Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 6)

Title: RManagement of

Doc No: UNIF-HSE-PRO-205-C1

Formatted

Radioactive Materials and

Rev No: 01

Page 26 of 38

Radiation Generators adioactive

Sources Management Procedure

Dated: SeptemberOctober, 2004

Originating Dept: HSE

5 MONITORING FOR RADIATION AND CONTAMINATION

Calibrated radiation dose rate monitors, appropriate to the radiation being used, must

be available wherever radioactive sources are likely to be used.

These monitors must be thoroughly examined and tested at least once in every

period of 12 months. A qualified and certified Contractor company shall undertake

the examination and test of radiation dose rate monitors.

The certificate resulting from such a test must be retained for two years from the date

of the test.

If a radiation-monitoring instrument is damaged such that the accuracy of the

calibration may have been affected, then the instrument must be repaired and re-

calibrated.

Only individuals who have been trained in their safe use may use these monitors.

Individuals who have been trained in their safe use may only use these monitors.

Under normal operating conditions, dose rates around sites/installations, which

incorporate a radioactive source shall be monitored monthly or following any work

which has been carried out which could affect the adequacy of the shielding.

The Radiation Protection Supervisor or his delegate will carry out this activity. The

results of such monitoring shall be recorded and retained on the facility for 2 years.

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Title: RManagement of

Doc No: UNIF-HSE-PRO-205-C1

Formatted

Radioactive Materials and

Rev No: 01

Page 27 of 38

Radiation Generators adioactive

Sources Management Procedure

Dated: SeptemberOctober, 2004

Originating Dept: HSE

Appendix A

Glossary of terms

TERM

DEFINITION

Absorbed Dose

Quantity of energy imparted by ionising radiation to unit mass

of matter such as tissue. Unit gray, Symbol Gy. Gy = 1 joule

per kilogram.

Activity

Measure of an amount of a radionuclide. Describes the rate at

which transformations occur in it. Unit becquerel. Symbol Bq. 1

Bq = 1 transformation per second.

Classified Person

Classified person is a person who is likely to receive an

effective dose in excess of 6 mSv per year or an equivalent

dose that exceeds three-tenths of any relevant dose limit.

Classified person should be informed if he/she is so

designated. Classified person should be over 18 years old and

has a health record certified by doctor confirming he/she is fit

for this job.

Contamination

Loose unsealed radioactive material/substance.

Contingency Plan

Document the purpose of which is to restrict any exposure that

arises from an accident both to the employees themselves and

to others, including emergency services personnel, who may

be affected by it.

Controlled Area

Controlled Area is the area where:

It is necessary for any person who enters or works in

the area to follow special procedures designated to

restrict significant exposure to ionising radiation in that

area or prevent or limit the probability and magnitude of

radiation accidents or their effects; or

Any person working in the area is likely to receive an

effective dose greater that

6 mSv a year or an

equivalent dose greater than three-tenths of any

relevant dose limit in respect of an employee aged 18

years or above.

Decay

The process of spontaneous transformation of a radionuclide.

The decrease in activity of a radioactive substance.

Designated Area

Designated Areas include Controlled and Supervised Areas.

Disposal

In relation to radioactive waste, dispersal or emplacement in

any medium without the intention of retrieval.

Dose

General term for quantity of radiation. See absorbed dose,

equivalent dose, and effective dose.

Dose Limit

Dose Limit in relation to persons of a specified class is the limit

on effective dose or equivalent dose in relation to a person of

that class.

Dose Rate

Dose Rate, in relation to a place, is the rate at which a person

or part of a person would receive a dose of ionising radiation

from external radiation if he were at that place being a dose

rate at that place averaged over one minute.

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Title: RManagement of

Doc No: UNIF-HSE-PRO-205-C1

Formatted

Radioactive Materials and

Rev No: 01

Page 28 of 38

Radiation Generators adioactive

Sources Management Procedure

Dated: SeptemberOctober, 2004

Originating Dept: HSE

Effective Dose

The quantity obtained by multiplying the dose equivalents to

various tissues and organs by the tissue weighting factor

appropriate to each and summing the products. Unit sievert,

symbol Sv. Frequently abbreviated to dose.

Equivalent Dose

The quantity obtained by multiplying the absorbed dose by a

weighting factor to allow for the different effectiveness of the

various ionising radiations in causing harm to tissue. Unit

sievert, symbol Sv. Usually the factor for gamma rays, X-rays

and beta particles is 1 but for alpha particles is 20.

External Radiation

External radiation, in relation to a person, is the ionising

radiation coming from outside the body of that person.

Internal Radiation

Internal radiation, in relation to a person, is the ionising

radiation coming from inside the body of that person.

Ionising Radiation

Gamma rays, x-rays or corpuscular radiations such as alpha

and beta, which are capable of producing ions either directly or

indirectly.

Local Rules

Set of working procedures written in accordance with the

Ionising Radiations Regulations, 1999, to enable work with

ionising radiations to proceed safely, and in accordance with

the Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974. Incorporating

Contingency Plans.

LSA Scale

Inorganic based chemical scale produced in conjunction with

oil and gas production and containing low levels of naturally

occurring radioactive material.

Non-ionising radiation

Radiation that does not produce ionisation in matter. Examples

are ultraviolet radiation, light, infrared radiation, and radio

frequency radiation.

NORM

Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material produced with oil and

gas deposits within process equipment.

Overexposure

Any exposure of a person to ionising radiation to the extent

that the dose received by that person causes a dose limit

relevant to that person to be exceeded or causes a proportion

of a dose limit relevant to any employee to be exceeded.

Practice

Practice means work involving:

1. The production, processing, handling, use, holding,

storage, transport or disposal of radioactive substances;

2. The operation of any electrical equipment emitting

ionising radiation and containing components operating

at a potential difference of more than 5Kv,

that can increase the exposure of individuals to radiation from

an artificial source, or from a radioactive substance containing

naturally occurring radionuclides that are processed for their

radioactive, fissile or fertile properties.

Radiation

The process of emitting energy as waves or particles.

Radiation accident

Accident where immediate action would be required to prevent

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Title: RManagement of

Doc No: UNIF-HSE-PRO-205-C1

Formatted

Radioactive Materials and

Rev No: 01

Page 29 of 38

Radiation Generators adioactive

Sources Management Procedure

Dated: SeptemberOctober, 2004

Originating Dept: HSE

or reduce the exposure to ionising radiation of employees or

any other persons.

Radiation control

Obtaining information about radiation state in the organisation,

in the environment and of the level of exposure to radiation

(includes dozsimetric and radiometric control)

Radiation Protection

Person or body consulted in accordance with the Ionising

Adviser

Radiations Regulations, 1999, to give advice on radiation

protection.

Radiation Protection

Person appointed in accordance with the Ionising Radiations

Supervisor

Regulations, 1999 who is responsible for day-to-day

supervision of work with ionising radiation.

Radioactive Material

Substance in any aggregated state containing active

radionuclids

Radioactive Waste

Waste material containing radionuclides. Frequently

categorised, in the nuclear power industry, according to

activity content and other criteria, as low level, intermediate

level, and high-level waste.

Radioactivity

The property of radionuclides of spontaneously emitting

ionising radiation.

Radionuclid source

Source of ionising radiation containing radionuclid or a mixture

of radionuclids

Risk Assessment

Assessment that must be carried out in accordance with the

Ionising Radiations Regulations, 1999. Forms basis of

Contingency Plans. See Local Rules.

Source of ionising

Radioactive substance or device emitting or capable of

radiation

emitting ionising radiation

Sealed Source

Radiation source containing a radioactive material and

constructed to certain standards to prevent loss of that

material.

Unsealed Radioactive

Radioactive material not in the form of a sealed source, e.g.

Materials

gas, liquids or solid powder.

Waste Management

The control of radioactive waste from creation to disposal.

Written System of Work

A written method of work that permits non-classified workers

who to enter a controlled area.

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Title: RManagement of

Doc No: UNIF-HSE-PRO-205-C1

Formatted

Radioactive Materials and

Rev No: 01

Page 30 of 38

Radiation Generators adioactive

Sources Management Procedure

Dated: SeptemberOctober, 2004

Originating Dept: HSE

Appendix B

Written System of Work

This written system of work applies to all non-classified workers who are

required to enter controlled areas.

Before work begins in a controlled area, each individual worker must be given

a copy of the written system of work form attached below. The RPS is

responsible for ensuring the details of the form are completed.

No non-classified person may enter a controlled area where the external dose

rate is more than 30 microsieverts per hour without reference to the radiation

protection adviser.

No non-classified person may work in controlled areas for more than 200

hours in any calendar year.

No person will remain in a controlled area for longer than is necessary.

No person will enter a controlled area unless a Permit to Work has been

issued. This Permit to Work shall include the following details:

 A description of the work to be done

 The precautions to be used to minimise the effects of any hazard

 A copy of the relevant local rule

 The period of time for which the permit is valid.

The Permit to Work will be signed by the Area Authority and countersigned by

the RPS.

The following conditions will apply when the controlled area has been

established because of the presence of uncontained radioactive material:

 All persons entering the controlled area will use the appropriate personal

protective equipment.

 Washing, changing and monitoring facilities will be provided as close as

reasonably practicable to the exit from the controlled area.

 Eating, drinking, smoking and chewing gum are prohibited in the

controlled area.

 Minor cuts, grazes etc. must be covered with a suitable waterproof

dressing before entry to the controlled area. Any cuts received in the

controlled area must be reported to the RPS and appropriate first aid

treatment obtained.

 All reasonably practicable steps will be taken to eliminate the production

of airborne radioactive material and to control surface contamination to

prevent the spread of contamination outside the controlled area.

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Formatted

Radioactive Materials and

Rev No: 01

Page 32 of 38

Radiation Generators adioactive

Sources Management Procedure

Dated: SeptemberOctober, 2004

Originating Dept: HSE

Written System of Work

Name of Worker_______________________________________

Radiation dose for year to date _____________ mSv

(confirmed by RPS)

Time spent in controlled areas this year____________ hours (confirmed by RPS)

Description of Work Area:

____________________________________________

Brief Description of Work:

____________________________________________

___________________________________________

Permit to Work Reference

____________________________________________

This area has been designated as a Controlled Area. The radiation protection

supervisor for this area is _______________________________.

The maximum radiation dose rate in this area is _________________ microsieverts

per hour.

The average level of surface contamination in this area is _________________

Becquerels per cm².

While in this area you must use the protective equipment selected by the radiation

protection supervisor. You will be instructed in the use of any equipment with which

you are not familiar. You must not eat, drink or smoke in the controlled area. Any cuts

must be covered.

Any contaminated clothing must be left inside the controlled area. You will be

monitored for contamination when you leave the controlled area. You should then go

to the locker room and wash before eating. The radiation protection supervisor must

monitor any tools or equipment before being removed from the controlled area.

Contaminated equipment must be suitably bagged or wrapped and labelled before

being removed from the controlled area.

The log sheet on the other side of this form will be kept to record each time you enter

and leave the controlled area. You must make sure this is completed every time you

enter and leave the area.

Issued by __________________________________ (RPS)

Date __________

I understand and will comply with the conditions contained in this written system of

work:

Signed __________________________

_________________

Date

__________________________

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Title: RManagement of

Doc No: UNIF-HSE-PRO-205-C1

Formatted

Radioactive Materials and

Rev No: 01

Page 33 of 38

Radiation Generators adioactive

Sources Management Procedure

Dated: SeptemberOctober, 2004

Originating Dept: HSE

Record of Entries into Controlled Areas

Date

Time of Entry

Time of Exit

Time Spent in

Free of

Initialled

Controlled

Contamination

by RPS

Area ⁽¹⁾

(3)

Yes/No ⁽²⁾

Total Time in

Area (hours)

⁽¹⁾ Rounded up to nearest half hour.

⁽²⁾ All contamination MUST be removed before worker can leave the area.

⁽³⁾ RPS or appointed deputy.

On completion of the work one copy of this form is sent to the worker’s

employer and one is retained on the installation for two years.

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Title: RManagement of

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Radioactive Materials and

Rev No: 01

Page 34 of 38

Radiation Generators adioactive

Sources Management Procedure

Dated: SeptemberOctober, 2004

Originating Dept: HSE

Appendix C

Contractors Checklist

Details of contractor using radioactive material

Contractor’s Name and Address

Contract Company’s RPA:

Contract Company’s RPS on site

Nature of work:

Has hazard assessment been seen and accepted?

Yes No  N/A 

Valid Registration Seen

Yes No  N/A 

Valid Authorisation Seen

Yes No  N/A 

Local Rules Seen and Acceptable

Yes No  N/A 

Notification Given to HSE

Yes No  N/A 

Are Workers classified?

Yes No 

Is Personal Dosimeter Available?

Yes No 

Is Functioning Dose rate Meter Available?

Yes No  N/A 

Test certificate seen?

Yes No 

Is Functioning Contamination Meter Available?

Yes No  N/A 

Test certificate seen?

Yes No 

Is Neutron Monitor Available?

Yes No  N/A 

Test certificate seen?

Yes No 

Source Movement Notification Details

Container/Packing Adequate?

Yes No 

Are Source Leakage Tests Available?

Yes No N/A 

Intended Source Storage Location on site

Responsible Person when Contractor

not on site

Details of Emergency Equipment/

Warning Notices

Special Precautions

........................................................…

Comments:

Signed

Facilities RPS…

Contractor

......................................………

…….. Print

………

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Title: Management of Radioactive

Doc No: UNIF-HSE-PRO-205-C1

Formatted

Materials and Radiation

Rev No: 01

Page 36 of 38

Generators Radioactive Sources

Management Procedure

Dated: SOctoeptember, 2004

Originating Dept: HSE

Appendix D

Sealed Radioactive Source Management & Accountancy Register

Local I.D. No.

(if applicable)

Distinguishing

Nature of

Radioactive

Date

Date of

Element

Strength

Measured

Receipt

Mark No

Address of Normal Location of Source

Initial Date Source Accounted For.

Year:

Location

Date

JAN

FEB

MAR

APR

MAY

JUN

JUL

AUG

SEP

OCT

NOV

DEC

Date

Dept/Area

Site

Used for

Source Movements/Inspection Comments

Date and

New Location of Source

Mover.

Time

(Inspector:

Signature)

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Radioactive Materials and

Rev No: 01

Page 37 of 38

Radiation Generators adioactive

Sources Management Procedure

Dated: SOctobereptember, 2004

Originating Dept: HSE

Appendix E

References



The Ionising Radiations Regulations 1999 SI 1999/3232 Stationery Office

1999.



Work with Ionising Radiation. Ionising Radiations Regulations

1999.

Approved Code of Practice and Guidance HSE Books (L121) 2000.



Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 HMSO 1974.



”Council Directive 96/29 Euratom of 13 May 1996 laying down basic safety

standards for the protection of health of workers and the general public

against the dangers arising from ionising radiation” Official Journal of the

European Communities 1996 39(L159) 1-114.



“Council Directive 97/43 Euratom of 30 June 1997 on health protection of

individuals against the dangers of ionising radiation in relation to medical

exposure” Official Journal of the European Communities 1997 40 (L180).



Radioactive Substances Act 1993 HMSO 1993.



Radiation doses - assessment and recording IRIS (rev) HSE Books 2000.



Radiation protection - sealed radioactive sources - leakage test methods ISO

9978: 1992.



Atomic Energy and Radioactive Substances: Radioactive Material

(Road

Transport) (Great Britain) Regulations 1996 HMSO 1996.



Packaging, Labelling and Carriage of Radioactive Material by Rail

Regulations 1996 SI 1996/2090 HMSO 1996.



Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations

1995 SI 1995/3163 HMSO 1995.

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Title: RManagement of

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Radioactive Materials and

Rev No: 01

Page 38 of 38

Radiation Generators adioactive

Sources Management Procedure

Dated: SOctobereptember, 2004

Originating Dept: HSE

Appendix F

Correlation

Between SI system of units and Off-system Units of Activity and

Radiation Field Features

Value and its

Name and symbol of units

Relation between the units

symbol

SI unit

Off-system unit

Activity (А)

Becquerel (Bq)

Curie (Ci)

1 Ci = 3.700 *10¹⁰ Bq;

equals to one

1 Bq = 1 dec../s;

disintegration per

1 Bq = 1 dec../s = 2.703 * 10^-11

second (dec../s)

Absorbed Doze

Gray (Gy) equals to

Rad (rad)

1 rad = 100 erg/g = 1*10^-2 J/kg

(D)

one joule per

kilogram (J/kg)

= 1*10^-2 Gy;

1 Gy = 1 J/kg;

1 Gy = 1 J/kg = 10⁴ egr/g = 100

rad.

Equivalent Doze

Sievert (Sv) equals to

Rem (Rem)

1 Rem = 1 rad/Q = 1*10^-2 J/kg /

(H)

one gray per Quality

Q =

coefficient

= 1* 10^-2 Gy/Q = 1*10^-2 Sv;

[1 Gy/Q = 1 (J/kg)/Q]

1 Sv = 1 Gy/Q = 1 J/kg/Q =

100 rad/Q=

= 100 Rem.

Equivalent Doze

Sievert per second

Rem per

1 Rem/s = 1 *10^-2 Sv/s;

rating(Н)

(Sv/s)

second (Rem/s)

1 Sv/s = 100 Rem/s

Exposure Doze

Coulomb per

Roentgen (R)

1 R = 2.58*10^-4C/kg (exact);

(Х)

kilogram (C/kg)

1 C/kg = 3.88 10³ R

(approximately)

Kerma (К)

Gray (Gy) equals to

Rad (rad)

1 rad = 100 erg/g = 1*10^-2 J/kg

one joule per

kilogram (J/kg)

= 1*10^-2 Gy;

1 Gy = 1 J/kg;

1 Gy = 1 J/kg = 10⁴ egr/g = 100

rad.

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Title: Leak Testing Procedure

Doc No: UNIF-HSE-PRO-241-C1

Rev No: C1

Page 2 of 18

Dated: September, 2004

Originating Dept: HSE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1

PURPOSE

1.2

DEVIATIONS

1.3

SCOPE

1.4

DOCUMENT REVIEW

1.5

SSOW SPECIFIC CROSS REFERENCES

1.6

LANGUAGE FACILITATION

2 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1

OFFSHORE INSTALLATION MANAGER / SITE MANAGER / SITE CONTROLLER

2.2

AREA AUTHORITY

2.3

PERFORMING AUTHORITY

3 COMPETENCY, TRAINING AND AWARENESS

3.1

COMPETENCY

3.2

UNDERSTANDING

3.3

AW ARENESS

3.4

NEW INDIVIDUALS

4 SELECTION OF TEST TYPE

4.1

GENERAL

4.2

HYDRAULIC

4.3

NITROGEN

4.4

LIQUID FILL AND NITROGEN SQUEEZE

4.5

NITROGEN - HELIUM

4.6

SERVICE

5 LEAK TESTING GUIDELINES

5.1

COMMUNICATION

5.2

TEST AREA ACCESS

5.3

TEST EQUIPMENT

5.4

TEST BOUNDARY

5.5

ISOLATIONS

5.6

VENTS AND SAFETY VALVES

5.7

APPLYING THE TEST

5.8

MONITORING AND INSPECTION

5.9

DEPRESSURISING AND RETURN TO SERVICE

5.10 SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS IN NITROGEN LEAK TESTING

6 RECORDS (CERTIFICATION)

7 REGISTERS

8 CONTRACTORS

9 AUDIT AND REVIEW

APPENDIX A - LIST OF DEFINITIONS

APPENDIX B - PRESSURE TESTING CHECKLIST

APPENDIX C - GUIDANCE NOTES

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Title: Leak Testing Procedure

Doc No: UNIF-HSE-PRO-241-C1

Rev No: C1

Page 3 of 18

Dated: September, 2004

Originating Dept: HSE

INTRODUCTION

1.1

PURPOSE

The purpose of this document is to provide:

 Guidelines for assessing the risks and establishing the precautions to be taken

when carrying out leak testing.

 Information that may be used as the basis for producing formal instructions for

specific pressure and leak testing activities.

Prior to re-instatement of plant or equipment, any leak testing operations shall

be conducted in accordance with this procedure.

A leak test (hydraulic where practicable) is performed to prove the pressure tightness (i.e.

fitness for service) of joints, seals and glands etc. Whenever the integrity of containment

systems is broken, either at hook-up/commissioning or post-operations phase. The

prevention of even minor leaks is vitally important where flammable or toxic fluids are

concerned.

Leak testing is performed at the Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP)

Leak pressure test may vary according to the test medium being used but shall never

exceed 100% of the MOP. Gross (preliminary) air leak tests, using instrument air up to a

maximum of 8barg, are often used at an early stage of hook-up/commissioning as a

means of identifying large leaks, prior to performing the standard pressure tests.

1.2

DEVIATIONS

The procedures are written in sufficient detail that they should be able to be applied

consistently at all sites. There may still be the requirement for some local rules covering

site-specific logistical/administrative arrangements and local variations in responsibilities to

reflect differences in organisational arrangements. These local rules should not deviate

from the core processes within this document. Any form of deviation from this procedure,

including but not limited to local rules, shall be requested and authorised in accordance

with the SSOW Deviations from Regulations and Procedures procedure (Doc. No. UNIF-

HSE-PRO-101)

1.3

SCOPE

This applies to all leak testing operations carried out on BP owned and managed sites and

installations in AZBU.

1.4

DOCUMENT REVIEW

This document will be reviewed on an annual basis when users from the sites will have an

opportunity to propose changes to the existing processes and procedures. The document

Technical Authority will be responsible for coordinating this review.

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Title: Leak Testing Procedure

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Page 4 of 18

Dated: September, 2004

Originating Dept: HSE

1.5

SSOW SPECIFIC CROSS REFERENCES

This SSOW procedure shall, where appropriate, be used in conjunction with this suite of

BP AzBU SSOW Procedures referenced below.

Document Number

Title of Procedure

UNIF - HSE- PRO - 101

Deviations from Regulations and Procedures

UNIF - HSE- PRO - 102

Incident Investigation and Reporting

UNIF - HSE- PRO - 103

Permit To Work

UNIF - HSE- PRO - 104

Authorisation

UNIF - HSE- PRO - 105

Task Risk Assessment

UNIF - HSE- PRO - 106

Energy Isolations-Electrical

UNIF - HSE- PRO - 107

Energy Isolations-Process

UNIF - HSE- PRO - 108

Confined Space Entry

UNIF - HSE- PRO - 241

Leak Testing

1.6

LANGUAGE FACILITATION

Due to the various languages spoken at site, there is a necessity to assist all with “an ease

of understanding”. Therefore, the development and use of information tools are available.

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Dated: September, 2004

Originating Dept: HSE

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1

OFFSHORE INSTALLATION MANAGER / SITE MANAGER / SITE CONTROLLER

The Offshore Installation Manager/ Site Manager/ Site Controller is responsible for

ensuring that:

 All leak testing activities on their site are carried out in accordance with this

procedure

 Formal records of all leak tests are maintained in accordance with this procedure

2.2

AREA AUTHORITY

The Area Authority shall:

 Fulfil the responsibilities of Area Authority as described in UNIF-HSE-PRO-103

 Ensure that leak testing operations comply with the guidelines within this document

and/or ensure that any deviations from those guidelines are documented and

authorised.

2.3

PERFORMING AUTHORITY

The Performing Authority shall:

 Have such practical experience and theoretical knowledge of the equipment to be

tested so that he will be able to detect defects or weaknesses highlighted by the test

and assess their importance to the integrity and function of the equipment. The

Performing Authority must be qualified and trained to a standard sufficient to meet

any applicable regulations.

 Fulfil the responsibilities of Performing Authority as described in UNIF-HSE-PRO-103

 Ensure that leak testing operations comply with the guidelines within this document

and/or ensure that any inability to comply with the conditions of the Permit result in a

re-assessment of the task.

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Originating Dept: HSE

COMPETENCY, TRAINING AND AWARENESS

3.1

COMPETENCY

BP‟s employees and those of its Contractors must provide adequate training for all

personnel likely to be involved in Leak Testing to ensure that they possess the correct

levels of competency.

All individuals shall be able to and be prepared to demonstrate their levels of competency

to the Performing Authority, Supervisor and / or Leak Test Supervisor

This shall be demonstrated through individuals understanding, knowledge and the skills

necessary to safely perform their assigned duties together with certifiable evidence of their

competency.

3.2

UNDERSTANDING

All individuals shall be fully conversant with the:

 Scope of work and the potential hazards associated within their scope of work to

ensure that they understand the hazards of the task in hand and all associated

controls

 Safe systems of work (SSOW) elements associated with their scope of work,

including but not limited to: PTW, Energy Isolations., purging and / or ventilation

procedures,

 Relevant scope of work task risk assessments

 Should be trained to at least AGT2.

3.3

AWARENESS

All individuals shall be fully aware of:

 What they need to do in the event of an emergency on site

 What they need to do in the event of an incident related to their scope of work

 How to use the relevant communications equipment

 Self rescue

 How to use continuous gas monitoring equipment

 All aspects of the proposed Leak Test activities with focus on their particular duties

3.4

NEW INDIVIDUALS

New individuals shall not be assigned to the above tasks, unless under training and

accompanied by a competent person (maximum 2 new starts to 1 supervisor) who is

familiar with the hazards of Leak testing.

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SELECTION OF TEST TYPE

4.1

GENERAL

A liquid medium (hydraulic) is the preferred means of testing and should be used for leak

testing wherever possible, in order to minimise the stored energy.

The preferred liquid medium is water. However, the effect of the water, and any additives,

on the metallurgy of the pressure envelope, and the effect of any residual water/additives

on the process (eg formation of hydrates), shall be considered (eg when testing austenitic

stainless steels, the water should be distilled or demineralised and contain <30ppm of

chloride ions).

Selection of liquids other than water should take account of:

 The possibility of explosion resulting from the „diesel‟ effect

 The boiling point relative to the test temperature

The flammability of the liquid, the flash point of which should not be less than 65°C, and at

least 10°C above the maximum test temperature.

For Safety Considerations in Nitrogen Leak Testing see section 5.10.

4.2

HYDRAULIC



Weight must be considered, particularly in context of equipment support e.g. pipe

hangers, foundations



Care must be taken with draining the test fluid on completion - in some cases the

equipment may require flushing and/or drying.



Some test fluids, typically water, may be incompatible with equipment materials



Generally considered to be a “safe” test medium due to low levels of stored energy



Internal leakage, e.g. through valves at the boundary, may require continuous

pressuring of the equipment. In severe cases this can prevent a successful test



Detection of leakage is typically by observation of fluids leaking to atmosphere at

joints/connections under test. In cases where joints/connections are not visible then

pressure drop off can be used as an indicator.

4.3

NITROGEN



Relatively high levels of stored energy



Large volumes may require supply of bulk nitrogen



Considerable time may be needed to pressurize and/or vent



Vent location(s) must be carefully selected so as to avoid any risk of asphyxiation to

personnel



Detection of leakage is typically by means of bubble test at joints/connections.

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4.4

LIQUID FILL AND NITROGEN SQUEEZE

 Combination of both sets of attributes mentioned in sub sections 4.2 and 4.3.

4.5

NITROGEN - HELIUM

 Addition of a small proportion of helium (known as a tracer) enhances the searching

qualities of nitrogen

 Typically supplied in bulk by a specialist contractor. Usually used for large-volume

tests e.g. post shutdown

 Detection - Requires specialist detection equipment - can give a quantitative output

4.6

SERVICE

 Uses the service fluid under service conditions

 Typically restricted to non-hazardous and low pressure fluids

 Assurance must be available that the test does not introduce an unacceptable hazard

into unproven system

 Test at normal operating pressure NOT the MAWP + 10%

 Detection will depend on the nature of the service fluid

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LEAK TESTING GUIDELINES

5.1

COMMUNICATION

 Effective communication must be established between sites whenever the test

envelope extends beyond one site, for example, pipelines.

5.2

TEST AREA ACCESS

Access to the test area shall be limited to essential personnel only. In particular, before the

test commences compliance is required with the following points:



The area shall be cordoned off (using tape, shields or barriers, etc) at an adequate

distance from the equipment to be tested,



Warning signs shall be posted at access ways, at other strategic positions, and on

the equipment to be tested

(including the doors of test workshops or other

designated areas.



Wherever possible, warnings of an imminent pressure test shall be broadcast.



When testing, the test area boundaries shall be patrolled to ensure that no

unauthorised personnel enter the area.

5.3

TEST EQUIPMENT



Pressuring equipment shall be provided with suitably calibrated pressure control /

regulator devices.



Suitably calibrated pressure indicating device(s) shall be provided in a location

clearly visible to the person controlling the pressure. Account should be taken of

pressure variation caused by elevation changes inside the envelope.



Pressuring equipment and plant/equipment shall not be left unattended at any time

during the test.



Pressuring equipment shall be isolated from the equipment under test and where

practicable disconnected, when the test pressure has been reached. The

pressurising valve should be locked in the closed position.



All hoses are fully secured with tie-down devices capable of withstanding the forces

used in the test

5.4

TEST BOUNDARY



A Competent Person shall inspect the equipment to be tested, prior to testing, to

ensure the equipment is free from any obvious flaws



Within the test boundary, there should be an accessible and operable means of

quickly and safely de-pressuring the test in the event of equipment failure etc.



Prior to any hydraulic pressure test taking place it must be established that the

foundation and supports of the equipment under test are rated and capable of

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Originating Dept: HSE

withstanding the combined weight of the equipment and the liquid required to fill it.



The volume of equipment under test must be kept as small as possible so to

minimise the stored energy within the pressurised system.



Hazard and risk identification shall, as a minimum, consider:

o the stability of components such as expansion joints and spring hangers

o any interfaces with lower pressure systems or equipment

(including heat

exchangers, gauges, instruments etc) and must ensure measures are in place to

ensure that such systems cannot be over-pressurised

o any connected high pressure equipment such as pulsation dampers and

accumulators.

5.5

ISOLATIONS



Blanking devices such as spades, blinds and screwed plugs, etc. shall conform to

the equipment specification. For plugs up to 1-1/2” NB, at least 7 to 8 threads must

be engaged.



Where testing is carried out against closed valves it must be assumed that the

valves leak, and downstream equipment must be protected against subsequent

over pressuring. This should be done by opening of suitable vents or by monitoring

of downstream pressures

5.6

VENTS AND SAFETY VALVES



Where the source pressure of the pressurising medium is greater than the test

pressure, a safety valve should be fitted to the equipment/system being tested, set

to relieve at a pressure that will prevent over pressurisation.



Sufficient venting / draining points shall be provided in order to prevent trapping of

pressurising medium behind non-return valves, check valves, between isolation

valves, or within dead legs of the pressure envelope.



When filling equipment/plant, adequate venting must take place at all high points or

dead ends to release entrapped gas.

5.7

APPLYING THE TEST



Pressure must be increased gradually to the final pressure, and sufficient time

should be allowed for equipment and test medium to reach equilibrium. The

pressure should be maintained sufficiently long for an inspection engineer to

examine the entire system, and for any defects to have time to manifest

themselves.



Equipment must not be subjected to any form of shock loading during testing.



When any equipment/plant is left under pressure for decay or leak observation,

consideration must be given to the ambient temperature changes, particularly in

respect to thermal expansion of liquids in a closed system.

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5.8

MONITORING AND INSPECTION



Pressure monitoring shall extend to any adjacent systems that are not positively

isolated.



Close examination of equipment at above maximum allowable working pressure

shall not take place until the pressure has been held for 30 minutes. In any event,

extreme care should be exercised until the pressure has been reduced to maximum

allowable working pressure.



If an inspection is required within the hold period, then pressure should be reduced

to 80% of the test figure.

5.9

DEPRESSURISING AND RETURN TO SERVICE



Extreme care shall be taken to ensure that all pressure has been relieved before

opening any system that has been subject to pressure or leak test.



On completion of the test, the pressure shall be reduced gradually and under

controlled conditions until approximately atmospheric pressure is reached. More

rapid draining of the test fluid can then take place.



When draining equipment, adequate vents at the highest point must be opened to

prevent drawing a vacuum. The drainage system must be capable of handling the

flow from the pressurized equipment/plant without itself over pressuring.



Consideration must be given to the possibility of test fluids being trapped behind

non-return valves; it may often be necessary to vent or drain the test fluid from

more than one point.



Special consideration should be given to test fluid which may be contaminated with

oil or contain corrosion inhibitor or other chemical. The method of disposal of test

fluid must be included in Work Permit.



Clamps or bolts on flanges shall not be loosened while the system is still under

pressure. Clamps shall only be removed by competent personnel who have been

trained in such procedures.



Depending upon the test medium used, the return of equipment/plant back into

service may produce additional hazards. In particular:

o Residual water after draining may contaminate the product, or cause problems if the

equipment is on high or low temperature service.

o Systems containing air need to be inert prior to the introduction of process gas.

o Inert gas must be vented to an area where personnel cannot be affected by it.



Consideration must be given to the flushing and preserving of systems that are not

being taken back into re-use immediately.

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5.10 SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS IN NITROGEN LEAK TESTING

Nitrogen can asphyxiate, therefore great care should be taken to avoid gross leakage of

nitrogen or nitrogen/helium. Particular care should be taken when opening up vessels that

have been nitrogen purged or when the venting of nitrogen is taking place.

Pressure shall be introduced gradually into the system allowing adequate time for

temperature equalisation; in this respect special attention is drawn to the cooling Joule-

Thompson effect which occurs when letting down high-pressure nitrogen into the system

to be tested. Nitrogen leak testing is performed with gases at high pressure. Therefore

attention is drawn to the hazards of a possible release, with explosive force, of energy

stored in the system. Systems under test shall be depressurised prior to bolt re-tightening,

tensioning or other remedial action to improve leaks, the only exceptions to this being

valve glands, which may be adjusted but not re-packed whilst the system is still

pressurised.

The possibility of brittle fracture shall be considered when conducting a nitrogen leak test

at metal temperatures near the ductile/brittle transition temperature of the steel. It is

recommended that nitrogen leak testing should not be carried out when the ambient

temperature is below 2°C on equipment and piping constructed from non-impact tested

carbon steel materials with nominal thickness of >3/4in (19mm), (ie API 5L, A 106, A 105,

A 216, etc). For non-impact tested carbon steel materials with nominal thickness >3/4in, a

Competent Person shall specify the minimum metal temperatures for leak testing, based

on requirements of either RP 42-1 or BS 5500. Sites are advised to identify any systems

containing non-impact tested carbon steel and prepare the appropriate local test

procedures.

Introducing nitrogen to a system introduces a large energy source, far greater than the

energy stored in an equivalent liquid leak test. To minimise this stored energy, vessels

which normally operate with a liquid level should be water filled (ensure water filling of the

vessel is acceptable with respect to corrosion and scaling) prior to pressurising with

nitrogen.

When a specialist contractor is contracted to carry out nitrogen leak testing rather than

leak testing with nitrogen quads or low volume pumps the following additional measures

apply:

•

There will be a Pump Operator who will be in radio contact with the Leak Test

Supervisor who will monitor system pressure. The pumping unit will be manually shut

down on the instruction of the Leak Test Supervisor. The leak test crew should have a

written procedure for radio protocol

•

There will be an automatic pump trip (Overpressure Protection Device (OPPD)) that will

shut down the pumping unit. The OPPD will be located close to the injection point so

that it can monitor the highest pressure that will be seen in the Installation system

•

Full flow pressure relief will be available via Pressure Safety Valves

(PSVs). It is

acceptable and appropriate for the PSVs on the Installation system/plant to be used for

this purpose. However, if full flow pressure relief is not available via a plant system,

then consideration should be given to the use of temporary PSVs supplied by the leak

test contractor. If full flow pressure relief is not provided, then a Level

2 Risk

Assessment should be completed and assurance gained that there is sufficient control

in place to manage the HP/LP interface

•

If it has been identified that the leak test contractor will have to supply PSVs,

consideration should be given to the location that these PSVs would vent to in an

emergency. The vent location should be surveyed and approved by the Installation

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Originating Dept: HSE

Area Authority with guidance from the leak test contractor on expected nitrogen plume.

RECORDS (CERTIFICATION)

All pressure / leak test results shall be formally certificated and recorded where necessary

and all certificates included with the relevant equipment records.

REGISTERS

A register will be held on site of all personnel deemed competent for all the roles

associated with Leak testing, and will be managed by the Site Manager / Site Controller /

Offshore Installation Manager.

CONTRACTORS

In cases where leak testing is contracted to a specialist third party, the contract shall, as a

minimum, specify the need to observe the requirements of this procedure and in addition

the:

 Roles and responsibilities of the relevant BP and contractor personnel

 Authority for approval of procedures

 Required competency of the contractor personnel and the means of controlling

compliance

 Keeping of test records

 Means of monitoring the contractor‟s safety management system.

AUDIT AND REVIEW

Business Units shall periodically review pressure and leak testing activities to verify

general compliance with this procedure and with any local procedures. Such reviews shall

include checks to verify compliance with any statutory requirements for periodic strength

tests of equipment to demonstrate its continued fitness for service.

Independent audit of pressure / leak testing procedures and records shall be undertaken

periodically at the request of the Site Manager.

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APPENDIX A - LIST OF DEFINITIONS

Blank / Blanking:

Installation of a piping specification rated device such as a blind

flange, spade or spectacle blind for the purpose of achieving

positive isolation.

Boundary

Isolations that define the boundaries of a discrete pressure

isolations:

envelope.

Competent

a person having such practical experience and theoretical

Person:

knowledge of the equipment to be pressure tested so that he

will be able to detect defects or weaknesses highlighted by the

pressure test and assess their importance to the strength and

function of the equipment.

Competent Persons must be qualified and trained to a standard

sufficient to meet any applicable regulations.

Leak test:

Application of pressure to a system in which the integrity of

individual components has already been proven by a pressure

test so as to identify leakage and leakage rates from

component connections, valves etc.

Local

Site specific or Business Unit specific procedures that address

procedures:

the arrangements in place for the implementation of

recommended and statutory practices.

Maximum

The maximum pressure expected during normal systems

Operating

operation.

Pressure (MOP)

Pressure test:

A test involving the application of pressure to a system so as to

apply a load greater than the maximum load generated in

service but less than would cause physical damage. The test

provides evidence that the system can safely withstand the

service pressure.

The term “Strength Test” may correctly be used instead.

Service leak

A leak test undertaken when a system is brought into normal

test:

service, where failure would not itself result in any undue

hazard, e.g. sea water systems.

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APPENDIX B - PRESSURE TESTING CHECKLIST

Note: This checklist in this appendix is provided as an aide memoir only, and is not intended for use

as an approved test certificate or an official document:

Pressure Testing Checklist

1.TYPE OF TEST:

STANDARD PRESSURE TEST:

LEAK PRESSURE TEST:

2.TESTING MEDIUM:

HYDRAULIC:

PNEUMATIC:

3.EQUIPMENT TO BE TESTED:

Maximum Allowable W orking Pressure (strength test)

Proposed Test Pressure:

Maximum Operating Pressure (leak test)

Incremental steps (%):

Duration each step:

Duration of Test Pressure:

Written procedure

YES

provided:

All threaded connectors, plugs, and caps secure and tight:

YES

All attachments unable to withstand Test pressure removed or isolated:

YES

Quality:

Temperature:

4. TEST ENVELOPE INSPECTION:

Visual

YES

MPI:

YES

Radiography:

YES

Other (specify):

YES

5. EQUIPMENT ISOLATED AT:

and at:

6. PRE-TEST PREPARATIONS:

Equipment vented for filling at:

and at:

Check facilities for venting trapped pressure from NRVs or between isolation valves

YES

Vents now SHUT

YES

Safety valves set to prevent test pressure being exceeded

YES

Calibrated test pressure gauge(s) fitted and visible to operator

YES

Any pipe support / expansion joints fitted with temporary restraints

YES

Pressuring equipment fitted with regulator and relief valve and is in sound condition

YES

Methods for upstream and downstream monitoring are in place

YES

W arning signs posted, barriers erected, and sentries in place

YES

PA announcement of proposed test has been organised / made

YES

7. ON COMPLETION OF TEST:

Vents are open for slow depressurisation at:

and at:

Drains are open for draining of test medium at:

and at:

8. EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN RETURNED TO PRE-TEST EXCEPT FOR:

and:

YES

9. CHECKLIST COMPLETED BY:

Name:

Signature:

Title:

Date:

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COMPETENT PERSON

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Originating Dept: HSE

An overview of the leak testing process is shown within the main Energy Isolations-

Process flowchart in Appendix C. A checklist to be used when planning leak tests is

provided in Figure 1 below as a guide.

TEST PLAN / PROGRAMME

 Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP) or Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) defined

 Test pressure defined

 Marked up P&ID‟s produced showing test boundaries

 Written test procedure developed

 Test medium selected (hydraulic considered rather than pneumatic)

 If pneumatic test planned, consider reducing the volume by water filling vessels

 Emergency depressurisation route identified

 Pressurisation / depressurisation procedures take account of the position of non-return valves

 Pressurisation procedure specifies hold points (25%, 50%, 75% of the test pressure)

PRE-TEST PREPARATION AND EQUIPMENT CHECKS

 All threaded connections, plugs and caps are secure

 All attachments unable to withstand test pressure are removed/ isolated

 Facilities have been checked for means of venting trapped pressure

 Safety valve set to prevent test pressure being exceeded

 Calibrated test pressure gauge(s) fitted and visible to operator

 Any pipe supports/expansion joints fitted with restraints

 Pressure equipment is fitted with regulator and relief valve and is in sound condition

 Methods of upstream and downstream monitoring are in place

 Warning signs and barriers erected

 PA announcement of proposed test has been organised

 Contingencies for leakage have been made

 Overpressure protection device in place for specialist contractor nitrogen testing

 Pumping unit connected to Isolation ESD system

POST-TEST CHECKS

 Vents to be opened at high points during liquid depressurisation

 Pressure to be released gradually

 Inert gases vented to flare or alternatively to a safe area

 Confirm that there is no trapped pressure within test envelope

Figure 1 Leak Testing Checklist

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APPENDIX C - GUIDANCE NOTES

LEAK TESTING ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

This section defines the allowable leak rates for different test medium and equipment type

and duty.

Acceptance Criteria for Hydraulic Testing

For hydraulic testing using water the test should be conducted for a minimum of

30 minutes. A test should be deemed successful if no significant reduction in pressure is

observed over the test period and all joints and connections have been visually inspected

for leakage. In some cases it may not be possible to maintain a constant test pressure due

to trapped air in the system or passing valves. In this case the visual inspection is vital in

confirming an acceptable test.

Acceptance Criteria for Nitrogen Testing

For nitrogen testing, depending on the scope of the test, there are two primary means of

confirming an acceptable test. These are:

 Bubble testing

 Leak rate measurement using a helium tracer

Helium tracer testing is normally used for large scale testing of plant or the installation of

new equipment involving a specialist contractor. Bubble testing is normally applicable

when carrying out smaller scale testing using nitrogen quads.

Bubble Testing Criteria for Hydrocarbons

Bubble Testing Method

Acceptance Criteria

Method 1 involves the application of a soap solution

No presence of continuous bubble growth

to the joint and monitoring for surface bubbles.

detected in 60 seconds for flanges up to

and including 4in NB and 90 seconds for

flanges above 4in NB.

Method 2 involves taping the joint and inserting a

5 bubbles/min.

1/4in diameter tube from the flange into a water

bucket and monitoring the number of bubbles

released.

Note:

5 bubbles/min approximates to 15scf/year from a 1/4in tube.

The controlled version of this document can be found at: http://baku.bpweb.bp.com/dep/hse/safe/

Next Revision Date: 30/09/2005

Print Date: 24/07/2010

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING

Title: Leak Testing Procedure

Doc No: UNIF-HSE-PRO-241-C1

Rev No: C1

Page 18 of 18

Dated: September, 2004

Originating Dept: HSE

Helium Tracer Testing

Leak rate measurement in the case of helium tracer testing involves taping of individual

flanges and measurement of leakage using a measurement probe. The following leakage

criteria apply:

Leakage Rates (scf/yr)

Helium Tracer Testing Method

Acceptance Criteria (scf/year)

Target

Maximum

Closed Module

Open Module

Oil

100

200

400

Gas <50barg

100

200

Gas >50barg

100

Acceptance of leak rates in the range between target and maximum allowable leakage is

by exception only and review by the appropriate Technical Authority. The review shall take

into account fluid type, location of joint and ventilation and subsequent monitoring

programme.

The controlled version of this document can be found at: http://baku.bpweb.bp.com/dep/hse/safe/

Next Revision Date: 30/09/2005

Print Date: 24/07/2010

PAPER COPIES ARE UNCONTROLLED. THIS COPY VALID ONLY AT THE TIME OF PRINTING

Foreword

Executive Director

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

The use of the Internet for terrorist purposes is a rapidly growing phenomenon, requiring

a proactive and coordinated response from Member States.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) plays a key role in providing

assistance to Member States, in furtherance of its mandate to strengthen the capacity

of national criminal justice systems to implement the provisions of the international

legal instruments against terrorism, and does so in compliance with the principles of

rule of law and international human rights standards. In particular, in 2011, the General

Assembly, in its resolution 66/178, reaffirmed the mandate of UNODC to continue to

develop specialized legal knowledge in the area of counter-terrorism and pertinent

thematic areas, including the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes.

Despite increasing international recognition of the threat posed by terrorists’ use of the

Internet in recent years, there is currently no universal instrument specifically address-

ing this pervasive facet of terrorist activity. Moreover, there is limited specialized training

available on the legal and practical aspects of the investigation and prosecution of ter-

rorism cases involving the use of the Internet. The present publication complements

the existing resources developed by UNODC in the areas of counter-terrorism, cyber-

crime and rule of law. It also addresses the importance of developing integrated,

specialized knowledge to respond to the technical assistance needs of Member States

in combating this continually evolving threat. UNODC is deeply grateful for the generous

support of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern

Ireland, which made the publication of that work possible.

The publication, which is intended for use both as a stand-alone resource and in sup-

port of the capacity-building initiatives of UNODC, is aimed at providing guidance

regarding current legal frameworks and practice at the national and international levels

relating to the criminalization, investigation and prosecution of terrorist cases involving

the Internet.

Terrorism, in all its manifestations, affects us all. The use of the Internet to further

terrorist purposes disregards national borders, amplifying the potential impact on victims.

By highlighting cases and best practices that respond to this unique challenge, the

present publication has two aims: first, to promote a better understanding of the ways

in which communications technologies may be misused in furtherance of acts of ter-

rorism and, second, to increase collaboration among Member States, so that effective

criminal justice responses to this transnational challenge can be developed.

Yury Fedotov

Executive Director

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Secretary-General’s

Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force

The Working Group on Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes of

the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force is aimed at coordinating the activities

of the United Nations system in support of the United Nations Global Counter-

Terrorism Strategy, adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 60/288, in which

Member States resolved to “coordinate efforts at the international and regional levels

to counter terrorism in all its forms and manifestations on the Internet” and “use the

Internet as a tool for countering the spread of terrorism, while recognizing that States

may require assistance in this regard”. The Working Group has identified three key

themes for discussion: legal issues, technical issues and ways in which the international

community might use the Internet more effectively to counter terrorism by exposing

the fallacy of the terrorist message that violence is a legitimate way to effect political

change.

The present study, produced by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and

conducted within the framework of the Working Group, owes much to the contribution

and support of Member States. It takes discussion of the legal challenges to the next

stage and adds significantly to the knowledge and expertise that the Working Group

has accumulated and shared with Member States in that area. In particular, it provides

important examples of Member State legislation dealing with terrorist use of the Internet

and demonstrates, through real examples of legal cases, the difficulties faced by Member

States in criminalizing and prosecuting such acts.

The Working Group is confident that the present report will help to identify the legisla-

tive areas in which the United Nations can assist in the implementation by Member

States of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in combating the use of the Internet

for terrorist purposes.

Richard Barrett

Coordinator of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team

Co-Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force Working Group on

Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes

Government of the United Kingdom

The United Kingdom has pioneered legislation to counter use of the Internet for ter-

rorist purposes over the past decade; we have had considerable success in tackling online

terrorist activity within the country’s borders, while doing our utmost to uphold free-

doms and benefits that the Internet has brought to our citizens.

However, we recognize that the threat is transnational by its very nature. Only by tak-

ing action together can the international community hope to tackle terrorist use of the

Internet effectively.

The British Government therefore welcomes the opportunity to support UNODC in

producing the publication that you are about to read. We hope that it will rapidly

become a useful tool for legislators, law enforcement officials and criminal justice

practitioners to develop and implement legal frameworks that will effectively disrupt

terrorists’ activities online. If so, it will make a valuable contribution to making our

communities—both real and virtual—safer places.

Simon Shercliff

Sue Hemming OBE

Head, Counter Terrorism (Ops)

Head of the Special Crime and Counter

Ðepartment Foreign and

Terrorism Division

Commonwealth Office

Crown Prosecution Service

vii

Contents

Page

Foreword.

Executive Director United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Secretary-General’s Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force

Government of the United Kingdom

vii

Background.

Use of the Internet for terrorist purposes .

A. Introduction

B. Means by which the Internet is utilized for terrorist purposes.

C. Uses of the Internet for countering terrorist activity

D. Rule-of-law considerations

II.

The international context .

A. Introduction

B. United Nations counter-terrorism resolutions

C. Universal counter-terrorism legal instruments

D. International human rights law

E. Regional and subregional counter-terrorism legal instruments .

F. Model legislation

III.

Policy and legislative frameworks.

A. Introduction

B. Policy

C. Legislation

IV.

Investigations and intelligence-gathering .

A. Tools in the commission of terrorist offences involving the Internet.

B. Investigations of terrorist cases involving the Internet

Page

C. Forensic data preservation and recovery

D. Supporting the authentication of digital evidence

E. Operational cybercrime units

F. Intelligence-gathering

G. Training

International cooperation .

A. Introduction

B. Instruments and arrangements relating to international cooperation.

C. National legislative frameworks

D. Non-legislative measures

E. Formal versus informal cooperation

F. Challenges and issues

VI.

Prosecutions .

101

A. Introduction

101

B. A rule-of-law approach to criminal prosecutions

101

C. Role of prosecutors in terrorism cases

102

D. The investigative phase

103

E. International cooperation

106

F. The charging phase

106

G. The trial phase: evidential issues

107

H. Other issues

120

VII.

Private sector cooperation.

123

A. The role of private sector stakeholders

123

B. Public-private partnerships

130

VIII.

Conclusion.

133

A. Use of the Internet for terrorist purposes

133

B. The international context

133

C. Policy and legislative frameworks

134

Background

Technology is one of the strategic factors driving the increasing use of the Internet by

terrorist organizations and their supporters for a wide range of purposes, including

recruitment, financing, propaganda, training, incitement to commit acts of terrorism,

and the gathering and dissemination of information for terrorist purposes. While the

many benefits of the Internet are self-evident, it may also be used to facilitate com-

munication within terrorist organizations and to transmit information on, as well as

material support for, planned acts of terrorism, all of which require specific technical

knowledge for the effective investigation of these offences.

It is a commonly accepted principle that, despite the heinous nature of their acts, alleged

terrorists should be afforded the same procedural safeguards under criminal law as any

other suspects. The defence of human rights is a core value of the United Nations and

a fundamental pillar of the rule-of-law approach to the fight against terrorism. The

present publication accordingly highlights the importance of respect for the principles

of human rights and fundamental freedoms at all times and, in particular, in the context

of the development and implementation of legal instruments related to countering

terrorism.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), as a key United Nations

entity for delivering counter-terrorism legal and related technical assistance, actively

participates in the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, thus ensuring that

the counter-terrorism work of UNODC is carried out in the broader context of, and

coordinated with, United Nations system-wide efforts. In January 2010, the Task Force’s

Working Group on Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes initiated

a series of conferences involving representatives from Governments, international and

regional organizations, think tanks, academia and the private sector to evaluate the use

of the Internet for terrorist purposes and potential means to counter such use. The

objective of the Working Group initiative was to provide Member States with an over-

view of the current nature of the challenge and to propose policy guidelines, projects

and practical guidance regarding legal, technical and counter-narrative aspects of the

challenge. Working Group conferences were held in Berlin in January 2010, Seattle

(United States of America) in February 2010 and Riyadh in January 2011.

In furtherance of its mandate “to develop specialized legal knowledge in the area of

counter-terrorism … and to provide assistance to requesting Member States with regard

to criminal justice responses to terrorism, including … the use of the Internet for ter-

rorist purposes,”¹ the Terrorism Prevention Branch of UNODC, in collaboration with

¹General Assembly resolution 66/178.

THE USE OF THE INTERNET FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES

the Organized Crime and Illicit Trafficking Branch of UNODC and with the support

of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

undertook to contribute to the Working Group project through the development of the

current technical assistance tool on the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. The

current UNODC publication builds upon the conclusions of the Working Group con-

ferences, and in particular the conference held in Berlin in January 2010, relating to

Internet-specific legal aspects of terrorism.

In connection with the development of the present publication, UNODC convened two

expert group meetings in Vienna, in October 2011 and February 2012, to provide a

forum for counter-terrorism practitioners, from a geographically diverse group of Mem-

ber States, to share their experiences relating to the use of the Internet for terrorist

purposes. Experts from a total of 25 Member States participated in these meetings,

including senior prosecutors, law enforcement officers and academics, as well as rep-

resentatives from several intergovernmental organizations. The present publication draws

heavily on the discussions and expertise shared during those meetings, and is intended

to provide practical guidance to Member States to facilitate the more effective investi-

gation and prosecution of terrorist cases involving the use of the Internet.

Use of the Internet for terrorist purposesI.

A. Introduction

1. Since the late 1980s, the Internet has proven to be a highly dynamic means of

communication, reaching an ever-growing audience worldwide. The development of

increasingly sophisticated technologies has created a network with a truly global reach,

and relatively low barriers to entry. Internet technology makes it easy for an individual

to communicate with relative anonymity, quickly and effectively across borders, to an

almost limitless audience. The benefits of Internet technology are numerous, starting

with its unique suitability for sharing information and ideas, which is recognized as a

fundamental human right.² It must also be recognized, however, that the same techno

logy that facilitates such communication can also be exploited for the purposes of

ŧerrorism. The use of the Internet for terrorist purposes creates both challenges and

opportunities in the fight against terrorism.

B. Means by which the Internet is utilized for terrorist purposes

2. For the purposes of the present publication, a functional approach has been adopted

regarding the classification of the means by which the Internet is often utilized to pro-

mote and support acts of terrorism. This approach has resulted in the identification of

six sometimes overlapping categories: propaganda (including recruitment, radicalization

and incitement to terrorism); financing; training; planning (including through secret

communication and open-source information); execution; and cyberattacks. Each of

these categories is addressed in greater detail below.

1. Propaganda

3. One of the primary uses of the Internet by terrorists is for the dissemination of

propaganda. Propaganda generally takes the form of multimedia communications pro-

viding ideological or practical instruction, explanations, justifications or promotion of

terrorist activities. These may include virtual messages, presentations, magazines, trea-

tises, audio and video files and video games developed by terrorist organizations or

sympathizers. Nevertheless, what constitutes terrorist propaganda, as opposed to legiti-

mate advocacy of a viewpoint, is often a subjective assessment. Further, the dissemina-

tion of propaganda is generally not, in and of itself, a prohibited activity. One of the

²See, for example, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (General Assembly resolution 2200 A

(XXI), annex), art. 19, para. 2.

THE USE OF THE INTERNET FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES

basic tenets of international law is the protection of fundamental human rights, which

include the right to freedom of expression (see discussion in section I.D below). This

guarantees an individual the right to share an opinion or distribute content which may

be considered objectionable by others, subject to certain limited exceptions. One com-

monly accepted exclusion with respect to that right is the prohibition against the dis-

tribution of certain categories of sexually explicit content, the prohibition of which is

deemed to be in the public interest in order to protect certain vulnerable groups. Other

exclusions, all of which must be provided for by law and shown to be necessary, may

include communications that are clearly detrimental to the protection of national security

and communications that are both intended and likely to incite acts of violence against

individuals or specific groups of individuals.³

4. The promotion of violence is a common theme in terrorism-related propaganda.

The broad reach of content distributed via the Internet exponentially increases the

audience that may be affected. Further, the ability to directly distribute content via the

Internet diminishes the reliance on traditional channels of communication, such as news

services, which may take steps to independently evaluate the credibility of the informa-

tion provided or to edit or omit aspects deemed to be unduly provocative. Internet

propaganda may also include content such as video footage of violent acts of terrorism

or video games developed by terrorist organizations that simulate acts of terrorism and

encourage the user to engage in role-play, by acting the part of a virtual terrorist.

5. The promotion of extremist rhetoric encouraging violent acts is also a common

trend across the growing range of Internet-based platforms that host user-generated

content. Content that might formerly have been distributed to a relatively limited audi-

ence, in person or via physical media such as compact discs (CDs) and digital video

discs (DVDs), has increasingly migrated to the Internet. Such content may be distri

buted using a broad range of tools, such as dedicated websites, targeted virtual chat

rooms and forums, online magazines, social networking platforms such as Twitter and

Facebook, and popular video and file-sharing websites, such as YouTube and Rapidshare,

respectively. The use of indexing services such as Internet search engines also makes it

easier to identify and retrieve terrorism-related content.

6. The fundamental threat posed by terrorist propaganda relates to the manner in

which it is used and the intent with which it is disseminated. Terrorist propaganda dis-

tributed via the Internet covers a range of objectives and audiences. It may be tailored,

inter alia, to potential or actual supporters or opponents of an organization or shared

extremist belief, to direct or indirect victims of acts of terrorism or to the international

community or a subset thereof. Propaganda aimed at potential or actual supporters may

be focused on recruitment, radicalization and incitement to terrorism, through messages

conveying pride, accomplishment and dedication to an extremist goal. It may also be

used to demonstrate the effective execution of terrorist attacks to those who have pro-

vided financial support. Other objectives of terrorist propaganda may include the use of

psychological manipulation to undermine an individual’s belief in certain collective social

³Ibid., art. 19, para. 3.

CHAPTER I. Use of the Internet for terrorist purposes

values, or to propagate a sense of heightened anxiety, fear or panic in a population or

subset of the population. This may be achieved through the dissemination of disinformation,

rumours, threats of violence or images relating to provocative acts of violence. The

intended audience may include direct viewers of content, as well as those affected by

potential publicity generated by such material. With respect to the wider international

community, the goal is often to convey a desire to achieve noble political ends.⁴

(a) Recruitment

7. The Internet may be used not only as a means to publish extremist rhetoric and

videos, but also a way to develop relationships with, and solicit support from, those

most responsive to targeted propaganda. Terrorist organizations increasingly use propa-

ganda distributed via platforms such as password-protected websites and restricted-

access Internet chat groups as a means of clandestine recruitment.⁵ The reach of the

Internet provides terrorist organizations and sympathizers with a global pool of potential

recruits. Restricted access cyberforums offer a venue for recruits to learn about, and

provide support to, terrorist organizations and to engage in direct actions in the fur-

therance of terrorist objectives.⁶ The use of technological barriers to entry to recruitment

platforms also increases the complexity of tracking terrorism-related activity by intel-

ligence and law enforcement personnel.

8. Terrorist propaganda is often tailored to appeal to vulnerable and marginalized

groups in society. The process of recruitment and radicalization commonly capitalizes

on an individual’s sentiments of injustice, exclusion or humiliation.⁷ Propaganda may

be adapted to account for demographic factors, such as age or gender, as well as social

or economic circumstances.

9. The Internet may be a particularly effective medium for the recruitment of minors,

who comprise a high proportion of users. Propaganda disseminated via the Internet

with the aim of recruiting minors may take the form of cartoons, popular music videos

or computer games. Tactics employed by websites maintained by terrorist organizations

or their affiliates to target minors have included mixing cartoons and children’s stories

with messages promoting and glorifying acts of terrorism, such as suicide attacks. Simi-

larly, some terrorist organizations have designed online video games intended to be

used as recruitment and training tools. Such games may promote the use of violence

against a State or prominent political figure, rewarding virtual successes, and may be

offered in multiple languages to appeal to a broad audience.⁸

⁴Gabriel Weimann, Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges (Washington, D.C., United States

Institute of Peace Press, 2006), pp. 37-38.

⁵Scott Gerwehr and Sarah Daly, “Al-Qaida: terrorist selection and recruitment”, in The McGraw-Hill Homeland

Security Handbook, David Kamien, ed. (New York, McGraw-Hill, 2006), p. 83.

⁶Dorothy E. Denning, “Terror’s web: how the Internet is transforming terrorism”, in Handbook of Internet Crime,

Yvonne Jewkes and Majid Yar, eds. (Cullompton, United Kingdom, Willan Publishing, (2010)), pp. 194-213.

⁷European Commission, Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation, “Radicalisation processes leading to acts of

ŧerrorism” (2008). Available from www.clingendael.nl/publications/2008/20080500_cscp_report_vries.pdf.

⁸Gabriel Weimann, “Online terrorists prey on the vulnerable”, YaleGlobal Online, 5 March 2008. Available from

http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/online-terrorists-prey-vulnerable.

THE USE OF THE INTERNET FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES

(b) Incitement

10. While propaganda per se is not generally prohibited, the use of propaganda by

terrorists to incite acts of terrorism is considered unlawful by many Member States.

The Internet provides an abundance of material and opportunities to download, edit

and distribute content that may be considered unlawful glorification of, or provocation

to, acts of terrorism. It should be noted, however, that some intergovernmental and

human rights mechanisms have expressed doubt that the concept of “glorification” of

terrorism is sufficiently narrow and precise to serve as a basis for criminal sanctions

compliant with the requirements of the principle of legality and the permissible limita-

tions of the right to freedom of expression, as enshrined in articles 15 and 19 of the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.^9,10

11. It is important to emphasize the distinction between mere propaganda and mate-

rial intended to incite acts of terrorism. In several Member States, in order to be held

liable for incitement to terrorism, a showing of the requisite intent and a direct causal

link between alleged propaganda and an actual plot or execution of a terrorist act is

required. For example, in a contribution to the expert group meetings, a French expert

indicated that the dissemination of instructive materials on explosives would not be

considered a violation of French law unless the communication contained information

specifying that the material was shared in furtherance of a terrorist purpose.

12. Preventing and deterring incitement to terrorism in the interest of protecting

national security and public order are legitimate grounds for limiting freedom of expres-

sion, as provided under article 19, paragraph 3, of the International Covenant on Civil

and Political Rights. These grounds are also consistent with article 20, paragraph 2, of

that Covenant, which requires States to prohibit any advocacy of national, racial or

religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. In

the light of the fundamental nature of the right to freedom of expression, however, any

restrictions on the exercise of this right must be both necessary and proportional to

the threat posed. The right to freedom of expression is also linked to other important

rights, including the rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, belief and

opinion.¹¹

13. Recruitment, radicalization and incitement to terrorism may be viewed as points

along a continuum. Radicalization refers primarily to the process of indoctrination that

often accompanies the transformation of recruits into individuals determined to act

with violence based on extremist ideologies. The process of radicalization often involves

⁹General Assembly resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.

¹⁰See the following reports of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fun-

damental freedoms while countering terrorism: A/65/258 (para. 46) and A/61/267 (para. 7); see also the report of the

Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the rights to freedom of opinion and expression, addendum

on the tenth anniversary joint declaration: ten key challenges to freedom of expression in the next decade (A/HRC/14/23/

Add.2).

¹¹ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Human rights, terrorism and counter-

terrorism”, Fact Sheet No. 32 (Geneva, 2008), Chap. III, sect. H.

CHAPTER I. Use of the Internet for terrorist purposes

the use of propaganda, whether communicated in person or via the Internet, over time.

The length of time and the effectiveness of the propaganda and other persuasive means

employed vary depending on individual circumstances and relationships.

2. Financing

14. Terrorist organizations and supporters may also use the Internet to finance acts

of terrorism. The manner in which terrorists use the Internet to raise and collect funds

and resources may be classified into four general categories: direct solicitation,

e-commerce, the exploitation of online payment tools and through charitable

organizations. Direct solicitation refers to the use of websites, chat groups, mass mailings

and targeted communications to request donations from supporters. Websites may also

be used as online stores, offering books, audio and video recordings and other items

to supporters. Online payment facilities offered through dedicated websites or

communications platforms make it easy to transfer funds electronically between parties.

Funds transfers are often made by electronic wire transfer, credit card or alternate

payment facilities available via services such as PayPal or Skype.

15. Online payment facilities may also be exploited through fraudulent means such

as identity theft, credit card theft, wire fraud, stock fraud, intellectual property crimes

and auction fraud. An example of the use of illicit gains to finance acts of terrorism

can be seen in the United Kingdom case against Younis Tsouli (see para. 114 below).

Profits from stolen credit cards were laundered by several means, including transfer

through e-gold online payment accounts, which were used to route the funds through

several countries before they reached their intended destination. The laundered money

was used both to fund the registration by Tsouli of 180 websites hosting Al-Qaida

propaganda videos and to provide equipment for terrorist activities in several countries.

Approximately 1,400 credit cards were used to generate approximately £1.6 million of

illicit funds to finance terrorist activity.¹²

16. Financial support provided to seemingly legitimate organizations, such as charities,

may also be diverted for illicit purposes. Some terrorist organizations have been known

to establish shell corporations, disguised as philanthropic undertakings, to solicit online

donations. These organizations may claim to support humanitarian goals while in fact

donations are used to fund acts of terrorism. Examples of overtly charitable organiza-

tions used for terrorist ends include the innocuously named Benevolence International

Foundation, Global Relief Foundation and the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and

Development, all of which used fraudulent means to finance terrorist organizations in

the Middle East. Terrorists may also infiltrate branches of charitable organizations, which

they use as a cover to promote the ideologies of terrorist organizations or to provide

material support to militant groups.¹³

¹²Written submission of expert from the United Kingdom.

¹³ Maura Conway, “Terrorist ‘use’ of the Internet and fighting back”, Information & Security, vol. 19 (2006), pp.

12-14.

THE USE OF THE INTERNET FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES

3. Training

17. In recent years, terrorist organizations have increasingly turned to the Internet as

an alternative training ground for terrorists. There is a growing range of media that

provide platforms for the dissemination of practical guides in the form of online manu-

als, audio and video clips, information and advice. These Internet platforms also provide

detailed instructions, often in easily accessible multimedia format and multiple lan-

guages, on topics such as how to join terrorist organizations; how to construct explosives,

firearms or other weapons or hazardous materials; and how to plan and execute terrorist

attacks. The platforms act as a virtual training camp. They are also used to share, inter

alia, specific methods, techniques or operational knowledge for the purpose of commit-

ting an act of terrorism.

18. For example, Inspire is an online magazine allegedly published by Al-Qaida in the

Arabian Peninsula with the stated objective of enabling Muslims to train for jihad at

home. It contains a large amount of ideological material aimed at encouraging terror-

ism, including statements attributed to Osama Bin Laden, Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri

and other well-known Al-Qaida figures. The fall 2010 edition included practical instruc-

tional material on how to adapt a four-wheel-drive vehicle to carry out an attack on

members of the public and how a lone individual could launch an indiscriminate attack

by shooting a gun from a tower. The publication even suggested a target city for such

an attack, in order to increase the chances of killing a member of the Government.¹⁴

19. Instructional material available online includes tools to facilitate counter-intelligence

and hacking activities and to improve the security of illicit communications and online

activity through the use of available encryption tools and anonymizing techniques. The

interactive nature of Internet platforms helps build a sense of community among

individuals from different geographical locations and backgrounds, encouraging the

creation of networks for the exchange of instructional and tactical material.

4. Planning

20. Many criminal justice practitioners have indicated that almost every case of ter-

rorism prosecuted involved the use of Internet technology. In particular, planning an

act of terrorism typically involves remote communication among several parties. A recent

case from France, Public Prosecutor v. Hicheur,¹⁵ illustrates how different forms of Internet

technology may be used to facilitate the preparation of acts of terrorism, including via

thorough communications within and between organizations promoting violent

extremism, as well as across borders.

¹⁴Written submission of expert from the United Kingdom.

¹⁵Judgement of 4 May 2012, Case No. 0926639036 of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (14th Chamber/2),

Paris.

CHAPTER I. Use of the Internet for terrorist purposes

Public Prosecutor v. Hicheur

In May 2012, a French court sentenced Adlène Hicheur, an Algerian-born French national,

to five years of imprisonment for participation in a criminal conspiracy for the preparation

of a terrorist act (under Article 421-1 et. seq. of the French Criminal Code), relating to acts

that took place in France in 2008 and 2009.

The investigation implicating Hicheur, a nuclear physicist, was launched in early 2008 in

connection with an e-mail communication containing jihadist content, which was sent to

the website of the President of the French Republic and traced back to a member of Al-

Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

A preservation order issued in January

2009 enabled the authorities to identify e-mail

exchanges between the AQIM member and, inter alia, the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF)

and the Rafidayin Center, a website with the stated goal of hosting and disseminating Al-

Qaida documents, audio and video recordings, statements from warlords and suicide attack-

ers and the materials of other extremist Islamic groups. The e-mail exchanges were encrypted

using the dedicated software

“Asrar el Mojahedeen” or “Mujahedeen Secrets”, which

includes 256-bit encryption, variable stealth cipher encryption keys, RSA 2,048-bit encryption

keys and encrypted chat-forum-supported instant messaging.

Dozens of decrypted e-mail communications were presented at trial. The prosecution claimed

that the content of those e-mails indicated that Hicheur actively performed, inter alia, the

following acts in support of the jihadist network, notably on behalf of the Rafidayin Center:

Translated, encrypted, compressed and password-protected pro-jihadist materials,

including documents and videos, which he then uploaded and circulated via the

Internet

Distributed the encryption software “Mujahedeen Secrets” to facilitate covert Internet

communications

Conspired with an AQIM member to organize and coordinate pro-jihadist activities,

including but not limited to providing financial support to the jihadist cause, dissemi-

nating pro-jihadist information and supporting the creation of an operational unit in

Europe, and in particular in France, to potentially prepare terrorist attacks

Acted as moderator on the pro-jihadist Ribaat website

Took concrete steps to provide financial support to AQIM, including through the

attempted use of PayPal and other virtual payment systems.

At trial, the prosecution claimed that those communications proved Hicheur had been fully

aware that he was engaging with a member of AQIM, and that he had acted knowingly

and willingly as an intermediary between jihadist fighters and GIMF. At the conclusion of

the trial, the Court held that; “Hicheur became … a logistical and media support for this

terrorist structure for which the ‘media jihad’ is crucial”.

The Court further held that “Adlène Hicheur, by giving his agreement to the establishment

of an operational unit linked to AQIM in Europe, or even in France, and determining targets

or categories of targets to be struck, participated in a group [AQIM] specifically created to

prepare acts of terrorism.”

THE USE OF THE INTERNET FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES

The court therefore found sufficient evidence to demonstrate, as required under the French

Criminal Code, that Hicheur had provided not merely intellectual support but also direct

logistical support to a clearly identified terrorist plan. The decision of the court is

appealable.

Sources: Judgement of 4 May 2012 of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris; and Tung, Liam, Jihadists

get world-class encryption kit (29 January 2008), available from www.zdnet.com.au/jihadists-get-world-class-encryp-

tion-kit-339285480.htm.

21. Steps may also be taken via the Internet to identify a potential target of an attack

and the most effective means of achieving the terrorist purpose. These preparatory steps

may range from obtaining instructions on recommended methods of attack to collecting

open-source and other information regarding a proposed target. The ability of the

Internet to bridge distances and borders, and the vast amount of information publicly

available in cyberspace, make the Internet a key tool in the planning of terrorist acts.

(a) Preparatory secret communication

22. The most basic function of the Internet is to facilitate communication. Terrorists

have become increasingly sophisticated at exploiting communications technologies for

anonymous communication related to the planning of terrorist acts. A simple online

e-mail account may be used by terrorists for electronic, or virtual, “dead dropping” of

communications. This refers to the creation of a draft message, which remains unsent,

and therefore leaves minimal electronic traces, but which may be accessed from any

Internet terminal worldwide by multiple individuals with the relevant password.

23. There is also an abundance of more sophisticated technologies that increase the

difficulty of identifying the originator, recipient or content of Internet communications.

Encryption tools and anonymizing software are readily available online for download.

These tools may, inter alia, mask the unique Internet Protocol (IP) address that identi-

fies each device used to access the Internet and its location, reroute Internet commu-

nications via one or more servers to jurisdictions with lower levels of enforcement

against terrorist activity and/or encrypt traffic data relating to websites accessed. Steg-

anography, the hiding of messages in images, may also be used.

(b) Publicly available information

24. Organizations and individuals often publish extensive amounts of information on

the Internet. In the case of organizations, this may be a result in part of a desire to

promote their activities and streamline their interaction with the public. Some sensitive

information that may be used by terrorists for illicit purposes is also made available

through Internet search engines, which may catalogue and retrieve inadequately pro-

tected information from millions of websites. Further, online access to detailed logistical

information, such as real-time closed-circuit television footage, and applications such

as Google Earth, which is intended for and primarily used by individuals for legitimate

ends, may be misused by those intent on benefiting from the free access to

CHAPTER I. Use of the Internet for terrorist purposes

high-resolution satellite imagery, maps and information on terrain and buildings for the

reconnaissance of potential targets from a remote computer terminal.

25. Particularly in the age of popular social networking media, such as Facebook,

Twitter, YouTube, Flickr and blogging platforms, individuals also publish, voluntarily

or inadvertently, an unprecedented amount of sensitive information on the Internet.

While the intent of those distributing the information may be to provide news or other

updates to their audience for informational or social purposes, some of this information

may be misappropriated and used for the benefit of criminal activity.

5. Execution

26. Elements of the categories described above may be employed in the use of the

Internet for the execution of terrorist acts. For example, explicit threats of violence,

including in relation to the use of weapons, may be disseminated via the Internet to

induce anxiety, fear or panic in a population or subset of the population. In many

Member States, the act of issuing such threats, even if unfulfilled, may be deemed an

offence. For example, in China, the fabrication of a threat and/or the circulation of a

threat that is known to be fabricated in relation to the use of bombs or biological,

chemical, or radioactive materials or other weapons, when committed with the intent

“to seriously disrupt public order”, is criminalized under domestic legislation.¹⁶ Internet

communications may also be used as a means to communicate with potential victims

or to coordinate the execution of physical acts of terrorism. For example, the Internet

was used extensively in the coordination of participants in the attacks of 11 September

2001 in the United States.

27. The use of the Internet in furtherance of the execution of acts of terrorism may,

inter alia, offer logistical advantages, reduce the likelihood of detection or obscure the

identity of responsible parties. Internet activity may also facilitate the acquisition of

items necessary for the execution of the attack. Terrorists may purchase individual

components or services required to perpetrate violent acts of terrorism by means of

electronic commerce. Misappropriated credit cards or other forms of compromised

electronic payment may be used to finance such purchases.

6. Cyberattacks

28. A cyberattack generally refers to the deliberate exploitation of computer networks

as a means to launch an attack. Such attacks are typically intended to disrupt the proper

functioning of targets, such as computer systems, servers or underlying infrastructure,

through the use of hacking, advanced persistent threat techniques, computer viruses,

malware,¹⁷ phlooding¹⁸ or other means of unauthorized or malicious access. Cyberattacks

¹⁶Written submission of expert from China.

¹⁷Pursuant to the International Telecommunication Union Toolkit for Cybercrime Legislation, section 1 (n), malware

may be defined as a program that is inserted into a computer program or system, usually covertly, with the intent of

compromising the confidentiality, integrity or availability of the computer program, data or system.

¹⁸“Phlooding” refers to the targeting of the central authentication servers of an organization with multiple simul-

taneous authentication requests, with the aim of overloading the servers, resulting in a distributed denial of service.

THE USE OF THE INTERNET FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES

may bear the characteristics of an act of terrorism, including the fundamental desire

to instil fear in furtherance of political or social objectives. An example of a cyberattack

was seen in Israel in January 2012, involving the targeting of multiple symbolic Israeli

websites, such as the websites of the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange and the national airline,

and the unauthorized disclosure of the credit card and account details of thousands of

Israeli nationals.¹⁹ While a considerable amount of attention has focused in recent years

on the threat of cyberattacks by terrorists, that topic is beyond the scope of the present

publication and, as such, will not be a subject of analysis.

C. Uses of the Internet for countering terrorist activity

29. While terrorists have developed many ways to use the Internet in furtherance of

illicit purposes, their use of the Internet also provides opportunities for the gathering

of intelligence and other activities to prevent and counter acts of terrorism, as well as

for the gathering of evidence for the prosecution of such acts. A significant amount of

knowledge about the functioning, activities and sometimes the targets of terrorist organi-

zations is derived from website, chat room and other Internet communications. Further,

increased Internet use for terrorist purposes provides a corresponding increase in the

availability of electronic data which may be compiled and analysed for counter-terrorism

purposes. Law enforcement, intelligence and other authorities are developing increas-

ingly sophisticated tools to proactively prevent, detect and deter terrorist activity invol

ving use of the Internet. The use of traditional investigative means, such as dedicated

translation resources for the timely identification of potential terrorist threats, is also

expanding.

30. Online discussions provide an opportunity to present opposing viewpoints or to

engage in constructive debate, which may have the effect of discouraging potential sup-

porters. Counter-narratives with a strong factual foundation may be conveyed through

online discussion forums, images and videos. Successful messages may also demonstrate

empathy with the underlying issues that contribute to radicalization, such as political

and social conditions, and highlight alternatives to violent means of achieving the desired

outcomes.²⁰ Strategic communications that provide counter-narratives to terrorist propa-

ganda may also be disseminated via the Internet, in multiple languages, to reach a

broad, geographically diverse audience.

31. The Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, based in the United

States, offers an example of a recently launched inter-agency initiative which is aimed

at reducing radicalization and extremist violence by identifying in a timely manner

extremist propaganda, inter alia, on the Internet and responding swiftly with targeted

¹⁹See Isabel Kershner, “Cyberattack exposes 20,000 Israeli credit card numbers and details about users”, New York

Times, 6 January 2012; and “2 Israeli web sites crippled as cyberwar escalates”, New York Times, 16 January 2012.

²⁰ Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force Working Group on Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes,

“Conference summary and follow-up/recommendations” of the Conference on the Use of the Internet to Counter the

Appeal of Extremist Violence, held in Riyadh from 24 to 26 January 2011. Available from www.un.org/en/terrorism/

ctitf/pdfs/ctitf_riyadh_conference_summary_recommendations.pdf.

CHAPTER I. Use of the Internet for terrorist purposes

counter-narratives via a wide range of communications technologies, including digital

tools.²¹ For instance, in May 2012, the Center was cited as having responded, within

48 hours, to banner advertisements promoting extremist violence posted on various

websites by Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, with counter-advertisements on the

same websites featuring an altered version of that same message that was intended to

convey that the victims of the terrorist organization’s activities were Yemeni nationals.

The counter-narrative campaign involved cooperation among the United States Depart-

ment of State, the intelligence community and the military. The Center also uses media

platforms such as Facebook and YouTube for counter-narrative communications.^22,23

D. Rule-of-law considerations

32. Respect for human rights and the rule of law is an integral part of the fight against

terrorism. Due care must be taken to respect international human rights standards in

all phases of counter-terrorism initiatives, from preventive intelligence gathering to

ensuring due process in the prosecution of suspects. This requires the development of

national counter-terrorism legislation and practices that promote and protect funda-

mental human rights and the rule of law.²⁴

33. States have both a right and a duty to take effective measures to counter the

destructive impact of terrorism on human rights, in particular the rights to life, liberty

and physical integrity of individuals and the territorial integrity and security of States.

Effective counter-terrorism measures and the protection of human rights are comple-

mentary and mutually reinforcing objectives which must be pursued together.²⁵ Counter-

terrorism initiatives relating to Internet use may have an impact on the enjoyment of

a range of human rights, including the rights to freedom of speech, freedom of associa-

tion, privacy and a fair trial. While a comprehensive analysis of human rights issues is

beyond the scope of the present publication, it is important to highlight key areas for

consideration.

34. As noted in subsection B.1(b) above, the proscription of incitement to terrorism

may involve restrictions on freedom of expression. Freedom of expression is not an

absolute right. It may be restricted, subject to satisfaction of strictly construed tests of

legality, necessity, proportionality and non-discrimination, when that freedom is used

to incite discrimination, hostility or violence. A key difficulty in cases of glorification

or incitement to terrorism is identifying where the line of acceptability lies, as

²¹Executive Order 13584 of 9 September 2011, “Developing an Integrated Strategic Counterterrorism Communica-

tions Initiative and Establishing a Temporary Organization to Support Certain Government-wide Communications

Activities Directed Abroad”, Federal Register, vol. 76, No. 179, 15 September 2011.

²²“United States State Department fights al-Qaeda in cyberspace”, Al Jazeera (25 May 2012). Available from

http://blogs.aljazeera.com/americas/2012/05/25/us-state-department-fights-al-qaeda-cyberspace.

²³“U.S. uses Yemeni web sites to counter al-Qaeda propaganda”, The Washington Post (24 May 2012). Available

from www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-hacks-web-sites-of-al-qaeda-affiliate-in-yemen/2012/05/23/gJQ-

AGnOxlU_story.html.

²⁴ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 32, chap. III, sect. H.

²⁵Ibid., chap. I, sect. C.

THE USE OF THE INTERNET FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES

this varies greatly from country to country depending on differing cultural and legal

histories.²⁶ The right to freedom of association is similarly a qualified right, which may

be subject to narrowly construed limitations and derogations.

35. Countering terrorist use of the Internet may involve the surveillance and collection

of information relating to suspects. Due regard should be given to protecting persons

against arbitrary or unlawful interference with the right to privacy,²⁷ which includes the

right to privacy of information about an individual’s identity as well as his or her private

life. Domestic laws must be sufficiently detailed regarding, inter alia, the specific cir-

cumstances in which such interference may be permitted. Appropriate safeguards must

also be in place to prevent abuse of secret surveillance tools. Further, any personal data

collected must be adequately protected to ensure against unlawful or arbitrary access,

disclosure or use.²⁸

36. Guaranteeing due process rights is critical for ensuring that counter-terrorism

measures are effective and respect the rule of law. Human rights protections for all

persons charged with criminal offences, including terrorism-related crimes, include the

right to be presumed innocent, the right to a hearing with due guarantees and within

a reasonable time by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal and the right to

have a conviction and sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal that meets the same

standards.²⁹

37. For a more detailed analysis of the issues highlighted in the present section and

other relevant considerations, please see, for example, Fact Sheet No. 32 of the Office

of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on “Human rights, ter-

rorism and counter-terrorism”, the report of the United Nations High Commissioner

for Human Rights on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while

countering terrorism (A/HRC/16/50) and the following reports of the Special Rappor-

teur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while

countering terrorism: ten areas of best practices in countering terrorism (A/HRC/16/51);

and compilation of good practices on legal and institutional frameworks and measures

that ensure respect for human rights by intelligence agencies while countering terrorism,

including on their oversight (A/HRC/14/46).

²⁶ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights,

“Human rights considerations in combating incitement to terrorism and related offences”, background paper prepared

for the expert workshop on “Preventing terrorism: fighting incitement and related terrorist activities”, held in Vienna

on 19 and 20 October 2006, sects. 3 and 4.

²⁷See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 17.

²⁸“Human rights, terrorism and counter-terrorism”, chap. III, sect. J.

²⁹Ibid., chap. III, sect. F.

II.

The international contextII.

A. Introduction

38. Terrorist use of the Internet is a transnational problem, requiring an integrated

response across borders and among national criminal justice systems. The United

Nations plays a pivotal role in this regard, facilitating discussion and the sharing of

good practices among Member States, as well as the building of consensus on common

approaches to combating the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes.

39. The applicable international legal framework related to counter-terrorism is con-

tained in a range of sources, including resolutions of the General Assembly and the

Security Council, treaties, jurisprudence and customary international law. Security

Council resolutions may impose legally binding obligations on Member States or provide

“soft law” sources of political commitments or emerging norms of international law.

Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations

are binding on all Member States. The General Assembly has also adopted a number

of resolutions relating to terrorism which provide useful sources of soft law and have

high political importance, even though they are not legally binding.³⁰

40. Legal obligations are also imposed upon States pursuant to bilateral and multi-

lateral instruments addressing terrorism. “Universal” legal instruments are agreements

that are open for ratification or accession by all Member States of the United Nations.

By contrast, agreements promulgated by regional or other inter-State groupings may

be open to only a limited group of potential signatories; such treaty-based obligations

are binding only upon those States which choose to become a party to the

agreements.

41. The duty to bring perpetrators of acts of terrorism to justice rests primarily with

domestic authorities, as international tribunals do not generally have jurisdiction over

such acts.³¹ United Nations resolutions, universal legal instruments, regional agreements

and model laws against terrorism play a key role in establishing common standards

accepted across multiple jurisdictions.

³⁰See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Frequently Asked Questions on International Law Aspects of

Countering Terrorism (2009). Available from www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/FAQ/English.pdf.

³¹The Special Tribunal for Lebanon, established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1757 (2007), is currently

the only international court with limited jurisdiction over the crime of terrorism.

THE USE OF THE INTERNET FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES

B. United Nations counter-terrorism resolutions

42. The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy³² was unanimously

adopted by the General Assembly in 2006, representing a milestone in the domain of

multilateral counter-terrorism initiatives. Pursuant to the Strategy, Member States

resolved, inter alia:

(a) To consistently, unequivocally and strongly condemn terrorism in all its forms

and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever pur-

poses, as it constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace

and security;

(b) To take urgent action to prevent and combat terrorism in all its forms and

manifestations;

undertake to prevent and combat terrorism must comply with [their] obliga-

tions under international law, including the Charter of the United Nations

and relevant international conventions and protocols, in particular human

rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law;

(d) To work with the United Nations with due regard to confidentiality, respect-

ing human rights and in compliance with other obligations under international

law, to explore ways and means to “(a) Coordinate efforts at the international

and regional levels to counter terrorism in all its forms and manifestations on the

Internet; (b) Use the Internet as a tool for countering the spread of terrorism, while

recognizing that States may require assistance in this regard” [emphasis added].

43. Several Security Council resolutions adopted in recent years require States to

cooperate fully in the fight against terrorism, in all its forms. In particular, resolutions

1373 (2001) and 1566 (2004), adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United

Nations, require legislative and other action to be taken by all Member States to combat

terrorism, including through increased cooperation with other Governments in the inves-

tigation, detection, arrest, extradition and prosecution of those involved in terrorist acts;

and call upon States to implement the international conventions and protocols relating

to terrorism.

44. Another key Security Council resolution relating to terrorist activity that may be

conducted by means of the Internet is resolution 1624 (2005), which addresses the

incitement and glorification of terrorist acts. In its fourth preambular paragraph, the

Council condemns “in the strongest terms the incitement of terrorist acts “and repudi-

ates” attempts at the justification or glorification (apologie) of terrorist acts that may

incite further terrorist acts”. In paragraph

1, it calls upon all States to adopt such

measures as may be necessary and appropriate, and in accordance with their obligations

under international law, to prohibit by law and prevent incitement to commit a terrorist

act or acts.

³² General Assembly resolution 60/288.

CHAPTER II. The international context

45. Recent United Nations reports and resolutions have specifically acknowledged the

importance of countering terrorist use of the Internet as a key part of a comprehensive

counter-terrorism strategy. In his 2006 report to the General Assembly entitled “Unit-

ing against terrorism: recommendations for a global counter-terrorism strategy”,³³ the

Secretary-General explicitly stated: “The ability to generate and move finances, to

acquire weapons, to recruit and train cadres, and to communicate, particularly through

use of the Internet, are all essential to terrorists.”³⁴ The Secretary-General went on to

assert that the Internet was a rapidly growing vehicle for terrorist recruitment and dis-

semination of information and propaganda, which must be countered through coordi-

nated action by Member States, while respecting human rights and other obligations

under international law.³⁵

46. In its resolution 1963 (2010), the Security Council expressed “concern at the

increased use, in a globalized society, by terrorists of new information and communica-

tions technologies, in particular the Internet, for the purposes of the recruitment and

incitement as well as for the financing, planning and preparation of their activities.”

The Council also recognized the importance of cooperation among Member States to

prevent terrorists from exploiting technology, communications and resources.

C. Universal counter-terrorism legal instruments

47. Since

1963, the international community has been developing universal legal

instruments to prevent terrorist acts under the auspices of the United Nations and its

specialized agencies, in particular the International Civil Aviation Organization and the

International Maritime Organization, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The

universal counter-terrorism instruments represent a major element of the global regime

against terrorism and an important framework for international cooperation in counter-

ing terrorism. These universal legal instruments cover acts ranging from the hijacking

of aircraft to nuclear terrorism by individuals and groups³⁶ and require the States that

adopt them to criminalize the most foreseeable terrorist acts in the areas covered by

the conventions. Nevertheless, these universal legal instruments are legally binding only

on the signatories thereto,³⁷ which are also responsible for enforcing the provisions

through the domestic criminal justice systems.

48. As a result of the attention focused on countering terrorism following the adop-

tion of Security Council resolution

1373 (2001), in which the Council called on

³³A/60/825.

³⁴Ibid., para. 38.

³⁵Ibid., paras. 58 and 60.

³⁶ Other covered terrorist acts include acts of aviation sabotage, acts of violence at airports, acts against the safety

of maritime navigation, acts against the safety of fixed platforms located on the continental shelf, crimes against inter-

nationally protected persons (such as the kidnapping of diplomats), acts of unlawful taking and possession of nuclear

material, acts of hostage-taking, acts of terrorist bombings and acts of funding of the commission of terrorist acts and

terrorist organizations.

³⁷For a list of the current ratification status of these universal legal instruments, please see www.unodc.org/tldb/

universal_instruments_NEW.html.

THE USE OF THE INTERNET FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES

Member States to become parties to the universal counter-terrorism legal instruments,

the rate of adherence to these instruments has increased significantly. As at June 2011,

two thirds of Member States had either ratified or acceded to at least 10 of the 16

universal counter-terrorism instruments.³⁸

49. There is currently no comprehensive United Nations treaty on terrorism that is

applicable to an exhaustive list of the manifestations of terrorism. Similarly, the inter-

national community has yet to agree on an internationally binding definition of the

term “terrorism”,³⁹ owing largely to the difficulty of devising a universally acceptable

legal categorization for acts of violence committed by States, by armed groups such as

liberation or self-determination movements or by individuals.

50. Member States have been engaged since 2000 in negotiations relating to a com-

prehensive counter-terrorism convention, which will ultimately include a definition of

terrorism. Faced, however, with the difficulty of reaching consensus on a single, globally

accepted definition of what constitutes terrorism, progress has instead been made

through the existing universal legal instruments, which have developed along sectoral

lines. These instruments focus on criminalizing specific “terrorist acts” without defining

the broader concept of terrorism.

51. The universal instruments do not define terrorist offences as crimes under inter-

national law. Rather, they create an obligation for States parties to the agreements to

criminalize the specified unlawful conduct under their domestic law, exercise jurisdiction

over offenders under prescribed conditions and provide for international cooperation

mechanisms that enable States parties to either prosecute or extradite the alleged offend-

ers. Until the successful conclusion of ongoing negotiations on a universal definition

or comprehensive convention relating to terrorism, bilateral and multilateral agreements

should provide the basis for the development of common standards to counter the use

of the Internet for terrorist purposes, in the interest of promoting international

cooperation.

52. No universal convention has been adopted specifically relating to the prevention

and suppression of terrorist use of the Internet. In December 2010, the General Assem-

bly adopted resolution 65/230, in which it, inter alia, endorsed the Salvador Declaration

on Comprehensive Strategies for Global Challenges: Crime Prevention and Criminal

Justice Systems and Their Development in a Changing World⁴⁰ and requested the Com-

mission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice to establish, in line with the Salvador

Declaration, an open-ended intergovernmental expert group to conduct a

³⁸See www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/laws.html.

³⁹It is worth noting, however, that a recent decision by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon held that there was suf-

ficient evidence to support the existence of a definition of the crime of terrorism under customary international law.

See Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging,

Case No. STL-11-01/I, Special Tribunal for Lebanon (16 February 2011); available from www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/

stl-11-01/rule-176bis/filings/orders-and-decisions/appeals-chamber/

interlocutory-decision-on-the-applicable-law-terrorism-conspiracy-homicide-perpetration-cumulative-charging.

⁴⁰Adopted by the Twelfth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, held in Salvador,

Brazil, from 12 to 19 April 2010, which addressed, inter alia, the need for Member States to consider ways of fighting

new forms of crime, such as cybercrime.

CHAPTER II. The international context

comprehensive study of the problem of cybercrime and responses to it by Member

States, the international community and the private sector, including the exchange of

information on national legislation, best practices, technical assistance and international

cooperation. The results of this study, which was launched by UNODC in February

2012, will facilitate an evaluation of the effects of the use of emergent information

technologies in furtherance of criminal activities, including with respect to certain ter-

rorist uses of the Internet, such as computer-related incitement to terrorism and terrorist

financing offences.

D. International human rights law

53. Human rights obligations form an integral part of the international legal counter-

terrorism framework, both through the obligation imposed on States to prevent terrorist

attacks, which have the potential to significantly undermine human rights, and through

the obligation to ensure that all counter-terrorism measures respect human rights. In

the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Member States reaffirmed those

obligations, recognizing in particular that “effective counter-terrorism measures and the

protection of human rights are not conflicting goals, but complementary and mutually

reinforcing”.

54. Key universal human rights instruments adopted under the auspices of the United

Nations include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,⁴¹ the International Cov-

enant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social

and Cultural Rights,⁴² and applicable protocols.

55. Several regional organizations have also developed conventions guaranteeing human

rights. Examples include the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights

and Fundamental Freedoms⁴³ (1950), the American Convention on Human Rights⁴⁴

(1969), the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights⁴⁵ (1981), and the Charter

of Fundamental Rights of the European Union⁴⁶ (2000).

56. While a comprehensive analysis of issues relating to human rights law is beyond

the scope of the present publication, rule-of-law considerations and the applicable legal

instruments will be addressed with reference to specific counter-terrorism measures

where the context so requires.⁴⁷

⁴¹ General Assembly resolution 217 A (III).

⁴² General Assembly resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.

⁴³ Council of Europe, European Treaty Series, No. 5.

⁴⁴ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1144, No. 17955.

⁴⁵Ibid., vol. 1520, No. 26363.

⁴⁶ Official Journal of the European Communities, C 364, 18 December 2000.

⁴⁷See also United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Frequently Asked Questions on International Law Aspects

of Countering Terrorism, sect. V.

THE USE OF THE INTERNET FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES

E. Regional and subregional counter-terrorism legal instruments

57. In addition to the universal counter-terrorism instruments, several regional and

subregional instruments offer valuable substantive and procedural standards for crimi-

nalizing acts of terrorism that may be perpetrated by means of the Internet. These

instruments, which complement the universal counter-terrorism instruments, may vary

in scope and in their degree of enforceability.

1. Council of Europe

58. In 2001, the Council of Europe elaborated the Council of Europe Convention on

Cybercrime,⁴⁸ which is currently the only multilateral, legally binding instrument

addressing criminal activity conducted via the Internet. The Council of Europe Con-

vention on Cybercrime seeks to harmonize national laws relating to cybercrime, to

improve domestic procedures for detecting, investigating, and prosecuting such crimes

and to provide arrangements for fast and reliable international cooperation on these

matters.⁴⁹ The Convention establishes a common minimum standard for domestic

computer-related offences⁵⁰ and provides for the criminalization of nine such offences,

including offences relating to unauthorized access to and illicit tampering with computer

systems, programs or data; computer-related fraud and forgery; and attempting, aiding

or abetting the commission of such acts.⁵¹

59. The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime also includes important pro-

cedural provisions which may facilitate investigations and evidence-gathering in con-

nection with acts of terrorism involving use of the Internet. These provisions apply to

any criminal offence committed by means of a computer and the collection of evidence

in electronic form and are subject to applicable safeguards provided for under domestic

law.⁵²

60. For example, the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime requires parties

to adopt legislation requiring Internet service providers (ISPs) to preserve specified data

stored on their servers for up to 90 days⁵³ (renewable), if requested to do so by law

enforcement officials during the course of a criminal investigation or proceeding, until

the appropriate legal steps may be taken to compel disclosure of such data.⁵⁴ This

expedited procedure for the preservation of stored data is crucial given the transient

⁴⁸ Council of Europe, European Treaty Series, No. 185 (also available from www.coe.int/cybercrime).

⁴⁹Ibid., preamble.

⁵⁰Explanatory report to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, para. 33. Available from http://conven-

tions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/185.htm.

⁵¹Ibid., arts. 2-8 and 11.

⁵²Ibid., art. 14, para. 2 (b) and (c), and art. 15. Such conditions shall include protection of human rights and

liberties, including rights arising pursuant to obligations undertaken under the European Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, other applicable

international human rights instruments, and judicial or other independent supervision.

⁵³A minimum of 60 days is imposed with respect to preservation effected in response to a request for mutual legal

assistance (Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, art. 29).

⁵⁴ Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, art. 16.

CHAPTER II. The international context

nature of electronic data and the often time-consuming traditional mutual legal assis-

tance procedures in transnational cases.⁵⁵ The issuance of a preservation order, or similar

measure, also has several benefits compared with traditional search and seizure proce-

dures, as the ISP may be better placed to rapidly secure the evidence in question.

Additionally, a preservation measure may be less disruptive to the legitimate business

of the ISP, with lower potential for reputational harm to the business,⁵⁶ which may

facilitate ongoing cooperation. The search and seizure procedure with respect to stored

data, established pursuant to article 19 of the Council of Europe Convention on Cyber-

crime, provides protections regarding stored data that are similar to those generally

afforded to tangible evidence⁵⁷ under the relevant domestic legislation.⁵⁸

61. The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime also requires parties to imple-

ment legislation relating to the production of stored subscriber data.⁵⁹ Such information

may be crucial during the investigative stage to establish the identity of a perpetrator

of a terrorist act involving use of the Internet, and may include the physical location

of such person, as well as other related communication services employed in the com-

mission of the act. The Convention also requires signatory States to establish minimum

standards to enable real-time collection of traffic data⁶⁰ associated with specified com-

munications and the interception of content data in relation to specified serious offences

under domestic law.⁶¹

62. The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime may be applied in conjunction

with counter-terrorism instruments, such as the Council of Europe Convention on the

Prevention of Terrorism,⁶² to provide a legal basis for cooperation against the use of

the Internet for terrorist purposes. The Council of Europe Convention on the Preven-

tion of Terrorism requires parties to criminalize certain acts under domestic law that

may lead to the commission of terrorist offences, such as public provocation, recruit-

ment and training, all of which may be committed through the Internet. The Conven-

tion also mandates national and international cooperation measures aimed at preventing

terrorism, including investigative measures. For example, article 22 of the Convention

provides for the sharing with another party of unsolicited information relating to inves-

tigations or proceedings, within the limits imposed by domestic law, in the common

interest of responding to criminal acts (spontaneous information).

⁵⁵Explanatory report to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, para. 157.

⁵⁶Ibid., para. 155.

⁵⁷Such as the data medium upon which the data is stored.

⁵⁸Explanatory report to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, para. 184.

⁵⁹See Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, art. 18. “Subscriber data” is defined to include any informa-

tion, other than traffic data or content data, relating to the user’s identity, postal or geographic address, telephone and

other access number, billing and payment information or any other information concerning the site or location where

the communication equipment is installed that is available on the basis of the service agreement with the Internet service

provider.

⁶⁰Pursuant to article 1 (d) of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, “traffic data” includes informa-

tion that indicates a communication’s origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration or type of underlying

service.

⁶¹Pursuant to articles 20 and 21, respectively, of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime.

⁶² Council of Europe, Treaty Series, No.

196. Also available from http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/treaties/

html/196.htm.

THE USE OF THE INTERNET FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES

63. The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime and the Council of Europe

Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism are open to ratification or accession by all

member States of the Council of Europe,⁶³ non-member States that participated in the

elaboration of those Conventions and other non-member States by invitation, with

agreement from all of the States then parties to the relevant Convention.⁶⁴ It is worth

noting that several countries that have not formally acceded to the Council of Europe

Convention on Cybercrime have nonetheless used its provisions as guidelines in the

drafting of their own national cybercrime legislation. (See also section ‎F below on

model legislation.)

64. The Council of Europe has also elaborated the Additional Protocol to the Con-

vention on Cybercrime, concerning the Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist and Xeno-

phobic Nature Committed through Computer Systems.⁶⁵ This Additional Protocol may

also facilitate the prosecution of terrorist acts committed via the Internet with the

intention of inciting violence on the basis of race, colour, descent, national or ethnic

origin, or religion.⁶⁶ The Additional Protocol is open to all contracting States of the

Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime.⁶⁷

2. European Union

65. In

2002, the Council of the European Union adopted framework decision

2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, which harmonizes the defini-

tion of terrorist offences in all European Union member States⁶⁸ by introducing a

specific and common definition of the concept of “terrorism”, setting forth jurisdictional

rules to guarantee that terrorist offences may be effectively prosecuted, and outlining

specific measures with regard to victims of terrorist offences. In response to the grow-

ing terrorist threat, including the use of new technologies such as the Internet, frame-

work decision 2002/475/JHA was amended in 2008⁶⁹ to specifically include provisions

on public provocation to commit a terrorist offence, recruitment for terrorism and

training for terrorism. In that decision, the Council of the European Union also took

note of Security Council resolution 1624 (2005), in which the Council called upon

States to take measures to prohibit by law incitement to commit a terrorist act or acts

and to prevent such conduct.

⁶³As at the date of the present publication, the 47 member States of the Council of Europe are the following:

Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech

Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,

Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway,

Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,

the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine and United Kingdom.

⁶⁴See Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, art. 36, and Council of Europe Convention on the Preven-

tion of Terrorism, arts. 23-24.

⁶⁵ Council of Europe, European Treaty Series, No. 189.

⁶⁶Ibid., art. 2.

⁶⁷Ibid., art. 11.

⁶⁸As at the date of the present publication, the 27 member States of the European Union are: Austria, Belgium,

Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,

Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United

Kingdom.

⁶⁹ Council of the European Union Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending Framework

Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism.

CHAPTER II. The international context

66. Framework decision 2008/919/JHA provides a basis for prosecuting the dissemina-

tion of terrorist propaganda and bomb-making expertise also through the Internet, to

the extent that such dissemination is committed intentionally and meets the require-

ments of the named offences. The amendments to framework decision 2002/475/JHA

relating to the offences of public provocation, recruitment and training were based on

similar provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terror-

ism.⁷⁰ Framework decision 2008/919/JHA introduced new offences regarding conduct

that may lead to acts of terrorism, irrespective of the means or technological tools

through which these offences are committed. As with the Council of Europe Conven-

tion on the Prevention of Terrorism, while the provisions of framework decision

2008/919/JHA are not Internet-specific, they also cover activities conducted by means

of the Internet.

3. Additional legal instruments

67. Additional binding legal instruments adopted by regional or subregional organiza-

tions which may contain provisions relevant to countering terrorist use of the Internet

include the following:

••

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Regional Convention on

Suppression of Terrorism (1987)

••

Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (1998)

••

Treaty on Cooperation among States Members of the Commonwealth of Inde-

pendent States in Combating Terrorism (1999)

••

Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating Inter-

national Terrorism (1999)

••

Organization of African Unity Convention on the Prevention and Combating

of Terrorism (1999)

••

Inter-American Convention against Terrorism (2002)

••

Association of Southeast Asian Nations Convention on Counter Terrorism

(2007)

••

Economic Community of West African States directive on fighting cybercrime

(2009).

F. Model legislation

68. While model legislation provides advisory guidelines, rather than legally binding

obligations, it plays an important role in harmonizing legal standards among States.

Unlike international conventions, which may be subject to extensive negotiations to

reflect the needs of a diverse range of potential signatories, the provisions of model

⁷⁰ Council of Ministers, “Amendment of the Framework Decision on combating terrorism”, press release of 18

April 2008.

THE USE OF THE INTERNET FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES

laws provide States with the benefit of strong foundational legal provisions as a point

of departure for the development of domestic legislation. A key benefit of the use of

model provisions as a basis for national legislation is the facilitation of international

cooperation, including through the mitigation of conflicts arising out of misinterpreta-

tion of provisions in different legal systems (for example, between common-law and

civil-law jurisdictions) and with respect to dual criminality requirements.⁷¹ (See discus-

sion in section V.F.5 below.)

1. Commonwealth

69. The Commonwealth Model Law on Computer and Computer Related Crime

(2002) was drafted on the basis of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime.⁷²

The Model Law is aimed at leveraging the similarities in the legal traditions of Com-

monwealth member States⁷³ to promote the harmonization of both substantive and

procedural aspects of combating cybercrime and to promote international cooperation.

The Commonwealth Model Law is consistent with the standards defined by the Council

of Europe Convention on Cybercrime.

2. Commonwealth of Independent States

70. Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have also

adopted model legislative acts and guidelines, aimed at harmonizing the national leg-

islative systems, taking into account international experiences in the fight against ter-

rorism. These model provisions reflect international legal standards, adapted to the

needs of CIS member States.⁷⁴ For example, article 13 of the Model Law on the regu-

latory framework of the Internet⁷⁵ provides model provisions with respect to countering

the use of the Internet for illegal purposes.

3. International Telecommunication Union

71. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is a specialized agency of the

United Nations that plays a leading role in cybercrime issues. ITU has developed the

Toolkit for Cybercrime Legislation (2010) to promote harmonized national cybercrime

⁷¹Pursuant to the principle of dual criminality, extradition may be possible only in cases in which the act on the

basis of which extradition has been requested is punishable in both the requesting and the requested State.

⁷²For more information, see www.thecommonwealth.org/shared_asp_files/uploadedfiles/%7BDA109CD2-5204-

4FAB-AA77-86970A639B05%7D_Computer%20Crime.pdf.

⁷³As at the date of the present publication, the 53 member States of the Commonwealth were: Antigua and Bar-

buda, Australia, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Canada, Cyprus,

Dominica, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives,

Malta, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint

Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon

Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Kingdom, United

Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu and Zambia.

⁷⁴As at the date of the present publication, the 11 member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States

were: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turk-

menistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

⁷⁵Annex to resolution 36-9 of the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the members of the Commonwealth of Inde-

pendent States, adopted on 16 May 2011.

III.

Policy and legislative frameworksIII.

A. Introduction

72. In addition to using the Internet to plan and finance terrorist acts, terrorists also

use it to recruit and train new members; communicate, research or reconnoitre potential

targets; disseminate propaganda; and incite others to carry out acts of terrorism.

73. In the present chapter, issues related to the development of criminal justice poli-

cies and legislation aimed at countering these threats are considered, with the aim of

identifying, by reference to examples and national experiences offered by some States

represented at the expert group meetings, common challenges and approaches that can

either impede or strengthen the effective investigation and prosecution of terrorism

cases involving some aspect of Internet use.

B. Policy

74. In order to provide effective criminal justice responses to threats presented by

terrorists using the Internet, States require clear national policies and legislative frame-

works. Broadly speaking, such policies and laws will focus on:

(a) Criminalization of unlawful acts carried out by terrorists over the Internet or

related services;

(b) Provision of investigative powers for law enforcement agencies engaged in

terrorism-related investigations;

(d) Facilitation of international cooperation;

(e) Development of specialized judicial or evidential procedures;

(f) Maintenance of international human rights standards.

Policy approaches

75. In its 2011 publication, Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes: Legal

and Technical Aspects,⁷⁸ the Working Group on Countering the Use of Internet for

⁷⁸See United Nations, Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, Working Group on Countering the Use of

Internet for Terrorist Purposes, Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes: Legal and Technical Aspects (New York,

2011).

THE USE OF THE INTERNET FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES

Ŧerrorist Purposes of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force identified three

broad strategic approaches by which States might counter terrorist activities over the

Internet; involving the use of:

(a) General cybercrime legislation;

(b) General (non-Internet-specific) counter-terrorism legislation;

76. It is noted that in approach (a), in addition to the use of general cybercrime

legislation, other inchoate criminal offences such as solicitation and criminal association

might also be used when dealing with terrorism cases involving some aspect of Internet

use, particularly when dealing with alleged acts aimed at inciting acts of terrorism.

77. The Working Group’s broad classification system is a useful conceptual frame-

work to guide the work of policymakers and legislators when considering appropriate

policy and legislative approaches for their particular States.

78. Another useful resource for policymakers and legislators, referred to in Countering

the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes⁷⁹ is the Toolkit for Cybercrime Legislation,

developed under the auspices of ITU. In addition to other model criminal provisions,

the Toolkit contains several specific terrorist-related offences, including section 3 (f),

which deals with unauthorized access to, or acquiring computer programs for, the

purpose of developing, formulating, planning, facilitating, assisting in the commission

of, conspiring to commit or committing acts of terrorism.

79. Within the broad framework provided by universal counter-terrorism instruments

and relevant international human rights standards, Governments have considerable flex-

ibility in their preferred approach; inevitably, these vary between States. The present

chapter merely highlights examples of approaches adopted by some States that might

be helpful to policymakers and legislators.

80. Currently, few States have developed counter-terrorism legislation specifically

targeting the use of the Internet itself by terrorists, but there are some, including the

United Kingdom, where, after the 2005 bombings in London the Government enacted

the Terrorism Act 2006, Part 1 of which includes provisions specifically dealing with

Internet-based activity that is likely to encourage or assist in the commission of acts of

terrorism. The Act supplements the Computer Misuse Act 1990, which addresses

computer-based crime and cybercrime more generally.

81. In 2007, the United Arab Emirates passed federal cyberlaws that, in addition to

criminalizing hacking and other Internet-related activity, criminalized the establishment

of a website or the publication of information for terrorist groups under false names

with intent to facilitate contact with their leadership or promote their ideologies, finance

⁷⁹Ibid., para. 20.

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