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Appendix I
z
Requesting additional emergency response capabilities.
Medical.
Fire.
Hazmat response.
Civil engineers.
Towing services.
z
Establishing control of the incident scene.
Controlling traffic.
Securing identified crime scenes.
Evacuating personnel and establishing a perimeter, if required.
z
Identifying victims and injured personnel and rendering first aid, as appropriate.
z
Identifying evidence and establishing measures to protect or preserve evidence.
z
Identifying witnesses, victims, or potential subjects.
z
Detaining personnel at the scene (in a safe location) to conduct interviews.
INTERVIEWS AND SCENE PROCESSING
I-5. Initial interviews will typically be conducted by LE patrol personnel. After establishing control of the
incident, responding LE patrols should initiate the interview process beginning with identified victims,
potential subjects, and witnesses. If a large number of personnel require interviews, additional patrols
should be requested. Witnesses, victims, and alleged subjects should be separated to the fullest extent
possible. All initial interviews should be conducted separately.
I-6. LE personnel should ensure that victims are interviewed in an area that is out of sight and hearing
range of alleged suspects, witnesses, and bystanders. Follow-on interviews and possible LE interrogations
may be required by MPI or USACIDC SAs, depending on the circumstances and severity of the incidents.
LE patrol personnel do not conduct LE interrogations. Circumstances will dictate how complete the
interviews will be at the scene. Written statements should be collected when possible. In cases where
interviews do not result in a written statement, the LE patrol personnel should document the interview in
their patrol report. LE patrol personnel must ensure that responding MPI and USACIDC SAs are briefed, as
required, on conducted interviews, identified and collected evidence, and initial impressions and
observations.
ACTIVE SHOOTERS
I-7. An active shooter is typically characterized as one or more subjects participating in a random or
systematic shooting spree. They demonstrate intent to continuously cause serious physical injury or death
to others. Active shooters are intent on committing mass casualties, unlike criminals who engage in crimes
(robbery, hostage taking). Subjects are considered active shooters if they—
z
Continue to actively shoot.
z
Take additional victims.
z
Exhibit a willingness to harm others or themselves unless stopped by authorities.
I-8. Consequently, incidents with active shooters are dynamic events that often defy normal response
protocols. Recent history suggests that the typical police response, contain and control while awaiting the
arrival of tactical units, is ineffective. In an incident with an active shooter, time is clearly not an ally of
first responders. Training, instincts, and initiatives of first responders that are capably equipped have
proven more effective than rigid interdiction protocols.
I-9. Response tactics to incidents involving active shooters must be simple by design; flexible in nature;
easy to implement; and effective against a fast-moving, unpredictable suspect. Initial responders arriving
on-scene should have the authority and capability to take action without waiting for command directives or
the arrival of specialty units (SRTs, negotiators). The goal of police intervention in these incidents is to
neutralize the threat by various means, up to and including the use of deadly force. As with most
I-2
ATP 3-39.10
26 January 2015
Special-Response Considerations
emergencies, an effective response requires informed decisionmaking, clear lines of decision authority
based on established rules for use of force, and reliable communications.
I-10. Federal Bureau of Investigation studies have concluded that—
z
Emergency management preplanning is critical.
z
Responders arriving first have a drastic effect on the progress of the incident. They must quickly
and safely conduct a situational assessment.
z
Immediate interagency cooperation and the establishment of incident commands are essential.
z
Clear and reliable communications are necessary for effective operations.
z
Helicopter access for overhead assessments is a positive response asset.
z
Key agencies and supporting entities
(emergency operations centers, hospitals) should be
mobilized as quickly as possible.
z
Media response (large and immediate) is likely.
z
Additional responder personnel will attempt to converge on the scene.
z
Fire and emergency medical personnel should wear helmets and clearly marked clothing.
z
Body armor should be worn by personnel responding within range of the shooter.
z
Tactical medics to support LE operations are beneficial.
z
A shooter may use secondary devices.
I-11. Emergency planning for active shooters requires a commonly accepted set of assumed operational
conditions that provide a foundation for establishing protocols and procedures. Responses to active-shooter
scenarios must be trained and exercised with all participating elements to ensure full understanding and
implementation of active-shooter response protocols. In the case of an active shooter—
z
An incident may occur at any time of the day or night and on any day of the week.
z
Most acts occur without warning; the succession of events is often unpredictable.
z
The suspect may be better armed than the police, sometimes making use of automatic weapons,
explosives, booby traps, and body armor.
z
Assailants will have some degree of familiarity with the building or location they choose to
occupy.
I-12. One of the most urgent concerns for responding LE personnel is the safety of the public. Developing
and maintaining working partnerships with appropriate staffs, building managers, or administrators
responsible for high-population areas (schools, shopping areas, hospitals) is essential in responding to
critical incidents. Schools may be of specific concern due to the impact on children. Military police LE
planners should coordinate with the appropriate staffs of these entities within their AOs to ensure that
Army LE personnel understand the response policies and procedures of each element. Administrators and
staff should also be briefed on LE actions and expectations in the event of an incident. In the event of an
active-shooter or other critical incident, a well-coordinated and effective response is needed to ensure the
safety of persons involved. Specific circumstances will dictate the best course of action to protect potential
victims. These courses of action include—
z
Evacuations. Potential victims may be evacuated from their current location when conditions
are safer outside a building or away from the immediate danger area. All persons within the
danger area or hazard zone will be directed to leave their current location and move to a
designated safe area. The evacuation of an entire facility or area may not always be prudent,
especially if evacuation may lead to other risks by taking the occupants out of the physically
secure environment of the facility and into the streets.
z
Reverse evacuations. When conditions are safer inside a building, personnel may be directed to
seek shelter indoors. After personnel are inside, the building exterior doors should be locked and
lock-down or shelter-in-place procedures should be initiated. Likewise, if the situation makes
movement hazardous and cover is unavailable, personnel may be directed to stay behind cover at
their present location. A perimeter should be established to control the area.
z
Lock-down or shelter-in-place procedures. When a person or situation presents an immediate
threat to personnel in a building, the order to initiate lock-down or shelter-in-place procedures
may be given. All doors leading to hallways or outside the building should be locked; personnel
26 January 2015
ATP 3-39.10
I-3
Appendix I
should stay in their offices, work areas, and classrooms and away from windows. Initial
notification may be made using public address and emergency notification systems.
I-13. Active-shooter situations are dynamic and tend to evolve quickly. First responders faced with an
active-shooter situation should be prepared for many possible outcomes. Active-shooter incidents may
continue for long periods or end suddenly. Regardless, military police and USACIDC Soldiers must be
prepared for—
z
Mobile crises. The shooter continues to fire, but has chosen to do so while on the move.
z
Fleeing suspects. The shooter has ceased the act and has fled the scene; however, he remains
mobile in the immediate area. The shooter has continued capability and opportunity to engage
additional victims.
z
Suicide or suicide threats. The shooter ceases shooting others and has committed suicide or
threatens to do so. This includes suicide-by-cop scenarios.
z
Homicide investigations. The shooting has ceased, the shooter has been captured or terminated,
and the process of investigation has begun.
z
Trauma responses. The shooting has ceased, the shooter has been captured or terminated, and a
large number of victims require medical attention.
BOMB THREATS AND SUSPICIOUS PACKAGES
I-14. A bomb threat is a communication, usually verbal or written, expressing intent to detonate an
explosive or incendiary device to cause property damage, death, or injuries—whether or not such a device
actually exists. Typically delivered by telephone or other telecommunication means, most threats are
intended to cause disruption or diversion—as hoaxes or for reasons other than actual destruction of
property—rather than warning of real devices. Many bomb threats that are not pranks are made as parts of
other crimes (extortion, arson, robbery). Actual bombings for the malicious destruction of property,
terrorism, or murder are often perpetrated without warnings.
I-15. A suspicious package can be an out-of-place object in a location. Suspicious items can appear
harmless (backpack left at a bus stop or sidewalk, parcel found in an office space, toolbox left in a parking
lot). Suspicion arises when no one claims ownership of the item or the item just seems out of place. At
times, a suspicious package may have characteristics consistent with devices or material meant to cause
harm (visible timing devices, apparent explosive material, wires, oily residue, powdery substances).
I-16. The initial moments of a bomb threat or the discovery of a suspicious package is crucial to the
evaluation of an incident. To ensure the successful resolution of the incident, a bomb threat or suspicious
package contingency plan should be developed and rehearsed by personnel. This is typically a component
of the installation force protection, antiterrorism, or physical security plan. The contingency plan enables
training on procedures for bomb threat or suspicious package responses. LE staffs should ensure that
procedures outlined in the plan are coordinated with the appropriate staff, building managers, or facility
administrators within the AO. Military police LE planners should coordinate with the appropriate staffs of
these entities within their AO to ensure that Army LE understands the response policies and procedures of
each element. Administrators and staff should also be briefed on LE actions and expectations in the event
of an incident.
I-17. Bomb threats and suspicious packages require a multifunctional response, including assets from LE,
fire departments, emergency medical response organizations, and EOD. Upon notification of a bomb threat
or suspicious package, LE patrols will—
z
Respond to the scene of the bomb threat or suspicious package and secure the area. The scene
should be treated as a crime scene until directed otherwise by LE supervisors.
z
Ensure that additional response elements have been notified, including—
Fire department personnel. Fire department personnel normally respond to the scene and
stand by. Fire is a common occurrence in connection with an explosive detonation. The
early notification of fire department personnel can assist in minimizing property damage
and injury if a device detonates.
I-4
ATP 3-39.10
26 January 2015
Special-Response Considerations
Emergency medical personnel. Emergency medical personnel may arrive at the scene in a
standby status. The potential for injury with any explosion or hazmat dispersal is high. Time
can be saved by having trained medical personnel stand by with an ambulance in case of
injuries.
EOD personnel. EOD personnel should be notified immediately; although under normal
situations, EOD personnel do not typically respond to a bomb threat unless a suspicious
item is located. EOD personnel may be able to tell if other threats of a similar type have
been received and if a bomb was subsequently discovered. They can also give guidance if a
device is located. (See AR 75-15 for information on EOD responsibility.)
Other elements. Other elements should be notified, based on local policy (PM, higher
commanders, public affairs)
z
Cordon off the target area to prohibit bystanders from entering the threatened location. The
initial cordon distance should be at least 100 meters for placed explosive objects and at least 200
meters for potential vehicle-borne explosives. This distance may be increased based on the
discovery of an actual device, the size of the device, or advice from EOD or explosive experts.
z
Provide traffic control, to include roadblocks and checkpoints 100 meters or more from the area,
to keep out everyone except authorized personnel.
z
Be prepared to wear personal protective equipment as required.
z
Determine if the building is occupied. If it is not occupied, obtain and report the names and
telephone numbers of the persons responsible for the area to the military police desk.
z
Notify the supervisors of nearby buildings and prepare them to evacuate if necessary.
z
Obtain facts for the preliminary investigation.
z
Stay on scene until relieved by the LE supervisor.
I-18.
Evacuation is not necessary for all bomb threats. Immediate action can include—
z
Searches without evacuations.
z
Movement of personnel within the area to a safer location.
z
Partial evacuations.
z
Total evacuations.
I-19.
The decision to evacuate and search an area or building is typically made by those in charge of the
targeted facility
(commanders, facility managers). Leaders and supervisors may solicit the support of
facility workers who may be the most familiar with their surroundings and most apt to recognize anomalies.
LE supervisors may direct an evacuation when exigent circumstances exist, based on identified threats,
advice from EOD experts, and established local procedures. When possible, the decision to evacuate is left
to the facility commander or site manager.
I-20. The facility commander or manager should—
z
Notify the PMO of the bomb threat or suspicious package and the actions taken.
z
Maintain communications with the military police desk or on-site LE patrols.
z
Decide if the facility will react to the threat or conduct business as usual.
z
Determine if a supervisor’s search will be conducted without evacuation.
z
Decide if the building will be evacuated and searched.
z
Serve as the primary person responsible for the search team.
z
Execute control of operations within the emergency operations center.
z
Determine if and when normal operations will resume after the search if no device is discovered.
z
Clear the area immediately and ensure that EOD is notified if a device is discovered.
26 January 2015
ATP 3-39.10
I-5
Appendix I
I-21. When a large facility is involved, it can be very difficult and time-consuming to ensure the absence
of bombs or other hazardous devices or substances. The decision to evacuate is determined based on the
evaluation of available information, including—
z
Information received and documented on a bomb threat checklist. (See ATP 3-39.32.) If the
bomber describes, in detail, the type of device, its location, and the placing of the device, the
threat may be deemed more credible. Threats with little to no detail may indicate that the subject
merely wants to disrupt operations at the target location. A decision to evacuate and disrupt
operations may only serve the purpose of the subject.
z
Information and advice from support agencies (EOD, fire departments).
z
The criticality of the mission of the targeted facility.
I-22. LE personnel may support a bomb search, but they do not generally conduct one because they are not
familiar with the search area. A search of an area for a suspect device or package requires intimate
knowledge of the area. This allows search personnel to identify items or arrangements that are out of place.
In some cases, MWDs that are certified in explosives detection may be used to search an area for suspected
explosives. (See ATTP 3-39.34.) Upon discovery of a suspect package, device, vehicle, or other item, EOD
should be notified to confirm the existence of an explosive device and to take action to render the device
safe. (See ATP 3-39.32 for additional information on bomb threat response.)
DOMESTIC DISTURBANCES
I-23. LE personnel respond to reports of domestic disturbance just as they would to any other report of a
criminal nature or a request for assistance. A domestic disturbance can manifest itself in several forms.
Two of these forms are—
z
Domestic dispute. A domestic dispute is an argument that could cause a pattern of behavior that
results in emotional or psychological abuse, economic control, or interference with the personal
liberty of a current or former spouse, a person with whom the abuser shares a child in common,
or a current or former intimate partner with whom the abuser shares or has shared a common
residence. During a domestic dispute, LE typically has four courses of action available—
Mediation.
Referral.
Temporary separation.
Apprehension.
z
Domestic violence. Domestic violence is the use of force or violence or a violation of a lawful
order of protection against a current or former spouse, a person with whom the abuser shares a
child in common, or a current or former intimate partner with whom the abuser shares or has
shared a common residence. The nature of domestic violence, public awareness, and recent legal
and policy mandates dictate many actions that LE personnel are required to take when
responding to cases of domestic violence. These actions limit LE discretion in many instances,
but serve to protect all parties involved in domestic violence incidents. Domestic violence is a
violation of the UCMJ and local and state laws.
I-24. When Army LE personnel receive a report of a domestic disturbance incident, the police operations
center or desk section should attempt to obtain (from the caller and identified accessible LE databases)—
z
The nature of the alleged incident.
z
The address or specific location of the alleged incident.
z
The nature of injuries, if any.
z
A telephone number where the caller can be reached and a determination as to whether the caller
is the victim or a witness.
z
The involvement or presence of firearms or other weapons, if any.
z
The need for fire department, ambulance, or other emergency response.
z
The victim was sexually assaulted.
z
The alleged suspect is present. If the alleged suspect is not present, LE personnel should obtain
their name, description, direction of flight, mode of travel, and possible use of alcohol or drugs.
I-6
ATP 3-39.10
26 January 2015
Special-Response Considerations
z
There are children present.
z
Others are present at the scene, what involvement they play in the alleged incident, and their
relationship to those involved in the incident.
z
There have been previous domestic disturbance incidents involving the individuals.
z
There is a protective order in effect involving the individuals.
SAFETY
I-25. The safety of an alleged victim becomes a primary concern of the LE personnel receiving the initial
report. LE personnel receiving the call should attempt to keep the alleged victim on the line until the patrol
arrives. They may advise the alleged victim to await the arrival of the patrol at a neighbor’s house or a
convenience store or, if the perpetrator returns, to leave the location. If the caller is a witness, the dispatcher
must keep them on the phone and relay ongoing information to the responding patrol.
INITIAL RESPONSE
I-26. Once the police operations center has received a call of domestic disturbance and has obtained as
much information as possible concerning the individuals involved (including a history of past incidents),
the information is relayed to the responding LE patrol in person or via a secure radio network. The police
operations center must periodically check the safety of the responding patrol at the scene as in other life-
threatening calls.
I-27. At least two LE personnel are required for response to a domestic disturbance in progress or to one
that just occurred. The LE patrol must approach the scene of a domestic disturbance call with great caution
and treat the incident as one of high risk, taking into consideration such things as—
z
Parking away from the residence.
z
Waiting for backup. This is especially important when a patrol consists of one person.
z
Stopping and listening from a safe vantage point before attempting contact
(to increase
situational understanding).
z
Checking for the assailants outside the residence.
I-28. Upon arrival and after determining the best method for approaching the incident, LE patrol personnel
identify themselves, explain their presence, and request entry to the residence. The LE personnel request to
speak to the person who placed the call. If the caller is someone other than the victim, LE personnel should
not reveal the name or location of the caller. They should be persistent in accessing and speaking to the
victim privately. If LE personnel are refused entry and forced entry appears imminent to investigate the
call, the desk sergeant or other appropriate LE representative will coordinate with the SJA for legal advice.
I-29. If there is an obvious imminent threat to persons at the location and the patrol determines that
immediate forced access is required for the protection of persons at the site, LE personnel may proceed
without waiting for SJA or other approval. They should thoroughly document their observations in the
patrol report, specifically the details that warranted the immediate entry. Additionally, LE personnel are
responsible for—
z
Remaining at the scene and speaking to the victim when there is evidence that indicates a crime
has occurred. Such evidence may be the condition of the scene or the state of the person who is
speaking to LE personnel.
z
Remaining at the scene if they believe that serious injury has occurred or will occur.
z
Entering quarters with consent of the parties involved or, if necessary, without consent to
prevent serious bodily injury or render emergency first aid to injured persons.
z
Driving by the location after departing the scene to observe for any further disturbances.
z
Parking away from the scene location if remaining in the area to continue observation of the
premises.
I-30. Once LE personnel have accessed the scene, they establish control by--
z
Identifying potential weapons in the surrounding areas.
z
Separating the alleged victim and the alleged suspect.
26 January 2015
ATP 3-39.10
I-7
Appendix I
z
Restraining, detaining, or apprehending the alleged suspect as needed.
z
Assessing injuries, administering first aid, and notifying emergency medical services when
necessary.
z
Inquiring about the alleged incident.
z
Identifying all occupants and witnesses on the premises.
z
Separating occupants and witnesses from the alleged victims and suspects and keeping all
persons out of hearing range of one another.
z
Conducting a protective sweep to locate persons who may be hiding or injured.
Note. If the domestic dispute is a verbal altercation, LE personnel may consider mediation as a
method of gathering more information and determining if a crime or abuse has occurred. After
separating the two disputants and obtaining the facts, the officers should attempt to bring parties
together to discuss the problem and possible solutions. Based on the results of this mediation
effort, Army LE may refer the parties for appropriate professional assistance, separate the parties
involved in the dispute, or if required apprehend the parties.
SCENE PROCESSING
I-31. LE personnel will follow the guidance of ATP 3-39.12 for processing a crime scene. Because of the
unpredictability and volatility of a domestic disturbance, some specific procedures are included here. LE
personnel will continue processing the scene by—
z
Attempting to locate the potential whereabouts of the alleged subject (if the subject has fled the
scene).
z
Interviewing witnesses as fully and as soon as circumstances allow. When witnesses provide
information regarding previous incidents, LE personnel should document it to establish a pattern.
Witness names, addresses, and phone numbers must be recorded for follow-on interviews or
possible court testimony.
z
Interviewing children
(preferably alone) in a manner appropriate to their age taking into
consideration the emotional trauma displayed by the child and the child’s developmental level.
Any interviews should be limited to statements of injuries and what they saw. Further
questioning and interviews should be conducted by MPIs or USACIDC SAs. Photographs of the
children should also be taken by MPIs, USACIDC SAs, or medical personnel. LE personnel
must verify that any children present were not abused and document the children’s names and
ages, signs of trauma, any apparent healing of past abuse wounds, and statements.
z
Collecting and preserving all physical evidence necessary to establish what took place, including
photographic evidence substantiating the victim’s injuries, the crime scene condition, and
evidentiary articles that substantiate the incident. (See ATP 3-39.12 for collecting and processing
evidence.)
I-32. LE personnel must follow established procedures for apprehending (military) and detaining (civilian)
personnel and advising military personnel of Article
31 of the UCMJ or turning over civilians to
appropriate civilian authorities. These procedures must be conducted according to the SOP of the police
operations center. The investigator’s statement must clearly state why an apprehension was not made if
probable cause existed. These established procedures include—
z
Seeking appropriate legal advice if the seizure of firearms not directly related to the incident is
contemplated.
z
Seizing weapons for safekeeping. If there is a weapon in the alleged subject’s possession, which
in the judgment of LE personnel, would put the victim or alleged subject at risk, the weapon
should be seized for safekeeping. Weapons may be seized regardless of whether an apprehension
has been made.
z
Explaining to the alleged victim why an apprehension or detention is not going to be made if it is
not authorized. The decision to apprehend or detain is the responsibility of LE personnel.
(Factors that LE personnel should not consider when electing to apprehend or detain are
described in paragraph I-33).
I-8
ATP 3-39.10
26 January 2015
Special-Response Considerations
z
Remaining at the scene to ensure that the situation is completely under control.
z
Advising the alleged victim of the availability of local shelters, victim advocate and domestic
violence services, and procedures for obtaining legal protection orders. If the alleged victim opts
to go to a shelter, LE personnel are obligated to remain at the scene while personal effects are
being gathered and to provide transportation if required.
APPREHENSIONS AND DETENTIONS
I-33. When LE personnel are confronted with the decision to execute an apprehension or detention, they
should not consider the following:
z
The victim’s opposition to apprehend or detain the alleged suspect or claims of being unwilling
to prosecute the alleged suspect. The decision to prosecute is made by the commander or a U.S.
attorney; prosecution is the decision of the government, not the victim.
z
Any speculation that the victim may not follow through with prosecution.
z
Concerns regarding financial consequences of an apprehension.
z
Speculation that the apprehension may not lead to a conviction.
z
The relationship or marital status of the parties involved (for example, individuals who are not
married, are separated, or are pending divorce).
z
The denial by either party that the abuse occurred when there is evidence of domestic violence.
z
Verbal assurances that the violence will cease.
z
The racial, cultural, social, political, professional, or sexual orientation of the victim or the
accused.
z
The location of the incident.
z
The absence of visible injuries.
FOLLOW-UP INVESTIGATIONS
I-34. All domestic disturbance reports prepared by LE patrols should be reviewed by the chief of military
police investigations or USACIDC SAs and given follow-up investigation as needed. Follow-up
investigations should be initiated within 48 hours of the occurrence of the assault. Cases in which a crime
was alleged, but a patrol did not make an apprehension at the scene, deserve particular attention. Follow-up
investigations should examine the case to determine if available information, evidence, or leads have been
overlooked by LE patrols or investigators.
I-35. Follow-up investigations should focus on attempting to prove the case without the participation or
cooperation of the victim in the prosecution. Each case should be analyzed in the following manner: Can
the elements of the offense be established without the testimony of the victim? If not—
z
Will the victim appear in court and testify truthfully if subpoenaed to do so?
z
Can further investigations identify additional witnesses or information to pursue prosecution
with an uncooperative or hostile victim?
z
Are there additional physical evidence items, prior inconsistent statements, witness statements,
911 tapes, circumstantial evidence, or defendant statements available?
EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED PERSONS
I-36. LE personnel may be called upon to respond to individuals who are emotionally disturbed at some
level. Many of these conditions can be severe and result in erratic or violent behavior. The condition may
be associated with environmental factors, medical conditions, or substance-related causes. There may or
may not be an underlying mental illness related to the emotional state.
26 January 2015
ATP 3-39.10
I-9
Appendix I
I-37. Mental illness or emotional distress, especially when combined with excessive alcohol or drug use
can result in a substantial risk of—
z
Physical harm (self-inflicted) to the disturbed individual. This may be manifested by threats
of, or attempts at, suicide or serious bodily harm.
z
Physical harm to other persons. This may be manifested by homicidal or other violent
behavior and serious bodily harm to others.
z
Physical impairment of the disturbed individual. This may be manifested by evidence that the
person’s judgment is so affected that he is unable to protect himself.
I-38. Not all emotionally disturbed persons are dangerous. Some may become dangerous only under
specific circumstances or conditions that trigger a volatile reaction. Indications that an emotionally
disturbed person may present an immediate or potential danger include the following:
z
Statements by the subjects which suggest that they are prepared to commit a violent or
dangerous act. Such comments may range from subtle innuendos to a direct threat that, when
taken in conjunction with other information, paints a more complete picture of the potential for
violence.
z
Past history of mental illness or treatment and a personal history of violence under similar or
related circumstances.
z
Lack of control of emotions (rage, anger, fright, agitation). Signs of lack of control include
extreme agitation, wide eyes, and rambling thoughts or speech. The subject clutching themselves
or other objects to maintain control, begging to be left alone, or offering frantic assurances that
he is all right may also suggest that the individual is close to losing control.
I-39. LE personnel dealing with emotionally disturbed persons must be aware of the surrounding
environment. A chaotic and volatile environment can trigger dangerous responses by emotionally disturbed
persons. Agitators who may affect the person, large crowds, or loud noisy environments may incite
violence. LE personnel must always be aware of any weapons or items that can be used as weapons that are
within a potentially disturbed person’s area. Any weapons (or items that can be used as weapons) should be
moved or the emotionally disturbed person should be moved to a location where potential weapons are not
readily available.
I-40. Emotionally disturbed persons may harm themselves (through direct physical harm or through
irrational actions that place them in danger) or be a threat to others in the area. Emotionally disturbed
persons or persons suffering from excessive alcohol or drug use may be taken into custody to prevent harm
to the individual, other persons, or both. If an individual is identified by LE personnel as emotionally
disturbed, police intervention may be required to reduce any potential threat that the individual poses.
Considerations for dealing with emotionally disturbed persons include—
z
Requesting backup. An emotionally disturbed person should not be dealt with alone. A backup
LE patrol should be requested at the earliest opportunity.
z
Calming the environment. When possible, eliminate lights and sirens, disperse crowds, and
assume a quiet and nonthreatening manner when approaching or conversing with the person.
z
Taking precautions to not excite the person. Precautions may include—
Moving slowly and providing reassurance that the police are there to help and that
appropriate care will be provided.
Not threatening the person with arrest or in any other manner as this may cause additional
fright, stress, and potential aggression.
Avoiding topics that may agitate the person and guiding the conversation toward subjects
that help bring the person back to reality.
z
Communicating with the person. Attempt to determine what is bothering the individual. Relate
concern for their feelings and allow them to vent feelings. Where possible, gather information
about the person from acquaintances and family members. Request professional assistance if
needed.
z
Acting truthfully. If subjects become aware of deception, they may withdraw from the contact
in distrust and may become hypersensitive or retaliate in anger.
I-10
ATP 3-39.10
26 January 2015
Special-Response Considerations
I-41. Emotionally disturbed persons taken into custody should be taken to the emergency room for
evaluation by medical professionals. Medical professionals should determine what action is appropriate.
Under most circumstances, emergency medical services should transport the subject. Only under exigent
circumstances should LE personnel transport an emotionally disturbed person. One or more LE personnel
may be required to accompany an individual to the emergency room. They may be required to ride in the
ambulance if the subject is combative or uncooperative. The emotionally disturbed person should be
searched for weapons and may require appropriate restraints. Individuals should not be left unattended at
treatment facilities. LE personnel should remain with the subject until released by a physician or counselor.
I-42. LE personnel, normally LE investigators, may be required to interview an emotionally disturbed
person if the individual is a subject or witness in a criminal incident. Typically, basic LE patrol personnel
will not attempt to interview an emotionally disturbed person beyond efforts to obtain basic information at
the incident scene. LE personnel conducting interviews of emotionally disturbed persons should exercise
care when dealing with mentally ill persons during all interviews. Emotionally disturbed persons should
never be left alone; if there is any indication of unpredictable or violent behavior, two officers should be
with the person at all times.
HAZMAT
I-43. A hazmat incident may be a spill or release of toxic industrial materials (toxic industrial chemicals,
toxic industrial radiological materials, or toxic industrial biological materials) inside a building or into the
environment. The user may manage simple spills; however, major spills or emergencies require emergency
assistance from emergency response elements. Many times, hazmat incidents may not be immediately
known until identified by first responders. Hazmat incidents may also coincide with an attack intent on
causing damage, casualties, and terror within the target population. Military police and USACIDC elements
must be familiar with protocols for responding to a scene with hazmat present.
I-44. The decision to declare an incident controlled and stabilized is made by emergency response
elements that are trained to identify and safely mitigate the effects of hazmat. These elements typically
include fire department personnel, environmental health and safety personnel, or hazmat teams. Depending
on the nature and magnitude of the incident, assistance and services may be required from other public
support agencies or specialized contractors to identify and mitigate potential or actual hazmat situations.
Fire control or hazardous debris and spills may require evacuations of nonessential personnel from the area.
I-45. When faced with a potential hazmat incident, LE patrols should always proceed with caution. Public
safety and the safety of first responder personnel are paramount. Initial response considerations include—
z
Approaching the scene. Personnel must approach an incident with caution and from an upwind
direction. They should also wear personal protective equipment, as appropriate, for the incident.
z
Securing the scene. Personnel must secure the scene by isolating the spill or leak for at least 50
meters in all directions. The perimeter may require expansion based on direction from qualified
hazmat personnel or Emergency Response Guidebook data.
z
Assessing the situation. Consider the following:
Did a spill or leak occur? How much hazmat has spilled (estimate the quantity if unknown)?
Has the spill reached, or does it have the potential to contact, surface water or public
drainage systems?
What are the existing weather conditions?
What are the conditions of the terrain?
Does this situation place people, property, or the environment at risk?
What actions need to be taken immediately (evacuation, additional resources)?
z
Identifying the hazards. Personnel should identify hazards (if possible) by using information
contained on placards, container labels, shipping documents, safety data sheets, and railcar and
road trailer identification charts. Vehicle drivers can also assist in identifying hazards. If the
substance cannot be identified, personnel must maintain a secure perimeter and obtain support
from qualified hazmat personnel.
26 January 2015
ATP 3-39.10
I-11
Appendix I
z
Reporting and obtaining assistance. Personnel should always obtain assistance when dealing
with hazmat, including—
Notifying the military police desk. Ask the military police desk to notify the responsible
agencies and call for assistance from qualified personnel.
Obtaining emergency response phone numbers. In the event that contact cannot be made
with anyone, look for emergency response phone numbers in the shipping documents.
Referring to the Emergency Response Guidebook. It can be a useful tool for first responders
to identify and appropriately react to potential hazmat incidents.
z
Deciding actions. Take command of the scene or situation. Military police patrols must consider
several factors, including—
What is the risk?
What conditions are competing for LE patrol attention (heavy traffic areas that require
traffic control, high population areas that require immediate notification or evacuation,
potential explosive or fire hazards)?
Will rescue attempts to people, property, or the environment help or aggravate the situation?
What is the estimated arrival time of additional response assets? Are they better equipped
and qualified to attempt rescue?
Is it better, all things considered, to maintain perimeter control and wait?
z
Responding appropriately. Response operations include—
Establishing an incident command post.
Identifying and establishing a casualty triage, treatment area, and decontamination corridor
if necessary.
Maintaining continuous communications with the military police desk.
Reassessing the situation continually.
z
Avoiding hazmat. Avoidance includes the following—
Do not walk on or touch spilled material.
Do not inhale fumes, smoke, or vapors.
Do not mark the area with flares or any other material that could ignite flammable or
explosive hazmat.
HOSTAGE SITUATIONS
I-46. Hostage situations can develop without warning and for a variety of reasons. They are all unique in
their characteristics and require rapid response by LE patrols and follow-on personnel to increase the
probability of a successful outcome. Hostage situations can be the result of—
z
Terrorist operations.
z
Perpetrators seeking revenge or profit (ransom).
z
Domestic violence or other relationship problems.
z
Mental illness or impairment.
z
A thwarted crime in progress.
z
Suicide-by-cop scenarios.
I-47. Initial LE patrols responding to a hostage situation should immediately notify the military police
desk or police operations center of their arrival and exact location. Patrol vehicles should be parked a safe
distance from the building or area, typically no closer than 50 meters. This decision should be based on the
terrain, the weapons the hostage taker may have available, and other environmental considerations. LE
patrols should position themselves where they can best observe and control the area. Other considerations
include—
z
Avoiding exposure to gunfire by the hostage taker (always exit vehicles on the side away from
the hostage taker).
z
Taking cover behind vehicles (preferably the engine block), walls, trees, or other protective
objects.
I-12
ATP 3-39.10
26 January 2015
Special-Response Considerations
z
Positioning to allow as much visual coverage of the scene as possible.
z
Directing bystanders to take cover or depart the area to limit the likelihood of bystander injury.
z
Securing a perimeter around the scene to seal the area.
z
Ensuring that constant observation of all entrances and exits is established.
z
Requesting immediate backup and informing the military police desk or operations center of
how many additional patrols are required to control the scene.
I-48. The scene should be evaluated to determine as much information as possible. Bystanders or
witnesses on-scene that can provide information should be quickly interviewed. Military police patrols
should attempt to verify information through their own observations. Patrols should determine and
immediately report—
z
The number of subjects.
z
Subjects who are armed and what types of weapons they have.
z
The number of hostages.
z
Other helpful information, including descriptions of hostage takers, vehicles driven, and
behaviors and demeanors.
I-49. All patrols should remain in their assigned positions until relieved. Duties could consist of sealing
avenues of escape, evacuating surrounding buildings, rerouting traffic away from the scene, keeping
entrances and exits to the location of the hostage taker under constant watch, and removing bystanders after
obtaining their identification and other pertinent information.
I-50. Hostage situations require extensive resources and support by specific LE capabilities. These
capabilities work in concert as personnel attempt to peacefully conclude incidents or, if necessary, remove
the hostage taker as a threat to protect victims and bystanders. The following support elements may be
required—
z
USACIDC elements.
z
Hostage negotiators.
z
SRTs.
z
Emergency medical services.
z
Fire department services.
z
Outside LE agencies.
z
EOD teams.
z
MWD teams.
I-51. Any hostages that escape or are released must initially be treated as possible threats. Because LE
personnel do not know who the hostage taker or their friends are, handcuff all persons and move them to a
safe and secure area until their identities are determined.
I-52. Hostage situations can last for several hours or several days, depending on the will of the hostage
taker, the resources available to the hostage taker, and other variables. Constant surveillance of the hostage
taker should be maintained, if possible. The LE personnel should try to gain as much information as
possible about the person or persons committing the act. Observations can include things that may seem
unimportant (clothing, identified habits, threatening actions, activities that seem out of the ordinary or out
of place). These pieces of information can be valuable to hostage negotiators in dealing with hostage takers.
I-53. Communication with the hostage taker should only be done by trained hostage negotiators who are
authorized to communicate with hostage takers. The USACIDC is responsible for providing hostage
negotiation assets, internal to USACIDC or through supporting LE agencies. Hostage negotiation is an art,
not a science; it is very much a learned skill. Do not attempt to negotiate with a hostage taker. If
communication with the hostage taker cannot be avoided—
z
Do not make threats, offers, or promises.
z
Do not refuse the subject’s demands; tell the hostage taker that you must check with the
supervisor.
z
Do not answer questions and demands until the negotiators arrive; create delays.
26 January 2015
ATP 3-39.10
I-13
Appendix I
LAW ENFORCEMENT RAIDS
I-54. Normally, LE raids are conducted to apprehend offenders, obtain evidence of illegal activity,
safeguard hostages, or recover U.S. government property. In contingency operations, combined U.S.,
multinational, or HN LE raids may be used to collect information, capture or eliminate threats (terrorists,
criminals, insurgents), or confiscate weapons.
I-55. The LE raids are most effective when conducted by SRTs in cooperation with specially trained LE
personnel
(such as military police or USACIDC SAs skilled in raids, apprehensions, and evidence
collection and preservation). (See AR 190-14.) At a minimum, each raid team should have at least one
trained, experienced investigator who is responsible for collecting and processing evidence. Specially
trained SRTs are suited for high-risk LE raids in high-threat environments. The SRTs are experienced
military police and trained in breaching techniques, barrier penetration, and threat and occupant control.
(See ATP 3-39.11.)
PREPARATION
I-56. The preparation and planning of LE raids must be thorough, led by reliable police and other
intelligence personnel, and rehearsed until the raiding force reaches battle drill precision. The PMs, military
police commanders, staffs, and USACIDC elements plan and coordinate LE raids. Planning and
coordination activities include—
z
Coordinating legal aspects with the supporting SJA.
Ensure that there is probable cause to conduct the raid.
Coordinate with the local SJA, military magistrate, or judge to obtain authorization for the
raid.
(Army LE personnel must adhere to the laws governing authority, jurisdiction,
responsibility, search and seizure, apprehension, and use of force.)
z
Conducting a thorough reconnaissance of the target location to—
Observe activity at the target location.
Determine entrance and exit routes.
Identify the best route of entry to the target.
Identify the vantage points, movements, or behavioral patterns of the occupants of the area.
Identify the points offering observation and fields of fire for the raiding party and the
occupants of the raid area or building.
Obtain blueprints of the building. When reconnoitering a specific building, blueprints will
help identify the interior arrangements of the buildings, to include the placement of doors
and windows, their construction, and the direction in which they open. LE personnel should
determine likely points of exits and entrances, to include emergency doors and fire escapes.
Note. LE personnel must not enter a building before a raid if it will in any way jeopardize the
mission.
z
Obtaining videos or photographs of persons entering and leaving the target location.
z
Determining the raid team composition to establish a chain of command for each raiding team
and within each team. The raiding party is typically composed of—
Entry team. This team is normally used to make apprehensions (as needed) and to recover
property. The team may have a recorder, a photographer, and an evidence custodian.
Security team. This team provides security for the entry team. It also seals off possible
avenues of approach and escape.
Reserve team. This team reinforces or assists when needed. Part of the team may stay
mobile for use as a pursuit unit. If it is not needed for its basic purpose, the team can
augment processing procedures and help control the raid site.
I-14
ATP 3-39.10
26 January 2015
Special-Response Considerations
Prisoner team. This team enters a secured building and takes charge of prisoners
apprehended by the entry team.
Medical team. This team should include a doctor if possible. The team normally remains
with the reserve team and treats injuries, as required.
z
Determining equipment requirements. Selected equipment must suit the purpose of the raid and
the expected degree of opposition. Too much equipment can slow the raiding party; too little
equipment can hamper the effectiveness of the raid. Equipment considerations include—
Weapons. Weapons must be carefully selected. Personnel must take into consideration the
armament of the subject, the terrain of the neighborhood, and the degree of resistance
expected.
Riot control equipment. If riot control equipment is to be used, personnel should identify
the type of equipment required and obtain clearance from the installation commander.
Consider the wind direction and traffic and population density. Remember to provide the
raiding party with protective masks.
Communications equipment. Consider the requirement for radios, telephones, and visual
signals (hand and arm signals, sounds [such as a whistle]). Personnel must always plan for
an alternate means of communication.
Special equipment. This equipment includes lighting, breaching equipment, armor, special
munitions, and protective masks.
z
Identifying and coordinating response and reserve force composition.
z
Identifying and coordinating transportation requirements.
z
Coordinating medical support.
z
Identifying other resource requirements.
z
Briefing the members of the raid team on—
The objective of the raid action.
Each member’s position and responsibilities.
The number of subjects and their names, descriptions, injuries, and other available
information.
The identity and description of covert agents who may be working within the group to be
raided.
The offense of which the suspect is accused.
The reputation, backg2round, characteristics, and mental state of the suspect.
The hostages or other bystanders involved and their descriptions.
The location of the suspects (apartment number, floor, room number, window).
The name and description of the subject and if the subject is armed (if so, the type of
weapons and the amount of ammunition the subject has, if known).
The physical layout of the operation, including sewers, skylights, adjacent buildings, and
type of construction (wood, brick).
The identity of support forces.
z
Reviewing police intelligence files.
z
Analyzing videos or photographs and attempting to identify visitors to the target location.
z
Coordinating with LE and intelligence-gathering agencies (local, multinational, HN, and joint
forces).
z
Debriefing the reconnaissance team and reviewing the size, activity, location, unit, time, and
equipment report.
z
Deciding if the operation will be a daytime or nighttime raid.
z
Deciding if the operation will include a ruse or diversion.
z
Determining if entry will be dynamic or covert.
z
Coordinating with units and agencies that will be affected by the raid or that can assist.
z
Publishing the operation order.
26 January 2015
ATP 3-39.10
I-15
Appendix I
I-57. The following factors are common to a successful raid:
z
Surprise. Personnel should plan to conduct a raid at a time fitting of the circumstances and
when few uninvolved people are present.
z
Speed. Personnel should plan to conduct raids with speed and precision, ensuring that
participants understand their specific assignments.
CAUTION
Speed must not be gained at the expense of safety.
z
Simplicity. Personnel must ensure that instructions are clearly stated and easy to carry out.
z
Superiority. Personnel must know and exceed the capabilities of the suspect in manpower and
firepower.
z
Safety. Personnel must ensure that the raiding party is thorough, cautious, and safety-conscious.
Trained and experienced personnel should be used to conduct the raid.
REHEARSALS
I-58. It is strongly recommended that the raid force rehearse their entry and sweep of the residence in a
mock-up mission that closely resembles the target. The degree of detail and the location of the rehearsal
depends on mission variables. The rehearsal should be conducted in the same light conditions as the
planned raid. An analysis of the target photographs can help provide the necessary information to select a
proper rehearsal location. Obtaining crucial interior information may be more difficult.
I-59. Each team member must fully understand their specific job. Cross-training missions are crucial so
that all team members can continue the raid if a team member is incapacitated. Support personnel must
train and rehearse their roles and attend all operational briefings. Specific tasks to train and rehearse
include—
z
Movement techniques.
z
Breaching techniques.
z
Threat and occupant control procedures.
z
Outer security, building isolation, and escape blocking procedures.
z
Communications procedures.
z
Apprehension procedures.
z
Evidence collection and preservation procedures.
z
Emergency medical evacuation procedures.
z
Follow-on missions.
EXECUTION
I-60. This section describes typical execution procedures for conducting an LE raid to apprehend subjects,
obtain evidence of illegal activity and maintain its evidentiary value, recover personal or U.S. government
property, prevent the commission of a crime, and confiscate contraband.
I-61. Members of the raid team must—
z
Ensure that members of the raid team comply with the limitations imposed by the search
authorization. Search only those locations described in the authorization and search only in areas
where it is likely that objects of the search will be found.
z
Exercise plain-view doctrine regarding evidence collection.
z
Ensure that items seized during the raid are clearly marked with the initials of the person making
the seizure and the military date and time.
I-16
ATP 3-39.10
26 January 2015
Special-Response Considerations
z
Ensure that a DA Form 4137 is prepared for evidence and that the chain of custody is
maintained.
z
Ensure that female subjects are searched and attended by female members of the raiding party.
z
Ensure that minimum force is used and that juveniles involved in the incident are processed
separately from adult subjects. Ensure that juveniles are supervised and out of public view
during detention. Keep juveniles separated from adult subjects until they are released to their
parents or custodians or are transferred to juvenile facilities.
STRESS RELATED TO CRITICAL INCIDENTS
I-62. The USAMPS training division developed a Critical Incident Peer Support Course to assist military
police in preparing and understanding critical incident stress, posttraumatic stress trauma, and cumulative
or chronic stress before being exposed to a traumatic incident. The course is a peer-based program that
prepares military police and USACIDC SAs for responses to catastrophic incidents (loss of lives, serious
injuries, traffic fatalities, children’s deaths, suicides). These instances may be associated with combat and
contingency operations or LE response activities.
I-63. The Critical Incident Peer Support Course is designed to assist military police Soldiers and leaders in
identifying stress-related concerns and equipping them to provide peer support. This can lead to follow-up
consultations with medical professionals to help fill a void created by the shortage of psychologists,
counselors, and combat stress teams. The course is not designed to replace the functions of behavioral
health personnel or a chaplain; it is designed to support the process.
I-64. Critical incident stress has the potential to create an overwhelming emotional reaction in individuals.
These individuals may be unable to function during or following the incident or are unable to cope
psychologically with the event.
I-65. The following primary conditions determine a Soldier’s reaction to a critical incident:
z
The event is sudden and unexpected.
z
The event represents a significant threat.
z
The event can include an element of loss.
z
A Soldier’s values or beliefs are challenged.
I-66. The definition of a critical incident must remain fluid; situations that have an effect on one Soldier
may not have the same effect on another. Reactions are normal, healthy responses to abnormal situations.
Signs and symptoms of critical incident stress may be experienced in a cognitive, behavioral, emotional,
spiritual, or physical manner.
I-67. The following are examples of critical incident stress symptoms:
z
Cognitive—includes diminished concentration, loss of the meaning of life, preoccupation with
trauma, apathy, hypoalertness, hyperalertness, and self-doubt.
z
Behavioral—includes sleep disturbances, appetite disturbances, crying, decreased ability to
speak, increased smoking, and increased drinking and aggressiveness.
z
Emotional—includes oversensitive and overemotional behavior, mood swings, worry, loss of
self-confidence, and increased cynicism and negativism.
z
Spiritual—includes doubts in value systems or religious beliefs, declined investments in others,
disillusionment, loss of purpose or hope, loss of trust, or placing blame on God.
z
Physical—includes exhibiting changes in sleep patterns and nightmares; becoming easily
startled; and suffering from headaches, migraines, muscle tics, trembles or twitches, restlessness,
hyperactivity, or increased perspiration.
I-68. Understanding the dynamics of critical incident stress, posttraumatic stress trauma, and cumulative or
chronic stress and how the disorders occur can aid military police and USACIDC Soldiers in seeking
immediate help for themselves, their peers, and their subordinates. This help begins with talking to their
peers.
26 January 2015
ATP 3-39.10
I-17
Appendix I
I-69. Following mission incidents, unit leaders should ensure that exposed individuals or elements receive
one-on-one intervention or critical incident debriefings within the first 8 to 24 hours. These debriefings
should be included in SOPs and enforced by unit leadership. Critical incident stress, posttraumatic stress
trauma, and cumulative or chronic stress can affect anyone, regardless of age or position. All personnel,
including unit leaders who are involved in a critical incident, should be required to participate.
I-18
ATP 3-39.10
26 January 2015
Glossary
The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Terms for
which ATP 3-39.10 is the proponent are marked with an asterisk (*).
SECTION I - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ACI2
Automated Criminal Investigation/Criminal Intelligence Reporting System
ADP
Army doctrinal publication
ADRP
Army doctrinal reference publication
AO
area of operations
AR
Army regulation
AT
antiterrorism
ATP
Army techniques publication
attn
attention
ATTP
Army tactics, techniques, and procedures
CBRN
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CBRNE
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives
CLEP
Conservation Law Enforcement Program
COPS
Centralized Operator’s Police Suite
D-DEx
Defense data exchange
DA
Department of the Army
DC
District of Columbia
DD
Department of Defense
DNA
deoxyribonucleic acid
DOD
Department of Defense
DODD
Department of Defense directive
DODI
Department of Defense instruction
DSCA
defense support of civil authorities
DTR
Defense Travel Regulation
EO
executive order
EOD
explosive ordnance disposal
fed
federal
FM
field manual
GIS
geographic information system
HN
host nation
HSPD
Homeland Security Presidential Directive
JP
joint publication
LE
law enforcement
MO
Missouri
MPI
military police investigator
26 January 2015
ATP 3-39.10
Glossary-1
Glossary
MSCoE
Maneuver Support Center of Excellence
MWD
military working dog
No.
number
OC
oleoresin capsicum
PDTT
police development and transition team
PhD
doctor of philosophy
PL
public law
PM
provost marshal
PMO
provost marshal’s office
POLICE
police and prison structures, organized criminal elements, legal systems,
investigations and interviews, crime-conducive conditions, and enforcement
gaps and mechanisms
PSRB
Physical Security Review Board
S-3
battalion or brigade operations staff officer
SA
special agent
SJA
staff judge advocate
SOP
standard operating procedure
SRT
special-reaction team
std
standard
TC
training circular
TCP
traffic control post
TMCI
traffic management and collision investigator
UCMJ
Uniform Code of Military Justice
UFC
United Facilities Criteria
U.S.
United States
USACIDC
United States Army Criminal Investigation Command
USAMPS
United States Army Military Police School
USC
United States Code
SECTION II - TERMS
*crime prevention
A direct crime control method that applies to efforts to reduce criminal opportunity, protect potential
human victims, and prevent property loss by anticipating, recognizing, and appraising crime risk and
initiating actions to remove or reduce it.
*law enforcement interrogation
The systematic effort by law enforcement investigators to prove, disprove, or corroborate information
relevant to a criminal investigation using direct questioning in a controlled environment.
Glossary-2
ATP 3-39.10
26 January 2015
References
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication..
ADRP 1-02. Terms and Military Symbols. 24 September 2013.
JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 8 November 2010.
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents contain relevant supplemental information.
ARMY
ADP 3-0. Unified Land Operations. 10 October 2011.
ADP 3-07. Stability. 31 August 2012.
ADP 3-28. Defense Support of Civil Authorities. 26 July 2012.
ADRP 3-0. Unified Land Operations. 16 May 2012.
ADRP 3-07. Stability. 31 August 2012.
ADRP 3-28. Defense Support of Civil Authorities. 14 June 2013.
ADRP 3-37. Protection. 31 August 2012.
ADRP 5-0. The Operations Process. 17 May 2012.
ADRP 6-0. Mission Command. 17 May 2012.
AR 25-30. The Army Publishing Program. 27 March 2006.
AR 27-10. Military Justice. 3 October 2011.
AR 75-15. Policy for Explosive Ordnance Disposal. 17 December 2013.
AR 190-11. Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives. 5 September 2013.
AR 190-12. Military Working Dogs. 11 March 2013.
AR 190-13. The Army Physical Security Program. 25 February 2011.
AR 190-14. Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for Law Enforcement and Security Duties.
12 March 1993.
AR 190-16. Physical Security. 31 May 1991.
AR 190-24. Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Boards and Off-Installation Liaison and Operations.
27 July 2006.
AR 190-30. Military Police Investigations. 1 November 2005.
AR 190-45. Law Enforcement Reporting. 30 March 2007.
AR 190-47. The Army Corrections System. 15 June 2006.
AR 190-51. Security of Unclassified Army Property (Sensitive and Nonsensitive). 30 September 1993.
AR 190-54. Security of Nuclear Reactors and Special Nuclear Materials. 19 June 2006.
AR 190-56. The Army Civilian Police and Security Guard Program. 15 March 2013.
AR 190-58. Personal Security. 22 March 1989.
AR 195-2. Criminal Investigation Activities. 9 June 2014.
AR 195-5. Evidence Procedures. 22 February 2013.
AR 381-10. U.S. Army Intelligence Activities. 3 May 2007.
26 January 2015
ATP 3-39.10
References-1
References
AR 381-20. The Army Counterintelligence Program. 26 May 2010.
AR 525-13. Antiterrorism. 11 September 2008.
ATP 3-34.80. Geospatial Engineering. 23 June 2014.
ATP 3-39.11. Military Police Special Reaction Teams. 26 November 2013.
ATP 3-39.12. Law Enforcement Investigations. 19 August 2013.
ATP 3-39.32. Physical Security. 30 April 2014.
ATP 3-39.35. Protective Services. 31 May 2013.
ATP 4-16. Movement Control. 5 April 2013.
ATP 5-19. Risk Management. 14 April 2014.
ATTP 3-39.20. Police Intelligence Operations. 29 July 2010.
ATTP 3-39.34. Military Working Dogs. 10 May 2011.
ATTP 3-90.15. Site Exploitation Operations. 8 July 2010.
FM 1-04. Legal Support to the Operational Army. 18 March 2013.
FM 3-19.4. Military Police Leaders’ Handbook. 4 March 2002.
FM 3-22. Army Support to Security Cooperation. 22 January 2013.
FM 3-34.170. Engineer Reconnaissance. 25 March 2008.
FM 3-39. Military Police Operations. 26 August 2013.
FM 3-63. Detainee Operations. 28 April 2014.
FM 6-0. Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. 5 May 2014.
FM 7-15. The Army Universal Task List. 27 February 2009.
FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956.
TC 19-210. Access Control Handbook. 4 October 2004.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DOD 5240.1-R. Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect
United States Persons. 7 December 1982.
DODD 3025.18. Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). 29 December 2010.
DODD 5200.27. Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated With
the Department of Defense. 7 January 1980.
DODD 5240.01. DOD Intelligence Activities. 27 August 2007.
DODI 2000.12. DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program. 1 March 2012.
DODI 2000.16. DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Standards. 2 October 2006.
DODI 3025.21. Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies. 27 February 2013.
DODI 5200.08. Security of DOD Installations and Resources and the DOD Physical Security Review
Board (PSRB). 10 December 2005.
DODI 5525.11. Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilians Employed By or Accompanying the Armed
Forces Outside the United States, Certain Service Members, and Former Service Members.
3 March 2005.
DODI 5525.16. Law Enforcement Defense Data Exchange (LE D-DEx). 29 August 2013.
DODI 5525.17. Conservation Law Enforcement Program (CLEP). 17 October 2013.
References-2
ATP 3-39.10
26 January 2015
References
JOINT
JP 1. Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 25 March 2013.
JP 2-0. Joint Intelligence. 22 October 2013.
JP 3-0. Joint Operations. 11 August 2011.
JP 3-22. Foreign Internal Defense. 12 July 2010.
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-section1385)&f=treesort&edition=prelim&num=0&jumpTo=true>, accessed on
7 October 2014.
18 USC 3261. Criminal Offenses Committed by Certain Members of the Armed Forces and by Persons
Employed or Accompanying the Armed Forces Outside the United States.
<http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:18 section:3261 edition:prelim) OR
(granuleid:USC-prelim-title18-section3261)&f=treesort&edition
=prelim&num=0&jumpTo=true>, accessed on 7 October 2014.
section:3262 edition:prelim) OR (granuleid:USC-prelim-title18-section3262)&f
=treesort&edition=prelim&num=0&jumpTo=true>, accessed on 7 October 2014.
/view.xhtml?req=(title:18 section:3263 edition:prelim) OR (granuleid:USC-prelim-title18
-section3263)&f=treesort&edition=prelim&num=0&jumpTo=true>, accessed on
7 October 2014.
edition:prelim) OR (granuleid:USC-prelim-title18-section3264)&f=treesort&edition
=prelim&num=0&jumpTo=true>, accessed on 7 October 2014.
edition:prelim) OR (granuleid:USC-prelim-title18-section3265)&f=treesort&edition
=prelim&num=0&jumpTo=true>, accessed on 7 October 2014.
edition:prelim) OR (granuleid:USC-prelim-title18-section3266)&f=treesort&edition
=prelim&num=0&jumpTo=true>, accessed on 7 October 2014.
edition:prelim) OR (granuleid:USC-prelim-title18-section3267)&f=treesort&edition
=prelim&num=0&jumpTo=true>, accessed on 7 October 2014.
26 January 2015
ATP 3-39.10
References-3
References
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7 October 2014.
=true&num=2028&hl=true&edition=prelim&granuleId=USC-prelim-title32-front>, accessed
on 7 October 2014.
DTR 4500.9-R. Defense Transportation Regulation. Part V, Department of Defense Customs and
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/pv_obj_cache/pv_obj_id_7410989F4294AE44A2EBF6A80ADB640BCA8E4200/filename
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Fed-Std-376B. Preferred Metric Units for General Use by the Federal Government.
7 October 2014.
/files/publications/Homeland%20Security%20Presidential%20Directive%205.pdf >, accessed
on 7 October 2014.
Kelling, George L. and James Q. Wilson, “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety.”
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McGrath, John J., Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations. Global War on
Terrorism Occasional Paper 16, Combat Studies Institute Press. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Minnesota versus Dickerson. 508 U.S. 366. 7 June 1993.
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Miranda versus Arizona, 384 U.S. 436. 13 June 1966. <http://supreme.justia.com
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PL 106-523. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000. 22 November 2000.
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References-4
ATP 3-39.10
26 January 2015
References
Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook. U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
/ucr_handbook.pdf/view>, accessed on 7 October 2014.
accessed on 7 October 2014.
PRESCRIBED FORMS
None.
REFERENCED FORMS
Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate Web site at
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
DA Form 2823. Sworn Statement.
DA Form 3881. Rights Warning Procedure/Waiver Certificate.
DA Form 3946. Military Police Traffic Accident Report.
DA Form 3975. Military Police Report.
DA Form 4002. Evidence/Property Tag.
DA Form 4137. Evidence/Property Custody Document.
DA Form 4833. Commander’s Report of Disciplinary or Administrative Action.
DD Form 1408. Armed Forces Traffic Ticket.
DD Form 2922. Forensic Laboratory Examination Request.
on 7 October 2014.
WEB SITES
Army Knowledge Online, Doctrine and Training Publications Web site,
Army Publishing Directorate, Army Publishing Updates Web site,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System Web site,
7 October 2014.
Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Crime Information Center Web site,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports Web site, <http://www.fbi.gov/about
-us/cjis/ucr/ucr>, accessed on 7 October 2014.
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports Web site, National Incident-Based Reporting
RECOMMENDED READINGS
ADP 1. The Army. 17 September 2012.
ADP 3-05. Special Operations. 31 August 2012.
ADP 3-37. Protection. 31 August 2012.
ADP 5-0. The Operations Process. 17 May 2012.
ADP 6-0. Mission Command. 17 May 2012.
ADRP 2-0. Intelligence. 31 August 2012.
26 January 2015
ATP 3-39.10
References-5
References
ADRP 3-05. Special Operations. 31 August 2012.
ADRP 4-0. Sustainment. 31 July 2012.
AR 195-6. Department of the Army Polygraph Activities. 29 September 1995.
AR 385-10. The Army Safety Program. 27 November 2013.
ATP 3-39.33. Civil Disturbances. 21 April 2014.
Carter, David L. PhD, Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law
Enforcement Agencies, 2d Edition. School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University.
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DA Pamphlet 350-38. Standards in Training Commission. 18 November 2013.
DODD 8521.01E. Department of Defense Biometrics. 21 February 2008.
DODI 5525.15. Law Enforcement (LE) Standards and Training in the DOD. 27April 2012.
FM 3-24. Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies. 13 May 2014.
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Intelligence-Led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture. Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S.
on 7 October 2014.
National Cooperative Highway Research Program Report 504. Design Speed, Operating Speed, and
accessed on 7 October 2014.
National Institute of Justice Guide 100-01. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs.
Selection and Application Guide to Personal Body Armor. November 2001.
Shane, Jon M., Compstat Process. Washington, DC. Federal Bureau of Investigation Law Enforcement
Bulletin. April 2004. <http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement
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TC 2-22.82. Biometrics-Enabled Intelligence. 21 March 2011.
/ccb/DOD/UFC/ufc_4_730_04an.pdf >, accessed on 7 October 2014.
Understanding Community Policing: A Framework for Action. Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S.
7 October 2014.
Wilson, James Q., Varieties of Police Behavior: The Management of Law and Order in Eight
Communities. Cambridge, Maine. Harvard University Press. 1968.
7 October 2014.
References-6
ATP 3-39.10
26 January 2015
Index
Entries are by page number.
dismounted patrols, 4-5
A
PM, 2-6, 2-12, 2-14, 2-21, 2-26,
mounted patrols, 4-6
2-27, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-7, 3-9, 3-
analysis, 3-17
static or fixed patrols, 4-5
13, 3-18, 4-2, 4-3, 4-8, 5-7, 6-2,
B
LE patrol strategies, 4-8
6-9, 7-5, 7-18, 7-19, B-3, B-4
differential response, 4-10
border control, 2-17, D-2
POLICE, 2-20
directed patrols, 4-9
definition, 2-20
C
random or routine patrols, 4-8
policing
saturation patrols, 4-10
categories of crime, 2-30
definition, 1-5
split-force patrolling, 4-9
crime mapping, 2-23
policing models, 2-2
LE-sensitive, 3-4
crime prevention
broken-windows policing, 2-2
definition, 3-8
M
community-oriented policing,
2-3
criminal investigations, 4-11
managing police information, 3-3
computer statistics, 2-3
ACI2, 3-5
critical incidents, 2-26
intelligence-led policing, 2-4
Centralized Operations Police
problem-oriented policing, 2-3
D
Suite, 3-5
database applications, 3-6
principles of policing, 2-1
defensive operations
GISs, 3-6
definition, 1-8
R
HN LE, 3-7
E
legal and regulatory
requirements for police station
constraints, 3-4
operations, 3-12
exceptional information, 5-4
criminal investigations
manpower requirements, 2-25
F
capability, 3-13
measure of effectiveness
LE operations section, 3-12
force protection team, 2-15
definition, 2-28
logistics and supply capability,
forensic evidence, 3-18
measure of performance
3-14
forensics, 3-17
definition, 2-28
police administration, 3-14
police desk section, 3-13
full spectrum operations, 1-7
military police organizations and
traffic enforcement and
defensive operations, 1-8
capabilities, 2-12
investigations capability,
offensive operations, 1-8
Army civilian police and
3-14
security guard, 2-19
I
training capability, 3-15
customs inspection teams,
insurgency, 1-3
2-16
rule of law, 1-5
evidence response team, 2-17
interview
rules for the use of force, 1-4
definition, 4-13
law and order detachments,
rules of engagement, iv, 1-5
2-12
interviews and LE interrogations,
law and order operations
S
4-12
center, 2-12
interviews, 4-13
security, 3-17
MWD teams, 2-17
LE interrogations, 4-14
protective services and high-
security and mobility support, 6-2
risk personnel protection,
definition, 6-2
L
2-18
site exploitation
law and order operations, 1-2
SRT, 2-18
definition, C-5
definition, 1-2
O
spectrum of conflict, 1-2
law enforcement interrogation
definition, 4-14
offensive operations
stability operations, 1-8
LE law enforcement patrol
definition, 1-8
T
definition, 4-1
P
TCP, 6-2, 6-3
LE patrol methods, 4-3
patrol
technical channel, 2-12, 3-3, 3-9,
bicycle patrols, 4-7
definition, 4-1
7-5, 7-18
boat and watercraft patrols, 4-8
canine patrols, 4-7
patrol areas and patrol
theater, 6-2
distribution, 2-20
26 January 2015
ATP 3-39.10
Index-1
Index
traffic control
U.S. Army Military Police School.
4-11, 4-14, 4-20, 5-1, 5-6, 6-29,
definition, 6-3
See also USAMPS, iv
7-2, 7-6, B-2, C-1, I-2, I-13
traffic control devices, 6-8
unified action
USAMPS. See also U.S. Army
definition, 2-27
Military Police School, iv
traffic control post
definition, 6-7
Uniform Crime Report, 2-32
V
traffic control studies, 6-9
unit allocation planning factors,
variance
2-8
traffic management, 6-1
definition, 2-28
USACIDC. See also U.S. Army
U
Criminal Investigation
U.S. Army Criminal Investigation
Command Support, 2-19, 2-23,
Command Support. See also
2-25, 2-26, 2-34, 3-3, 3-5, 3-13,
USACIDC, iv
Index-2
ATP 3-39.10
26 January 2015
ATP 3-39.10
26 January 2015
By Order of the Secretary of the Army
RAYMOND T. ODIERNO
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
GERALD B. O’KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
1501301
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: Distributed in electronic media
only (EMO).
PIN: 104926-000
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