Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 5)

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CHAPTER 1

WEAPON

GOVERNING

SYSTEM

REPORT

MEDIA

DIRECTIVE

PURPOSE OF REPORT

UGM-109-1

PRODUCT

Standard

NAVSEAINST

Report receipt of defective

UGM-109-2

QUALITY

Form 368

4855.7

AURs or material.

RGM-109-2

DEFICIENCY

RGM-109-4

REPORT

(QDR)

UGM-109-1

REPORT OF

Standard

NAVMATINST

Report shipping and

UGM-109-2

ITEM DIS-

Form 364

4355.7

packaging discrepancies

RGM-109-2

CREPANCY

RGM-109-4

(ROID)

UGM-109-1

SUBMARINE

SWFTR

For use by Organizational

UGM-109-2

WEAPON

Form

Level Activities under

FIELD

the cognizance of

TROUBLE

the Submarine Type

REPORT

Commanders (TYCOMs)

(SWFTR)

to report damaged, faulty,

or failed equipment,

ineffective documentation,

routine requests for

technical assistance,

corrective maintenance

and/or results of PMS

accomplishment for

UGM-109C/D/E AURs

and related equipment.

UGM-109-1

TECHNICAL

NAVSEA

NAVSEAINST

Report errors, omissions

UGM-109-2

MANUAL

Form

4160.3

or discrepancies or

RGM-109-2

DEFICIENCY/

4160/1

recommend changes

RGM-109-4

EVALUATION

to basic manuals.

REPORT

(TMDER)

UGM-109-1

HAZARDOUS

Message

OPNAVINST

Report accident or incident

UGM-109-2

INCIDENT

5102.1 for Navy/

with material loss or

RGM-109-2

REPORT

CMPINST 5102.1

damage to any variant

RGM-109-4

for contractor

creating hazard/potential

hazard.

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Table 1-6. Common Descriptive Data

ITEM

DESCRIPTION

Engine:

Designation

F107-WR-400(a) or F107-WR-402(b)

Type

Turbofan

Thrust.

600 lb

Rocket Motor Assembly:(a)

Designation

Mk 106 Mod 0

Type

Single-chamber, fixed nozzle

Propellant

Arcadene 228G solid grain (304 lb)

Control

Jet tab thrust vector

Safe-Arm Igniter Assy

Electromechanical, dual initiator

Rocket Motor Assembly:(b)

Designation

Mk 111 Mod 0

Type

Single-chamber, omnidirectional nozzle

Propellant

UTP-25201C solid grain (349 lb)

Control

Nozzle thrust vector

Safe-Arm Igniter Assy

Electromechanical, dual initiator

Electrical System:

Shroud Converter:

Type

AC/DC

Input

115/200V, 400Hz, 3 phase, Y

Output

27.5-28.5 Vdc

Guidance Set Battery:

Type

Thermal

Output

23-33 Vdc

Airframe Battery:

Type

Thermal, dual output

Output 1/Output 2

25-32 Vdc/26-44 Vdc

Engine Generator/Regulator:

Type

Dual output

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ITEM

DESCRIPTION

Output

28+/−1 Vdc (regulated)

Output 2

24-40 Vdc (semi-regulated)

REM Batteries (2):(c)

Type

Silver oxide-zinc, remotely activated

Output

25-32 Vdc

RSS Battery:(d)

Type

Thermal

Output

23-33 Vdc

Fuel:

Propellant, high density synthetic hydrocarbon, JP-10,

MIL-P-87107C

Pneumatic System:

Airframe Supply Bottle:

Pressure

6000 psi (helium)

Volume

39 cu in

TVC Supply Bottle:(e)

Pressure

6000 psi (nitrogen)

Volume(g)

23 cu in

Volume(h)

60 cu in

REM Flotation Supply

Botles(2):(c)

Pressure

6000 psi (nitrogen)

Volume

60 cu in each

Hydraulic System:(f)

Hydraulic Reservoir/Accumulator

3550 psi

Pressurization/Vent System:

Transducer:(g)

Type

Dual differential, pressure sensing

Range

0.5 - 12.5 psid

Pressure Relief Valve:(g)

Type

Poppet, spring-loaded

Cracking Pressure

12-16 psid

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ITEM

DESCRIPTION

Reseat Pressure

10.8 psid (min)

Pressure Relief Valve:(h)

Type

Poppet, spring-loaded

Cracking Pressure

3.4-17.0 psid

Reseat Pressure

3.0 psid

CLS Electrical System:(h)

Type

Vdc

Input

24-30 Vdc and 4.5-5.5 Vdc

Output

24-30 Vdc

Engine:(i)

Designation

Model F415-WR-400

Type

Turbofan

Thrust

650 lb

Rocket Motor Assembly:(i)

Designation

Mk 135 Mod 0

Type

Single-chamber, fixed nozzle

Propellant

Arcadene 360B HTPB, high performance, aluminized

composite propellant (322 lb)

Control

Jet tab thrust vector

Safe Arm Igniter Assy

Mk 38

Airframe Battery:(i)

Type

Lithium thermal, dual output

Output 1/Output 2

28-34 Vdc/40-65 Vdc

Alternator:(i)

Type

Engine shaft mounted, three phase permanent magnet

generator

Output

4.3 KVA (max)

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Table 1-7. Variant Unique Descriptive Data

ITEM

109A

109C

109D

109E

Guidance:

Land Attack

Land -Attack

Land At-

AN/DWS-15

tack Guid-

(V)I Block III

ance Electron-

w/ DSMAC or

ics Unit w/DS-

DSMAC IIA and

MAC,GPSS, and

GPSS

TERCOM

Warhead:

Type/Weight

W80 Mod 0 Non-

WDU-25/B

BLU-97/B

WDU-36/B

Conventional

high explosive

High Explosive

(Picratol/H-6)

(Cyclotol 70/30)

Warhead

992 lb (378 lb

287grams each

(PBXN-107 Type

explosive)

II) 690 lb (265

explosive)

Warhead:

Type/Weight

WDU-36/B

Conventional

high explosive

(PBXN-107 Type

II) 690 lb (265 lb

explosive)

Fuel Capacity:

TACTICAL;

1121

lb (a)

350 lb (a) 546 lb

527

lb (a)

568

1100 lb

(b)

REM

1121

lb (a)

354 lb (a) 558 lb

(b)

RSS

350 lb (a) 468 lb

474

lb (a)

474

(b)

Warhead Arming

Devices:

Dual Air Valve:

FZU-43/B

Pyrotechnic

actuated dual

initiator

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Table 1-9. Weights of TTL Variants and Related

Material

ITEM

HANDLING WEIGHT* (LBS)

Pounds

Kilograms

lbs

TACTICAL AUR

UGM-109A-1

4273

1938

UGM-109C-1

4548

2063

UGM-109D-1

4391

1992

UGM-109E-1

4510

2046

EXERCISE AUR

JUGM-109A-1

4245

1926

JUGM-109A-1(QAST)

JUGM-109C-1

4483

2033

JUGM-109D-1

4367

1981

TRAINING/CERTIFICATION VARIANTS

TOMAHAWK TEST MISSILE (TOTEM)

3550

1610

UTM-109-1

ENCAPSULATED NL TOTEM

3550

1610

COMMERCIAL OFF THE SHELF (COTS) TOTEM

4050

1837

PRESSURE VENT TEST VEHICLE (PVTV)

4550

2063.9

TOTEM

CREW TRAINING SHAPE (CTS) UTM-109-1A

3576

1622

WARHEAD INSTALLATION TRAINER (WIT) MK

4137

1877

35/0 w/WARHEAD

TOMAHAWK FITMENT SHAPE (TOMFISH) MK

4250

1928

1/0

VEHICLES AND CAPSULES

TOTEM TEST VEHICLE TM-109-1C

2600

1179

CAPSULE MK 1/0

938

425

CAPSULE MK 3/0

1005

456

TOTEM CAPSULE

950

431

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Table 1-10. Centers of Gravity for TTL Variants

*APPROXIMATE FWD

MEASUREMENT (IN)

ITEM

FROM CAPSULE CG

TACTICAL AUR

UGM-109A-1 w/ W80 Warhead

10.0

UGM-109A-1 w/o W80 Warhead

2.5

UGM-109C-1

12.0

UGM-109D-1

11.5

UGM-109E-1

10.6

EXERCISE AUR

JUGM-109A-1 w/ NTIK or REM & Inert Warhead

10.0

JUGM-109A-1w/QAST

JUGM-109C-1-M

11.5

JUGM-109C-1-S/W

10.5

JUGM-109D-1-S/W

11.5

TRAINING/CERTIFICATION VARIANTS AND

CAPSULES

TOMAHAWK TEST MISSILE (TOTEM) UTM-109-1

7.5

ENCAPSULATED NL TOTEM

7.5

COMMERCIAL OFF THE SHELF (COTS) TOTEM

7.5

ENCAPSULATED PVTV TOTEM

CREW TRAINING SHAPE (CTS) UTM-109-1A

6.0

WARHEAD INSTALLATION TRAINER (WIT) MK 35/0

9.5

w/W80

WARHEAD INSTALLATION TRAINER (WIT) MK 35/0

3.5

w/o W80

TOMAHAWK FITMENT SHAPE (TOMFISH) MK 1/0

0.0

CAPSULE MK 1/0, empty w/nose and slot covers

0.0

CAPSULE MK 1/0, empty w/o nose and slot covers

-5.0

CAPSULE MK 3/0, empty w/nose and slot covers

0.0

CAPSULE MK 3/0, empty w/o nose and slot covers

-2.39

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*APPROXIMATE FWD

MEASUREMENT (IN)

ITEM

FROM CAPSULE CG

TOTEM CAPSULE, empty w/ nose and slot covers

0.0

TOTEM CAPSULE, empty w/o nose and slot covers

-3.5

WIT CAPSULE, empty w/nose and slot covers

7.0

WIT CAPSULE, empty w/o nose and slot covers

2.5

*Measure from center of capsule CG stripe.

AUR CG calculation is for AUR configured with Mk 111 Rocket Motor, aluminum nose

cover and slot covers installed. Add up to 1.0 inch to measurement for variants with

Mk 106 Mod 0 Rocket Motor. Subtract 0.5 inch from measurement with lightweight

nose cover installed.

AUR/WIT/CTS CGs at station 142.1.

TOTEM, NL TOTEM and COTS TOTEM Capsule CGs at station 144.0.

PVTV TOTEM Capsule CG at station 155.0.

** QAST CG will vary depending on test requirements. Refer to Test and Evaluation

Plan for data.

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Table 1-11. Weights of CLS Variants and Related

Material

MAX. HANDLING

WEIGHT (POUNDS)*

WEIGHT

(KILOGRAMS)*

ITEM

CLS Mk 45

Mod 1

Mod 2

Mod 1

Mod 2

TACTICAL VARIANTS:

UGM-109C-2

5905

2679

UGM-109D-2

5749

2608

UGM-109E-2

5900

2676

EXERCISE VARIANTS:

JUGM-109C-2

5816

TBF

2638

TBF

JUGM-109D-2

5696

TBF

2584

TBF

JUGM-109E-2-S/W

5625

TBF

2552

TBF

JUGM-109E-2-W

5612

TBF

2546

TBF

CAPSULE:

Capsule Launching System Mk

2132

2290

967

1039

(w. CPC)

Capsule Launching System Mk

2218

2376

1006

1078

(Spent)**

MAX. HANDLING

WEIGHT (POUNDS)*

WEIGHT

(KILOGRAMS)*

TRAINING/INERT VARIANTS:

AUR VOLUMETRIC SHAPE

6800

3084

AUR SIMULATOR

6870

3116

AURES Mk 101

AURES Mk 112

Missile Tube Ballast Can (w/o

6800

3084

additional ballast)

AURBb

5680 ± 300

2576 ± 136

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MAX. HANDLING

WEIGHT (POUNDS)*

WEIGHT

(KILOGRAMS)*

CLS Loading and Handling Trainer

6390

2899

Assembly (Mod 1)

CLS Loading and Handling Trainer

TBF

Assembly (Mod 2)

SHIPPING SKID:

Shipping and Storage Skid Mk 30

2650

1202

Mod 2 w/covers

AUR Simulator Shipping Skid

2700

1225

w/covers

MISCELLANEOUS:

SABOT

Closure Protective Cover (CPC) Mk

Capsule Loading Cover (CLC)

Clamp Ring

Forward Capsule Support Adapter

Mk 168

CLS Uprighting Fixture Mk 26

130

Lifting Adapter Mk 169

500

227

Lifting Adapter Extension

300

136

Missile Tube Extension Loader

2000

907

(MTEL) Mk 23

MTEL Adapter

480

218

Container, Shipping/Storage, MTEL

2120

962

Adapter, Lifting Adapter Extension

(Loaded)

Container, Shipping/Storage, Work

750

340

Platform (Loaded)

MTEL Shipping Pallet

1100

499

Installation Guide Mk 116

185

Hydraulic Power Unit (HPU) Mk 8

290

132

Tilt Fixture, Mk 23

3000

1361

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Table 1-12. Centers of Gravity for CLS Variants

ITEM

CENTER OF GRAVITY

(INCHES)

CLS MK 45 1/2

TACTICAL AUR

UGM-109C-2

126 ± 6

UGM-109D-2

127 ± 6

UGM-109E-2

127 ± 6

EXERCISE AUR

JUGM-109C-2-M

133

JUGM-109C-2-S/W

132

JUGM-109D-2-S/W

132

JUGM-109E-2-S/W

143

CAPSULE LAUNCHER

SPENT CLS *

163 ± 6

OTHER

CENTER OF GRAVITY

(INCHES)

AUR SIMULATOR SHIP SKID (LOADED)

141

AUR SIMULATOR SHIP SKID (EMPTY)

160

AUR SIMULATOR VOLUMETRIC SHAPE w/ AURES

153

AUR SIMULATOR VOLUMETRIC SHAPE w/o AURES

155

AURBb

122.51 ± 1.00

MISSILE TUBE BALLAST CAN

132

CLS LOADING AND HANDLING TRAINING SHAPE

127

AUR variant, AUR Volumetric Shape, AURBb, AUR Simulator and CLS Loading and

Handling Trainer CGs are measured from ’datum B’ (lower edge of upper flange).

Missile Tube Ballast Can CG is measured from brass protector ring (flat gasket mounting

surface).

AUR Simulator Shipping Skid: Trunnion end.

*CG will vary for empty/spent capsule depending on amount of residual water remaining

in capsule after draining.

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CHAPTER 2

SECURITY AND SAFETY

2.1 SCOPE.

This chapter discusses TOMAHAWK Weapon System (TWS) security and safety requirements,

regulations and general policies relating thereto.

2.2 SECURITY.

TOMAHAWK mission criticality, high cost and political sensitivity require an adequate level of

security be maintained regarding security safeguards and physical protective measures used for

commercial/government transport. OPNAVINST 5530.13, PEO(CU)INST 4601.1 and NAVSEA

SW020-AG-SAF-010 contain specific security requirements for transport of TOMAHAWK

Cruise Missiles (TCM) variants over public highways. Storage and transport of TCM variants

on military installations will be IAW NAVSEA OP 5, NAVSEA OP 4461 and amplifying local

directives.

2.2.1

Security Classification. All TCMs carry a minimum security classification of

CONFIDENTIAL. OPNAVINST S5513.28 contains specific information on the security

classification of TCM variants and their components.

2.2.2

Maintaining Unwarheaded 109A Certification. Prior to, during, and subsequent to

warhead installation, the 109A variant receives no missile systems testing at the intermediate

level. To ensure that the variant retains its certification, the following requirements apply to

the 109A without warhead installed:

a. The 109A without warhead shall be safeguarded in accordance with the provisions of

OPNAVINST 5530.13 and OPNAVINST C8126.1/DOD C-5210.41-M and shall be

protected at the same level of security provided Category II Arms, Ammunition and

Explosives (AA&E).

b. Formal entry and access control shall be maintained in accordance with OPNAVINST

5530.13 after the tamper resistant tape seals are broken on the shipping container.

c. Upon breaking the tamper resistant tape seals on the shipping container, the 109A

shall be provided two-person control which is defined in Special Weapons Ordnance

Publication (SWOP) 4-1 as ’The close surveillance and control of materials at all

times by a minimum of two authorized persons, each capable of detecting incorrect or

unauthorized procedures with respect to the task to be performed, and each familiar

with established security requirements’.

2.2.3

Warheaded 109A. Warheaded 109A TCMs are secured, handled, maintained and

transported in accordance with applicable SWOPs.

2.2.4

Transportation Security. All shipping containers containing TCM variants are secured

by wire seals. Shipping containers containing 109A variants without warhead are shipped from

the manufacturer to the military first destination with tamper resistant tape seals, as well as wire

seals, applied to the container. Additionally, the manufacturer places tamper resistant tape seals

on the 109A variant prior to shipment. Tamper resistant tape seals are serially numbered with the

back of the seal coated with a bar pattern release agent that will show the bars if the seal was

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CHAPTER 2

removed and re-affixed or has been subjected to tampering. Serial numbers or seal identifying

data are recorded in the Record Book for TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile, PEO(W) PUB 4440, that

accompanies each TCM variant. Seal locations are illustrated in the record book as well as in

applicable volumes of this document addressing removal/installation of seals during handling

and maintenance processes.

2.2.4.1

Receipt. During receipt inspections, tamper resistant tape and wire seals are inspected

for integrity. Additionally, seal serial numbers/identifying data are compared with the information

contained in the record book. If seals are missing, broken, or show evidence of tampering,

compromise of the variant is suspected and Program Executive Officer for Unmanned Aviation

and Strike Weapons [PEO(U&W)] (PMA-280714) as well as the applicable In-Service

Engineering Agent are notified.

2.2.4.2

Transfer. Navy activities apply wire seals to shipping containers when transferring

TCMs out of Navy custody. Additionally, activities apply tamper resistant tape seals to a 109A

variant without warhead and its shipping container prior to shipment to the depot or to another

intermediate maintenance activity. Seal serial numbers/identifying data are recorded in the record

book.

2.3 SAFETY.

Operations associated with the TOMAHAWK Weapons System (TWS) present a number of

safety considerations at all levels. The TCM contains a number of hazardous components.

Handling evolutions involve moving heavy weights using dollies or hoists where ’free-wheeling’

or pendulum effects can occur. Operations may have to be performed under adverse conditions

where weather or sea state can impact safety. During TCM or related equipment maintenance

processes, personnel may be exposed to various hazardous materials which may require the use

of protective equipment or employing special procedures. To maximize safety, only qualified

ordnance certified personnel as specified in NAVSEA OP 4 and OP 5 and NAVSEAINSTs 8020.9

and 8023.2 shall be used to perform TWS evolutions. Additionally, procedural volumes of this

document contain the general safety summary, Table 2-1 "General Safety Summary"⇒, as well

as generic and specific warnings and cautions to identify potential hazards to personnel or

equipment. These warnings and/or cautions appear prior to the step or series of steps in which

potential hazards exist.

2.3.1

Explosives Safety Quantity Distance (ESQD) Arc Restrictions. At some activities,

other than designated ammunition handling facilities (i.e., WPNSTA), handling of explosives is

substantially restricted because nonexplosive ordnance activities (i.e., inhabited buildings) are in

close proximity to ordnance handling operations. To safely accommodate handling of more than

one TOMAHAWK All-UP-Round (AUR) at these ESQD restricted activities, special handling

procedures have been developed and approved for the conventional TOMAHAWK AUR.

2.3.1.1

The concept for these special handling procedures is based on maintaining a Maximum

Credible Event (MCE) of one TOMAHAWK AUR regardless of the number of AURs involved.

The acknowledged ESQD arc to inhabited buildings for one conventional TOMAHAWK AUR is

600 feet. The conventional TOMAHAWK AUR ESQD area is 600 feet.

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2.3.1.2

A maximum of two conventional TOMAHAWK AURs in their launch configuration,

either in or out of their shipping containers, must be maintained in a nose-to-tail configuration

with respect to each other either horizontally or vertically. Other stacking restrictions regarding

numbers in stacks on or off transport vehicles still apply. This nose-to-tail configuration is to

be maintained on the bed of a truck driven onto a pier, in small boats or on the pier itself.

Additionally, a maximum of two other conventional TOMAHAWK AURs in their launch

configuration (off-loaded from combatant) may be placed in a nose to-tail configuration in

specially positioned chocks or shipping containers on the pier. All four missiles must be in a

nose-to-tail configuration in groups of two, and each group of two must be positioned no closer

than 10 feet side-to-side or 5 feet nose-to-tail (Figure 2-1 "Explosive Safety Quantity Distance

(ESQD) Arc Restrictions (Typical)"⇒).

2.3.1.3

The use of these procedures will prevent sympathetic detonation and maintain an MCE

of one conventional TOMAHAWK AUR. If ESQD restrictions are less than 600 feet to inhabited

buildings, these procedures will not provide relief, and the requirements of NAVSEA OP 4 or

OP 5 prevail. Conversely, where ESQD arcs to inhabited buildings are well beyond 600-ft arc,

the ordnance handling activity may utilize the procedure to reduce, thus enhance the effect of

the available ESQD arc. These procedures are not applicable in magazines, bunkers, workshops

or inside ships.

2.3.2

TCM Hazardous Components. TCM hazardous components range from the

nonexplosive, combustible JP-10 fuel used by the TCM to cruise to the target, comparatively

low-explosive electro-explosive devices (EED) used to separate the TCM from its launching

device, to the highly destructive, high explosive warhead. Also included in the general category of

explosives are the solid propellant rocket motor and the Capsule Launching System gas generator.

TCM hazardous component locations are illustrated in Figure 2-2 "TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile

Hazardous Component Locations (2 Sheets)"⇒. All TOMAHAWK AURs are assigned to Storage

Compatibility Group “J” and to a DOT Hazard Class IAW SW020-AC-SAF-010/020/030. Table

2-2 "Storage and Hazard Data"⇒ summarizes storage and hazard data for all AURs. Table 2-3

"Pyrotechnic and Hazardous Materials Data"⇒ provides AUR pyrotechnic and hazard data

associated with composite material breakdown/combustion and postlaunch waste water in spent

CLS capsules.

2.3.3

Permits. As all TCMs contain some hazardous materials in their shipping configurations,

current Department of Transportation (DOT) Exemptions and Certifications of Equivalency

(COE) are required to authorize the movement of these items. Copies of the applicable permits

must accompany the shipment, and any special instructions contained in the permit must be

observed. The permits have the force and effect of federal law, and failure to have a permit or to

comply fully with its provisions may result in fine and/or imprisonment. The fact that a shipment

is made by or for the government in no way relieves the shipper from full compliance with permit

requirements. Five permits have been issued by federal agencies that effect shipment of TCMs.

2.3.4

Hazards Associated With Composite Material Breakdown/Combustion. CLS AURs

may be encapsulated in a steel or a composite material CLS. If a CLS made of composite material

is subjected to fire, additional precautions must be taken as outlined below and summarized in

Table 2-3 "Pyrotechnic and Hazardous Materials Data"⇒.

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2.3.4.1

Composite materials composed of carbon/graphite fibers present several hazards when

subjected to fire, explosion, etc. Carbon/graphite fibers can be released into the atmosphere if

their epoxy binder burns. When subjected to temperatures of approximately 752°F (400°C) the

epoxy binder will ignite or decompose, possibly releasing fiber material. Once free, the fibers can

be transported up to several miles by air currents. The fiber material is highly conductive and

fibers can potentially damage electric/electronic equipment. Mechanical agitation, especially an

explosion, can also fragment the composite causing fibers to become airborne.

2.3.4.2

Fires should be extinguished with CO₂, dry chemicals (AFFF), or water. Special

firefighting equipment such as Scott airpacks/MSAs/positive pressure self-contained breathing

apparatuses will be required. Hazardous combustion by-products may consist of carbon

monoxide, carbon dioxide, acrolein, phenols, amines, aldehydes, aromatic amines, hydrofluoric

acid and fluoroboric acid.

2.3.4.3

Personnel should wear protective clothing, such as:

a. Disposable coveralls and shoe covers

b. Gloves, preferably with leather palms

c. Safety glasses with side shields for cleanup personnel

d. Full face respirators for cleanup personnel

e. Positive-pressure self-contained breathing apparatus for firefighting personnel.

2.3.4.4

Waste materials should be collected with a vacuum cleaner equipped with High

Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filter elements. Waste materials should be packaged in

polyethylene plastic bags. If sheeting or bags are not available, fibers shall be contained using

an acrylic floor wax (i.e., Wax, Floor, Water Emulsion, P-W-155C). Affected areas shall be

decontaminated by washing down and/or vacuuming. Local solid waste disposal authorities shall

be consulted for approved burial sites/techniques for composites or composite contaminated

materials. Local cognizant industrial hygienist or medical department representative shall be

consulted for detailed health hazard control guidance, based upon extent of exposure.

2.3.5

CLS Post-Launch Waste Water. CLS post-launch waste water has a lead (Pb)

concentration consistently averaging between 5 to 10 milligrams per liter (mg/l) (particle setting

may cause concentrations to range from 1 to 5 mg/l at the top and 10 to 30 mg/l at the bottom of the

capsule) and cyanide concentration consistently between 20 to 25 mg/l. Because Environmental

Protection Agency regulations identify lead concentrations equal to or greater than 5 mg/l and

cyanide in any amount as hazardous, CLS post-launch waste water is considered hazardous waste

(HW). The internal volume of an expended CLS contains approximately 700 gallons of HW. Tube

flushing will produce approximately 300 additional gallons of HW. Therefore, approximately

1,040 gallons of HW are generated during off-load of one expended CLS.

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Table 2-1. General Safety Summary

GENERAL

Operators and maintenance personnel shall strictly observe all safety precautions applicable to

their work or duty station. Personnel are to immediately report any unsafe conditions or any

equipment that is considered unsafe.

Carelessness is one of the major causes of injury to personnel. Personnel shall be thoroughly

and frequently instructed in the general safety precautions associated with the system. Should

situations arise which are not covered in the safety precautions presented in this or other

applicable documents, the commanding officer, or other authorities, may issue orders as deemed

necessary.

For handling or maintenance of ordnance, personnel performing operations shall be qualified

and ordnance certified IAW NAVSEA OP 4 and OP 5, NAVSEAINST 8020.9 and 8023.2 and

other applicable documents. Familiarity with safety standards ASME/ANSI B30.5-1989 and

B30.8-1988 will help ensure safe crane operations.

The following are general safety precautions not related to any specific procedures and

therefore do not appear elsewhere in this publication. These are precautions that personnel must

understand and apply during many phases of operations and maintenance.

LIVE CIRCUITS

Personnel must observe all safety precautions while working on and around electrical

equipment. Do not replace components or make adjustments with the high voltage supply

turned on. Under certain conditions, dangerous potentials may exist when the power control is

in the OFF position. To avoid casualties, always remove power and discharge and ground a

circuit prior to touching it.

SERVICING OR ADJUSTING EQUIPMENT

Under no circumstances should the servicing or adjusting of equipment be attempted alone. The

immediate presence of someone capable of rendering aid is required.

RESUSCITATION

Personnel working with or near high voltages shall be thoroughly instructed in the latest

methods of cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). Should someone be injured by electricity and

stop breathing, begin resuscitation at once: a delay could result in the death of a victim.

VENTILATION

Ensure there is adequate ventilation to vent flammable and harmful vapors. Keep away from

heat, sparks, and open flame. Avoid prolonged breathing of vapors or repeated contact with

the skin. Failure to comply may result in injury to personnel.

RESPIRATORS

Personnel shall wear approved respirators when working with toxic cleaning agents, adhesives,

and other toxic materials.

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FIRST AID

An injury, no matter how slight, shall never remain unattended. First aid or medical attention

shall be given immediately.

HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH COMPOSITE MATERIAL COMBUSTION/BREAK-

DOWN

Composite materials composed of carbon/graphite fibers present several hazards when subjected

to fire, explosion, etc. The epoxy binder will ignite or decompose at high temperatures,

possibly releasing fiber materials. Mechanical breakdown (i.e., explosion) will also liberate

and fragment fibers. Such fibers can be spread via air currents for considerable distances.

Fiber material is highly conductive and can potentially damage electric/electronic equipment.

Combustion by-products may consist of carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, acrolein, phenols,

amines, aldehydes, aromatic amines, hydrofluoric acid, and fluoroboric acid.

COMMUNICATIONS

During a weapon loading/handling evolution, communications must be established and

maintained among all parties (e.g., handling/loading supervisor, security, crane/hoist operators,

handling personnel, damage control party) throughout the evolution. Should communications

become lost to any party engaged in an evolution, stop the operation and secure the weapon

until communications are reestablished.

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS AND SITUATIONS

Procedures involving hazardous materials or situations where there is potential for personnel

injury or damage to equipment are preceded by WARNING or CAUTION as appropriate.

For each hazardous material used, a Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) shall be posted and

reviewed to determine specific hazards involved, protective equipment requirements, and

appropriate handling and emergency procedures to be utilized.

NUCLEAR SAFETY PRECAUTIONS

All personnel performing technical operations on a TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile "A" variant

containing the W80 Warhead must be familiar with the Nuclear Safety Rules for Operations

provided in applicable Type Commander directives and SWOP 20-7.

FUEL PRECAUTIONS

TOMAHAWK Cruise Missiles are fueled with JP-10, a nonexplosive, combustible liquid. The

flashpoint for JP-10 is 130 degrees F and auto-ignition may occur at 474 degrees F.

Firefighting involving JP-10 is the same as for any other hydrocarbon fuel. Carbon dioxide, dry

chemical and water spray are the methods used to combat fire.

The probability of fuel leaking from the missile is highly unlikely since the capsule/canister

also serves as a fuel tight barrier. In the event leakage should occur, the affected areas should be

wrapped in Buna-N rubber sheeting and/or ordnance tape to provide a fuel tight seal.

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Do not use organic cartridge respirators or oxygen breathing apparatus to combat fuel associated

casualties, including cleanup of spills or combustion by-products. A minimum of two personnel

shall be present during operations involving fuel spills. No smoking, matches, or open flames

are permitted in the area of a fuel spill.

EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS

The TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile contains a number of explosive components. They range

from comparatively low-explosive electroexplosive devices (EED) to the highly destructive,

high explosive warhead. Also included in the general category of explosives is the solid

propellant rocket motor. General safety precautions regarding handling and storage of

explosives shall be observed at all times. Personnel shall be familiar with the operating

procedures and precautions necessary to prevent the spurious initiation of EEDs. Areas

containing explosives shall be clearly posted with the appropriate warning signs. See NAVSEA

OP 4 and OP 5.

POST LAUNCH WASTE WATER DISPOSAL

Removal of post launch waste water from expended capsules involves handling material which

is not authorized for direct dumping into coastal or inland waters. In many locations, disposal

of post launch waste water into shore sewage systems is prohibited. Contact the local public

works department and advise them of detailed disposal considerations to obtain guidance

for waste water disposal.

SAFETY HARNESSES

Personnel performing over-the-side operations or working in or around open hatches/missile

tubes shall wear safety harnesses with safety lines secured.

LITHIUM BATTERIES

REM-equipped TOMAHAWK missiles contain two lithium active battery packs, one used

to power the recovery beacon and one used to power a special instrumentation electronics

package. Lithium active batteries can become hazardous if the case is ruptured or the leads

are shorted together causing the battery to discharge at a high rate. Either situation can cause

a violent chemical reaction, the venting of potentially hazardous gasses including sulfur

dioxide (SO₂), hydrochloric acid (HCl), sulfuric acid (H₂SO₄), and sulfurous acid (H₂SO₃), and

possible explosion. This violent reaction can also be caused by water entering the battery

through a rupture in the case. Extreme care shall be used when disconnecting the active lithium

batteries to prevent the leads from shorting. Cease all operations and notify Explosive Ordnance

Disposal (EOD) if a ruptured or crushed lithium battery is observed. Do not spray water into

the REM compartment during missile washdown or decontamination operations.

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Table 2-2. Storage and Hazard Data

Q-D CLASS 1.1

DOT HAZARD MARKING "ROCKET AMMUNITION W/EXPLOSIVE PROJECTILE"

UN ID No.: UN0397

RGM/UGM-109C w/WDU-25/B/WDU-36/B Warhead, Rocket Motor Mk 106 Mod 0/Mk

111 Mod 0 and Liquid Sustainer Engine (Land Attack-Conventional)

JRGM/JUGM-109C-W w/WDU-25/B/WDU-36/B Warhead, RSS, Rocket

Motor Mk 106 Mod 0/Mk 111 Mod 0 and Liquid Sustainer Engine (Land

Attack-Conventional-Exercise)

RGM/UGM-109D w/BLU-97/B Payload Module (Kit-001/-002), Rocket

Motor Mk 106 Mod 0/Mk 111 Mod 0 and Liquid Sustainer Engine (Land

Attack-Conventional-Submunition)

JRGM/UGM-109D-W w/BLU-97/B Payload Module (Kit-003/-004), RSS,

Rocket Motor Mk 111 Mod 0 and Liquid Sustainer Engine (Land

Attack-Conventional-Submunitions-Exercise)

RGM/UGM-109E w/WDU-36/B Warhead, Rocket Motor Mk 135 Mod 0 and Liquid

Sustainer Engine (Land Attack-Conventional)

Q-D CLASS 1.3

DOT HAZARD MARKING "ROCKET MOTOR, CLASS B EXPLOSIVE"

UN ID No.: all UN0396

UGM-109A with W80 Warhead, Rocket Motor Mk 106 Mod 0 and Liquid Sustainer

Engine (Land Attack)

UGM-109A w/o W80 Warhead, Rocket Motor Mk 106 Mod 0 and Liquid Sustainer

Engine (Land Attack)

JUGM-109A-M/S w/ or w/o Inert W80 Warhead, REM or RSS, Rocket Motor Mk 106

Mod 0 and Liquid Sustainer Engine (Land Attack-Exercise)

JRGM/JUGM-109C-M/S w/Inert Warhead, REM or RSS, Rocket Motor Mk 106 Mod

0/Mk 111 Mod 0 and Liquid Sustainer Engine (Land Attack-Conventional-Exercise)

JRGM/JUGM-109D w/Inert Submunitions or Functional Indicator BLU-97/B Payload

(Kit 003), RSS, Rocket Motor Mk 106 Mod 0/Mk 111 Mod 0 and Liquid Sustainer

Engine (Land Attack-Conventional-Submunitions-Exercise)

JRGM/JUGM-109E w/Inert Warhead, REM or RSS, Rocket Motor Mk 135 Mod 0 and

Liquid Sustainer Engine (Land Attack-Conventional-Exercise)

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Table 2-3. Pyrotechnic and Hazardous Materials Data

ITEM

HAZARD

ROCKET MOTOR

Mk 106/0 = 304 lb propellant; Mk 111/0 = 349 lb

propellant; Mk 135/0 = 322 lb propellant

CONVENTIONAL WARHEAD

WDU-25/B = 378 lb explosive WDU-36/B = 265 lb

explosive

PAYLOAD MODULE

BLU-97/B = 106 lb explosive

FUEL JP-10

Flashpoint (FP) = 130 degrees F Auto-Ignition Temperature

= 474 degrees F

CLS SEPARATION NUT

Zirconium Potassium Perchlorate/Titanium

INITIATORS (4)

Hydride/Potassium Perchlorate Mixture = 295

milligrams

CLS GAS GENERATOR

Class B Pyrotechnic Propellant Grain Material = 7 lb

CLS IGNITER

Boron/Potassium Nitrate Binder Mixture = 100 grams

CLS GAS GENERATOR EBW

Boron Phosphate Nitrate/Superfine RDX Mixture = 240

INITIATOR

milligrams

GN₂ BOTTLES

6000 psi for Mk 106/0 Rocket Motor thrust vector control;

5000 psi for REM flotation system

He BOTTLES

6000 psi for air frame wing slots, wings, and inlet

deployment jet tab control

HYDRAULIC RESERVOIR/AC-

3500 psi for Mk 111/0 Rocket Motor thrust vector control

CUMULATOR

BLEED AIR VALVE

Zirconium/potassium perchlorate (65 mg) and Titanium

hydride/potassium perchlorate (220 mg)

FUEL SYSTEM ISOLATION

Zirconium/potassium perchlorate (65 mg) and Titanium

VALVE

hydride/potassium perchlorate (220 mg)

BOOSTER IGNITER

BKNO₃ Pellets, 107.5 gm

BOOSTER SEPARATION RING

(FLSC)/CH6 (5.76 gm) and Loaded Charge Case HNS

(.17 gm)

SHROUD EXPLOSIVE BOLT

ZPP (16 mg), Lead azide (14 mg) and RDX (200 mg)

CABLE CUTTER

Zirconium/potassium perchlorate (65 mg) and Titanium

hydride/potassium perchlorate (220 mg)

INLET COVER THRUSTER

Zirconium/potassium perchlorate (65 mg) and Titanium

hydride/potassium perchlorate (220 mg)

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ITEM

HAZARD

ENGINE START CARTRIDGE Ammonium nitrate based propellant (298 gm), Igniter mix

AND IGNITERS

IB-43, and Boron/potassium nitrate (17.5 gm)

WING PLUG THRUSTERS

Zirconium/potassium perchlorate (65 mg) and Titanium

hydride/potassium perchlorate (220 mg)

WING DEPLOYMENT

Zirconium/potassium perchlorate (65 mg) and Titanium

PNEUMATIC VALVES

hydride/potassium perchlorate (220 mg)

FIN CABLE CUTTER

Hercules Hi Temp (Boron, Calcium Chlorate, Tellurium

Dioxide, Viton B) (285 gm)

FIN DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM

1.3C Main Charge Talley TAL 11.0g, 1526 HTB Enhanced

PYROTECHNIC LINEAR

Thiokol 2D 140 mg Pellet, Equivalent to MIL-P-46994A

ACTUATORS (UGM-109E)

11B Pellet

CMA BATTERY

Iron sulfide, lithium fluoride, potassium chloride, lithium

bromide, magnesium oxide, Iron powder (MH 100 and NH

100), Cab-O-Sil, potassium perchlorate

NOTE: Refer to SW020-AC-SAF-010/-020/-030 for Net Explosive Weights

COMPOSITE CLS HAZARD INFORMATION

Composite materials in the Composite CLS are reinforced with carbon/graphite

fibers to provide stiffness, high strength-to-weight ratio, and ease of fabrication.

Carbon/graphite fibers can be released into the atmosphere if their epoxy binder

burns. (approximately 752 degrees F (400 degrees C) will cause epoxy binder to

ignite or decompose.) Once free, the small lightweight fibers can be transported

up to several miles by air currents. Because of their high electrical conductivity,

they can damage unprotected electrical/electronic equipment. Similarly, mechanical

agitation, especially an explosion, can fragment the composite and cause fibers to

become airborne.

EXTINGUISHING AGENTS: Carbon dioxide; dry chemical (AFFF); water.

SPECIAL FIREFIGHTING EQUIPMENT: Scott air packs; mine safety apparatus (MSA);

or positive pressure self-contained breathing apparatus.

HAZARDOUS PRODUCTS OF COMBUSTION: carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide;

acrolein; phenols; amines; aldehydes; aromatic amines; and hydrofluoric and

fluoroboric acids.

PERSONNEL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT:

a. All personnel - Disposable coveralls and shoe covers; gloves (leather palm preferred)

b. Firefighters - Positive pressure self-contained breathing apparatus

c. Clean-up personnel - Full face respirator; safety glasses w/side shield.

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ITEM

HAZARD

CLEAN-UP MATERIALS: Polyethylene sheeting and tape (for containing debris);

vacuum cleaner equipped w/High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filter elements;

polyethylene bags; water emulsion floor wax (P-W-155C (NSN 7930-00-141-5888)).

HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL: Local solid waste disposal authorities

shall be consulted for approved burial sites/techniques for composites or

composite-contaminated materials. In addition, the local cognizant industrial

hygienist or medical department representative should be consulted for detail health

hazard control, guidance, based upon extent of exposure.

POST-LAUNCH WASTE WATER IN SPENT CLS CAPSULES: Removal of post-launch

water from expended CLS capsules involves handling material which may be harmful

to personnel and which is not authorized for direct dumping into coastal or inland

waters.

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FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION

SECTION I. CHAPTER ORGANIZATION

3.1 SCOPE.

This chapter discusses functional descriptions of TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile (TCM)

components and systems as well as interfaces between the TCM and its launch platform. Section

II discusses the TCM electrical power system and type commands and requests for status issued

to the TCM by the launch platform systems and TCM responses to those commands and requests

for status which are, in general, common among all TCMs irrespective of launch platform.

Section III discusses unique interfaces between torpedo tube launch TCMs and the submarine.

Section IV discusses unique interfaces between Capsule Launching System (CLS) TCMs and the

submarine. Section V discusses unique interfaces between Vertical Launching System (VLS)

TCMs and the surface ship.

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SECTION II. GENERAL

3.2 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM.

The TCM electrical power system consists of a dc monitor/reset power bus, regulated bus,

semi-regulated bus, and a Cruise Missile Airframe (CMA) bus, a Mission Control Module

(MCM) bus, a pyro bus and an arm battery activate bus.

3.2.1

Prelaunch Electrical Power. The launch platform’s electrical power distribution system

converts 3-phase 400 Hz delta power to 3-phase wye power to provide operating power for the

missile; provide single phase wye power for Recovery Exercise Module (REM) heater power; and

dc power for commands to and responses from the TCM. The routing of power in the missile is

described in the following paragraphs.

3.2.1.1

Converter/Operate Power. Ship wye power is routed to the TCM ac-dc converter. The

dc output of the converter is connected to the missile REGULATED bus via the POWER BUS

control relay. For land-attack TCMs, power is fed to the DSMAC set, GPSS (109C and 109D

only) and the CMGS from the REGULATED bus. For all TCMs, power is also fed through

the normally closed contacts of the BUS ISOLATE relay to power the CMA and MCM buses.

The CMA bus supplies power to the airframe electrical equipment. The MCM bus powers the

decoder/relay drivers inside the MCM.

3.2.1.2

Cruise Missile (CM) Identification Power. The dc CM identification power is applied

to the TCM when the launch operator selects the missile designated for launch. Power is routed

back to confirm the identity of the TCM selected and permit it to be prepared for launch or to

advise the launch operator that there is a mismatch between the TCM selected and the actual TCM

in the launching device. In the latter instance, further processing is automatically precluded.

3.2.1.3

REM Heater Power. When the launch operator selects a REM-equipped TCM and

the identity of the TCM has been confirmed, power is applied to the REM battery heaters. The

heaters warm the battery electrolyte in preparation for REM battery activation.

3.2.1.4

Monitor/Reset Power. A dc monitor/reset voltage is applied to the DC

MONITOR/RESET POWER bus. The DC MONITOR/RESET POWER bus powers the

submarine launch TCM dual differential pressure transducer, the WARHEAD DEADFACE

relay (109A) and the rocket motor safe-arm monitoring circuits. The bus also supplies power

to energize the POWER BUS CONTROL relay and connects the ac-dc converter output to the

missile REGULATED bus. It supplies power to energize the FIRST MOTION relay via the first

motion loop to generate the MISSILE ENABLED mark that is sent prior to missile launch.

3.2.1.5

DC Monitor/Reset Power Return. The DC MONITOR/RESET POWER RETURN

provides the return leg back for dc monitor/reset power.

3.2.1.6

Chassis/Static Ground. A copper ground path is provided to assure that the launch

platform and missile are at the same ground potential.

3.2.2

Launch/Boost Electrical Power. Launch/boost electrical power is supplied by two

remotely activated thermal batteries. One battery, located in the missile midbody, is the CMA

battery. The second battery is the BPU located in the CMGS (109C/D). A REM-equipped TCM

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also has two electrically activated REM batteries. The CMA and CMGS batteries supply short

duration power (about 30 seconds) to power the TCM until the engine-driven generator/regulator

can take over. The REM batteries power REM subsystems and, once activated, last about 15

hours. Activation of batteries is described in the following paragraphs.

3.2.2.1

CMA Battery Activation. When the launch operator sets the switch to FIRE (Intent to

Launch (ITL), DC power is routed to the coil of the ARM BATTERY ACTIVATE BUS relay.

The relay energizes and applies CMA bus power to the ARM BATTERY ACTIVATE bus.

Upon CMGS command, the CMA BATTERY ACTIVATE relay energizes and fires the battery

pyros to activate the battery. Output 1 powers the MCM and CMA buses. Output 2 powers the

SEMI-REGULATED bus, which in turn, supplies power to the fin servoactuators.

3.2.2.2

CMGS Battery Activation. The CMA battery output is sensed by the MCM. When the

specified voltage is attained, a CMA BATTERY GO signal is sent to the CMGS. Upon CMGS

command, the CMGS BATTERY ACTIVATE relay energizes and applies power to fire the CMGS

battery pyros. Battery output is applied to the CMGS subsystems and the REGULATED bus.

3.2.2.3

REM Battery Activation. To allow time to activate the REM batteries and perform the

REM BIT, about 29 seconds are added between ITL and CMA battery activation. REM battery

activation begins when the REM ACTIVATE command is issued by the CMGS after receipt of

ITL. BATTERY ACTIVATE power is provided by the ARM BATTERY ACTIVATE bus. Upon

receipt of REM ACTIVATE, the REM performs a pre-battery activate BIT. If REM BIT fails, the

REM will not issue the REM ENABLE command and, as a result, the MISSILE ENABLED signal

will not be sent. If BIT passes, the REM batteries activate and post-battery activate BIT is begun.

3.2.2.4

Bus Isolation. Battery power is supplied only to those circuits essential to the

launch/boost phase. For a land-attack TCM, power-up of the BPU is sensed by the CMGS

RMUC. The RMUC, in turn, sends a discrete coded word to the MCM. From the MCM, power is

applied to the coil of the BUS ISOLATE relay. The relay energizes to isolate the REGULATED

bus from the MCM and CMA buses. The BUS ISOLATE relay remains energized until the

engine-driven generator/regulator comes on line during the transition to cruise flight.

3.2.2.5

First Motion. Upon first motion, the electrical connection between the TCM and the

launch platform is disconnected and deenergizes the FIRST MOTION relay. The opening of relay

contacts is sensed by the CMGS, which starts the safe eject test. The ARM ENABLE relay

energizes and the normally open contacts of the ARM ENABLE relay close, applying power to

the normally-open contacts of the SAFE/ARM relay. The CMGS confirms safe eject velocity

and distance, then commands the MCM to energize the SAFE/ARM relay. This action routes

electrical power from the CMA battery to energize the PYRO bus. The SAFE EJECT relay

energizes, completing the circuits that hold the SAFE EJECT relay and the ARM ENABLE relay

energized. The PYRO bus supplies the power to activate the CMA pyros. The PYRO bus remains

energized until the completion of transition to cruise flight.

3.2.3

Cruise Electrical Power. After the sustainer engine has started and comes up to speed, a

dual-output generator/regulator assumes the airframe and CMGS electrical loads. Output 1 is

dedicated to the CMGS and airframe equipment. Output 2 serves the fin servoactuator system.

Load transients occurring on Output 2 have no influence on Output 1.

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3.2.4

RSS Thermal Battery Activation. In the event that an RSS-equipped TCM loses cruise

electrical power, the RSS thermal battery is activated to provide electrical power to close the

throttle and initiate fin flip, thus aborting the mission.

3.3 DIGITAL DATA LINK.

Communications between the TCM and the launching platform is performed via the digital data

lines. The lines consist of four pairs of twisted wires (1 true and 1 complement per pair). Also

provided are a shield carry-through and a digital I/O power supply return. The lines are connected

when the launch operator selects the designated missile and disconnected prior to launch. The

digital data link utilizes serial 17 bit (16 data and 1 odd parity) data words. The least significant

bit is sent first and the parity bit is sent last. The first word is always the same in every data block,

and is used to initialize the CMGS/launch platform system interface software. The second word is

always a control word to request status or identify the data block and the number of data words

within the data block. The last word in the data block is a checksum (2’s complement addition)

of the control word and all following data words. Information transferred over the digital data

link includes the operational flight program, platform alignment data, missile status/command

sequences and mission data (land-attack TCM). The digital data lines used for communication are:

a. DATA ENABLE - Lines used to send the DATA ENABLE command, a discrete signal,

to permit the RMUC to accept and transmit data.

b. CLOCK - Lines used to send timing signals to synchronize commands and data.

c. DATA UPLINK - Lines used to transmit digital data sent to the RMUC.

d. DATA DOWNLINK - Lines used to transmit digital data from the RMUC.

e. SHIELD CARRY THROUGH - Line used to provide shield continuity on wires carrying

digital data. The shield is floated at the launch platform and grounded in the missile.

f. DIGITAL I/O POWER SUPPLY RETURN - Line used to provide a common ground

reference for digital input/output power to the I/O channel power supply and the CMGS.

3.4 DIGITAL COMMANDS/DATA BLOCKS SENT TO A LAND-ATTACK

TCM.

Digital commands and data blocks sent to a land-attack TCM over the digital data link discussed

in paragraph 3.3⇒ are described in the following paragraphs. Commands unique to a CLS

TCM are discussed in Section IV.

3.4.1

Bootstrap Load (Program). A BOOTSTRAP LOAD program permits the loading of

programs into the RMUC. When REPROGRAM discrete is received by the RMUC, it activates

the Programmable Read Only Memory (PROM) and reestablishes the serial data link. The

program is loaded into computer memory and data transmission begins.

3.4.2

Request Status. The REQUEST STATUS block is sent once every second to request a

go/no-go summary of missile BIT results. It is also used to request the present operating mode

of the CMGS (e.g., warmup, coarse level, navigate (Table 3-1 "Land-Attack TCM CMGS

Alignment Modes"⇒).

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3.4.3

Alignment Data. The ALIGNMENT DATA block is sent once every second to send

reference data to align the CMGS inertial platform relative to the launch platform inertial

reference system. Alignment data blocks continue to be sent until the missile is commanded to

terminate alignment.

3.4.4

Mission Data. The MISSION DATA block includes target characteristics, waypoints,

guidance parameters, terrain correlation maps and DSMAC scenes (109C and 109D only). It also

identifies the type missile and the type mission to be flown. Each group is sent by a unique data

block that is repeatedly sent until all data for that group are transferred to the CMGS.

3.4.5

Battery Activate. Receipt of the ITL command causes the CMGS to initiate the battery

activate sequence. For a tactical TCM, the CMA battery activates first, followed by the CMGS

battery. For a REM-equipped TCM, the REM batteries activate first, followed by the CMA

and CMGS batteries.

3.4.6

Launch Sequence Command. The LAUNCH SEQUENCE COMMAND block is

used to reinitialize the RMUC, terminate CMGS alignment, zero mission data, shut down the

CMGS, and declassify the CMGS memory. When the REINITIALIZE command is sent, the

CMGS recycles to Mode 0, begins normal operation to transfer mission data and begins a new

alignment. (For an explanation of alignment modes, see Table 3-1 "Land-Attack TCM CMGS

Alignment Modes"⇒.) When the TERMINATE ALIGNMENT command is sent, the RMUC

continues to accept alignment data and switches to the NAVIGATION mode. At this time, the

CMGS becomes an independent navigator. The ZERO MISSION DATA command causes the

program to zero all memory locations dedicated to mission data. The SHUT DOWN CMGS

command causes the CMGS to perform a controlled shutdown that includes a gyro despin to

preclude gyro damage. The DECLASSIFY CMGS MEMORY command is used to declassify the

CMGS memory following an abort.

3.5 DIGITAL DATA RESPONSES FROM A LAND-ATTACK TCM.

Two types of digital data responses are sent by the missile. The first, GOOD DATA word, is sent

after receipt of each data block that passes the parity and checksum tests. The second, MISSILE

STATUS word, is sent in response to a status request.

3.5.1

Good Data Word. As the CMGS accepts data, each word is checked for odd parity. The

data words are read, stored in a data table, and added to form a checksum that is checked against

the checksum word at the end of the data list. If the word parities are good and checksums agree,

a GOOD DATA word is sent (except in response to a missile status request).

3.5.2

Missile Status Word. The MISSILE STATUS word, sent once every second in response

to a status request, shows the results of pre-launch BIT via a combination of software commanded

and hardware continuous tests conducted by the CMGS prior to MISSILE ENABLED. It also

shows the present mode of the CMGS. The CMGS software will decode any BIT failure and

transmit the information to the launch platform as a zero bit in the appropriate bit position of the

MISSILE STATUS word.

3.6 DISCRETE COMMANDS SENT TO A TCM.

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The following paragraphs discuss discrete commands issued to the TCM by the launch platform.

Discrete commands unique to CLS are discussed in Section IV.

3.6.1

Booster Safe Command. The BOOSTER SAFE command is a dc signal that sets the

rocket motor in the SAFE position.

3.6.1.1

Mk 106 Rocket Motor. For the Mk 106 Rocket Motor, the BOOSTER SAFE

command interrupts the armed holding circuit. The command allows the safe-arm mechanism

to spring-return to SAFE, thus positioning a physical barrier between the igniter initiators and

propellant igniter. The signal is applied continuously until the BOOSTER ARM command is

received.

3.6.1.2

Mk 111 Rocket Motor. For the Mk 111 Rocket Motor, the safe-arm indicator plate is

held in the SAFE position by spring tension. In the safe position, the safe-arm indicator plate

will not complete the electrical circuit to the bridgewires and ARM monitor which are necessary

for rocket motor ignition. It also prevents the proper alignment of the barrier slots with the

poppet slots and consequently prevents a vent path for the initiator output to reach the igniter and

subsequent rocket motor ignition. The Mk 111 Rocket Motor will remain in SAFE position until

such time as the BOOSTER ARM command is received. The Mk 111 Rocket Motor arming-firing

device cannot be manually safed.

3.6.2

Booster Arm Command. The BOOSTER ARM command is a dc signal that places the

rocket motor in the ARMED position.

3.6.2.1

Mk 106 Rocket Motor. For the Mk 106 Rocket Motor, the BOOSTER ARM command

removes the physical barrier between the igniter initiators and propellant igniter to arm the rocket

motor.

3.6.2.2

Mk 111 Rocket Motor. For the Mk 111 Rocket Motor, the BOOSTER ARM command

is sent to the solenoid rotor of the arming-firing device. The energized rotor causes the safe-arm

indicator plate to rotate, which in turn moves the sweep contacts on the switch plate assembly to

complete the electrical circuit to the pyros and aligns the barrier slots to allow initiator output to

reach the igniter explosive thereby arming the rocket motor.

3.6.3

Warhead Safe Control/Command (109A only). The WARHEAD SAFE

control/command is a dc signal that sets the warhead to the safe condition.

3.6.4

Warhead Prearm Control/Command (109A only). The WARHEAD PREARM

control/command is a unique signal placing the warhead in the prearmed condition.

3.6.5

Reprogram Command (Land-Attack only). The REPROGRAM command is a dc

signal that allows the CMGS to be reprogrammed. It zeros the RMUC memory except for

calibration coefficients. To prevent gyro damage, this command is never issued without first

performing a controlled shutdown of the CMGS.

3.6.6

Fire Command or Intent to Launch. The FIRE or ITL command is a dc signal that

energizes the ARM BATTERY ACTIVATE BUS relay. The CMA battery activates first, followed

by the CMGS battery about one second later. For a REM-equipped missile, the REM batteries

activate first, followed by the CMA and CMGS batteries.

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3.6.7

REM Abort Command. The REM ABORT command is a dc signal that disconnects the

REM batteries which results in a turnoff of all REM-battery-powered equipment.

3.7 DISCRETE SIGNALS SENT FROM A TCM.

The following paragraphs discuss the discrete signals transmitted from a TCM to the launch

platform. Discrete signals unique to CLS are discussed in Section IV.

3.7.1

Weapon Identification. Electrical identification of the TCM is derived from CM

identification power. Decode circuit defects open on the identification lines not applicable to the

identified TCM. Weapon identification also allows the launch platform to configure for REM and

applies ac power to the REM battery heaters.

3.7.2

Simulator Present. SIMULATOR PRESENT is a continuity to DC MONITOR/RESET

POWER that indicates that a simulator is connected instead of an actual TCM.

3.7.3

Booster Safe Monitor. The BOOSTER SAFE monitor is a continuity to DC

MONITOR/RESET POWER that indicates the rocket motor igniter is safed.

3.7.4

Booster Armed Monitor. The BOOSTER ARMED monitor is a continuity to DC

MONITOR/RESET POWER that indicates the rocket motor igniter is armed.

3.7.5

Warhead Safe Monitor (109A only). The WARHEAD SAFE monitor is a continuity to

DC MONITOR/RESET POWER RETURN that indicates the warhead has been safed.

3.7.6

Warhead Prearmed Monitor (109A only). The WARHEAD PREARMED monitor is a

continuity to DC MONITOR/RESET POWER RETURN that indicates the warhead has been

prearmed.

3.7.7

Missile Bus Monitor. The MISSILE BUS monitor is a dc signal that monitors the dc

output of the ac-dc converter. Upon loss of voltage, prior to MISSILE ENABLED, the launch

platform automatically safes the warhead (109A only) and rocket motor igniter.

3.7.8

Missile Enabled. MISSILE ENABLED is a continuity to DC MONITOR/RESET

POWER that indicates the missile batteries have been successfully activated, BIT has passed and

the MISSILE STATUS word is good. The signal is combined in software with other conditions

to complete the closing of firing interlocks. For a REM/RSS-equipped missile, the MISSILE

ENABLED signal is routed through the REM/RSS. Before the MISSILE ENABLED signal can

be sent, the REM/RSS must first pass all REM/RSS BIT’s and issue a REM/RSS ENABLED to

complete the circuit.

3.7.9

Differential Pressure (TTL only). Because encapsulated TTL TCMs are subjected to

pressure differences when in a flooded torpedo tube prior to launch, two dc signals (A and B)

are provided by the missile dual differential pressure transducer to indicate differential pressure

between the shroud compartment and ambient outside pressure. The redundant signals, which

are derived from DC MONITOR/RESET POWER, are used to monitor the missile pressure

and provide a PRESSURE IN BAND signal.

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SECTION III. TORPEDO TUBE LAUNCH

3.8 GENERAL.

This section discusses launch platform and TCM physical and functional interfaces aboard the

submarine. These interfaces include missile/capsule and torpedo tube physical interfaces as well

as the submarine systems utilized to:

a. Maintain pressure in TCMs during preparation for launch.

b. Secure and prevent unauthorized launch of the UGM-109A-1.

c. Compute TCM attack solutions.

3.9 MISSILE/CAPSULE AND TORPEDO TUBE PHYSICAL INTERFACES.

The missile/capsule and torpedo tube physical interfaces consist of the mechanical, electrical and

pneumatic interfaces described in the following paragraphs.

3.9.1

Mechanical Interfaces. The mechanical interfaces consist of the following restraining

devices:

a. Loading button on the capsule barrel closure to load/unload the missile/capsule from the

torpedo tube.

b. Two guide studs on the capsule barrel to align the capsule in the torpedo tube. The

forward guide stud also engages the tube stop bolt.

c. Two shear holdback assemblies to restrain the missile in the capsule until ejection.

d. Two spring-loaded latches at the aft end of the capsule to restrain the capsule in torpedo

tube (UGM-109A/C/D-1).

e. Capsule retention fixture installed on the capsule to restrain the capsule in the torpedo

tube. The retention fixture also houses a clamp that is removed and installed on the

capsule barrel closure in order to secure the eletrical umbilical cable (UGM-109E-1).

3.9.2

Electrical and Pneumatic Interfaces. The electrical and pneumatic interfaces consist of

the electrical and pneumatic umbilical discussed below. The routing of the umbilicals is shown in

Figure 3-1 "TTL Electrical and Pneumatic Umbilical Routing (2 Sheets)"⇒.

3.9.2.1

Electrical Umbilical. The electrical umbilical connects between the breech door and

the missile to transfer power/commands and status signals between the missile and submarine

combat system.

3.9.2.2

Pneumatic Umbilical. The pneumatic umbilical connects between the breech door and

the capsule to connect the PVC system to pressurize the missile and supply pneumatic pressure to

close the capsule flow slots in preparation for capsule ejection, when authorized.

3.10 PRESSURIZATION/VENT CONTROL SYSTEM.

The PVC system features independent four-tube controls to regulate internal TCM pressure

to withstand sea ambient pressure during pre-launch operations. With the electrical and

pneumatic umbilicals connected to the TCM and the PVC system activated, dual-differential

transducers in the TCM (one operator selected and one alternate) compare internal free volume

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pressure with outside ambient pressure and output signals to PVC system equipment. The

signals energize/deenergize manifold pressure/vent block solenoids which permit pressurization

or venting to occur in order to maintain TCM internal pressure within prescribed limits.

When pressure is not within prescribed limits, the system inhibits launch until the TCM is

pressurized/vented and the PRESSURE IN BAND indication is restored. Should the selected

transducer fail, the system automatically vents the TCM and likewise inhibits launch until the

operator selects the alternate transducer and the PRESSURE IN BAND indication is restored.

Should the automatic PVC system fail, the PVC system can be operated manually utilizing the

TCM pressure relief valve as the backup to prevent TCM overpressurization. Just prior to launch,

the fire control system sends an IMPULSE FIRE mark to terminate pressure/vent commands to

prevent pressure cycling and a possible out-of-band condition at launch.

3.11 SECURITY SYSTEM.

Security of the UGM-109A-1 is maintained by connecting the missile to the submarine 4FZ

Security Alarm System using a special security plate. The security plate is a kidney-shaped plate

that replaces the electrical connector access protective cover and covers the pull switch lanyard

attachment, the electrical umbilical connection and the upper holdback assembly on the aft end of

the capsule. It is held in place by two captive thumbscrews that are lockwired together to provide

visual evidence of any tampering. A pneumatic coupling is installed in the plate to provide a

connection to the 4FZ Security Alarm System. The security plate is provided separately and is

installed after weapon shipping aboard the submarine and replaced by the electrical connector

access protective cover prior to weapon unshipping.

3.12 NAVIGATION SYSTEM.

Navigation and ownship parameter data are used in computing attack control solutions. Data

include latitude, longitude, velocity, heading, pitch, roll and depth computations. Except for

navigation equipment digital data, input data are supplied as either synchro or event data and are

converted to digital data for use by the submarine computer equipment.

3.12.1

Navigation Equipment Alignment. Computer equipment, through closed-loop control,

maintains true vertical alignment of navigation equipment stable platforms by collecting

velocity data from the velocity meters and using these data to provide torquing pulses to the

gimbal-mounted torquing motors.

3.12.2

Velocity and Position Computation. True position of the submarine is continuously

updated by computer equipment, using primarily navigation equipment data and secondarily,

Dead Reckoning Analyzer Indicator (DRAI) data. The electromagnetic underwater log (EM Log),

which measures ownship speed through the water, is used in conjunction with the computers to

provide damping to the navigation equipment. It also provides ownship speed to the DRAI.

3.12.3

Reset Computations. Latitude and longitude information is periodically computed by

the computer equipment from navigation satellite receiver data. These data are used to reset

navigation equipment position at the direction of the system operator.

3.12.4

Status and Performance Monitoring. The computer equipment reacts to navigation

operator directions concerning mode of operation and requests for data to be displayed on the

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SECTION IV. CAPSULE LAUNCHING SYSTEM

3.13 GENERAL.

This section discusses CLS unique electrical interrelationships between the submarine fire control

system and CLS. Additionally, this section discusses launch platform and TCM physical and

functional interfaces aboard the submarine. These interfaces include missile/capsule and missile

tube physical interfaces as well as the submarine systems utilized to:

a. Maintain pressure in TCMs during stowage and preparation for launch.

b. Operate missile tubes.

c. Compute TCM attack solutions.

3.14 CLS UNIQUE ELECTRICAL INTERRELATIONSHIPS.

In addition to common electrical interrelationships between the submarine combat system and

the TCM discussed in Section II, the CLS has unique requirements for pre-launch electrical

power in order to receive commands and provide responses to those commands. Unique power

requirements, commands and responses for CLS TCMs are discussed in the following paragraphs.

3.14.1

CLS Unique Prelaunch Electrical Power Requirements. CLS unique pre-launch

electrical power requirements are:

a. CLS Regulator Power - Supplies power to the CLS regulator which in turn provides

power to CLS components.

b. CLS Converter Power - Supplies power to the CLS Firing Unit Converter.

c. CLS Monitor Power - Supplies power to monitor discrete events from CLS prelaunch

and launch sensors.

d. CLS Power Return - Provides the return path for CLS Regulator Power, CLS Converter

Power and CLS Monitor Power.

e. Liquid Detector Power - Supplies power to the CLS liquid detector.

f. Coded Charge Signal Excitation - Initiates dc power to allow the Coded Charge Signal to

charge the CLS firing capacitor.

g. Coded Launch Signal Excitation - Initiates dc power to allow the Coded Launch Signal

to discharge the firing capacitor to fire the CLS gas generator.

3.14.2

CLS Unique Commands. The Coded Charge Signal and Coded Launch Signal are

unique digital commands and the Capsule Arm Command is a unique discrete command sent by

the submarine fire control system to the CLS:

a. Coded Charge Signal - A coded signal sent to charge the firing capacitor.

b. Coded Launch Signal - A coded signal sent 700 milliseconds after the Coded Charge

Signal to discharge the firing capacitor which, after separation nut release, fires the gas

generator to launch the TCM.

c. Capsule Arm Command - A command which causes capsule firing circuits to be placed

in the armed position.

3.14.3

CLS Unique Discrete Responses. The following are discrete signals sent by the CLS:

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a. Capsule Safe Monitor - A continuity of CLS Monitor Power indicating that the CLS

firing circuits are in the SAFE position.

b. Capsule Armed Monitor - A continuity of CLS Monitor Power indicating that the CLS

firing circuits are in the ARMED position.

c. Liquid in Capsule - A signal indicating the presence of liquid in the capsule.

d. Capsule Dry - A continuity of CLS Monitor Power indicating the absence of liquid

in the capsule

e. Fire Pulse Detected - A continuity of CLS Monitor Power indicating that the CLS firing

capacitor has discharged.

3.15 MISSILE/CAPSULE AND MISSILE TUBE PHYSICAL INTERFACES.

The missile/capsule and missile tube interfaces consist of mechanical and electrical interfaces

which are described in the following paragraphs.

3.15.1

Mechanical Interfaces. The mechanical interfaces consist of the following restraining

devices and connections:

a. The lateral support group on the interior of the CLS provides positioning and lateral

shock and vibration mitigation for the missile.

b. Six launch seals on the CLS prevent high pressure gases from the ejected missile from

contacting the missile surfaces forward of missile station 180.6.

c. Two holddown studs on the aft end of the missile position and secure the missile to the

vertical support assembly inside the CLS.

d. Eight retention segments on the top of the capsule mate with the upper missile tube

flange to restrain the CLS in the missile tube.

e. Lateral support pads on the CLS bear against shock lands bolted to the missile tube to

position and provide lateral shock support for the CLS in the missile tube.

f. An umbilical cable bracket is attached to the CLS exterior to provide protection for

the umbilical on the outside of the CLS.

g. A differential pressure transducer sensing line connects the CLS to the ship’s differential

pressure transducer via connections on the CLS and missile tube.

3.15.2

Electrical Interfaces. All electrical interfaces are routed through the electrical umbilical

cable. The routing of the electrical umbilical is shown in Figure 3-2 "CLS Electrical Umbilical

Routing"⇒.

3.16 PRESSURIZATION/VENT (P/V) SYSTEM.

The P/V system features automatic independent missile tube controls to replenish internal AUR

pressure during stowage in the missile tube; and to pressurize/vent the space below the capsule

closure assembly within a specified range of positive pressure over the underhatch volume

pressure prior to TCM launch. A differential pressure transducer in the missile tube monitors

pressure above the capsule closure assembly and sends a continuous signal to the Vertical Launch

Console (VLC). When the underhatch volume pressure is not within prescribed limits, the signal

causes a pressurization/vent control valve to activate to permit pressurizing/venting of the

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AUR to occur in order to maintain pressure within band. When underhatch volume pressure is

not equal to sea ambient pressure or AUR pressure is not within prescribed limits, the system

inhibits launch until required pressurization/venting has occurred and the PRESSURE IN BAND

indication is restored. Immediately prior to TCM launch, the P/V control valve is closed to

terminate pressurization/venting and to prevent reflood water or missile launch by-products

from entering the ship.

3.17 MISSILE TUBE CONTROL SYSTEM.

The Missile Tube Control System monitors the status of the missile tubes and supports launch. The

system provides all the interfaces between the ship systems and the submarine fire control system.

Monitoring and control occur in the Vertical Launch Center (VLC). A brief functional description

of the components of the missile tube control system is presented in the following paragraphs.

3.17.1

Missile Tube Control Panel. Missile Tube Control Panels (MTCP), located in the VLC,

provide two normal modes of system operation: MONITOR and OPERATE. When switches

are in the MONITOR position, command functions are disabled but monitoring functions and

displays are operating. When a switch is locked in the OPERATE position, monitoring and

display functions are operating and command functions are enabled for the common functions

and for the selected tube. The MTCP also has a special SIMULATE mode of operation to support

maintenance and trouble-shooting.

3.17.2

Differential Pressure Transducers. Two differential transducers, one adjacent to each

missile tube, sense the differential pressure between the underhatch area and the CLS. A pressure

switch senses TCM pressure. When underhatch differential pressure or AUR pressure is outside

the specified pressure range, the differential pressure transducer activates the pressure/vent system

to increase/vent pressure as required.

3.17.3

Environmental Monitoring Sensor. An Environmental Monitoring Sensor is located

in the underhatch area of each missile tube to sense underhatch pressure, temperature, and the

presence of fluid. Detection of one of these conditions outside the specified range results in an

alarm signal being sent to the MTCP.

3.17.4

Dew Point Monitor. The Dew Point Monitor, consisting of a sensor in the 700 psig

piping and electronics equipment, monitors the moisture level of the air being supplied to the

TCM by the pressurization/vent system.

3.17.5

Hatch and Valve Position Sensors. Hatch and valve position sensors are magnetic

proximity switches that sense the position of missile tube hatches and flood and drain system

outboard valves. The sensors provide a constant status of hatches and valves and will signal an

alarm when conditions are not consistent with operations.

3.18 NAVIGATION SYSTEM.

Navigation and ownship parameter data are used in computing attack control solutions. Data

include latitude, longitude, velocity, heading, pitch, roll and depth computations. Except for

navigation equipment digital data, input data are supplied as either synchro or event data and are

converted to digital data for use by the submarine computer equipment.

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3.18.1

Navigation Equipment Alignment. Computer equipment, through closed-loop control,

maintains true vertical alignment of navigation equipment stable platforms by collecting

velocity data from the velocity meters and using these data to provide torquing pulses to the

gimbal-mounted torquing motors.

3.18.2

Velocity and Position Computation. True position of the submarine is continuously

updated by computer equipment, using primarily navigation equipment data and secondarily,

Dead Reckoning Analyzer Indicator (DRAI) data. The electromagnetic underwater log (EM Log),

which measures ownship speed through the water, is used in conjunction with the computers to

provide damping to the navigation equipment. It also provides ownship speed to the DRAI.

3.18.3

Reset Computations. Latitude and longitude information is periodically computed by

the computer equipment from navigation satellite receiver data. These data are used to reset

navigation equipment position at the direction of the system operator.

3.18.4

Status and Performance Monitoring. The computer equipment reacts to navigation

operator directions concerning mode of operation and requests for data to be displayed on the

Navigation Control Console (NCC). Navigation software continuously monitors the equipment to

provide the navigation operator with equipment failure or misalignment indications.

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SECTION V. VERTICAL LAUNCHING SYSTEM

3.19 GENERAL.

This section discusses launch platform and TCM physical and functional interfaces aboard the

ship. These interfaces include missile/canister and launch cell physical interfaces as well as ship

systems utilized to:

a. Compute TCM attack solutions.

b. Provide a means of detecting and controlling hazardous conditions in launch cells.

3.20 MISSILE/CANISTER AND LAUNCH CELL PHYSICAL INTERFACES.

The missile/canister and launch cell/module physical interfaces consist of the mechanical,

electrical and pneumatic interfaces described in the following paragraphs.

3.20.1

Mechanical Interfaces. The mechanical interfaces consist of the following:

Pyrotechnically activated separation bolts to restrain the missile in the canister until

launch.

Thermal lined, corrugated shell structure for loading in the launch cell.

16 lateral supports inside the Mk 14 Canister to provide shock isolation for the TCM

in the Mk 10 Canister.

Deluge connector to connect the ship’s deluge system to provide distribution of water on

the missile warhead in the event of an emergency.

Latches to secure the Mk 14 Canister in the cell.

Mk 14 Canister and sill assembly interface to direct rocket motor exhaust gas into the

module plenum.

3.20.2

Electrical Interfaces. The electrical interfaces consist of the following:

Telemetry monitoring connector to transmit data from a telemetry missile prior to launch.

Umbilical connector connects to the MK 14 Canister Cable Assembly which, in turn,

connects the code plug, FWD closure breakwire, temperature sensor, AFT closure

breakwire, All-Up-Round (AUR) cable and conduit assembly and AUR umbilical

connector adapter to transmit commands from the fire control system and receive

responses from the canister and TCM.

Antenna connector to transmit data from telemetry monitoring equipment to the missile.

Canister Safe Enable Switch (CSES) (Mk 14 Canister) to monitor weapon status (safe

or enable).

3.20.3

Pneumatic Interface. The nitrogen supply valve provides a means to pressurize the Mk

10 by way of a nitrogen line inside the Mk 14 Canister.

3.21 NAVIGATION SYSTEM.

The navigational systems provide data on ownship’s time, position, heading, velocity, pitch

angular rate, and roll angular rate. The data is used for track data management and engagement

planning.

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3.21.1

Inertial Navigation Set (INS). Most ships have two INSs aboard. One is in the forward

Gyro Room, the other in the aft Gyro Room. The INSs are designated FWD and AFT. They serve

as the primary navigation data source. Each set provides ownship heading, position, speed,

roll, pitch, and time. These data are provided to the TOMAHAWK Weapons Combat System

(TWCS) by the Launch Data Processing Control Center via an interface with the Digital Linear

Switch (DLS).

3.21.2

Digital Linear Switch (DLS). The DLS determines if the input to the TWCS is from

the FWD or AFT INS unit. During a casualty to one, when one unit may be inoperable, an

operator can switch the DLS to the operating unit.

3.21.3

Data Terminal Group (DTG). The DTG (also called Input/Output Control Console

[IOCC]) provides an interface with the INS. Data is manually loaded by keyboard and

automatically though a paper tape reader. The control panel furnishes DTG control and indicators.

Output is displayed on a panel for operator evaluations. The printer and paper tape provide two

means of producing hard copies of output data. Reset and control data may be transmitted to

either INS as selected by the DLS.

3.21.4

Radio Navigation Set (RNS). The RNS receives Satellite Navigation (SATNAV) data

for updating INS. Reset data is transmitted to either INS as selected at the DLS that also interfaces

with the DTG.

3.21.5

Global Positioning System (GPS). The GPS is a satellite navigation system which

provides continuous worldwide information. The information is used to calculate 3-dimensional

speed and precise time of data. GPS also provides a parallel digital interface for information

exchange with the INS.

3.22 VLS DAMAGE CONTROL SYSTEM.

The VLS Damage Control System provides for detection and control of hazardous conditions

within launch cells and modules. Elements of the damage control system include the damage

control monitoring system which utilizes sensors located inside and outside launch cells to

monitor conditions; deluge system which distributes water over a missile warhead when activated

in an emergency; and the magazine sprinkler system that provides remote fire fighting capability in

missile modules. Conditions monitored include the status of the anti-icing system, deluge system

operating, module high-water level condition (one-half inch or deeper), a continuous launch

sequencer (LSEQ) power-off condition, and, when implemented, missile fuel leak. In the event a

sensor reports a hazardous condition, the Local Status Panel, located at the entrance to magazines,

displays the hazard and advises the Central Control Station of the hazardous condition. The LSEQ,

which continually monitors cell conditions, generates the hazard message to the launch control

unit, which after analysis of the hazard, directs the VLS to act to eliminate or reduce the hazard.

3.23 EXHAUST GAS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.

The exhaust gas management system (Figure 3-3 "VLS Exhaust Gas Control"⇒) directs the gas

from the rocket motor to the external atmosphere. Exhaust gas from the rocket motor expands

downward from the bottom of the canister into the module plenum where is vented through the

uptake and open uptake hatch. Sealing of the system is particularly critical to ensure that all

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Table 3-1. Land-Attack TCM CMGS Alignment Modes

MODE

COMMENT

0, Warmup

Mode 0 performs the first set of BITs and sequences the CMGS

inertial platform into gyro control. Operations include warmup,

loading of operational flight program, initialization, BIT, gyro

caging and gyro spinup. BIT results are contained in the MISSILE

STATUS word. If all BITs are passed and gyros have spun up, the

mode number advances to Mode 1.

1, Standby

Mode 1 tests availability to present position and checks to see

if inertial platform is under gyro control. Program will advance

to Mode 2 when present position is available and platform is

determined to be under gyro control.

2, Course Level

During Mode 2, the inertial platform is torqued to level by

computer program torquing commands. Mode is complete when

the computed tilt angle and mode time tests are passed.

3, Spare

Not used.

4, Align Axis#1

Mode 4 performs the first fine alignment phase and is completed

when a series of mode time, computed tilt angle, gyro bias

change and azimuth angle change tests are satisfied. If sufficient

maneuvering occurs in this mode to estimate the platform azimuth

angle, Modes 5 and 6 are bypassed and Mode 7 will be entered

at alignment completion.

5, Slue

During Mode 5, the platform is slued 90° from its previous

orientation by torquing the vertical gyro.

6, Align Axis #2

Mode 6 performs the second fine alignment phase and duplicates

the Mode 4 alignment. Upon passing of mode completion tests, the

alignment process advances to Mode 7.

7, Alignment Complete

Mode 7 is used only to indicate that alignment complete tests have

been passed. The computer program continues to perform the Mode

6 alignment until the CMGS is commanded to terminate alignment.

When this occurs, the computer program advances to Mode 8.

8, Navigate

Mode 8 signals that the CMGS has terminated alignment, and it has

become an independent navigator.

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SECTION II. TORPEDO TUBE LAUNCH

4.2 LAUNCH PLATFORMS.

The TTL TWS is employed aboard SSN 688, SSN 774, and SSN 21 Class submarines. TCM

launch operations are performed utilizing equipment located in the Attack Center, Combat

Systems Electronic Space (CSES) and Torpedo Room. General locations of the complexes are

shown in Figure 4-1 "General Locations of SSN Complexes"⇒. The following paragraphs

describe the major TWS-related TTL systems aboard the submarine. A simplified interface

block diagram of submarine TWS-related equipment is shown in Figure 4-2 "SSN/TWS-related

Equipment TTL Interfaces"⇒.

4.2.1

Submarine Combat System. Submarine Combat Systems (SCS) include the Combat

Control System (CCS) and the AN/BSY-1 Combat Control/Acoustic Set (CC/A). SSN 688 Class

submarines may employ either the CCS or CC/A. Each SCS, supported by the ownship navigation

system, CSES, Over-the-Horizon (OTH) targeting and the appropriate software programs,

provides the necessary power, discretes and data to power up weapons, transmit orders, process

and display data, initialize and align the missile guidance set, and initiate weapons launch. Also

included are control and monitoring circuits as well as various firing interlocks.

4.2.2

Combat Systems Electronic Space (CSES). The CSES equipment is shared by both the

SCS and the navigation system. Computer software programs, which include the operational

flight program, preplanned land-attack mission/targeting data generated at a shore-based Theater

Mission Planning System (TMPS) installation and provided to the submarine prior to deployment,

platform alignment data and sequential control commands, are stored on disks in the CSES. The

data are loaded into computer memory and sent to the missile on command. Missile responses

and status are evaluated by the CSES to provide data for displays on TCM status, Built-In-Test

(BIT), checksums and launch countdown.

4.2.3

Navigation Equipment. TOMAHAWK capable submarines are equipped with either the

Electrically Suspended Gyro Navigator (ESGN) AN/WSN-3A(V)2 or the Dual Miniature Inertial

Navigation System (DMINS) AN/WSN-1(V)2. Each system consists of two Inertial Measuring

Units (IMUs) and one dual-channel Navigation Control Console (NCC). Velocity and attitude

data are generated in raw form by the IMUs and transmitted to the CSES via the NCC. The raw

data are processed by the CSES computers to obtain velocity, attitude and position data and then

transmitted to various ship user subsystems.

4.2.4

Weapon Launch and Pressurization/Vent Equipment. The SSN 688 Class submarine

weapon launch equipment consists of a weapon launch console (WLC) flanked by two banks

of canted torpedo tubes; two tubes port and two tubes starboard. Also included are four PVC

manifolds (one for each torpedo tube) to control the air which pressurizes the TCM prior to

launch. Pressurization and torpedo tube pre-launch operations are controlled from the WLC.

Figure 4-3 "SSN TTL Pressurization/Vent Control System"⇒ depicts the PVC system.

4.2.5

Weapon Shipping/Unshipping Equipment. Both the SSN 688 and SSN 774 Class

submarines use a shipping line to ship and unship weapons. On SSN 688 Class submarines, the

major components are a portable topside deck skid, intermediate shipping rails and a shipping

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tray located in the torpedo room. The weapons, restrained by a shipping harness, are lowered

or raised along the shipping line, aft end down, using a chain drive. Figure 4-5 "TTL Weapon

Shipping, Handling and Stowage Equipment (SSN 688 Class)"⇒ depicts SSN 688 Class

submarine shipping, handling and stowage equipment. On SSN 774 Class submarines, the major

components are a portable topside deck skid, intermediate and shipping trunk mounted shipping

rollers, and a shipping cradle located in the torpedo room. The weapons, restrained by a shipping

nose piece and shipping cables, are lowered or raised along the shipping line, forward-end down,

using a pier-side crane connected to the shipping cables.

4.2.6

Weapon Handling and Stowage Equipment. Two-level stowage racks are provided aft

of the torpedo tubes for stowage of weapons. On the SSN 688 Class, the weapons are supported

by dollies on athwartship tracks and are restrained by lashing straps. On the SSN 774 Class, the

weapons are supported in cradles which in turn are supported at each end by an end truss track

and restrained by lashing bands. Transfer of weapons to the torpedo tube, or to any other stowage

position or working space, is accomplished via athwartship transfer mechanisms, vertical hoist(s),

pivot mechanisms/trays and loading rammers.

4.3 WEAPON ONLOAD.

The supporting submarine tender or shore base removes the weapon from its shipping container

and places the weapon on the topside skid (SSN 688 Class). Subsequent actions to lower the

weapon to the torpedo room are depicted in Figure 4-5 "TTL Weapon Shipping, Handling and

Stowage Equipment (SSN 688 Class)"⇒ for SSN 688 Class submarines. Weapon onload is

performed in accordance with applicable volumes and parts of NAVSEA OD 44979.

4.4 OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS/RESTRICTIONS.

Tactical employment of a TCM may impose constraints on the operating parameters of the

submarine and restrictions on the submarine’s tactical flexibility. The following paragraphs

identify the different constraints and methods of alerting the ship’s commanding officer to an

operational constraint or restriction.

4.4.1

Launch Constraints. The launch constraints imposed on the operational parameters of

the submarine during employment of tactical and exercise variants are described in the applicable

tactical employment manuals.

4.4.2

Weapon Mix. Weapon mix will depend on the particular conditions that exist at the time

the decision is made to load torpedo tubes. The SCS is capable of processing a combination of

TOMAHAWK variants, Mk 48 Torpedoes and other defensive systems. Prime consideration

for specific weapon mix is the time required to prepare and launch a TCM, to include the time

required to recycle the torpedo tube and, when authorized, to eject the capsule.

4.4.3

Alert Messages and Interlocks. Various alert messages and firing interlocks are used to

warn operators or inhibit launch when conditions exist that could impact missile performance,

endanger the submarine or result in the launch of a dud missile. Firing interlocks may be either

software or hardware interlocks. Prior to permitting activation of the FIRE switch, the submarine

fire control system must receive an indication that the following interlocks are closed:

a. WPN IDENT - Indicates that the designated weapon is loaded in torpedo tube

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b. INPUTS MATCHED - Indicates that all mission data have been transferred to the

missile and the CMGS has responded with appropriate MISSILE STATUS and GOOD

DATA words

c. WITHIN LIMITS - Indicates that speed and depth of the submarine are within limits

d. TUBE READY - Indicates that the torpedo tube outer door is open

e. BOOSTER ARMED - Indicates that the rocket motor igniter is armed

f. WARHEAD PREARMED - Indicates that the UGM-109A-1 warhead is in prearmed

condition.

g. PRESSURE IN BAND - Indicates that missile pressure is between 3.8 - 7.2 psid.

Upon activation of the FIRE switch and indication of MISSILE ENABLED (i.e., batteries

activated, BIT passed, MISSILE STATUS word good), the fire control system performs a firing

interlock check and closes final interlocks prior to permitting the impulse fire relay to energize

and eject the TCM from the torpedo tube.

4.5 LAND-ATTACK TCM OPERATIONAL SEQUENCE.

This paragraph describes typical actions and responses required to launch a land-attack TCM.

Primary coverage is given to a normal launch. Abnormal launch conditions and abort procedures

are discussed by highlighting only those events that differ from a normal launch. Typical launch

operations are shown in Figure 4-6 "UGM-109-1 Land-Attack TCM Operational Sequence (7

Sheets)"⇒. The figure illustrates the orders given by the ship’s commanding officer, typical

actions taken by equipment operators and typical equipment operations, status displays and

machine decisions. The operational sequence is described in the following paragraphs. Operating

procedures and checklists, as well as actions to be taken under abnormal conditions, are contained

in appropriate volumes and parts of NAVSEA OD 44979.

4.5.1

Weapon Preparation and Tube Loading. Preparation starts with the authorization to

launch a land-attack TCM. A torpedo tube is made ready for loading. For a UGM-109A, the 4FZ

Security Alarm System is disconnected and the capsule security band unlocked and removed.

The weapon serial number is reverified. The missile is then depressurized and moved to the

loadline where the slot covers are removed.

4.5.1.1

The loading pole is attached between the rammer and capsule loading button. Upon order

to load tube, the loadline rollers are raised and ramming is commenced. The capsule nose cover

and lashing straps are removed as they clear the forward loadline rollers. Ramming is continued

until the capsule forward guide stud contacts the tube stop bolt. The stop bolt is then rotated to the

LOCK position. On a UGM-109A/C/D-1, the capsule latch pins are pulled to allow the capsule

latches to extend and engage the slots in the aft land of the torpedo tube. On a UGM-109E-1, the

retention fixture is installed in the torpedo tube and secured to the capsule. The loading pole is

removed. Two shipping nuts are then removed from the missile holdback assemblies.

4.5.1.2

After verifying STOP BOLT LOCKED indication, covers are removed and the electrical

umbilical is connected between the breech door Y-connector and the missile and secured to the

inside of breech door. The pneumatic umbilical is connected between the breech door penetrator

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and the capsule and secured to the eyebolt on the inside of the breech door. The breech door is

shut and locked.

4.5.2

Weapon Power-Up and Make Ready. Weapon power-up and make ready is initiated

by the weapon control console (WCC) operator in the attack center. The WCC operator

activates switches to select Land-Attack TOMAHAWK mode, Land-Attack TOMAHAWK

Preset Submode and the designated torpedo tube to be used for launch. These selections permit

the WCC operator to monitor the selected tube and any alerts concerning launch. The weapon

launch control (WLC) operator in the torpedo room positions the designated tube weapon loaded

switch to the assigned missile variant. This action initiates alignment of torpedo room equipment

to the selected weapon and allows verification in the attack center, through displays on equipment

indicators, that the appropriate weapon is loaded in the tube. If such verification can not be

obtained, the launch is recycled or aborted.

4.5.2.1

When ordered, FIRING ORDER and MAKE READY ORDERED are input by the

attack control console (ACC) operator which permit other operator actions and equipment

responses to commence in preparation for launch. The mission disk pack is removed from secure

storage and mounted on the random access storage set (RASS). The disk pack serial number is

entered and the RASS is initialized.

4.5.2.2

The WLC operator positions the designated tube weapon supply switch to POWER ON.

WEAPON READY indicators appear on the WCC, ACC and WLC to reflect that the weapon

is ready to receive commands. A tube status check is again performed to verify readiness. If

WEAPON READY indicators are not obtained, the launch is recycled or aborted.

4.5.2.3

Positioning the weapon supply switch to POWER ON applies DC MONITOR/RESET

POWER to the PVC system and a PRESSURIZE indicator appears on the WLC. Upon receipt of

this indicator, the ship 700-psi air isolation valve of the designated tube pressure/vent manifold is

opened to supply air to the missile. When missile pressure stabilizes between 3.8 and 7.2 psid,

a PRESSURE IN BAND indicator appears on the WLC and the PRESSURIZE indicator goes

out. PRESSURE IN BAND, PRESSURIZE and VENT indicators may cycle on and off during

the preparation for launch due to changes in missile pressure.

4.5.3

Mission Assignment. With RASS initialized, the CMGS is ready to accept mission

data when BALLISTICS SET and CMGS PROGRAMMED are indicated to the WCC operator

(CMGS flight program has been transferred to the missile and the missile has responded with

a valid Missile Status Word.). The WCC operator changes the submode until Land-Attack

TOMAHAWK Evaluation is indicated on the WCC. THEATER, MPS, MISSION and VERIFY

codes are received from the appropriate authority and entered on the WCC. Mission data are

then indicated on the WCC. Mission data are also transferred to the central computer resident

memory. The WCC operator enters the target number and the pre-established waypoints to that

target are displayed on the WCC. The WCC operator reviews the mission data and approximate

flight path to the target and makes route alterations by introducing or deleting waypoints. The

WCC operator then assigns the mission to a designated torpedo tube and a verification that the

mission is assigned to the correct tube is performed. Once a mission has been assigned, no

further modifications can be made without resetting the mission and then reentering the mission

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number and verification code. After assigning the mission, the WCC operator normally selects the

Land-Attack TOMAHAWK Preset submode for the remainder of the launch in order to monitor

torpedo tube and missile status and any alerts concerning launch.

4.5.3.1

CMGS alignment begins automatically upon completion of a successful upload of the

Operational Flight Program (OFP). The mission data are loaded into the CMGS and a course level

is performed, followed by the alignment of axis#1. The inertial platform is then slued 90° and

alignment of axis #2 is performed. The two-position alignment technique eliminates the need to

perform submarine maneuvers at latitudes below 75°. If the submarine is maneuvering and the

CMGS can estimate platform azimuth angle during alignment of axis#1, the slue and alignment

of axis #2 will be bypassed. Launches at latitudes above 75°, however, will require submarine

maneuvers to meet the alignment timeline. Upon completion of alignment, the CMGS will

provide an ALIGNMENT COMPLETE message to the WCC operator.

4.5.3.2

If CMGS computer BIT is not passed, or valid communications can not be established

or becomes lost with the CMGS computer, an alert message is provided to the WCC operator.

To establish or restore communications, a controlled shutdown of the CMGS is performed and

missile electrical power recycled. The normal start-up sequence is then repeated and program load

reattempted. When program load is accomplished, the reprogram command is sent to the CMGS.

4.5.4

Tube Ready. The final steps to launch the missile are making the torpedo tube ready and

arming the weapon. Upon receipt of indications that alignment and mission transfer are complete

and that inputs match, the ACC operator gives the order to flood the designated torpedo tube.

Responding to the order, the WLC operator floods the tube, and when so ordered, equalizes

tube pressure with ambient sea pressure. Indicators advise operators that the tube is flooded

and equalized. When ordered, the ACC operator orders OPEN DOOR for the designated tube.

Responding to the order, the WLC operator opens the muzzle door. Indicators advise ACC and

WLC operators that the muzzle door is open. When ordered, the WLC operator turns the launch

mode switch to EJECT. The ACC operator selects the firing tube and a NEXT indicator appears.

4.5.5

Rocket Motor Arming. When ordered, the booster armed and warhead arm supply

key-lock (UGM- 109A only) switches are activated by the ACC operator for the designated tube.

BOOSTER ARMED indicators on the ACC and WLC advise operators of successful arming

of the rocket motor. If indicators do not reflect that the rocket motor is armed, the launch is

recycled or aborted.

4.5.6

Warhead Prearming (UGM-109A only). When ordered, the warhead arm switch on the

ACC is activated for the designated tube. After approximately 24 to 40 seconds, WARHEAD

ARMED indicators on the ACC and WLC will advise operators that the warhead has been

successfully prearmed.

4.5.7

Weapon Firing. With INTERLOCKS CLOSED indicated and firing status ready, the

order is given to the ACC operator to position the STANDBY/FIRE switch to STANDBY.

Upon order, the switch is then positioned to FIRE and held until the FIRE indicator is present.

Subsequent actions occur automatically. The missile batteries activate and missile essential

busses are isolated. The CMGS performs a status check using battery power and, if successful,

sends a MISSILE ENABLED signal. With the closing of final interlocks, the impulse fire

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relay energizes, the stop bolt rolls, the electrical umbilical deadfaces, and the tube fires. Upon

firing, TUBE FIRED indicators on the ACC and WLC advise operators that the tube has been

successfully fired. If indicators reflect that the tube was not successfully fired, the launch is

aborted in accordance with NAVSEA OD 44979.

4.6 POST-LAUNCH OPERATIONS.

The post-launch operational sequence begins after the missile has been launched from the torpedo

tube. Operations consist of those evolutions to either eject the capsule or return the capsule to the

stowage racks. The operations also include resetting the tube if required, and securing the torpedo

tube. A typical post-launch sequence is briefly described in the following paragraphs. Post-launch

operations are preformed in accordance with NAVSEA OD 44979.

4.6.1

Tube Reset. If the WLC indicator continues to show TUBE FIRED at the completion of

missile launch, the WLC operator takes action to reset the tube and close the outer door.

4.6.2

Capsule Ejection. (UGM-109A/C/D-1) When ordered to eject capsule, the WLC operator

positions the missile interrupter switch to MANUAL and the tube stop to LOCK. The WLC

operator then activates the switch to route ship 700-psi air to the capsule. Upon application of air

pressure, the capsule sleeve moves forward, unlocking the capsule latches. Continued movement

of the capsule sleeve retracts the capsule latches and closes the flow slots. With the closing of the

flow slots, the weapon supply switch on the WLC is turned to OFF.

(UGM-109E-1) When ordered to eject capsule, the WLC operator shall unload the capsule from

the torpedo tube in accordance with NAVSEA OD 44979. The capsule nose cover shall be

re-installed. The AUR will then be loaded back into the torpedo tube.

4.6.2.1

When ordered, the ACC operator orders OPEN DOOR. Responding to the order, the

WLC operator opens the muzzle door. WLC and ACC indicators advise the operators that the

tube is ready to eject the capsule. On order, the tube is fired and the capsule ejected. If indicators

show that the tube did not fire, operators refer to NAVSEA OD 44979 for further guidance.

4.6.2.2

Upon receipt of indicators that the tube successfully fired, the WLC operator closes the

muzzle door, turns the weapon loaded switch to OFF, secures the ship 700-psi air isolation valve

to the pressure/vent manifold, and drains the tube. After the tube is drained, the breech door is

opened. The umbilicals and inside of the breech door are rinsed with fresh water to remove salt

water residue, and then dried. The umbilicals are then disconnected and removed, and the tube is

secured using procedures contained in NAVSEA OD 44979.

4.6.3

Capsule Return to Stowage. Upon order to stow capsule, the WLC operator turns the

weapon supply and weapon loaded switches to OFF, secures the ship 700-psi air isolation valve to

the pressure/vent manifold and drains the tube. The breech door is then opened and the umbilicals,

the inside of the breech door and the aft face of the capsule are rinsed with fresh water to remove

salt water residue, and dried. The umbilicals are then disconnected and removed. The capsule

latches are manually retracted by pressing and holding their spring-loaded plungers; then lifting

the latches and securing them with the pins provided. The capsule is removed from the tube using

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SECTION III. CAPSULE LAUNCHING SYSTEM

4.8 LAUNCH PLATFORM.

The TWS provides selected SSN-688 Class, SSN-774 Class and SSGN-726 Class submarines

with the capability to carry, target, and launch TCMs against enemy land targets. TCM launch

operations are performed aboard the submarine utilizing equipment located in the Attack Center,

Combat Systems Electronic Space (CSES) and Vertical Launch Center. General locations of

the complexes are shown in Figure 4-8 "General Locations of SSN 688 Class Submarine

Complexes"⇒. The following paragraphs describe the major TWS-related CLS systems aboard

the submarine. A simplified interface block diagram of TWS-related equipment aboard the

submarine is shown in figure 4-9 "SSN 688 Class Submarine TWS-related Equipment Interfaces

(2 Sheets)"⇒.

4.8.1

Submarine Combat System (SCS). The SCS include the Combat Control System

(CCS) and the AN/BSY-1 Combat Control/Acoustic Set (CC/A). SSN 688 Class submarines

may employ either the CCS or CC/A. Each SCS, supported by the ownship navigation system,

CSES, Over-the-Horizon targeting (OTH-T) and the appropriate software programs, provides the

necessary power, discretes and data to power up weapons, transmit orders, process and display

data, initialize and align the missile guidance set, and initiate weapons launch. Also included are

control and monitoring circuits as well as various firing interlocks.

4.8.2

Combat Systems Electronic Space (CSES). The CSES equipment is shared by both the

SCS and the navigation system. Computer software programs, which include the operational

flight program, preplanned land-attack mission/targeting data generated at a shore-based Theater

Mission Planning System (TMPS) installation and provided to the submarine prior to deployment,

platform alignment data and sequential control commands, are stored on disks in the CSES. The

data are loaded into computer memory and sent to the missile on command. Missile responses

and status are evaluated by the CSES to provide data for displays on TCM status, Built-In-Test

(BIT), checksums and launch countdown.

4.8.3

Navigation System. SSN/VLS capable submarines are equipped with the Electrically

Suspended Gyro Navigator (ESGN) AN/WSN-3A(V)2. The system consists of two Inertial

Measuring Units (IMUs) and one dual-channel Navigation Control Console (NCC). Velocity and

attitude data are generated in raw form by the IMUs and transmitted to the CSES via the NCC.

The raw data are processed by the CSES computers to obtain velocity, attitude and position data

and then transmitted to the various ship user subsystems.

4.8.4

Weapon Launch System. The weapon launch system consists of the missile tube

assembly and the various ship systems which operate the missile tube assembly during stowage

and launch operations. The following paragraphs describe the components of the weapon launch

system.

4.8.4.1

Missile Tube Assembly. The missile tube assembly (Figure 4-10 "SSN 688 Class

Submarine Missile Tube Assembly"⇒) houses and physically protects the weapon in the

missile tube. The assembly consists of the missile tube, hatch and linkage gear, and interfaces

to operate the assembly. Ship system interfaces include connections for the flood and drain and

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pressurization/vent systems. AUR interfaces provide shock mitigation and alignment of the

AUR as well as a means to pressurize the AUR in the missile tube. Missile tubes are topped by

hatches that are individually operated by outboard hydraulic rotary actuators and are locked by an

over-center toggle linkage mechanism with locking further enhanced by a device to assure that

hatches do not inadvertently open when adjacent tubes are subjected to launch pressure.

4.8.4.2

Hydraulic System. The hydraulic system (Figure 4-11 "SSN 688 Class Submarine

Hydraulic System"⇒) provides power to actuate flood and drain system valves and missile

tube hatches.

4.8.4.3

Pressurization/Vent System. The pressurization/vent system (Figure 4-12 "SSN 688

Class Submarine Pressurization/Vent System"⇒) replenishes the AUR internal atmosphere

during stowage and pressurizes or vents the AUR to maintain internal pressure within a specified

range of positive pressure over the underhatch volume pressure prior to launch using 700 psig

ship service air.

4.8.4.4

Flood and Drain System. The flood and drain system (Figure 4-13 "SSN 688 Class

Submarine Flood and Drain System"⇒) floods and equalizes the missile tube underhatch volume

to sea pressure so that the hatch can be opened, drains the underhatch volume to remove water

and allows this volume to be maintained at submarine internal ambient pressure.

4.8.4.5

Missile Tube Control System. The missile tube control system (Figure 4-14 "SSN 688

Class Submarine Missile Tube Control System"⇒) contains the controls, indicators, and interlock

circuitry necessary to ready the missile tubes for launch and to monitor missile tube operation.

The system also provides all of the interfaces between the ship systems and the SCS.

4.9 ONLOAD AND OFFLOAD.

The following paragraphs provide general information regarding preparation for, and onload

and offload of weapons, as well as offload of a spent CLS. Various volumes of NAVSEA

OD 44979 contain specific procedures to be used by SSN personnel. Technical manual

SW820-AD-WHS-010/UGM-109-2 contains specific procedures for submarine tender and shore

based personnel supporting SSNs. For SSGN Class procedures refer to NAVSEA OD 64501 and

SW820-AD-WHS-040/UGM-109-2.

4.9.1

Onload. Submarine onload begins when the submarine arrives at a designated shore

base activity or supporting submarine tender to receive a complement of weapons. Wind and

sea motion, which affect the submarine’s position and movement, are factors in determining

the feasibility of loading operations. To prevent damage to the missile, ship, or equipment,

it is recommended that weapons not be onloaded or offloaded if roll exceeds 3 degrees or pitch

exceeds 1/2 degree, and winds exceed 30 knots. The submarine tender/shore base loading

supervisor and the submarine’s commanding officer will determine if conditions are satisfactory

prior to commencing onload. Prior to onload, the security system is neutralized for each missile

tube to be loaded; flood and drain system and pressure/vent system operability are verified at the

VLC; and SCS operability is verified through operator conducted system diagnostics. During

loading, responsibility for all operations is shared between the submarine’s commanding officer

and the submarine tender/shore base loading supervisor. All actions involving ship system

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preparation are the responsibility of the submarine’s commanding officer. His permission is

required prior to commencing loading operations. His designated representative is responsible

for weapon handling operations and ensures that a weapon transfer inspection is conducted.

Upon completion of submarine preparation, responsibility for loading transfers to the submarine

tender/shore base loading supervisor. The submarine crew conducts the final hookup and

closeout of the missile tube upon disconnect and removal of the loading equipment from the

submarine. The following paragraphs provide a general overview of procedures used during

loading operations. For purposes of illustration, loading of a generic weapon into one missile

tube is discussed. There are some minor differences in loading procedures among AURs, AUR

Simulator Volumetric Shapes and ballast cans which are not discussed. For multiple loadings,

the procedures are the same except that multiple actions may be occurring simultaneously to

prepare missile tubes and weapons. Additionally, loading equipment is moved from missile

tube to missile tube until the full complement of weapons is aboard the submarine. Similarly,

post-loadout is accomplished on a tube by tube basis until full closeout is accomplished. Onload

terminates when the submarine has received its scheduled complement, final hookup has been

accomplished, all loading equipment has been removed, missile tube hatches are closed and

secured, and ship system equipment has been activated.

4.9.1.1

Prepare Missile Tube and Ship Systems. After supporting submarine tender/shore

base personnel have erected the loading platform (Figure 4-15 "Loading Platform Installed"⇒).

submarine personnel prepare the missile tube and ship systems for onload. The missile tube hatch

is opened and gagged (Figure 4-16 "SSN 688 Class Submarine Missile Tube Equipment"⇒). and

the missile tube is visually inspected to ensure it is free of potential contaminants. Contaminants,

if present, will damage the lip seal on an AUR or o-ring on an AUR Volumetric Shape/Simulator

during loading. The muzzle face protective cover and the missile tube muzzle hatch and

magnet protective cover are installed (Figure 4-16 "SSN 688 Class Submarine Missile Tube

Equipment"⇒). For the AUR Volumetric Shape/Simulator onload, the mylar O-ring protective

sleeve assembly is also installed. Special procedures like direct tube to tube transfer of AURs

on the same submarine or between different submarines may utilize lip seal protective covers

(fabricated from split garden hose or equivalent) or a lip seal protective sleeve (fabricated from

various sheet materials). The counterbore cover is installed to prevent personnel, tools, water

and debris from entering the empty missile tube. The Environmental Monitoring Sensor (EMS)

pressure and temperature ambients are checked, and a leak test performed. SCS circuits are

checked using the All-Up-Round Electronic Simulator (AURES). The accuracy of the differential

pressure transducer is verified and the pressurize/vent (P/V) plug is removed and stowed. The

counterbore cover is removed.

4.9.1.2

Install Loading Equipment. After the missile tube and ship systems have been

prepared for loading, submarine tender/shore base personnel install the loading equipment aboard

the submarine. This includes the Installation Guide Assembly Mk 116, Hydraulic Power Unit

(HPU) Mk 8, Missile Tube Extension Loader (MTEL) Mk 23 and the MTEL Safety Cover. The

installation guide is installed on the missile tube inner shoulder to assist in centering the MTEL

over the missile tube. The MTEL is lowered over the missile tube, maneuvered to align its

guide holes with the missile tube pins, and bolted to the muzzle face. The installation guide is

then removed. The MTEL safety cover is installed over the MTEL mouth to prevent objects from

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falling into the open missile tube. The HPU is positioned on the loading platform and connected

to the electrical source aboard the submarine. Hoses are connected between the HPU and the

MTEL. A check is made to insure the centering guides and the insertion pin stop-plates are in

the correct position on the MTEL

4.9.1.3

Prepare Weapon. As the missile tube and ship systems are being prepared for loading

and loading equipment is being installed, submarine tender/shore base personnel prepare the

weapon for loading. After opening the Shipping and Storage Skid Mk 30, two trunnions or

trunnion bearing assemblies are installed in the weapon to allow vertical uprighting with either

the Tilt Fixture, Mk 23 Mod 0 with Kit B, or a Shipping and Storage Skid Mk 30 that has

been rigged for uprighting. The weapon is removed from the skid and placed in the uprighting

equipment being used where, if not previously performed, a pressure check and inspection, to

include rocket motor safe/armed and weapon configuration tests, are performed. Interface support

and elastomer loading guard pads as well as the upper flange grooves are greased to facilitate

loading the weapon into the missile tube. The forward section of the weapon is depressurized

and the Closure Protective Cover (CPC) is replaced with the Capsule Loading Cover (CLC). The

annular space vent plug is removed and stowed. Two lip seals are then greased and carefully

installed into the upper flange grooves. The lifting adapter is then attached to upright the weapon

to the vertical position.

4.9.1.4

Load Weapon in Missile Tube. The weapon is uprighted about the trunnions or

trunnion bearing assemblies and lifted off the Mk 23 fixture (Figure 4-34 "Tilt Fixture Mk 23

Mod 0 with Kit B"⇒) or uprighting skid (Figure 4-17 "CLS Weapon Onload"⇒). The trunnions

or trunnion bearing assemblies are removed and the weapon is lifted over the MTEL and aligned

for insertion into the missile tube. The MTEL safety cover is removed. The weapon is lowered

into the MTEL until the bellyband and the moisture and dust plug can be sequentially removed.

The MTEL centering guides are released to allow the flange to pass, permitting the weapon to be

lowered until the lifting adapter is above the bellmouth. The lifting adapter arm is then pinned

in the vertical position and the weapon is further lowered until the lifting adapter insertion pins

rest on the MTEL stop plates (Figure 4-18 "CLS Weapon Seating in Missile Tube"⇒). Seating

the weapon in the missile tube is accomplished hydraulically using the HPU. The lifting adapter

arm is disconnected from the crane and the MTEL hydraulic cylinders are connected to the

lifting adapter insertion pins. The hydraulic cylinders are extended using the HPU until the

weapon seats in the missile tube.

4.9.1.5

Remove Loading Equipment. After the AUR has been fully seated in the missile tube,

the MTEL hydraulic cylinders are disconnected from the lifting adapter insertion pins. The

insertion pins are inserted into the lifting adapter and the MTEL hydraulic cylinders are then fully

retracted. The HPU is disconnected from the MTEL and the MTEL unbolted from the muzzle

face and removed from the deck. The lifting adapter is unbolted and removed from the weapon

which signifies completion of the loading sequence and final hookup and testing becomes the

responsibility of submarine personnel.

4.9.1.6

Post-Loadout. Post-loadout involves connecting the weapon to the ship systems

through missile tube interfaces (Figure 4-19 "Secure CLS Weapon in Missile Tube"⇒). The

umbilical cable connector is connected to the missile tube umbilical connector. Eight retention

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segments are installed to restrain the CLS in the missile tube at launch. Umbilical cable brackets

are connected to the retention segments to restrain the umbilical. The SCS, missile tube, and

weapon are then tested to ensure operability. The annular space vent is plugged and the P/V

sensing line connected to the pressure transducer in the missile tube. A leak test at the missile

tube hatch opening is conducted and the underhatch area cleaned. The CLC is removed and the

capsule closure is inspected to ensure no damage occurred during loading. The missile tube hatch

and fairing are then closed and the loading platform removed.

4.9.1.7

SSGN Onload Overview. The following paragraphs provide a brief description of the

unique aspects of onloading the Tomahawk onboard a SSGN-726 Class submarine.

4.9.1.8

AUR Onload Sequence. An onload sequence begins with staging and preparing the

work platform (Figure 4-4 "MTEL Work Platforms"⇒) onto the MTEL, attaching the MTEL

adapter (Figure 4-7 "MTEL With MTEL Adapter Installed"⇒) onto the MTEL, and attaching

the lifting adapter extension (Figure 4-21 "Lifting Adapter and Extension"⇒) onto the lifting

adapter. The MTEL work platform, the MTEL adapter and the lifting adapter extension are

support equipment unique to SSGN.

4.9.1.9

Organizational-Level Preparations. The submarine crew opens the missile tube

hatch providing access to the Multiple All-Up-Round Canister (MAC) (Figure 4-33 "Multiple

All-Up-Round Canister (Fully Loaded)"⇒) and its individual AUR cells, and tags out the

hydraulic system. The appropriate AUR cells are inspected for dirt, debris or foreign material that

will damage lip seals during loading, and the area is cleaned as required.

4.9.1.10

Installing Loading Equipment. The HPU is transferred and secured to the SSGN

work area. There are two different MTEL Adapters and each must be used in the appropriate

AUR cells. The 7124601-003 Adapter is used with MAC cells A, C, E, and G. The 7124601-004

Adapter is used with MAC cells B, D and F (Figure 4-35 "Multiple All-Up-Round Canister

MTEL Orientation"⇒). The prepared MTEL/MTEL Adapter is lowered onto the AUR cell and

oriented with the large and small alignment pins temporarily placed in the MAC top plate. The

MTEL/MTEL Adapter is secured to the MAC with four bolts. The hydraulic hoses from the HPU

are connected to the manifold on the MTEL.

4.9.1.11

Uprighting and Inserting. Procedures to upright the AUR are similar to the SSN Class

with the exception of installing the lifting adapter extension. Inserting the AUR is essentially

the same as for the SSN Class as well, with the MTEL adapter providing an interface between

the existing MTEL design and the MAC top plate. The additional height of the MTEL adapter

requires the lifting adapter be attached to the AUR with an extension of equal height.

The MTEL adapter is outfitted with a guide ring. The guide ring can be rotated to the open or shut

position to engage or disengage the guide shoes. The guide shoes perform the same function as

the MTEL centering guides, which is to assist in keeping the AUR in the center of the cell during

loading and offloading operations.

4.9.1.12

Removing Loading Equipment. The MTEL/Adapter is unbolted from the MAC top

plate and removed. The lifting adapter/extension is unbolted from the capsule upper flange and

removed. The HPU is disconnected from the electrical power source and removed.

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4.9.1.13

Organizational-Level Closeout Operations. Topside personnel connect the

pressure/vent sensing line and install the eight retention segments to secure the AUR in the AUR

cell. Topside personnel mate the AUR upper umbilical cable connector to the MAC umbilical

cable stowage receptacle. Inside the MAC, the crew connects the AUR ground strap, moves the

P1130 connector to the stowage position of the aft cover, and mates the MAC umbilical cable to

the J1130 connector (Figure 4-36 "AUR Aft Cover Viewed in MAC"⇒). Each AUR requires

one MAC umbilical to be connected to the J1130 connector. A bubble test is performed on the

installed AUR to check for leaks at the MAC top plate.

4.9.2

Offload. Submarine offload begins when the submarine arrives at a designated shore

base activity or supporting submarine tender to discharge a complement of weapons or spent

CLSs. Wind and sea motion, which affect the submarine’s position and movement, are factors

in determining the feasibility of offload operations. To prevent damage to the missile, ship,

or equipment, it is recommended that weapons not be offloaded if roll exceeds 3 degrees or

pitch exceeds 1/2 degree, and winds exceed 30 knots. The submarine tender/shore base loading

supervisor and the submarine’s commanding officer will determine if conditions are satisfactory

prior to commencing offload. Prior to offload, ship systems are neutralized for each missile tube to

be offloaded. During offload, responsibility for all operations is shared between the submarine’s

commanding officer and the submarine tender/shore base loading supervisor. All actions involving

ship system and weapon preparation are the responsibility of the submarine’s commanding officer.

His permission is required prior to commencing offload operations. His designated representative

is responsible for weapon handling operations and ensures that a weapon transfer inspection is

conducted. Upon completion of submarine and weapon preparation, responsibility for offload

transfers to the submarine tender/shore base. The following paragraphs provide a general

overview of procedures used during offload operations. For purposes of illustration, offload of a

generic weapon from one missile tube is discussed. There are some minor differences in offload

procedures among AURs, AUR Simulator Volumetric Shapes, ballast cans and spent CLSs which

are not discussed. For multiple offloads, the procedures are the same except that multiple actions

may be occurring simultaneously to prepare missile tubes and weapons. Additionally, loading

equipment is moved from missile tube to missile tube until the full complement of weapons is

offloaded from the submarine. Similarly, post-offload procedures are accomplished on a tube by

tube basis until full closeout is accomplished. Offload terminates when all weapons scheduled for

offload have been removed from the submarine and all loading equipment has been removed

4.9.2.1

Prepare Missile Tube and Ship Systems. Initially, the SCS must be disengaged from

those missile tubes containing weapons to be offloaded. After the SCS has been disengaged

from those missile tubes to be offloaded and the loading platform (Figure 4-15 "Loading

Platform Installed"⇒) installed by supporting submarine tender/shore base personnel, the first

missile tube hatch is opened and gagged (Figure 4-16 "SSN 688 Class Submarine Missile Tube

Equipment"⇒). The muzzle face protective cover, the missile tube muzzle hatch and magnetic

protective cover and the EMS protective cover are installed to protect submarine personnel and

equipment while preparing AUR weapons for removal.

4.9.2.2

Prepare Spent CLS for Offload. In addition to those above tasks to be performed to

prepare for weapon offload, reflood water and residue must be removed from a spent CLS prior

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removing it from the missile tube. Submarine tender/shore base personnel pump approximately

half of the reflood water in the spent CLS into a holding tank using a submersible pump. The

submarine crew then performs a P/V piping blow-down to ensure reflood water is removed. The

upper tube and muzzle hatch areas are then flushed with fresh water and all residual reflood water

is pumped from the spent CLS. Remaining residue and by-products are cleared from above the

CLS in order to attach the lifting adapter. Additionally, egress of the TCM from the CLS causes

the diaphragm to rupture leaving residue which must be removed to permit attachment of the CLC

and to secure the umbilical cable to the cover.

4.9.2.3

Prepare Weapon for Offload. Once the missile tube has been prepared, the submarine

crew prepares the weapon for offload. The CLC is installed. The umbilical cable connector is

disconnected, the connector protective cap installed, and the connector is secured to the CLC.

Umbilical cable clamps, retention segments and the annular space vent plug are then removed.

A protective shield is installed on the umbilical to prevent contact with the missile tube and

damage to the umbilical.

4.9.2.4

Install Offload Equipment. Submarine tender/shore base personnel connect the lifting

adapter to the weapon. The MTEL is positioned, and secured over the missile tube. The HPU is

positioned on the loading platform and connected to the electrical source aboard the submarine

and to the MTEL cylinders. The lifting adapter insertion pins are installed and the MTEL

hydraulic cylinders are connected to the insertion pins.

4.9.2.5

Remove Weapon from Missile Tube. With the MTEL cylinders attached to the lifting

adapter insertion pins, the HPU is energized causing the hydraulic cylinders to retract thereby

extracting the weapon from its seated position in the missile tube. The weapon is positioned on

the stop plates and the hydraulic cylinders are detached from the insertion pins. A crane hook is

attached to the lifting adapter arm to withdraw the weapon. As the weapon is raised, the insertion

pins are retracted, the moisture and dust plug is installed, and the bellyband and tag lines are

attached. The weapon is fully extracted from the missile tube, lifted clear of the submarine and

transferred to the tender or dockside where trunnions or trunnion bearing assemblies are installed.

The weapon is positioned on the Tilt Fixture, Mk 23 Mod 0 with Kit B, or on a MK 30 skid rigged

with a Mk 26 Uprighting Fixture.

4.9.2.6

Remove Offload Equipment. After the weapon has been removed from the missile

tube, the offload equipment is removed from the submarine or moved to another missile tube.

The MTEL centering guides are disengaged, the HPU/MTEL connection is severed and the

hydraulic cylinders are stowed on the MTEL. After detaching the MTEL from the missile tube,

the MTEL is removed.

4.9.2.7

Secure Missile Tube and Ship Systems after Weapon Offload. After the offloading

equipment has been removed from the missile tube, the submarine crew secures the missile tube

and ship systems. The crew installs the missile tube counterbore cover, the P/V port plug, and the

missile tube umbilical security cap. The missile tube muzzle hatch protective cover, muzzle face

protective cover, fairing, cofferdam, and counterbore cover are removed. The missile tube hatch

is ungagged and the hatch is closed. Flood and drain, pressurization/vent and security systems are

then energized to return the submarine to normal operations. The loading platform is removed.

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4.9.2.8

Post-Launch P/V Refurbishment after Spent CLS Offload. After the offload

equipment has been removed from the missile tube, the submarine crew conducts post-launch P/V

refurbishment. The P/V valve is disassembled, cleaned, and reinstalled. Differential transducer

lines are cleaned and the transducer is checked and tested. P/V piping is flushed, dried and tested

for serviceability. Upon completion of the refurbishment, the P/V plug is reinstalled.

4.9.2.9

Post-Launch Missile Tube Refurbishment after Spent CLS Offload. Launching a

TCM and exposure to sea water during the launch may cause minor damage to the missile tube

necessitating post-launch missile tube refurbishment. The submarine crew removes the missile

tube counterbore cover, inspects the interior of the missile tube and performs, or arranges for,

missile tube maintenance depending on the complexity of repairs required.

4.9.2.10

SSGN Offload Overview. The following paragraphs describe unique aspects of

offloading the Tomahawk from a SSGN-726 Class submarine. Primary elements unique to

offloading from the SSGN platform are the location of the umbilical for disconnection by

submarine personnel, and the requirements for the MTEL work platform, MTEL adapter, and

lifting adapter extension.

As discussed in the SSGN onload overview, there are two MTEL adapters each of which must be

used in the appropriate AUR cells. The 7124601-003 Adapter is used with MAC cells A, C, E and

G. The 7124601-004 Adapter is used with MAC cells B, D and F.

Similar to the MTEL centering guides, the guide ring of the MTEL adapter is rotated to the

shut position to engage the guide shoes and assist in keeping the AUR in the center of the cell

during offload.

4.10 OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS/RESTRICTIONS.

Tactical employment of the TCM imposes a number of constraints on the operating parameters of

the submarine. The constraints imposed during tactical launch operations of the TOMAHAWK

Cruise Missile are provided in applicable tactical publications. Employment also places

restrictions on the submarine’s tactical flexibility which are described in Operating Guidelines,

tactical employment manuals and operation manuals.

4.10.1

Weapon Mix. Weapon mix will depend on the particular conditions that exist at the

time the decision is made to prepare weapons for launch. The SCS is capable of processing a

combination of land-attack TCM variants for single or salvo launch from vertical missile tubes,

as well as a combination of land-attack TCM variants, Mk 48 Torpedoes and other defensive

systems for launch from torpedo tubes. Prime consideration for selecting a specific weapon for

launch should be the time required to prepare and launch a single TCM or, in the case of salvo

fire, the time required to prepare and launch multiple TCMs.

4.10.2

Alert Messages and Interlocks. Various alert messages and firing interlocks are used to

warn operators or inhibit launch when conditions exist that could impact missile performance,

endanger the submarine or result in the launch of a dud missile. Firing interlocks may be either

software or hardware interlocks. Prior to permitting activation of the FIRE switch, the fire control

system must receive an indication that the following interlocks are closed:

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a. OPERATIONAL FLIGHT PROGRAM TRANSFERRED - Indicates that the flight

program has been successfully transferred to the missile.

b. MISSILE ALIGNED - Indicates that the CMGS inertial platform relative to the

submarine’s inertial reference system has been aligned.

c. MISSION DATA TRANSFERRED - Indicates that all data relative to the mission have

been transferred to the missile.

d. WITHIN LIMITS - Indicates that speed and depth of the submarine are within limits.

e. INPUTS MATCHED - Indicates that the CMGS has responded with good MISSILE

STATUS, missile presetting is complete and launch constraints are satisfied,

f. TUBE IN ACTIVE FIRING SEQUENCE - Indicates that the proper tube has been

selected and sequenced, all controls have been positioned and all indicators are go.

g. TUBE READY - Indicates that the underhatch volume has been flooded and the

pressurization/vent control valve is closed.

h. CAPSULE/BOOSTER PREARMED - Indicated that the capsule and rocket motor are

in the prearmed position.

Upon activation of the FIRE switch and indication of MISSILE ENABLED (i.e., , hatch open,

booster armed, capsule armed, batteries activated, BIT passed, MISSILE STATUS word good),

the fire control system closes firing interlocks prior to permitting the coded charge and launch

signals to be sent to the CLS.

4.11 LAND-ATTACK TCM OPERATIONAL SEQUENCE.

This paragraph describes typical actions and responses required to launch a land-attack TCM.

Primary coverage is given to normal launch of a single weapon. For salvo launch, the operational

steps for a single launch are sequentially accomplished for each weapon selected for launch.

Abnormal launch conditions and abort procedures are discussed by highlighting only those

events that differ from a normal launch. Typical launch operations are shown in Figure 4-20

"UGM-109-2 Land-Attack TCM Operational Sequence (10 Sheets)"⇒. The figure illustrates the

orders given by the ship’s commanding officer, typical actions taken by equipment operators and

typical equipment operations, status displays and machine decisions. The operational sequence

is described in the following paragraphs. For a full discussion of operating procedures and

checklists, as well as actions to be taken under abnormal conditions, refer to the appropriate

volumes and parts of NAVSEA OD 44979.

4.11.1

Weapon Preparation. Preparation for launch commences with the authorization from

the commanding officer. He will issue the necessary make ready command for a single or salvo

launch. Based on that command, the MAKE READY command is issued and the appropriate

land-attack weapon for the mission is selected. To verify the correct missile has been selected and

to permit weapon power-up, the Weapon Supply Switch is placed in the IDENT position. Should

a weapon conflict result from CM IDENT POWER application, an ID ERROR will be displayed

and all relays to the weapon will remain closed.

4.11.2

Weapon Power-Up and Make Ready. When the correct designator is reflected, the

Missile Power keyswitch is placed in the ENABLE position and the Weapon Supply Switch is

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moved from IDENT to ON. This permits MONITOR/RESET POWER and CAPSULE POWER

to flow to the missile and CLS respectively so the SCS can transmit commands, receive responses,

and open relay circuitry for missile OPERATE POWER. Additionally, activation of the switches

permits the flow of REM BATTERY HEATER POWER to exercise weapons. Weapon responses

are monitored to ensure that BOOSTER SAFE and CAPSULE SAFE indicators show that the

weapon is in a safe status. If a BOOSTER ARMED or CAPSULE ARMED indication exists,

or there is no condition status indicated, the launch is aborted.

4.11.3

Mission Assignment. The appropriate mission disk pack is removed from secure storage

and mounted on the random access storage set (RASS). The disk pack serial number is entered

and the RASS initialized. With RASS initialized, the Cruise Missile Guidance Set (CMGS) is

ready to accept mission data when BALLISTICS SET and CMGS PROGRAMMED are indicated

to the Weapon Control Console (WCC) operator (CMGS flight program has been transferred to

the missile and the missile has responded with a valid Missile Status Word.). The WCC operator

changes the submode until Land-Attack TOMAHAWK Evaluation is indicated on the WCC.

THEATER, MPS, MISSION and VERIFY codes are received from the appropriate authority

and entered on the WCC. Mission data are then indicated on the WCC. Mission data are also

transferred to the central computer resident memory. The WCC operator enters the target number

and the pre-established waypoints to that target are displayed on the WCC. The WCC operator

reviews the mission data and approximate flight path to the target and makes route alterations by

introducing or deleting waypoints. The WCC operator then assigns the mission to the designated

missile tube and a verification that the mission is assigned to the correct tube is performed. Once

a mission has been assigned, no further modifications can be made without resetting the mission

and then reentering the mission number and verification code. After assigning the mission, the

WCC operator normally selects the Land-Attack TOMAHAWK Preset submode for the remainder

of the launch in order to monitor tube and missile status and any alerts concerning launch.

4.11.3.1

CMGS alignment begins automatically upon completion of a successful upload of the

Operational Flight Program (OFP). A two-position alignment technique eliminates the need to

perform submarine maneuvers at latitudes below 75°. Launches at latitudes above 75°, however,

will require submarine maneuvers to meet the alignment timeline. Upon completion of alignment,

the CMGS will provide an ALIGNMENT COMPLETE message to the WCC operator.

4.11.3.2

If CMGS computer built-in test (BIT) is not passed, or valid communication can not

be established or becomes lost with the CMGS computer, an alert message is provided to the

WCC operator. To establish or restore communications, a controlled shutdown of the CMGS is

performed and missile electrical power recycled. The normal start-up sequence is then repeated

and program load reattempted. When program load is accomplished, the reprogram command

is sent to the CMGS.

4.11.4

Rocket Motor/Capsule Prearm. When proper authorization is given, the BOOSTER

ARM and CAPSULE ARM switches are activated to prearm the rocket motor and capsule

respectively.

4.11.5

Tube Ready. When the WCC display indicates INPUTS MATCHED YES, and when

proper authorization is given, the READY TO FLOOD pushbutton at the Vertical Launch Console

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(VLC) is depressed and the FLOOD/DRAIN valve opened. The Hatch Control Switch must be

in REMOTE. FLOOD/DRAIN VALVE OPEN and EQUALIZE indicators illuminate, and the

PRESSURE IN BAND indicator remains illuminated. Consoles are continuously monitored to

ensure that all systems are operational. Any anomaly will be displayed on the WCC as a systems

alert or mode message which must be resolved prior to proceeding with the launch.

4.11.6

Weapon Firing. When the STANDBY ENABLE is displayed, the STANDBY switch is

activated. A STANDBY indicator illuminates at the VLC which directs the closing of the P/V

valve and unlatching of the missile tube hatch. The command is then given to activate the FIRE

switch. Activation of the FIRE switch activates the HATCH OPEN RELAY which automatically

routes all subsequent commands directly to the weapon. The FIRE command opens the missile

tube hatch, arms the rocket motor and CLS, and sends the ITL signal to the missile. It also sends

the coded charge and launch signals to the CLS after the missile batteries are activated and

MISSILE ENABLED and FIC signals have been sent to the VLC.

4.11.6.1

Once the FIRE command has been sent, operators no longer have the ability to

intervene in the launch with the exception of sending an ABORT command. An abort can be

accomplished any time until the MISSILE ENABLED signal is sent to the SCS. Once batteries

have been activated and the ABORT command issued, the missile is dudded and cannot be

recycled for firing.

4.11.6.2

Upon receipt of the coded launch signal, the gas generator ignites, initiating missile

launch. FIRE PULSE DETECTED signal is received from the CLS and all functions to the

missile are terminated. At first motion, a MISSILE AWAY signal is received from the CLS

and all commands are terminated.

4.11.7

Multiple Launch/Salvo Fire. Upon receipt of the multiple launch/salvo fire order from

the commanding officer, and subsequent to selection of the missile tube firing order, commands

and orders are inputted into each weapon sequentially until FIRE is ordered. During multiple

launch/salvo fire, activation of the FIRE switch initiates the salvo fire. Interlocks for all weapons

programmed for launch must be closed prior to launching the first missile. Once the FIRE switch

is activated, firing is automatic and only the loss of HATCH OPEN, CAPSULE ARMED, or

MISSILE ENABLE will inhibit launch automatically. The salvo firing sequence may be manually

interrupted by pushing the STANDBY or FIRE button a second time. Manual interruption will

not abort or stop a weapon in process of being fired after ITL has been issued to a missile in the

firing sequence. The salvo may be restarted by manually pressing the FIRE button again.

4.12 POST-LAUNCH OPERATIONS.

After first motion and transmittal of the MISSILE AWAY signal, the missile clears the missile

tube and missile launched is indicated. The order is given to close the missile tube and secure

the system after ensuring a HANGFIRE alert is not indicated. The Hatch Control Switch is

moved from REMOTE to CLOSE, and the Weapon Supply Switch turned OFF. The Missile Tube

Power Switch is moved to MONITOR and Missile Power turned OFF. Post-launch operations are

performed in accordance with NAVSEA OD 44979.

4.13 LAND-ATTACK TCM CASUALTY MODE.

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There is no casualty mode for land-attack TCM variants.

4.14 BLOCK IV TACTOM OPERATIONAL SEQUENCE.

The following paragraphs describe typical actions and responses during a Block IV TACTOM

launch.

4.14.1

Prelaunch Sequence. The Block IV TACTOM Missile prelaunch sequence includes

checks of missile hardware and software; loading of missile flight capable software, mission data,

and strike data; and alignment of the inertial measurement unit. The prelaunch sequence starts

when the application of power is initiated and completes when the missile is ready for launch.

The missile prelaunch sequence initiates with the application of power from the launch platform.

The missile’s first operation, upon power application is to run Built-In-Tests of the air data

module, inertial measurement unit, mission control processor, and navigation processor.

Once the initial Built-In-Tests are completed, the platform’s SCS interrogates the missile for its

ID number, tail number, OFS cyclic redundancy check status, and OFS version ID. The SCS

also requests version IDs from other missile software components such as the DSMAC flight

software and GPS flight software. After these checks are passed, the SCS loads the Missile

Launch Capable Flight Software (LFS). Once the LFS is loaded, the Missile Response Status

Word reported to the SCS will show the missile to be launch capable.

After the software loads are completed, the Anti-Jam GPS Receiver, Digital Scene Matching Area

Correlator, and Satellite Data Link Transceiver are powered up and Built-In-Tests are performed.

Next, the Thrust Vector Control and Fin Control System Built-In-Tests are performed.

Initialization of the Inertial Measurement Unit begins with the transmittal of the missile

initialization message from the FCS, which contains data from the platform’s inertial navigation

system. This allows the navigation processor to transition from Mode 1 (Ready to Align) to

Mode 2 (Aligning).

Alignment data from the platform is combined with up to 220 KB of mission data and loaded

into the missile. The Mission Data also includes strike data and communications parameters.

Mission data loads are verified by checksum tests after download completion. The loading of

mission data continues with the over-water data (planned by the launch platform), GPS almanac

data, and GPS keys.

The FCS continues to monitor the navigation processor status until Mode 3 (aligned) is reported.

At that point, the FCS issues the Booster Arm and the Intent to Launch (ITL) commands. Once

the ITL is issued, responsibility for aborting the launch passes from the FCS to the missile. Next,

the FCS issues a Terminate Alignment to the missile, which causes the Mission Control Processor

(MCP) to command the navigation processor into “Navigate” mode. The MCP then initiates the

rocket motor, thrust vector control, and fin control system. The cruise missile airframe battery

is also enabled.

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Before the MCP issues the Enable Missile command, it performs several initial status checks,

including a status update from the navigation processor and verification of proper GPS load data.

4.14.2

Launch Sequence. The Block IV TACTOM Missile launch sequence from application

of Intent-To-Launch (ITL) to wing deployment includes discrete signals from missile, removal of

launcher power, digital interface deadfacing, gas generator ignition, first motion, booster ignition,

deployment of fins and wings, rocket motor jettison, and engine start-up.

The missile launch sequence begins upon transmission of Firing Command (ITL) by the launch

platform to the missile. The ITL and subsequent sequence results in missile battery activation,

transition from platform power to internal missile power, execution of missile Built-In-Test, and

the subsequent return of Missile Enable to the launch platform. After receipt of Missile Enable,

the launch platform’s SCS removes launcher power to the missile and the Mission Control

Processor (MCP) issues a Mk-82 deadface command to prevent spurious digital commands.

Following the deadface command, the SCS issues a gas generator ignition command. When the

missile senses first motion a launcher position and velocity test is initiated. When launcher

position and velocity is detected the missile disables the booster and waits for a deceleration

indication and when the deceleration occurs the booster is ignited and the missile enables ACR

monitor, TVC control, and initiates booster guidance/autopilot. Missile enable is then turned off.

When water broach is detected the wing slot plugs are ejected. Shroud separation occurs, fins

are deployed, and boost roll control is initiated. Regardless of the launch platform, the missile

then jettisons the inlet cover and deploys the wings. When the rocket motor thrust decays the

missile jettisons the rocket motor and starts the cruise engine and follows the cruise route to

the designated target.

4.14.3

Submarine Weapon System Interfaces. During the pre-launch phase, the Block

IV TACTOM AUR interfaces directly to the SCS and the Mk 45 Capsule Launching System

(CLS). The Mk 45 Capsule provides for all mechanical and environmental interfaces to the

AUR (including the longitudinal shock isolation, lateral support, mounting to Mk 45 canister

aft structure restraint/gas generation system, umbilical cable connection, temperature control,

humidity control, and storage). Each SCS provides the Mk 82 digital data link for all command

and response message traffic to/from the AUR. Each SCS also provides power, discrete, and

analog signals to the AUR via the capsule wiring harness that connects to the side of the Mk

45 capsule. All commands, power application, data loads and status requests to the missile

are applied by submarine class SCS.

Once in flight, the Block IV TACTOM missile is capable of receiving various directions (flex

command, re-targeting, BDI request, H&S requests) via the use of In-Flight Mission Modification

Messages (IMMM) transmitted by the Strike Controller via the TOMAHAWK Strike Network

(TSN). It is also capable of acquiring and receiving GPS information directly from the GPS

satellite constellation.

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4.14.4

TOMAHAWK Strike Network In-Flight Communications. The TOMAHAWK Strike

Network (TSN) is used to link communications between a Block IV TACTOM with a strike

controller or missile controller during flight. The missile sends health and status (H&S) messages

and receives commands from the controller to modify mission outcome or communication

parameters. Messages are transmitted via UHF Satellite Communications on 5 KHz and 25 KHz

UHF Demand Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA) channels.

Message Types:

From Block IV TACTOM Missile:

• H&S: Sent to controller to report missile location, current mission outcome, and status of

selected missile subsystems. H&S messages may be prescheduled, triggered by events,

or in response to a request by the controller.

• Battle Damage Information: This is an H&S message that also contains an estimate of

navigation error at the target. BDI messages are sent during the terminal portion of the

mission.

• Battle Damage Indication Imagery: This is an H&S message that includes a compressed

single frame of imagery collected with the DSMAC sensor. Collection of images is

controlled by mission data.

From Strike/Missile Controller (In-Flight Mission Modification):

• Preplanned Outcome: These messages can be used to select one of up to 16 preplanned

mission outcomes. The missile will transition to the chosen outcome at a preplanned

point in the route. This type of message can also be sent to modify communications

parameters or request missile status.

• Aimpoint Update: This message is used to command the missile to directly transition to a

new target location, specified by GPS location. The message also provides commands

for flyout altitude to the target, dive angle, and warhead fuze delay. This type of message

can also be sent to modify communications parameters or request missile status.

• Retarget: This message also provides a new aim point to the missile, but also includes a

segment of mission data to guide the missile to the target. The message also specifies

where in the preplanned mission the missile shall divert to the new mission data. This

type of message can also be sent to modify communications parameters or request

missile status.

4.14.5

GPS To Missile Interface. The Block IV TACTOM missile uses the Global Positioning

System (GPS) for navigation aiding throughout its flight. GPS signals are received by the

Anti-jam GPS Receiver (AGR) via the AGR Antenna. These components provide the missile

with improved resistance to GPS jamming as compared to Block III.

As in Block III, the Block IV TACTOM missile receives GPS crypto keys and almanac data from

the launch platform during missile preparation. GPS crypto keys are transferred in a matter that

memory locations are zeroed after the key information is transferred.

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SW820-AP-MMI-010

REVISION 15

27 MARCH 2009

CHAPTER 4

SECTION IV. VERTICAL LAUNCHING SYSTEM

4.15 LAUNCH PLATFORMS.

The VLS TWS is employed using the VLS Mk 41 aboard CG 47 Class ships, CG 52 and up (VLS

Mk 41 Mod 0), DD 963 Class ships (VLS Mk 41 Mod 1) and DDG 51 Class ships (VLS Mk 41

Mod 2). The VLS Mk 41 is a multi-purpose launching system capable of launching TCMs as well

as STANDARD Missiles and the Vertical Launch Anti-Submarine Rockets (VLA). The VLS Mk

41 Mod 0 configuration (Figure 4-22 "Vertical Launching System Mk 41 Mod 0"⇒) consists of

two Mk 211 Mod 0 or Mod 1 Launch Control Units (LCU), two Mk 158 Mod 0 Launchers having

61 cells each, one fore and one aft, two status panels, one fore and one aft, and a Remote Launch

Enable Panel (RLEP). The VLS Mk 41 Mod 1 configuration (Figure 4-23 "Vertical Launching

System Mk 41 Mod 1"⇒) consists of two Mk 211 Mod 0 or Mod 1 LCUs, one Mk 158 Mod 0

Launcher having 61 cells forward, one status panel forward, and an RLEP. The VLS Mk 41 Mod

2 configuration (Figure 4-24 "Vertical Launching System Mk 41 Mod 2"⇒) consists of two Mk

211 Mod 1 LCUs, one Mk 159 Mod 0 Launcher having 29 cells forward, one Mk 158 Mod 0

Launcher having 61 cells aft, two status panels, one fore and one aft and an RLEP. Launch control

is provided by the TOMAHAWK Weapon Control System.

4.15.1

Launch Control Unit. LCUs (Figure 4-25 "Launch Control Unit (LCU)"⇒), designated

LCU 1 and LCU 2, maintain control of the launcher sequencer (LSEQ) in the launchers, which, in

turn, monitor launcher conditions and provide the interface to permit weapon launch. Each LCU

consists of a data processing set which receives orders from the weapon control system, selects

the weapon to engage the target, and issues pre-launch and launch commands to the launcher;

a signal data recorder-reproducer set which contains the tapes that control the launch control

computer program and record operational history and digital data pertinent to fault isolation and

data analysis; and a data terminal group which allows manual access to the VLS program and

provides hard copy of data received from the data processing set.

4.15.2

Launchers. Each launcher (Figure 4-26 "Vertical Launching System Launcher"⇒)

consists of 8-cell modules, six each for the Mk 158 Mod 0 Launcher and two each for the Mk 159

Mod 0 Launcher, an 8-cell system module, and a 5-cell strike down module.

4.15.2.1

8-Cell Module. Each 8-cell module consists of the following:

a. An upright structure to provide vertical storage space for eight missile canisters.

b. A deck to protect the canisters during stowage with a hatch assembly that opens to permit

missile launch.

c. A plenum and uptake assembly to capture and vent exhaust gases to the atmosphere.

d. Electronic equipment to monitor stored missile canisters and module components and

to assist in launching missiles.

4.15.2.2

8-Cell System Module. The 8-cell system module is like the 8-cell module except

that equipment is added to serve the entire launcher. The 8-cell system module receives and

distributes power and control signals from outside the launcher to all modules and collects control

and damage control signals from all modules and sends them outside the launcher.

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Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 5) - page 41