are specified in 29 CFR 1910.120, 40 CFR 260-279, 40 CFR 300, and where applicable,

equivalent state regulations.

RECOVERED BIOLOGICAL WARFARE MATERIEL

5-12. Recovered BWM refers to items configured as munitions but which contain etiological agents

intended to seriously injure, incapacitate, or kill through physiological effects. BWM also includes

etiological agents designed to damage or destroy crops intended for human consumption.

5-13. The Army does not maintain a BWM stockpile, and there are no plans for any BWM remediation.

Although the likelihood of accidental discovery is extremely remote, BWM could potentially be

encountered during Army remediation or restoration activities at active installations, BRAC sites, and

FUDS. The unplanned discovery of actual or suspected BWM must be reported by the site custodian in

accordance with chemical event reporting procedures as specified in AR 50-6.

5-14. Any BWM that is recovered is assessed by TE battalion personnel to determine the biological

composition of the material and ascertain whether it is explosively configured; whether it is fuzed; and

whether it can be safely moved, stored, treated, and disposed of. Assessments are based on the

circumstances of the discovery, visual examination, physical characteristics, gross and low-level

monitoring, X-ray imagery, and other tests as appropriate.

5-15. The primary objective of BWM response activities is the safe, effective, and timely mitigation of

public and environmental health and safety hazards posed by the materiel. Response activities are

conducted in compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements and in coordination with federal, state,

and local authorities. All recovered BWM is to be handled and managed at the appropriate biosafety level

as determined by a risk assessment (conducted in accordance with 32 CFR 626-627, AR 385-69, and DA

Pam 385-69) until it has been fully characterized or assigned to another risk group by the U.S. Army

Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). In the event that the contents of the

unknown recovered BWM cannot be positively identified, the items must be managed in accordance with

procedures applicable to the most hazardous of potential biological agent fills as determined by the

circumstances associated with the discovery.

5-16. Recovered BWM must be packaged, labeled, marked, prepared for transport, and transported in

accordance with applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulations, including 42 CFR 72, 49 CFR

172 and 173, 9 CFR 122, DA Pam 385-69, and the requirements of the International Air Transport

Association (IATA). All Risk Group 4 (RG-4) or U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)-restricted

animal pathogens are transported and accompanied by a designated courier who monitors aspects of the

shipment and ensures that required transfers are completed and documented and that final delivery is

accomplished and acknowledged. Audit trails and receipts of all BWM transport activities must be

established and maintained.

5-4

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Chapter 6

Technical Escorts

Federal agencies regulate the transportation of hazardous chemicals and related items within the

limits of CONUS and in some areas overseas. There are procedures that must be followed before,

during, and after the shipment of materiel requiring TEs. Personnel performing these procedures

must meet certain criteria.

MISSION PLANNING

6-1. The TE battalion operations staff officer (S-3) is responsible for planning and coordinating all off-

post escort missions. A locally generated worksheet is used as a format guide for off-post escort mission

planning. At least seven days prior to the planned shipment date of the chemical agent, the TE battalion S-3

ensures that the shipper has sent out the proper report of shipment. Immediately prior to departure of the

shipment, the TE battalion S-3 briefs the technical escort officer (TEO) according to unit SOPs. The TEO

then checks all team members for proper equipment and government credit cards and thoroughly briefs

personnel on the duties they are required to perform.

6-2. In accordance with unit SOPs, the TE battalion S-3 notifies all concerned agencies prior to the

commencement of off-post escorts. The TEO notifies the TE battalion S-3 about any and all delays as soon

as possible. The S-3 immediately notifies the consignee and all other elements involved in the escort about

the delay by telephone or alternative means. Addressees involved with classified shipments are also

notified of any delays or changes during the escort as well as at the completion of the mission. Emergency

telephone numbers are listed on the shipping papers.

6-3. Prior to the execution of any off-post escort, the TEO conducts premission checks in accordance

with unit SOPs. Sample procedures, checklists, and other documents are available in Appendix E. The

number of vehicles used during an escort is dependent on the mission; however, a minimum of three

vehicles—one sweep vehicle, one cargo vehicle, and one guard vehicle—are used for off-post chemical

surety agent movements. Although rental vehicles may be used as the sweep and guard vehicles, the cargo

vehicle (which must have a cargo compartment separate from the passenger section of the vehicle) must be

a General Services Administration (GSA), military, or contractor-owned vehicle.

PROCEDURES

6-4. TE battalion commanders establish procedures for all chemical-agent operations. The requirements

and procedures to be followed are determined by factors such as the origination, destination, type, and

quantity of materiel to be transported.

GENERAL

6-5. The TEO is responsible for all escort operations conducted throughout the mission. Operations are

conducted in accordance with the guidelines established in unit SOPs. Specifically, the TEO—

Follows security requirements outlined in the unit SOP.

Briefs TE members on their special orders and ensures that they sign the orders prior to

performing the escort mission.

Maintains a daily log (DA Form 1594 [Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer’s Log]) from the start

of each mission.

Notifies the TE battalion S-3 before departure and upon arrival at each location.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

6-1

Chapter 6

Provides a verbal duress code to the TE battalion S-3 and the escort team. The TEO must not

provide the duress code to any other entity. Furthermore, the TEO must not write or otherwise

record the duress code.

6-6. TE teams follow and strictly enforce a “two-person rule,” the intent of which is to help ensure the

safety of the individuals directly involved in chemical-agent handling and security. One of these two

personnel is designated as the team leader.

Receipt of Cargo

6-7. When receiving cargo from the shipper, the escort team—

Establishes and continuously mans a temporary exclusion area around the cargo. The size and

shape of the exclusion area is determined by the TEO or team leader.

Strictly controls entry into the exclusion area. To enter the area, visitors must be authorized by

the TEO or team leader and they must also be accompanied by an appointed escort.

Positively identifies the authorized recipient of the cargo by comparing information provided by

the TE battalion S-3 with the recipient’s picture identification card or security badge.

Obtains shipping documents and a DD Form 1911 thoroughly describing each container and its

contents.

Accounts for each container listed on the DD Form 1149 (Requisition and Invoice/Shipping

Document).

Ensures that the shipper has certified the material to be properly described, classified, marked,

packaged, labeled, and in the proper condition for transportation.

Verifies that the shipper has properly packaged and labeled the cargo in accordance with

49 CFR and TM 38-250.

Visually inspects cargo for signs of damage that could cause leakage during transportation. If

damage is discovered, the escort team monitors the cargo with appropriate air monitoring

equipment and follows emergency actions outlined in unit SOPs.

Obtains a DD Form 2890 (DOD Multimodal Dangerous Goods Declaration) from the shipper.

(Cargo drivers must sign this form and carry it with them at all times.)

6-8. The TEO signs for the cargo on a DD Form 1911 and retains the original. He then directs the escort

team to insert magazines into their weapons, search all transport vehicles (verifying that there are no

unauthorized personnel onboard or any evidence of sabotage present), and load the cargo onto the transport

vehicle. The TEO inspects the loading operation, ensuring that the cargo is properly secured to prevent

movement during transport.

Transportation of Cargo

6-9. Whenever the vehicle is loaded with cargo, placards must be displayed in accordance with 49 CFR.

In addition, when the driver is in the vehicle, the shipping papers must be within arm’s reach. If the driver

leaves the vehicle, the shipping papers must be placed on the driver’s seat or stored in a pouch on the

driver’s side door.

6-10. If the visual inspection conducted during receipt of the cargo indicated possible damage, the cargo is

also to be inspected—

After loading and securing the cargo in each transport vehicle.

After loading the cargo from one mode of transportation to another (ground to air or air to

ground).

After the occurrence of an unplanned incident (a road accident or heavy turbulence during air

movement).

6-11. Except in an emergency or when otherwise specified, convoys must not travel farther than 400 miles

or longer than 8 hours per day—whichever occurs first. Rest and meal periods are not considered driving

time. Overnight stops are not normally made; however, they may be arranged by the TEO or the TE

battalion S-3 on a case-by-case basis.

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FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Technical Escorts

Delivery of Cargo

6-12. Upon arrival at the destination, the escort team—

Establishes and continuously mans a temporary exclusion area around the cargo. The size and

shape of the exclusion area is determined by the TEO or team leader.

Strictly controls entry into the exclusion area. To enter the area, visitors must be authorized by

the TEO or team leader, and they must also be accompanied by an appointed escort.

Positively identifies the authorized recipient of the cargo by comparing information provided by

the TE battalion S-3 with the recipient’s picture identification card or security badge.

Provides one copy of the shipping documents to the receiver and retains the remaining copies.

Visually inspects cargo for signs of damage that may have occurred during transportation. If

damage is discovered, the escort team must follow guidelines contained in the receiver’s SOPs.

Assists the receiver in unpacking and taking inventory of the cargo, if required.

Signs the cargo over to the custodian on a DD Form 1911 and retains a copy of the receipt.

Removes the magazines from the weapons.

Conducts a safety inspection of each vehicle and then removes all placards.

Provides the time of mission completion to the TE battalion S-3.

Postmission

6-13. Following the completion of the mission and the return to home station, the TEO ensures that—

The equipment is cleaned and postmission preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS)

are performed.

All sensitive items are accounted for.

All equipment and supplies are returned to the TE battalion logistics staff officer (S-4).

The TE battalion S-3 receives an operational back-brief.

GROUND ESCORT

6-14. In addition to the general TE procedures, the following procedures also apply specifically to ground

transport:

The ground team leader contacts the TE battalion S-3 the afternoon prior to departure.

The ground team notifies local activities.

The ground team prepares primary and alternate strip maps for each vehicle in the convoy.

Following completion of the mission, the TEO ensures that a trip report for air escort (see

Appendix E) is prepared and submitted to the TE battalion S-3.

AIR ESCORT

6-15. In addition to the general TE procedures, the following procedures also apply specifically to air

transport:

A rotation order is established for the TE team members to ensure consistent compliance with

the two-person rule.

The TEO briefs the aircraft commander in accordance with unit SOPs. See the sample aircraft

commander’s/ship captain’s briefing in Appendix E.

The cargo and the escort kit, which is used to clean up spills in the event of an emergency, must

be stored in such a way that they are easily accessible in flight without moving other cargo.

Furthermore, compatibility requirements for cargo must also be observed (49 CFR). The escort

team is to advise the loadmaster or crew chief of these requirements.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

6-3

Chapter 6

SURETY MATERIEL

6-16. In addition to the general technical escort procedures, movement involving surety chemical agents

must comply with local, state, and federal laws, including 50 USC 1512; 49 CFR, Parts 171 through 180;

AR 50-6; AR 200-2; and DOD 4500.9-R and with the notification requirements of the Convention on the

Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their

Destruction (the “Chemical Weapons Convention”). Guidance and instruction for handling radiological,

nuclear, and improvised nuclear materiel is presented in DOD Directive DODD 3150.5, DODD 3150.8,

DOD 3150.8-M, and AR 50-5. Other surety-specific procedures include the following:

Movement of surety chemical agents exceeding the amounts specified in Table 6-1 and Table 6-

2 must be accompanied by at least two TE battalion CPRP personnel. Each of these personnel

must be capable of recognizing unsafe acts and performing self aid or buddy aid in the event of

exposure to a chemical agent. The TE teams must comply with DOD, AMC, RDECOM, and

DOT regulations.

In the event that the surety material is transported by ground, a minimum of three vehicles—one

sweep vehicle, one cargo vehicle, and one guard vehicle—are used for off-post movement.

Although rental vehicles may be used as the sweep and guard vehicles, the cargo vehicle (which

must have a cargo compartment separate from the passenger section of the vehicle) must be a

GSA, military, or contractor-owned vehicle.

In the event that the surety materiel is transported by air, the materiel must be accompanied by at

least four armed TE team personnel onboard the fixed/rotary wing aircraft. That number may be

increased at the discretion of the TE battalion commander. Additional personnel may also be

employed in a trainee capacity. While trainees do not serve as full-fledged team members, they

are armed and they are equipped with air-purifying protective masks for escape purposes.

Table 6-1. Surety Threshold Levels for Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation

Dilute Solutions

Agent

Maximum total quantity (mg)

Maximum concentration (mg/ml)

GA, GB, GD, GF

2.0

1.0

H, HD, HQ, HT, Q, T

100

10.0

L, HL

5.0

Table 6-2. Surety Threshold Levels for Neat Research Chemical Agents

HD (ml)

L (ml)

VX (ml)

GA, GB, GD, GF (ml)

10.0¹

¹Aggregate total for G series agents in 1-ml primary containers.

NONSURETY MATERIEL

6-17. In addition to the general TE procedures, the following procedures apply specifically to the

transportation of RCWM, viable biological agents, or other nonsurety materiel:

The TE battalion commander decides whether escort personnel should be armed during

transport of RCWM. If escort personnel are to be armed, the TE battalion S-3 ensures that escort

team members meet the appropriate security and weapons qualification requirements.

Only one escort vehicle is used if the nonsurety materiel is transported by ground, unless

additional vehicles are required due to the number of containers being shipped. If an item is

suspected of containing CWM, the cargo vehicle must be placarded for inhalation hazard.

Approval for movement of RCWM to a temporary storage facility, if necessary, is obtained by

the PMNSCM.

6-4

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Technical Escorts

Note. Intermediate serial dilutions produced when converting nonsurety levels of neat research

chemical agent (Table 6-2) to nonsurety levels of research, development, test, and evaluation

(RDTE) dilute solution (Table 6-1) are considered nonsurety work, providing the intermediate

dilutions are not stored overnight.

SECURITY

6-18. The size and composition of the security force accompanying a shipment is determined by the type

of cargo, the mode of transportation, the area to be traversed, and security considerations. The number of

TE battalion guards to be used must be sufficient to ensure protection of the chemical agents during

movement.

6-19. The premission briefing presented to the TE team members by the TEO may include use-of-force

instructions and special instructions involving the use of weapons. A sample of this type of briefing is

included in Appendix E.

6-20. In the event that a TE team comes under attack, team members take appropriate response action,

continue to the next delivery location, and notify the TE battalion S-3 to provide information concerning

the location and situation. In doing this, the TE team follows the use-of-force guidelines established in unit

SOPs. The TE battalion S-3 then initiates security assistance.

6-21. The following actions can be conducted prior to departure to reduce the risk of an attack during the

mission:

Obtain intelligence information from the TE battalion intelligence staff officer (S-2) for all

locations in which the TE team is to travel.

Ensure that the chain of command for the TE operation has been designated.

Ensure that all escort equipment needed for the mission is available and operational.

Conduct a security survey of the shipping location and delivery point.

Conduct a reconnaissance of the primary and alternate travel routes.

Ensure that the TE team is briefed on the primary and alternate travel routes.

Ensure that the TE team is briefed on establishing a security perimeter, as necessary, throughout

the escort mission.

Ensure that the TE team is briefed on all emergency procedures.

Ensure that the TE battalion S-3 and the TE team are provided a duress code.

In addition, informing the TE battalion S-3 of any delays encountered during the mission and the reasons

for those delays can also reduce the risk of attack.

EMERGENCIES

6-22. In the event of an incident involving the agent container, it is assumed that an agent spill has

occurred until it is proven otherwise. Emergency procedures vary depending on the mode of transportation.

GROUND TRANSPORT

6-23. During an emergency involving ground transport, the following actions are to be performed:

Personnel within the emergency action zone are immediately evacuated by rescue personnel

wearing PPE. Victims are evacuated upwind, and first aid is rendered when necessary.

A control point is established.

Local authorities and the TE battalion S-3 are notified of the situation and location by telephone.

If there is a military installation nearby, installation assistance is requested.

The security of the cargo and affected area is maintained in accordance with unit SOPs.

Communication is established with the HAZMAT team upon their arrival at the scene.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

6-5

Chapter 6

The accident site is surveyed to determine the status of the cargo and assess areas of possible

contamination.

The escort kit and other available material are used for decontamination, as necessary, in

accordance with unit SOPs.

6-24. During an emergency involving ground transport, the following actions are to be performed:

All personnel onboard the aircraft don the appropriate PPE as quickly as possible.

Smoke and fumes are eliminated from the aircraft, as determined by the pilot in charge (PIC).

Plastic bags are used in an attempt to contain liquid or vapor leaks. Attempts to open cargo

packages with only vapor leaks should not be made while in flight.

The PIC attempts to land at the nearest suitable “safe haven” airfield—preferably a military

airfield. The PIC notifies the airfield of the emergency and relays all necessary information.

Given a choice between communications security and flight safety, flight safety takes

precedence.

Because TE teams do not normally carry sufficient quantities of decontaminants to

decontaminate the entire aircraft, the TEO furnishes the PIC with the following information to

be relayed to the landing airfield command post (CP):

The type and quantity of equipment and decontaminant required.

The number of personnel required to support cargo off-loading and to provide assistance

with emergency decontamination.

The TEO contacts the TE battalion S-3 immediately after landing, reports the location, and

provides all pertinent information regarding the emergency—including whether or not security

was compromised.

TRAINING

6-25. TE personnel must receive annual training on the provisions of AR 50-6, AR 190-14, AR 190-56 , AR

190-59, DA Pam 385-61, and appropriate unit SOPs.

6-26. TE battalion personnel responsible for conducting TE operations must meet all the qualifications for

CPRP certification prior to conducting those operations.

6-27. Trainees receiving on-the-job training (OJT) must also meet all TE training requirements and be in

the CPRP program.

6-6

FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Chapter 7

Support to Combatant Commanders

This chapter implements STANAG 2195.

TE battalions generally support CCDRs at theater level and above. The CBRN teams

make use of several unique capabilities to provide full-spectrum CBRN technical

assistance to CCDRs and their AOs. This chapter focuses on the main types of

support missions conducted by CBRN teams.

TECHNICAL CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND

NUCLEAR ADVICE

7-1. Team members support combatant, incident, and on-scene commanders by providing technical

CBRN advice on issues such as—

Establishing isolation and safe zones. Based on the physical characteristics of the chemical agent

and the existing weather conditions, the team determines where the agent is likely to spread and,

therefore, which areas should be cordoned.

Selecting the necessary PPE. The team uses permissible exposure limit (PEL) information to

determine the level of PPE required for entry into the contaminated area.

Identifying appropriate decontaminants. The team determines the decontaminants appropriate

for the specific agent and situation.

Packaging and transporting agents. The team determines packaging and transportation

requirements based on the physical characteristics of the agent.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR

MUNITIONS ASSESSMENT

7-2. CBRN teams use nonintrusive technologies to identify discovered CBRN munitions by the external

and internal characteristics of the munitions. This important capability allows for the safety of the assets in

the vicinity of the munition.

7-3. During an initial assessment, the team visually inspects the munitions for markings, fuze condition,

and any leaks. Chemical munitions may be identified through visual inspection and the use of gross- or

low-level monitoring equipment. If the munition cannot be identified by visual inspection or initial

monitoring, an X-ray may be used to determine the fuze condition and fill type (liquid or solid).

7-4. If the presence of a liquid in the CBRN munition is verified, the team uses a PINS system to analyze

its chemical makeup. Once the chemical composition of the liquid has been determined, the team can make

recommendations regarding disposition of the munition. In general, the EOD members of the team perform

RSPs in preparation for movement of the munition to a safe storage location. After mitigating any initial

hazards and performing any necessary leak-seal procedures, the team members properly package the

munition for transportation. These procedures ensure that the munition is moved safely and without the

spread of contamination.

7-5. Once the munition has been packaged for transportation, the team escorts the munition to a transfer

point or to an authorized storage location.

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

7-1

Chapter 7

ELIMINATION OPERATIONS

7-6. Elimination operations involve eliminating or degrading the hazardous properties of a hazardous

substance. Elimination is conducted to protect the force from the enemy who is using hazardous materials

and also to prevent the lingering effects of the hazardous material from resulting in illness or death to

follow-on forces. There are two general methods that may be used to conduct elimination operations:

Neutralization. The process of neutralization involves introducing a substance to the hazardous

substance so that the hazardous substance is degraded and rendered nonhazardous. Monitoring

and detection equipment is used to obtain information about the physical properties of the

hazardous substance. This type of information is essential for the assessment of proper

neutralization methods. An adverse chemical reaction may occur when a neutralization

substance is introduced to a substance with unknown properties.

Incineration. The incineration of hazardous substances is currently conducted at only a few

locations. If the quantity of the substance is too great for on-site neutralization, the team may

request that the material be transported to an incineration facility. In situations involving only a

few chemical munitions, EOD personnel may conduct emergency disposals by thermally

treating the munitions in place with an appropriate amount of high explosives to incinerate any

liquids that may be present.

Note. Specific elimination operation procedures are described in TE battalion SOPs and training

plans.

DISABLEMENT OPERATIONS

7-7. Disablement operations are intended to render the process or machinery used to produce hazardous

substances—from small, clandestine laboratories used to make crude CBRN material to state-of-the-art

facilities producing larger amounts of CBRN material—inoperable for a period of time. CBRN teams

conduct disablement operations to protect the force and deny the enemy; they use whatever means are

available and authorized to ensure that the facility is not usable for the length of time ordered by the

supported command. This results in maintenance and financial burdens for the enemy attempting to reuse

the disabled facility.

Note. Disablement operation procedures are identified in TE battalion SOPs and training plans.

SENSITIVE-SITE EXPLOITATION SUPPORT

7-8. SSE is defined as “a related series of activities inside a captured sensitive site to exploit personnel

documents, electronic data, and material captured at the site, while neutralizing any threat posed by the site

or it contents” (JP 1-02). Although the physical process of exploiting the sensitive site begins at the site

itself, full exploitation may involve teams of experts located around the world. SSE is a combined arms

operation requiring extensive planning, coordination, and execution oversight by commanders and their

staffs. CBRN teams support the CBRN aspects of SSE operations.

PREPARATION

7-9. Operations involving CBRN SSE support are simply variations of normal tactical operations; all

planning steps and considerations pertinent to full-spectrum operations apply. Knowledge of the following

aspects of planning may assist planners and commanders in anticipating the effects of CBRN operations on

normal TTP:

Size of the AO. Commanders are assigned an AO that includes the sensitive site and enough

terrain around the site to accomplish the designated mission. The size of the area necessary for

CBRN response operations impacts the resources required.

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FM 3-11.20

29 August 2007

Support to Combatant Commanders

Intelligence. Information about known and suspected CBRN sites in the AO must be

incorporated into the intelligence preparation of the battlefield

(IPB). Because extensive

coordination may be required to obtain the necessary information, it should be requested and

developed well in advance of anticipated operations. Comprehensive intelligence and analysis of

potential sensitive sites should be collaboratively developed across the command and

disseminated as part of the IPB. Technical intelligence refers to intelligence derived from the

collection and analysis of the threat and foreign military equipment (and associated materiel) for

the purpose of preventing technological surprises, assessing foreign scientific and technical

capabilities, and developing countermeasures designed to neutralize an adversary’s

technological advantages. Weapons technical intelligence, a subcomponent of technical

intelligence, is focused on improvised explosive device

(IED) exploitation. Weapons

intelligence teams collect forensic evidence and device components that have been rendered safe

or acquired through postblast analysis from IED incident locations by EOD personnel. Units

involved in CBRN response must plan how to seize and dispose of intelligence material,

supplies, evidence, contraband, and other minor items collected during this mission; search

teams require detailed instructions for handling controlled items. All captured equipment and

documents must be processed in accordance with FM 34-54 and STANAG 2195.

Communications. TE battalion communications capabilities may need to be augmented to

provide linkages to subject matter experts (SMEs) or from SME teams to the supporting HQ.

For example, it may be necessary to establish a secure video linkup between unit teams on site

and SMEs located elsewhere in the AO.

Site preservation. CBRN response operations at sensitive sites are fragile and highly dynamic.

There is usually only one chance to properly search a sensitive site. Therefore, a good

preliminary survey should be conducted to use that chance to the best advantage. The evidence

value of CBRN items discovered at the site can easily be lost; however, a CBRN site survey

helps identify items and materiel that have potential evidence value. The CBRN survey team

performs a preliminary examination (preferably without entering the more critical areas of the

site), noting the conditions, items, and locations that seem to be of greatest importance. The

primary functions of the survey team are to observe and record. All material taken from the site

should be tagged with information indicating where it was found, the circumstances under

which it was found, and the names of the individual(s) handling it. Field-expedient tags may be

used in lieu of evidence tags.

7-10. There are many tools that may be taken into account during the planning process which can be used

to effectively conduct CBRN defense operations. Examples of these tools include OPORDs, warning

orders

(WARNORDs), fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs), and METT-TC analysis and vulnerability

assessments (including vulnerability analyses, threat analyses [IPB], and vulnerability reduction measures).

EXECUTION

7-11. The primary purpose of the CBRN SSE is to identify, characterize, secure, and render safe the

adversary’s CBRN materiel, equipment, weapons, infrastructure, and personnel. A secondary purpose is to

collect appropriate intelligence and forensic evidence.

7-12. After the sensitive site has been secured and safe access had been established, actual exploitation of

the site begins. Examples of units that support SSE operations are—

TE battalion CBRN teams. In a hostile environment, a CBRN team operates as a support asset

to a CCDR or force (see Figure 7-1, page 7-4). CBRN teams are capable of operating in

permissive environments with little or no outside support requirements. Because TE battalions

do not have organic security assets, operations in uncertain environments require area security

support.

EOD units. EOD units are trained to recognize and test for CBRN hazards. The units use

portable X-ray capabilities to determine ordnance type and function. For more information on

EOD, see Field Manual Interim (FMI) 4-30.50.

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FM 3-11.20

7-3

Chapter 7

Special Forces chemical reconnaissance detachments (CRDs). A CRD provides support for a

deployed Special Forces operational detachment

(SFOD) in all environments

(hostile,

permissive, and uncertain) in support of strategic, operational, and tactical objectives during

SSE operations. It is employed in one of two modes:

Unilaterally (in a permissive environment).

As augmentation or training support to an SFOD (in a nonpermissive or

semipermissive environment).

Hostile

Force support

asset

Area security

CBRN

required

team

Minimal support

required

Permissive

Figure 7-1. CBRN Team SSE Support

7-13. SSE operations may be conducted in either a hasty or deliberate manner. In both cases, operations

tend to follow a tactical sequence similar to that used for other combat missions. In general, the sequence

consists of—

Performing reconnaissance, assessing the site, and completing an initial report.

Performing tactical movement and isolating and securing the site.

Assessing and then accessing and exploiting the site. (Team members and subject matter experts

carefully enter and exploit every structure, facility, and vehicle on the site and determine their

value and hazard to the force.)

Neutralizing or destroying the site.

7-14. During each step of the sequence, all incoming and outgoing data (including any questions asked and

the responses provided) should be captured and archived in the most complete and accurate manner

possible. Throughout the duration of the SSE operation, the assault or support element provides support to

the exploitation team, and the security force maintains security of the site.

7-15. Although hasty and deliberate sensitive-site operations may follow similar tactical sequences, their

execution often varies drastically. Deliberate operations generally involve a greater degree of planning,

preparation, and organization than used for hasty operations. In addition, for deliberate operations, the unit

conducting the operation is normally task-organized into a company team or battalion task force (TF) and

key capabilities needed for conducting SSE are integrated into the organization. Units involved in

deliberate operations prepare to perform a wide variety of tactical tasks under differing scenarios by

rehearsing actions such as site searches, seizures, and exploitation.

7-4

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Support to Combatant Commanders

7-16. The value of a CBRN sensitive site to friendly forces is a function of the ability of the force to

exploit its contents. Sensitive sites normally contain vast amounts of data. If possible, the unit securing the

site should attempt to prevent the enemy or adversary from destroying sensitive material, equipment, or

documents and purging computers of sensitive information. However, the primary challenge facing the unit

is the containment of lethal material until it can be removed or destroyed.

POSTMISSION OPERATIONS

7-17. Depending on the situation, the sensitive site may be destroyed to prevent any potential utilization by

the enemy or it may be preserved as evidence. The destruction of a site is normally carried out when the

site is a military, weapons storage, or research and production facility. Experts, working in specially

organized teams or supervising tactical elements, destroy the site. The tactical unit continues to provide

security, and on order, expands the secure area to the minimum safe radius required for demolition. If the

site is to be preserved, site exploitation teams remove all sensitive material and manually destroy selected

enemy equipment. In addition, remediation of preserved sites may also be necessary.

7-18. Following the SSE response mission, the command reviews the data collected (incident event logs,

medical records for response personnel, costs and expenditures for personnel and equipment) and

addresses two key areas—documentation of lessons learned and identification of any necessary after-

operation follow-up.

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION CHEMICAL,

BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR BATTALION

SUPPORT

7-19. TE battalions have the capability to support the NATO CBRN Battalion; the TE battalions provide

that support as authorized and required. Support to the NATO CBRN Battalion must be requested and

approved through the JDOMS.

REACH-BACK

7-20. Reach-back is a process that employs communications assets to identify and make use of resources

not present at the site. When technical CBRN issues exceed the capabilities of on-scene CBRN personnel,

the CBRN team may consult with, or “reach back” to, off-site SMEs. Reach-back should be conducted in

accordance with established unit protocols and local SOPs.

7-21. Many of the organizations commonly used as CBRN reach-back resources have other primary

missions and are, therefore, not specifically resourced to provide reach-back capability. Technical reach-

back points of contact include the—

NRC hotline (telephone: 1-800-424-8802). The NRC hotline serves as an emergency resource

that first responders may use to request technical assistance during an incident. Intended users

include trained emergency personnel, such as firefighters, emergency medical technicians

(EMTs), and police who arrive at the scene of a CB terrorist incident. Other potential users may

include state emergency operations centers (EOCs) and hospitals that may need to treat victims

of agent exposure. Hotline operators have extensive reference materials and databases, and they

have immediate access to the nation’s top SMEs in the field of CB agents. NRC duty officers

take reports of actual or potential domestic terrorism and, if necessary, link emergency calls with

applicable SMEs (such as those at RDECOM and the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for

Chemical Defense [USAMRICD] for technical assistance and the FBI for federal response

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Chapter 7

actions.) The NRC also provides reports and notifications to other federal agencies as

necessary. The USCG mans the NRC hotline 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Specialty areas

include—

Federal response assets.

Applicable laws and regulations.

Physical properties of CB agents.

Toxicology information.

Hazard prediction models.

Detection equipment.

PPE.

Decontamination systems and methods.

Medical symptoms from exposure to CB agents.

Treatment of exposure to CB agents.

20^thSUPCOM (CBRNE) Operations Center (telephone: 1-410-436-4484). The U.S. Army

20^th SUPCOM Operations Center provides an avenue through which to request assistance from

USA TE battalion and EOD units. The hotline is manned and operated 7 days a week, 24 hours

a day.

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) (telephone: 1-877-240-1187). DTRA can provide

technical reach-back information and services to on-scene personnel. Requests for support

should be directed to the DTRA EOC.

Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute

(AFRRI)

(telephone:

1-301-295

0316/0530). The AFRRI can provide DOD technical support for nuclear/radiological incidents

or accidents.

USAMRIID (telephone: 1-888-872-7443). The USAMRIID is a DOD medical research facility

which is nationally recognized for its identification of biological agents from clinical specimens

and other sources. Medical and scientific SMEs on staff at the USAMRIID can provide

technical guidance to commanders and senior leaders regarding the prevention and treatment of

hazardous diseases and the prevention and medical management of biological casualties.

USAMRIID personnel can also provide technical guidance for assessing and evaluating

biological terrorist incidents from the initial communication of the threat through incident

resolution.

USAMRICD (telephone: 1-410-436-3277). The USAMRICD is a DOD medical research

facility which is nationally recognized for its identification of chemical agents from clinical

specimens. Medical and scientific SMEs on staff at the USAMRICD can provide technical

guidance to commanders and senior leaders regarding the prevention and treatment of chemical

casualties. USAMRICD personnel can also provide technical guidance for assessing and

evaluating chemical terrorist incidents from the initial communication of the threat through

incident resolution.

U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine

(USACHPPM)

(telephone: 1-800-222-9698). USACHPPM provides worldwide preventive medicine support

on a day-to-day basis. USACHPPM technical support teams perform detailed laboratory

analyses of environmental (air, soil, water) samples. Expertise is also provided for the analysis

of threats posed by TIM and arthropod-borne diseases, as well as for occupational hazards.

TOXIC INDUSTRIAL MATERIAL REFERENCE DATA WEB SITES

7-22. In addition to CBRN reach-back resources, there is a substantial amount of TIM information

available on the internet. The following Web sites contain TIM information that may be used to support the

military decision-making process (MDMP):

Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), uniform resource locator

(URL): <http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/hazdat.html >. ATSDR produces “toxicological profiles” for

hazardous substances from a priority list of 275 substances found at National Priorities List

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Support to Combatant Commanders

(NPL) sites. The hazardous substances are ranked based on their toxicity, potential for human

exposure, and frequency of occurrence at NPL sites.

North American Emergency Response Guidebook

(NAERG), URL: <http://hazmat.dot.

gov/pubs/erg/gydebook.htm>. The U.S. DOT, Transport Canada, and the Secretariat of

Communications and Transportation of Mexico

(SCT) jointly developed the NAERG—or

Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG)—for use by firefighters, police, and other emergency

services personnel who may be the first to arrive at the scene of a transportation incident

involving HAZMAT. The NAERG is intended to aid first responders in quickly identifying the

generic or specific classification of the materials involved in the incident and in determining

how to protect themselves and the public during the initial response phase. The NAERG

incorporates dangerous goods lists from national and international regulations and the most

recent United Nations (UN) recommendations. To incorporate new products and technology, the

NAERG is updated every 3 years.

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Pocket Guide (NPG) to

Chemical Hazards, URL: <http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npg/pgintrod.html >. The NPG

(U.S.

Department of Health and Human Services [DHHS] [NIOSH] Publication Number [No.] 2005-

149) serves as a source of general industrial hygiene information for workers, employers, and

occupational health professionals. The Pocket Guide presents key data and information (in

abbreviated tabular form) for 677 chemicals or substance groupings that are found in the work

environment (for example, manganese compounds, tellurium compounds, and inorganic tin

compounds). The chemicals or substances listed in the NPG include all of those for which the

NIOSH has established recommended exposure limits (RELs) as well as those which have been

assigned PELs, as documented in 29 CFR 1910.1000 (the Occupational Safety and Health

Administration

[OSHA] General Industry Air Contaminants Standard). The information

contained in the NPG includes identification codes, synonyms, chemical formulas and

structures, measurement methods, chemical and physical properties, incompatibilities,

reactivities, exposure limits, respirator selections, signs and symptoms of exposure, and

procedures for emergency treatment. The industrial hygiene information found in the NPG

should help users recognize and control occupational chemical hazards.

Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances (RTECS®), URL: <http://www.cdc.gov/

niosh/rtecs/default.html>. The RTECS provides toxicological information for more than

140,000 chemical substances. The detailed profiles contained in the RTECS include

toxicological data and reviews, analytical methods, references to U.S. standards and regulations,

international workplace exposure limits, and exposure and hazard survey data. For ease of use,

the information is compiled into individual records for each substance. Updated information is

fully integrated.

Chemical

Hazards

Response

Information

System

(CHRIS),

URL:

<http://www.chrismanual.

com>. The CHRIS database is a comprehensive source of emergency response information for

those involved in the transportation of hazardous materials. The database contains records for

more than 1,300 hazardous materials. Each record contains key identification data such as

chemical abstract service (CAS) numbers, synonyms, observable characteristics, and hazard

labels. In addition, information useful for emergency response situations (physical and chemical

properties; shipping and hazard classifications; water pollution; health, fire, and reactivity

hazards; first aid) is also included in the CHRIS database.

Hazardous Substances Data Bank (HSDB), URL: <http://www.nlm.nih.gov/pubs/factsheets/

hsdbfs.html>. The HSDB is a factual, nonbibliographic data bank created and maintained by the

National Library of Medicine. The data bank, which contains records for more than 4,500

chemical substances, includes extensive information on the identification, manufacturing, use,

regulations, chemical and physical properties, analytical determinations, safety, handling,

exposure, human and nonhuman toxicity, pharmacology, and environmental fate of chemical

substances.

Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS), URL: <http://www.epa.gov/iris/index.html >.

The IRIS is a fully indexed, searchable, electronic database containing regulatory and health risk

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Chapter 7

information for nearly 700 specific substances. The database, which is maintained by the U.S.

EPA, contains numerical and descriptive information regarding—

Oral reference doses and inhalation reference concentrations for chronic,

noncarcinogenic health effects.

Hazard identification, oral slope factors, and oral and inhalation unit risks

for carcinogenic effects.

Background documents and references that describe the rationale and

methods used to develop the values and associated information in the

chemical files.

A glossary of scientific terms used in the chemical files and backg2round

documents and definitions of acronyms and abbreviations used.

Supplementary data on acute health hazards and physical/chemical

properties.

Bibliographic citations.

Regional methods

(RM) programs, URL:

<http://epa.gov/osp/regions/rm.htm >. When

Congress passed the Clean Air Act (CAA) Amendments of 1990 (PL 101-549), EPA was required

to publish regulations and guidance for chemical accident prevention at facilities using

extremely hazardous substances. As a result, EPA now requires companies of all sizes that use

certain toxic and flammable substances to develop an RM program, with the goal of reducing

chemical risks at the local level. RM programs contain summaries of information about each of

the facilities, including an accident history for the last 5 years, a hazard assessment detailing the

potential effects of an accidental release, and an evaluation of worst-case and alternative

accidental releases. This information is useful to local fire, police, and emergency response

personnel who must prepare for and respond to chemical accidents and to citizens interested in

the chemical hazards of the community. Making the RM programs available to the public is

intended to stimulate communications between industry and the public to improve accident

prevention and emergency response practices at the local level.

High Production Volume (HPV) Challenge, URL: <http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/chemrtk/

index.htm>. HPV chemicals are those chemicals which are manufactured in or imported into the

United States in amounts greater than or equal to 1 million pounds per year. The HPV Challenge

Program is a collaborative partnership with a goal of ensuring that the public has access to the

type of information that allows them to actively participate in environmental decision making at

federal, state, and local levels. The HPV Voluntary Challenge Chemical List is available on the

HPV Challenge Web site.

Extremely Hazardous Substance (EHS) Chemical Profiles and Emergency First Aid Guides,

URL: <http://www.epa.gov/swercepp/ehs/ehslist.html >. The EHS Chemical Profiles and

Emergency First Aid Guides contain information on more than 300 EHS currently listed as part

of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) (PL 99-499). Each

chemical profile includes physical/chemical properties, fire and explosion hazards, reactivity

data, health hazards, precautions for safe handling and use, and protective equipment necessary

for emergencies. The first aid guides list signs and symptoms of poisoning and describe

emergency treatment for first responders. The information in the chemical profiles and first aid

guides are accessed through either the CAS number or the alphabetical list of EHS.

Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH) concentrations, URL: <http://www.cdc.

gov/niosh/idlh/idlhintr.html>. The original list of

387 chemicals considered IDLH was

developed in the mid-1970s, when only limited toxicological data was available for many of the

substances. In the

1990s, NIOSH requested information on the current use of IDLH

concentrations in the workplace. The information obtained is in the process of being evaluated

and will eventually be used to establish future actions concerning IDLH levels. In the interim,

however, NIOSH has reviewed and revised the original IDLH levels, to include an additional 85

substances.

General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library, URL: <http://www.train.

army.mil/>. The General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library is a repository

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Support to Combatant Commanders

of approved Army training and doctrine information; as such, it contains several references

appropriate for use by CBRN teams.

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), URL: <http://www.noaa.

gov/>. NOAA, a Department of Commerce agency, gathers data and conducts research on the

atmosphere, space, sun, and global oceans and applies this knowledge to everyday life. NOAA

charts the seas and skies, conducts research to improve understanding and stewardship of the

environment, guides the use and protection of ocean and coastal resources, and issues warnings

of impending dangerous weather. These services are provided through the National

Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service (NESDIS), the National Ocean Service

(NOS), the National Marine Fisheries Service, the National Weather Service (NWS), and

NOAA research and special programs units. NOAA research and operational activities are

supported by the seventh U.S. uniformed service, the NOAA Corps—a commissioned officer

corps of men and women who operate NOAA ships and aircraft and serve in scientific and

administrative posts.

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7-9

Chapter 8

Homeland Security

Task-organized teams support homeland security by providing defense support to

civil authorities. They apply the same principles when employed OCONUS in

support of foreign consequence management operations.

OVERVIEW

8-1. The National Strategy for Homeland Security complements The National Security Strategy of the

United States of America by providing a comprehensive framework that organizes the efforts of federal,

state, local, and private organizations whose primary functions are often unrelated to national security.

Critical to understanding the overall relationship is an understanding of the role that DOD plays in national

and homeland security and the policy in the National Strategy for Homeland Security that identifies the

DHS as the LFA.

8-2. Homeland security at the national level focuses on terrorist threats; the DOD focus in supporting

homeland security is much broader. Military response to threats and aggression aimed at the homeland

includes—

Preparation.

Detection.

Deterrence.

Prevention.

Defense.

Mitigation.

8-3. DOD also provides military assistance (including consequence management) to civil authorities. The

armed forces of the United States support the National Strategy for Homeland Security through two

distinct but interrelated missions—homeland defense and civil support (Figure 8-1, page 8-2).

HOMELAND DEFENSE

8-4. Homeland security is the protection of U.S. sovereignties, territories, domestic populations, and

critical infrastructures against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President

of the United States. DOD is responsible for homeland defense and recognizes that threats planned or

inspired by external actors may materialize internally. The reference to external threats does not limit

where or how attacks are planned and executed. DOD is prepared to conduct homeland defense missions

when the President exercises his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and authorizes military

action.

8-5. DOD is the LFA for homeland defense and is supported by other agencies as directed by the

President or the Secretary of Defense. However, DOD may be in support of DHS when defending against

internal asymmetric, nontraditional threats (such as terrorism).

8-6. When ordered to conduct homeland defense operations within U.S territories, DOD coordinates

closely with other federal agencies and departments. Consistent with laws and policy, the armed forces of

the United States provide support to combatant commands for a variety of air, land, maritime, space, and

cyber incursions that can threaten national security. These include invasion, IED CBRN attacks, computer

network attacks, and air and missile attacks. Upon DOD order, TE battalions provide task-organized

CBRN teams in support of homeland defense.

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8-1

Chapter 8

Civil support

Lead for

civil

In support of

support

others

DOD

Other federal

agencies

Supported by

Lead for

others

homeland

defense

Homeland defense

Figure 8-1. DOD Support Relationships

CIVIL SUPPORT

8-7. Civil support includes assistance to U.S. civic authorities for—

Domestic emergencies.

Designated law enforcement within the scope of restrictions required by 18 USC 1385 (the

Posse Comitatus Act).

Other incidents approved by the Secretary of Defense.

8-8. Support must be consistent with military readiness, DOD directives, and the law. The employment of

military forces within the United States and its territories and possessions under the auspices of civil

support typically falls under the broad mission of military assistance to civil authorities. This mission

consists of three mission subsets:

Military support to civil authorities.

Military support to civilian law enforcement agencies.

Military assistance for civil disturbances.

8-9. As directed in Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5, DHS is the LFA for CBRN

crisis management and consequence management. DOD supports DHS by identifying, assessing,

dismantling, transferring, and disposing of contaminants and by conducting decontamination operations.

Additionally, an incident involving CBRN contamination is likely to require a response according to a

specific federal emergency OPLAN (such as the NRP, NCP, or Federal Radiological Emergency Response

Plan). These plans designate an LFA to coordinate the federal response depending on the type of

emergency. In general, an LFA establishes operational structures and procedures to assemble and work

with agencies providing direct support to the LFA.

Note. Appendix A shows the designated LFA for each emergency support function as outlined in

the NRP.

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Homeland Security

8-10. TE battalions provide domestic civil support to local and federal agencies through task-organized

teams. Depending on the situation, these teams provide—

Support to the FBI, DOD, DHS, and local responders.

Domestic crisis management for CB devices.

WMD support.

Suspect CB IED support.

Limited decontamination (see paragraph 2-24).

Packaging and transport of CBRN dispersal device remnants.

Support for national special security events.

OUTSIDE THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

8-11. The primary responsibility for managing and mitigating the effects of a foreign incident resides with

the HN. If the HN requests U.S. assistance, the DOS serves as the LFA. DOD support is coordinated

through the appropriate chief of mission and country team, and DOD assets are under the command of the

geographic CCDR.

8-12. TE battalion CBRN teams support JTFs and combatant commands and are capable of forward

employment in nonpermissive environments, but not in hostile environments. They can provide operational

support to emergency response teams worldwide, including CBRN advice and assessment, secure reach-

back, and chemical and EOD expertise.

29 August 2007

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8-3

Chapter 9

Improvised Explosive Devices

The threat of IEDs has become increasingly probable when responding to an

emergency, and there has been a dramatic increase in the number of IEDs

encountered in the United States and worldwide. Information describing materials

and techniques for constructing and employing IEDs are readily available on the

Internet and in published material. An increasing number of civil law enforcement

agencies have IED disposal-trained personnel and the equipment needed to respond

to IEDs; however, many do not have IED response capability.

GENERAL

9-1. Each IED is unique in nature because its builder improvised with available materials. IEDs may

include explosives only, or they may include CBRN or other hazardous material. IEDs are constructed

from any available material, and they may range in size from a cigarette pack to a large vehicle. Though

they can vary widely in shape and form, IEDs share a common set of components that make them lethal:

Initiation system or fuze.

Explosive fill (may not be a component of CB devices).

Detonator (may not be a component of CB devices).

Power supply for the detonator.

Container.

TYPES OF DEVICES

9-2. There are many types of devices, including modified conventional munitions; vehicle-borne bombs;

suicide bombs; improvised nuclear, biological, and chemical devices; and radiological dispersal devices.

PACKAGE

9-3. A package device can vary from modified conventional munitions to common objects (Figure 9-1,

page 9-2, through Figure 9-3, page 9-3). The addition of CBRN material to an IED increases its impact,

and the lethality can last longer and affect more people than an IED that possesses only explosive and

fragmentation capabilities. Table 9-1, page 9-4, provides the amount of explosives contained in different

packages and the area affected when they are detonated.

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9-1

Improvised Explosive Devices

Figure 9-3. Sophisticated Briefcase IED

Modified Conventional Munitions

9-4. Enemies have used IEDs that contain mortar and artillery projectiles as explosive devices. Military

munitions are the most commonly used—usually 122-millimeter or greater mortar, tank, or artillery

munitions. IEDs have been—

Thrown from overpasses or roadsides in front of approaching vehicles.

Emplaced in potholes and covered with dirt.

Emplaced along main and alternate supply routes to target vehicles.

Employed along unimproved roads to target patrols.

Placed in front of cinder blocks or piles of sand to direct the blast into a kill zone.

Command-detonated by wire or remote devices.

Time delay-triggered.

Detonated by cordless phones (which provides a mobile firing platform and prevents tracing or

triangulation).

Vehicle-Borne

9-5. Vehicle-borne IEDs use vehicles as packages and containers. They come in all shapes, colors, and

sizes that vary by the type of vehicle used—from small sedans to large cargo trucks. Generators, donkey-

drawn carts, and ambulances have also been used to attack coalition forces and the new Iraqi government.

9-6. Large vehicles house large amounts of explosives, which results in a greater effect. The explosive

charge normally ranges from 100 pounds to well over 1,000 pounds and includes items such as mortar

rounds, rocket motors, rocket warheads, composition 4 (C4), and artillery rounds.

9-7. A growing technique has involved the use of multiple vehicles. In such instances, the lead vehicle is

used as a decoy or barrier buster. Once the decoy is stopped or neutralized and forces are moving to inspect

or detain it, the main vehicle-borne IED comes crashing through the crowd and detonates, resulting in

increased casualties.

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9-3

Chapter 9

Table 9-1. Initial Exclusion Areas

High Explosives

Building

Outdoor

Explosives Mass

Threat Description

Evacuation

(TNT Equivalent)

Distance

Pipe bomb

5 lb

70 ft

850 ft

(2.3 kg)

(21 m)

(259 m)

Suicide belt

10 lb

90 ft

1,080 ft

(4.5 kg)

(27 m)

(330 m)

Suicide vest

20 lb

110 ft

1,360 ft

(9 kg)

(34 m)

(415 m)

Briefcase/

50 lb

150 ft

1,850 ft

suitcase bomb

(23 kg)

(46 m)

(564 m)

Compact sedan

500 lb

320 ft

1,500 ft

(227 kg)

(98 m)

(457 m)

Sedan

1,000 lb

400 ft

1,750 ft

(454 kg)

(122 m)

(534 m)

Passenger/

4,000 lb

640 ft

2,750 ft

cargo van

(1,814 kg)

(195 m)

(838 m)

Small moving van/

10,000 lb

860 ft

3,750 ft

delivery truck

(4,536 kg)

(263 m)

(1,143 m)

Moving van/

30,000 lb

1,240 ft

6,500 ft

water truck

(13,608 kg)

(375 m)

(1,982 m)

Semitrailer

60,000 lb

1,570 ft

7,000 ft

(27,216 kg)

(475 m)

(2,134 m)

LPG

Fireball

Safe

Threat Description

Mass/Volume

Diameter

Distance

Small LPG tank

20 lb/5 gal

40 ft

160 ft

(9 kg/19 l)

(12 m)

(48 m)

Large LPG tank

100 lb/25 gal

69 ft

276 ft

(4.5 kg/95 l)

(21 m)

(84 m)

Commercial/

2,000 lb/500 gal

184 ft

736 ft

residential LPG tank

(907 kg/1,893 l)

(56 m)

(224 m)

Small LPG truck

8,000 lb/2,000 gal

292 ft

1,168 ft

(3,630 kg/7,570 l)

(89 m)

(356 m)

Semitanker LPG

40,000 lb/10,000 gal

499 ft

1,006 ft

(18,144 kg/37,850 l)

(152 m)

(608 m)

SUICIDE BOMBER

9-8. A suicide bomber represents a hard-to-recognize threat for Soldiers. The aim of the terrorist is not to

commit suicide, but to kill or injure as many people as possible. A suicide bomber usually opts for a high-

explosive/fragmentary effect and uses a command-detonated firing system, such as a switch or button

activated by hand. Explosives with fragmentation can be contained in a vest, belt, or clothing that is

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Improvised Explosive Devices

specifically modified to carry the material. Vehicle-borne suicide bombs use a command-detonated firing

system and employ the same methods and characteristics of other package or vehicle bombs.

9-9. If a suspect is determined to be a suicide bomber, deadly force is normally the only response option.

In such cases, Soldiers should be prepared for and expect a detonation. Soldiers responding to such events

should shoot from a protected position as far away as possible.

IMPROVISED CHEMICAL DEVICE

9-10. Improvised chemical devices disperse toxic chemicals, including chemical surety material. They may

be fabricated in a completely improvised manner or may be an unauthorized modification to a U.S. or

foreign chemical weapon.

IMPROVISED BIOLOGICAL DEVICE

9-11. Improvised biological devices disperse toxic biological organisms and associated toxins or agents of

biological origin.

RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL DEVICE

9-12. Radiological dispersal devices disperse radioactive material to cause contamination. They can be

almost any size, defined only by the amount of radioactive material and explosives contained within.

IMPROVISED NUCLEAR DEVICE

9-13. An improvised nuclear device (IND) causes a yield-producing nuclear explosion. It consists of

diverted nuclear weapon components, a modified nuclear weapon, or an indigenous-designed device. An

IND is designed to scatter radioactive material over an area to inhibit the use of the area. While identifying

the location of the radioactive contamination is time-consuming, removing the radiation from the affected

area can be even more time-consuming. Depending on the radioactive material used in the device, the

decay rate is from days to thousands of years—this means that if the radiation cannot be removed, it will

take that long for it to decrease to a lower, safer level.

9-14. The FBI is the LFA for IND incidents in the United States and its territories and possessions, and it

is DOD policy to assist the FBI during these incidents. When the U.S. Government responds to an IND

incident in a foreign country, the U.S. Ambassador coordinates response operations with the HN.

9-15. The DOD response team shall be prepared to deploy within 4 hours of notification of an IND

incident. The team shall be under the C2 of the senior DOD official, provided by the responsible service or

commander-in-chief (CINC), who shall establish coordination with the LFA. When DOD responds to an

IND incident, the DOD senior representative exercises OPCON over DOD assets.

SUPPORT

9-16. Teams responding to a suspect CBRN IED incident normally conduct operations in a support role

under the LFA. The senior DOD official on site coordinates the authorized team support operations with

the LFA.

9-17. CBRN teams, with assigned EOD personnel, support CBRN IED operations when requested and

authorized. When requested as the initial response team, CBRN team EOD personnel conduct RSP before

the CBRN team conducts leak-sealing and packaging procedures to prepare the IED for movement to an

authorized location. Further disposition of IEDs is determined by higher HQ. When an organic EOD team

has responded first and then requested support from a TE battalion, the CBRN team receives a back-brief

from the EOD team to establish what actions have been taken before they proceed downrange.

9-18. Each IED is evaluated with available nonintrusive assessment equipment to determine its potential

destructiveness. Evaluation data is forwarded to the IC for review and assistance in preparing for further

29 August 2007

FM 3-11.20

9-5

Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 8) - page 22