Index Manuals Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 2)

Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 2) - page 34

Appendix A

A-12

JP 3-15.1

field service representative). In the C-IED team configuration, the WITs usually consist of a
CEXC element, an EOD element, and the tactical exploitation team.

Figure A-1. (U) Weapons Intelligence Team

LEGEND

HUMINT

human intelligence

TTP

tactics, techniques, and procedures

WEAPONS INTELLIGENCE TEAM

Weapons

Intelligence

Team

Technical Exploitation

Investigator/Photographer

Security and Tactics

Battlefield Intelligence

Intelligence Fusion






Device exploitation

Device analysis

Employment analysis

Emplacement analysis







Evidence processing

On-scene interviews

Suspect tactical questioning

Interface with HUMINT

Investigation follow-up





Ensure security

Train team

Ground perspective



Identify enemy/targeting/

surveillance

Identify terrain/populace/

red and blue TTP



Identify individuals/

cells/networks

Fuse weapons intelligence

with all source

Link to brigade targeting

Explosive

Ordnance Disposal

Investigator

Tactics

Intelligence

Fusion

B-1

APPENDIX B

COUNTER-IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

EXPLOITATION PROCESS (U)

1. (U) Levels of Exploitation and Enablers

(U) The WTI process (Figure B-1) is divided into five distinct levels of exploitation and

analysis. Each level focuses on the technical and forensic activities able to be conducted and
required outputs, time and location of exploitation, and the user, not on the value of the
information. The levels of exploitation are divided due to the category of information that
can be gleaned, along with the level of expertise and equipment required to conduct the
exploitation and analysis. The information garnered from each level is valuable for analysis
from tactical through national levels and is required to provide a complete picture.

2. (U) Level 1—Tactical Exploitation

a. (U) The first level of exploitation (Figure B-2) involves the identification, collection,

preservation, transportation, and examination of physical material and contextual
information from an event or site involving WTI materiel of interest. It is designed to
support the immediate needs of the tactical commanders at the BCT or RCT level and below
for information on IED employment in their immediate operational area. This level of
exploitation begins at the site of a raid, cache, IED incident site, or post-blast site. Tactical-
level exploitation could also involve the initial detainment of individuals suspected of being
involved in insurgent activities. Many tactical responses involve site exploitation teams
conducting operations to search, locate, identify, and record items of interest. EOD teams
will be dispatched to the site to conduct analysis and perform render safe operations. Render
safe procedures allow WIT to recover material of WTI interest from the IED incident. EOD
teams may have to collect this materiel if WIT is unavailable to attend. WIT personnel
produce a technical report (covering “blast in” and “blast out”) in order to gain a full
understanding of the event or scene, conduct an initial technical assessment of the device or
weapon, provide the tactical commander with relevant and timely information, and evacuate
the material to higher-level exploitation forces.

b. (U) The first technical assessment is conducted by an EOD team and results in the

complete identification of the IED and its components. The first technical assessment
determines the type of IED, the method of employment, intended outcome, type of switch,
type and size of explosives, and identification of additional enhancements, to include CBRN
material. This assessment produces the following information:

(1) (U) Provides indicators and warnings of the enemy’s introduction of a new or

more capable weapon system or munition in the operational area (e.g., batteries and cooling
units found in a cache points to man portable air defense missiles in the possession of the
enemy).

(2) (U) Provides first reporting of new enemy TTP and devices.

Appendix B

B-2 JP

3-15.1

Figure B-1. (U//FOUO) Improvised Explosive Device Exploitation Process

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE EXPLOITATION PROCESS

CEXC

combined explosives exploitation cell

C-IED

counter-improvised explosive device

COIC

counter-improvised explosive device

operations integration center

CREW counter radio-controlled IED

electronic warfare

DNA

deoxyribonucleic acid

EOD

explosive ordnance disposal

IED

improvised explosive device

RCIED radio-controlled improvised explosive

device

TTP

tactics, techniques, and procedures

WIT

weapons intelligence team

EOD – Render Safe

EOD/WIT

Tactical Exploitation

CEXC

Forensics/

Biometrics

Evidentiary

Material

Detainee

Operations

Technical

Exploitation

WIT Reports

EOD Reports

C-IED

COIC

Trends and Patterns

LEGEND

Geospatial

Tracking

RCIED Threat

Consequences

CREW

Frequency

Management

Technical

Intelligence

Reports

Adversary

TTP Patterns/

Trends

Technical

Reports

New

Equipment/

Technology

Targeting

Information

IED

Event









Photographs
Incident sketches
Event analysis
Biometrics collection
On-site post-blast

analysis

Biometrics collection








Biometrics
Fingerprints
Palm prints
Iris
Facial image
DNA






Render safe reports
Weekly summary
IED emplacement
EOD IED analysis






Device mechanics
Patterns and trends
Identify bomb makers
Identify threat

frequencies

Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Exploitation Process (U)

B-3

Figure B-2. (U//FOUO) Tactical

Respo

nse (1st Phase Weapon

Technical Intelligence Process)

ACTICAL

RESPONS

(1st Phase W

apons T

echnical Intelligence Process)

Proce

dural respo

(Comm

on i

telligenc

pictur

s co

ntributi

ng to the

comm

on i

tell

igenc

e pictur

UNIT

EOD

WIT

S-3

S-2

(BUI

LDIN

COM

WEAPON

S TE

NIC

TEL

IGEN

CTU

FEEDBACK

LOOP

(

type

tel

ligence/in

format

ion tha

t should

flowing down the chai

UNI

ARCH

S-3

-2

REPO

RTS

HIGHER

(PROCE

DURAL/SOP

RESPONSE)

Tacti

cal

IED Event

Occurs

to Uni

to EO

to WI

-2

S-

2nd PHASE REPOR



ic ba

sed

Ide

ifica

tio

(fee

d t

tin

g p

)

tte

/tr

d analy

sis (tr

igge

pictur

pack

ages

cti

cal de

sign u

e fr

aly

sis



enda

tio

D TT

lop

oje

cte

d IE

tren



com

dat

ions fo

r IED

velop

ent

Feed

ck on

collectio

n ne

r em

pha

sis

d a

lys

is a

ti-a

rtin



Recove

d fr

ncies

f ex

plo

siv

ique

nical

fea

tur

oje

cted IE

D tr

ts f

ada

pta

tions

ren

r s

e pr

-W

rep

-D

IIR

)

-B

-F

D/U

nit/E

/WIT

cove

d i

-S

h re

por

-EOD

IGS

repor

-M

ical

inju

ries

-A

i-a

or re

-D

IIR

par

sed

incide

inc

por

ating pa

rtici

pan

ser

vat

ions

-I

rt on

libe

bin

r I

ED o

per

ions

-E

xecu

te H

VI tar

ting

ogr

-P

input

-C

oll

ate

-IE

D intellige

nce

-F

rrog

ion

por

-D

eter

ine in

tel

lige

nce g

d R

FIs

-Inp

det

aine

e da

into

-P

hoto

site

—

reco

ama

-Pr

epa

fiel

d sket

ch,

discer

n ta

ctical de

sign

-Ph

o incid

ent f

ind

s in

situ

-F

ield for

sic pr

ocessin

of re

items

d f

rd t

o C

EXC

-P

rod

e a

i-a

-R

d med

ica

l in

juri

-P

inp

ttach all

-so

int

ell

igence

)

-E

lua

te an

d re

spon

ion

sta

rt si

exploita

tion

-C

onduct

A (

dam

age a

let

hal

ity

inc

ide

ill an

sour

ces

of en

-D

ain an

d q

sti

ects

-C

firm

/of

-P

ce inc

ide

nt,

sear

, an

edi

l in

jury

por

-C

oor

dina

te co

ined

ppo

rt to

-IED

-B

tle cap

tain (p

and

SIG

Ts i

npu

-P

TTP

tle drill

-L

ate

item

s by

-P

ct for

ensic va

lue

-T

at casua

ltie

-T

nsm

it SPO

TREP

-R

st EO

-S

e ar

-P

repar

e ex

plo

siv

items for

tra

it t

o E

-E

valu

ate in

cid

t site

-C

ondu

ct re

pro

ced

-C

oor

dina

te/s

vise

spon

-D

rie

f un

it c

man

-D

rief u

nit

ande

-A

djus

t in

ter

dic

tion o

nipe

trol p

att

ns)

-Adju

st N

s fo

r su

rveillanc

-D

rie

f EO

D t

eam

-D

rie

f W

-D

rief s

ear

dinat

-I

por

ate

cide

repor

into

tar

tin

g pr

-D

ebr

ief

it com

and

-C

inate

ith

EOD

site

-G

r H

T r

epor

t r

ele

vant

D th

-Q

stion witne

sses

t p

rior

dur

ing,

d a

fter

-R

iew

unit

SPO

EPs fr

inciden

t s

ite

-P

rov

ide

tel

ligence

r co

bin

s sup

rt op

ation

-E

valu

ate

desi

gn of

cide

-Lo

cate

d ID

tion

comp

-I

ntif

y b

last s

ite

-D

eter

ine

evice typ

-Estima

charge

size

-D

escribe e

nt —

facts

-P

duce

EOD

por

-S-3

—

Are

a o

f ope

ratio

ns rep

orting

system



CEX

C QLR

eekly r

epor

EOD

attalio

n w

eekly r

vis

ion IN

BCT

S-2

Biome

tri

c i

nte

llige

nce I

fusion

cell (

dep

nt on

nit’

s b

aker targe

t list p

articipa

tio

n in

progra

)

C re

rts

IC RF

tur

Inf

orma

tio

n f

rom

gher



Bes

t p

cti

ce in C

-IE

D f

ight

w in

t IE

pla

cem

ent

signa

ised

TTP

et packa

ges

oje

cte

d I

ED tr

Ide

ify

hat to l

ook

for

Appendix B

B-4 JP

3-15.1

Figure B-2. (U//FOUO) Tactical

Respo

nse (1st Phase Weapon

s Tec

hnical Intelligence Process) (cont.)

CTICAL

RESPONSE (1st Phase W

eap

ons T

chnical Intelligence Process)

Biome

tric Automa

rack

Sys

BCT

rig

BDA

ttle

ment

tta

lio

CEXC

com

explosive

exploitation cell

CIDN

ned

Inform

ation Dat

Network

Excha

nge

C-IED

unter

-imp

rovise

d explos

ive

device

COIC

unter

-imp

rovise

d explos

ive

device

oper

ations

teg

ration

DIIR

dra

ft intelligen

ce in

for

tion rep

ort

ECM

lectronic c

termeas

res

explos

ive ord

nce

isp

osa

for

rters

hum

inte

enc

HVI

igh-va

lue individua

identify

impro

vise

d e

plosive

ice

telligence summ

ary

JDI

Joint Digi

tal

Informati

Gatheri

stem

NAI

named

ea of

intere

NGIC

Nationa

l Ground Intelligence Center

OPS

opera

tions

QLR

quick

look r

port

RFI

requ

est for

information

RFS

st for

sup

port

S-2

batta

lion or brigade

telligence staff offi

cer

S-3

batta

lion or briga

e opera

tions

taff office

SIGACT

significan

tivity

SOP

nda

rd operating pro

cedure

SPOTRE

spot report

TEDAC

rror

ist Ex

plosiv

Device Analy

tic

nte

tac

tics,

chn

ues, and pro

dure

WIT

pon

s intellig

team

Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Exploitation Process (U)

B-5

(3) (U) Educates other EOD technicians throughout theater of new or improved

render safe procedures.

(4) (U) Provides the technical EOD report required for WIT, the company

intelligence support team and the battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer (S-2) to
perform pattern and predictive analysis, link diagrams, time-event charts.

(5) (U) Provides critical information to improve TQ.

(6) (U) Enables in-theater C-IED training lanes to be updated quickly to educate

the next patrol.

(7) (U) Provides new TTP for home station and RSOI training.

c. (U) WITs are small TECHINT collection teams focused on TECHINT support to the

full spectrum of operations and dispatched according to the commanders’ intelligence
collection requirements. The teams are colocated with an EOD team, given the mutually
supporting roles. If necessary, an EOD team can perform the functions of a WIT. While a
WIT can also deploy independently, EOD support will still be required by a supported unit.
The WIT fully exploits a site of intelligence value by conducting IED-related TQ; collecting
forensic materiel, to include latent fingerprints and palm prints; preserving and documenting
documents and electronic media, including cell phones and Global Positioning System
devices; taking photographs of the scene; preparing material for evacuation; providing in-
depth documentation of the scene, including sketches and photographs; and evaluating the
effects of threat weapon systems. After examination of the scene and materiel collection, the
analytical process takes place to establish, among other things, what happened, what the
insurgent/terrorist intended, who the target was, and who is responsible.

d. (U) In addition to EOD teams and WITs, a number of specialized enablers facilitate

the processing and interpretation of information of relevance to immediate operations:

(1) (U) The EWO is the commander’s CREW SME. The EWO is responsible for

coordinating spectrum management with the unit-level communications staff officer to
deconflict electronic attack, assist in electronic protection, manage and oversee employment
of CREW systems, coordinate the integration of CREW assets, monitor intelligence and
ensure load sets of targeted frequencies are valid, and conduct EW training. The EWO is an
integral part of the organizational and C-IED working group staffs.

(2) (U) CRTs are specially trained and equipped to conduct deliberate site

exploitation operations to support WMD-E operations. CRTs are equipped with state-of-the-
art technology and incorporate the latest TTP to identify, neutralize, eliminate, and dispose
of chemical and biological agents, hazards, and munitions. CRTs provide theater-level
support to the JFC and have limited-capability EOD assets assigned, in order to support
CBRNE incidents. CRTs are not a one-for-one substitute for EOD and cannot be utilized in
lieu of EOD when JFC requires full-spectrum EOD capability in support of C-IED
operations. CRTs are also trained in the hazards and exploitation of clandestine laboratories.

Appendix B

B-6 JP

3-15.1

(3) (U) Case managers provide dedicated biometric support to tactical and

operational commanders. Case managers are deployed forward and function as a direct
liaison, facilitating BEI and ensuring that BEI is integrated into the unit’s targeting process.
They advise the S-2/component intelligence staff officer on specific IED bomb makers
operating in the unit operational area and provide linkages through WTI and biometrics to
interrogation activities.

3. (U) Level 2—Operational Exploitation

a. (U) The second level of WTI exploitation (Figure B-3) involves the nondestructive

technical and forensic examination as well as analysis of materiel and data. Operational-
level WTI exploitation organizations focus their efforts on providing immediate feedback
and outputs to the brigade, division, and corps, as well as theater commanders and staff.
Level 2 exploitation involves providing laboratory specialties at more forward locations to
provide expert level feedback and results to the battlefield commander. Operational-level
exploitation is conducted by theater exploitation elements and provides confirmatory
analysis of reporting and the first technical assessment, as well as relevant information
pertinent to the immediate threat or the identification of individuals responsible for the final
construction and emplacement. Additionally, this level of analysis includes combining EOD
and WIT reporting with all-source analysis to further enable targeting, force protection
(through alerting, informing and training), sourcing, and prosecution. Operational-level
forces focus exploitation efforts to produce timely and relevant forensic and technical design
information to support the commanders’ intelligence requirements. Operational activities
require more sophisticated equipment and specialized skills than tactical-level activities but
are typically conducted in theater to offset the time required to perform a thorough
exploitation at the strategic level. The operational-level activities also serve to select (triage)
and prepare materials for strategic-level exploitation and analysis.

b. (U) Outcomes associated with operational exploitation focus on a higher level of

evaluation and analysis than can be provided at the tactical level. The outcomes are provided
in the form of reports intended to support the theater commander’s intelligence requirements.
Emphasis is placed on enabling offensive operations to identify, track, and target individuals
involved in IED activities and threat networks. The following is a list of additional outcomes
associated with Level 2 technical exploitation:

(1) (U) Provide information to enhance BEI for targeting packages.

(2) (U) Provide confirmatory analysis of the tactical characterization and technical

categorization.

(3) (U) Identify IED trends.

(4) (FOUO) Identify IED makers and their links in threat networks.

(5) (FOUO) Develop bomb maker profiles and identify signatures to enable pattern

analysis and targeting.

Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Exploitation Process (U)

B-7

Figure B-3. (U//FOUO) Operatio

nal-L

evel Exploita

tion (2nd Ph

ase Weapo

s Technical Intelligence

Process)

OPERA

TIONAL-LEVEL

EXPLOIT

TION

(2nd

Phase

eapons

echnical

Intelligence

Process)

ocedu

ral res

ponse

(Co

mmon in

telligen

pict

Actions

con

tributing

to the

com

on inte

lligence

pictu

UIL

WEA

TEC

HNI

TELLI

GEN

E PI

URE)

(

type

int

ellige

nce/inf

ormati

on t

hat

shou

ing

down

he chain)

D BN

CEX

SPECIALIST FLD TM

C-I

D TF/

NGIC

FUSION C

REPORTS T

ROCEDU

RAL

/SOP

SPON

SE)

EOD

DDO

C-IE

/HQ

ITP

PHASE

REPO

EOD BN

CEXC

JIED

DO COIC

C-IED TF/

CITP

NGIC FUSI

ON C

ELL

-I

-R

eiv

ine

ed d

ice

-J

cont

rib

ute

to d

ase

-P

EOD

BN w

kly

-S

pecial r

epo

rts

-R

C device f

char

t b

y AOR

-W

kly r

epo

rts

-Q

uic

k l

ook

rts

-F

ward cap

tured de

vice

s to DSTL/

int

ain

g be

st pr

tice

-D

ivisiona

l supp

t team

-C

ondu

unit visits, co

ndu

ct f

the

ring

, a

nd a

uir

st pr

act

ice

-C

hai

r G

-3

-IE

D w

king

-A

lyz

e EO

por

tin

ide

RSP

upda

s to

deploy

ed te

-I

tiga

te s

ignifican

t IE

D inc

ide

nts

-P

ublish fi

eld

rep

-P

ublish wee

kly rep

ort

-P

vid

coo

rdina

tion

wit

h acc

ate

tes

of C-

IED

activi

ties

-Q

stio

n s

ign

ifican

t de

taine

-P

rep

e bo

b ma

tar

ting

pack

ages

-C

EXC

eekly re

rts

-C

C qu

ick

-P

ass exp

losive ite

s t

-In

ves

tiga

te s

ign

ific

t fi

nds

and

cac

hes

-E

loit RC d

evices, re

cover

fre

quencie

-Explo

siv

e residu

e t

esting

-C

duct

d ph

e of

lnerab

ility testin

-E

ttalion

eekly r

-R

over

fin

rin

-C

ct TE

-G

eosp

ial pa

tter

alysis

-C

ond

t C

-IE

D o

ration

-C

inat

e a

ll C

-IE

D t

hni

d spe

cialist inte

llig

ence

tivity

-P

vide

C-

IED

ainin

-P

vid

e CM

&D cell

-M

ito

r I

end

-A

ent C

EXC

for

ana

lysi

and fo

nsic r

-S

rmat

ion of

ing pa

ckag

-P

ticipa

ation

rge

tin

g pr

-P

lis

h IED ne

wsle

tter

-P

lis

h C-I

ED re

rts (a

-P

rod

uce JU

-S

ubm

it R

FIs

-P

vide

idanc

e o

n all

C-

IED

tec

hnical an

I-r

elat

tiv

itie

-O

k f

or IE

ake

r n

ana

lysi

s an

C-

IED

t pa

ckage

-R

ics

-P

vide C

-IED

attack



sed

ana

lys

is of in

sur

gen

nic

al a

nd t

tic

al tr

3rd

tes

t r

epo

rts

VEO

xploita

tio

sults



d pha

test r

epor

ts fr

ODTE

CHD

exp

loi

tion

resu

lts

Fore

ic ana

lys

is resu

lts

from

d pha

exploita

tion

repo

rts

L (U



sed an

aly

sis of

insur

gen

chn

ica

l an

d tac

tic

al t

nds

atio

ns, te

chn

ica

l, an

T upda

tes



fine a

onito

r IED

defe

Per

ted

IED

ends a

lysis

d an

aly

sis

insur

nt te

chnic

tactical tr

ends



age

tter

n a

lys

is of

IED

mb m

aker OR

Forensic an

alysis r

esu

lts

ppor

t in

rroga

tion



nsic i

nte

llige

nce

act

ion

rep

orts

Dev

ice te

nical

tes

Ele

ctr

ic ex

ploita

tion r

IIRs

/bulle

tins



ric in

telligenc

tio

n r

epo

rts

tter

n an

alysi

d thr

eat an

alys

Device

-s

cif

ic r

eports

Int

tion gu

ida

not

DIV



JDIGS

/JEODNET

COIC



S’

s re

for

ation from Higher

Appendix B

B-8 JP

3-15.1

Figure B-3. (U//FOUO) Operatio

nal-L

evel Exploitation (2

nd Ph

ase Weapo

s Technical Intelligence

Process) (co

nt.)

LEGEND

rea of

spo

nsib

ility

ttali

C-IED

nter-imp

rovis

d e

plosive de

vice

CACE

rps

ana

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ine

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g pr

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nce a

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nanc

pos

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intel

ligence summary

intel

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ation

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ital Information

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joint u

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hnical inte

llig

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IONAL-LEVEL

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TION

(2nd

Phas

apons

echnical

Intelligence

Process)

Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Exploitation Process (U)

B-9

(6) (U) Update radio-controlled frequency table to enhance EW.

(7) (U) Identify new threat technology or new use of technology.

c. (U) A number of specialized enablers facilitate the processing and interpretation of

information of relevance to operational commanders:

(1) (U) The 20th Support Command (CBRNE) integrates, coordinates, deploys, and

provides trained and ready specialized C-IED, CBRNE forces. It provides C2 of full-
spectrum CBRNE forces and is capable of deploying as JTF WMD-E in support of joint and
Army force commanders. The 20th Support Command (CBRNE) can provide a JTF’s
C-IED task force with a C2 element, staff augmentation, and EOD assets. The unit’s
CBRNE Analytical and Remediation Activity can also provide deployable laboratories to
support CBRNE-related WTI.

(2) (U) The C-IED task force is an operational headquarters providing C2 for all

specialized C-IED and CBRNE forces to neutralize the IED/CBRNE threat. The task force
coordinates and conducts WTI collection and exploitation to assist the targeting process to
defeat IED networks, provides training and recommends material solutions to protect the
force, and assists HN security forces in building sustainable security capabilities. The C-IED
task force also:

(a) (U) Provides WTI and foreign ordnance collection management and

dissemination.

(b) (U) Monitors IED trends, both emerging and migrating.

theater assessment of new materiel solutions.

(d) (U) Provides guidance on all C-IED technical WTI-related activities.

(e) (U) Trains in-theater forces on C-IED TTP.

(f) (U) Provides a focal point for reachback for WTI and foreign ordnance

exploitation.

(g) (U) Provides a focal point for and support to other C-IED initiatives and

programs.

(3) (U) The foreign ordnance exploitation cell is a small cell assigned to the C-IED

task force and is designed to track and analyze the discovery, collection, transportation, and
exploitation of foreign ordnance and weapon systems on the battlefield. The cell is
composed of EOD and intelligence professionals from the Services and DIA linked to the
intelligence community for reachback assistance and analysis. The cell provides
management of captured foreign ordnance in order to facilitate its exploitation by numerous
intelligence agencies and organizations.

Appendix B

B-10 JP

3-15.1

(4) (U) CEXC. For information on CEXC, see paragraph 6b(1) in Chapter VI,

“Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Task Force,” and paragraph 7c in Appendix A,
“Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Enabling Organizations.”

(5) (U) The US Army’s forensic expeditionary battalion’s JEFF is a deployable

forensic laboratory designed to support targeting, sourcing, prosecution, and detainment and
interrogation operations. The typical forensic laboratory capabilities include latent print
processing, firearm and tool mark analysis, and DNA analysis. While the JEFF laboratories
have a primary mission to conduct forensic analysis in support of criminal activity, they
provide direct support to CEXC by analyzing the tool marks on EFP liners to determine
fabrication processes and link EFP liners discovered in caches to caches in adjacent areas.

4. (U) Level 3—Strategic Exploitation

a. (U) The third level of exploitation (Figure B-4) involves the scientific examination

and analysis of materiel as well as data from an event or site involving WTI material. The
primary function of Level 3 is to identify associations between events, people, IEDs,
improvised weapons, and associated WTI-related materiel. Level 3 exploitation provides
direct support to attacking insurgent and terrorist networks by conducting “supply chain
defeat” analysis. This level of exploitation utilizes the full spectrum of techniques and
equipment, as well as all-source analysis, to fully understand the nature of the threat by
providing in-depth technical and forensic analysis. Strategic-level organizations focus
efforts to provide precise WTI exploitation and analysis for commanders, the materiel
developer, and national policymakers. Support involves providing intelligence to tactical
and operational forces. Materiel developer support involves assisting with the development
of countermeasures to enhance force protection measures and provide materiel solutions.
National policymakers use strategic-level WTI in support of strategic attack, targeting, and
international policy. Strategic-level WTI is a CONUS-based activity, supported by allied
nations, and currently overseen and facilitated by the FBI TEDAC. The elements of
strategic-level WTI, primarily applicable to ground warfare support, are overseen by the
NGIC and JIEDDO.

b. (U) Strategic exploitation results in:

(1) (U) Forensic intelligence analysis reports, providing detailed electronic

diagrams of IED circuits and interpretation of such.

Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Exploitation Process (U)

B-11

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Appendix B

B-12 JP

3-15.1

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Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Exploitation Process (U)

B-13

(2) (U) Analysis of US TTP and recommendations to mitigate the effects of

specific weapons of concern.

(3) (U) Analysis and reports to support interrogation of detainees.

(4) (U) Biometric intelligence analysis to support targeting packages.

(5) (U) Device association through forensic links in support of IED network attack.

(6) (U) Component sourcing activities using non-DOD authorities.

(7) (U) Support to material solutions through JIEDDO, academia, and the industrial

base.

c. (U) Appendix A, “Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Enabling Organizations,”

provides a detailed discussion of the strategic organizations that enable the C-IED
exploitation process.

5. (U) National Exploitation

(U) The fourth level of technical exploitation involves the sponsorship of national

laboratories to conduct exploitation on specific items across a range of scientific skills. This
level of exploitation results in the provision of in-depth reporting, which is linked to other
national facilities.

6. (U) Special Activities

(U) The fifth level of technical exploitation is conducted by special activities to support

unique collection and investigative activities of national importance. This level includes the
collection, analysis, and research of both government departments and agencies and private
research firms.

7. (U) Allied Nations

(U) Allied nations provide invaluable assistance and partnerships in the collection and

exploitation of WTI materiel. Allied nation support is embedded in every level of the WTI
process, providing valuable capabilities, experience, and expertise. The US has developed
agreements with other nations to assist with exploitation efforts designed to enhance the
technical assessment of IED components. Other nations are also developing similar
exploitation capabilities and enablers that provide tactical and operational assistance to US
forces.

Appendix B

B-14 JP

3-15.1

Intentionally Blank

C-1

APPENDIX C

WEAPONS TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE (U)

1. (U) General

(U) WTI is the result of a paradigm shift from traditional TECHINT activities in order to

respond to the threats of COIN and irregular warfare (IW). WTI is a category of intelligence
derived from the technical and forensic collection and exploitation of IEDs, associated
components, improvised weapons,  and other weapon systems. Traditional TECHINT
focuses solely on determining the source of a weapon as well as the force protection
capabilities to prevent technological surprise on the battlefield. The TECHINT process
involves collecting foreign material and providing TECHINT  to support the S&T
community. WTI goes beyond TECHINT to incorporate the necessary technical, forensic,
and biometric disciplines to support force protection, feed targeting information to facilitate
attacking the network, enable component sourcing, and support prosecution at all levels of
operations. WTI provides US forces  and  MNFs  a multilevel (tactical, operational,  and
strategic), systematic process to collect information and material from sites, exploit it, and
produce analytical outputs that mitigate the threat and get at the crux of the problem—the
enemy network.

2. (U) Weapons Technical Intelligence and the Range of Military Operations

a. (U)

Major Operations.

Traditional TECHINT is normally associated with large-

scale combat operations involving collecting and exploiting conventional weapons and
associated systems. However, the TECHINT process isn’t time-sensitive and cannot support
a rapid flow of information across all levels of operations. WTI supports large-scale combat
operations with the technical and forensic exploitation required to suppress unconventional
warfare activities, which normally accompanies large-scale combat operations. WTI
provides a process to quickly understand the enemy’s capabilities and take advantage of his
vulnerabilities and deny the enemy the opportunity to shape battlefield conditions by
resorting to improvised weapons. The WTI process shows great utility during large-scale
combat operations involving a nation state with a WMD program. The technical exploitation
component of WTI will generate intelligence on the manufacturing, synthesis processes, and
engineering capability of WMD programs. Nuclear forensics will produce linkages to other
sources of materiel, while biological and chemical laboratory analysis of samples will
provide information regarding the lethality of agents. The collection and processing of
biometric intelligence from research and development facilities will enable the targeting of
lead scientists and engineers involved with WMD programs.

b. (U)

IW and COIN.

In IW, the enemy is likely to use improvised weapons and IEDs

to inflict casualties, create fear in the local population, and ultimately assist in destabilizing
the legitimate government. WTI supports the commander’s ability to exploit enemy
vulnerabilities to gain or maintain the initiative by characterizing the tactical design of
improvised weapons and understand their emplacement, employment, and intended outcome.
This is made possible by the tactical and technical exploitation provided through the WTI
process.

Appendix C

C-2

JP 3-15.1

c. (U)

Peace Operations.

Improvised weapons and terrorism are threats associated

with peace operations. WTI conducted during peace operations provides outcomes similar to
those of COIN operations. The WTI process feeds information into intelligence cells
conducting network analysis and enhance the common intelligence picture for military
advisors. Military WTI enablers can conduct collection and analysis in order to feed HN
defense and law enforcement agencies. This relationship should be designed to eliminate
information gaps and enhance targeting in order for police to apprehend and prosecute
criminals involved with insurgent operations and terrorism.

3. (U) Weapons Technical Intelligence Exploitation Process and Functions

a. (U) The WTI process involves a systematic approach to conduct exploitation of WTI

material. Exploitation is based on the commander’s priorities for information and not based
on the sequential order the material is received. The WTI process may be altered or adjusted
based on the tactical situation, type of mission, and the required outputs. Key to its overall
success, the WTI process is a combined joint, interdepartmental, and interagency process.
The results of the WTI process affect the design of force protection initiatives, the production
of actionable intelligence for targeting of networks, the identification of IED sourcing, and
support for prosecution of bomb makers and others associated with the production and
emplacement of IEDs.

b. (U//FOUO) The WTI exploitation functions are the technical and scientific methods

and procedures applied systematically to solve a problem. The functions are a blend of
traditional TECHINT functions coupled with forensic examination to fully understand a
weapon, how it was employed, who employed it, and how to mitigate the effects. Technical
exploitation is taking full advantage of the information garnered from examining and
analyzing the design, material, and suitability of mechanical and electronic components of
IEDs and improvised weapons. This examination involves the operability and relationship
of components in comparison with others and how the item functions to produce a resulting
action. Forensic exploitation is the application of multidisciplinary scientific processes to
establish facts involving the use of physical science to link people with locations and events.
(See Appendix B, “Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Exploitation Process,” for a
detailed examination of the actual WTI exploitation process.)

c. (U)

Technical exploitation

includes:

(1) (U)

Electronic.

Electronic exploitation of WTI material centers on how IED

switches, both arming and firing, function, whether in relation to mechanical components
such as washing machine timers or other electrical components such as dual tone
multifrequency integrated circuit boards. Electronic exploitation also provides a description
of how the device functions, potential sources for the IED’s components, the arming and
firing sequence and codes, the frequency the device operates at for RCIEDs, and a record of
functioning times for electronic events.

(2) (U)

Mechanical.

Mechanical exploitation of WTI material focuses on devices

incorporating manual operations, the combination of mechanical/physical parts that transmits
forces, motion, and energy. An example of a mechanical IED switch requiring exploitation

Weapons Technical Intelligence (U)

C-3

is a washing machine timer. These timers have physical parts that move several contacts
together to complete a circuit. Mechanical exploitation involves the exploitation of the
mechanical functioning of improvised weapons and their associated launch platforms.

(3) (FOUO)

Explosive.

Initial identification and analysis of explosives is

conducted by EOD for use at the tactical level while confirmatory analysis is performed by
CEXC and other laboratories in theater.  The goal is to identify the main charge  and
precursor elements and evaluate the  detonating cord.  CEXC also has the capability to
conduct trace analysis of explosive residue recovered from a post-blast  investigation.
Explosive analysis utilizing laboratory equipment can provide an analysis of explosive
materials, and in some cases, the lab can source the explosive back to the country or region
of manufacture.  In the case of homemade explosives, produced from locally obtained base
materials, this analysis can provide information regarding the types of equipment Service
members should look for when conducting raids and site exploitation as well as identifying
the source of the precursors used in manufacturing.

(4) (U)

CBRN.

The collection, identification, characterization, and analysis of

CBRN material is conducted at the tactical and operational levels by EOD, CBRN response
teams, and DIA laboratories operating in theater. Field laboratories at the operational level
provide scientific data regarding the use of chemical warfare agents and toxic industrial
material enhancements used in IEDs.

(U)

For further guidance on CBRN hazards, their effects, and operational considerations,

refer to JP 3-11,

Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN)

Environments.

d. (U)

Forensic exploitation

includes:

(1) (FOUO)

Photography.

Photography is one of the first steps in the forensic

exploitation process. Detailed photographs are important for examiners and analysts to
identify profiling data and signatures, establish links to other devices seen in the operational
area, and identify manufacture information that could lead to identifying possible supply
routes.

(2) (FOUO)

Biometric.

Biometric exploitation is defined as taking full advantage

of the measurable physical characteristics or personal behavioral traits used to recognize the
identity or verify the claimed identity of an individual. Biometric modalities range from
fingerprints, DNA, and iris identification to face or palm prints. Key to identifying
insurgents living among the population is the use of biometric exploitation fused with other
intelligence such as SIGINT and HUMINT. The fusion of biometric intelligence with other
forms of intelligence facilitates targeting individuals and groups associated with insurgent
and criminal activity. Biometrics modalities include:

(a) (FOUO)

Latent Fingerprints.

Latent fingerprints are collected in theater

by WIT and CEXC as well as by TEDAC. Fingerprints and palm prints are the most
common and successful means to verify individuals who may be involved in IED activity.
The analysis of latent fingerprints can be completed within hours and the results

Appendix C

C-4

JP 3-15.1

disseminated in the form of a BIAR. The BIAR is posted by NGIC’s Automated
Identification Management Support System portal on the SECRET Internet Protocol Router
Network (SIPRNET) and pushed to tactical units via e-mail. BIARs aid the development of
target support packages, interrogation support packages, and warrant support packages.

(b) (FOUO)

DNA.

Mitochondrial deoxyribonucleic acid (mtDNA) is

extracted from hairs found on WTI materials, while nuclear DNA analysis is possible on
samples of bodily fluids taken from materials, with nuclear analysis being the more precise.
The DNA profile is then compared against other catalogued profiles previously collected
from post-blast sites, caches, the internal and external areas of IED components, bomb
makers, detainees, and suicide bombers. JEFF labs are capable of performing nuclear
analysis, while TEDAC is capable of mtDNA analysis.

(3) (FOUO)

Trace Analysis.

Trace evidence includes hairs and fibers discovered

at a site or caught in a device or in tape adhesive. Since these fibers are normally removed
from the internal area of the device or weapon, they were likely left by the bomb maker or
someone involved with the construction of the weapon. Hair is removed and processed for
mtDNA analysis, while fibers are analyzed visually under a microscope, compared to
existing samples, and retained for future comparison. Trace analysis supports pattern
analysis to determine the number of fabricators involved. This form of analysis is primarily
Level 3 exploitation and analytical activity.

(4) (FOUO)

Tool Marks.

Tool mark analysis involves studying characteristics

created on WTI-related items during the manufacturing process, such as marks left by
machinery, for the purpose of identifying the machinery and tools used to manufacture the
device. The JEFF and TEDAC are capable of analyzing tool marks and conducting
comparative analysis for manufacturing marks on EFPs by microscopically examining
milling and strike marks. Tool marks can often determine whether a device was fabricated
locally or by a foreign supplier, how many steps were required in the manufacturing process,
and the type of machinery involved in making the IED.

4. (U) The Outcomes of the Weapons Technical Intelligence Process

(U) WTI analysis supports a wide variety of activities from the commander’s decision-

making cycle to the design of improved individual protection equipment. The benefits of the
WTI process are illustrated in Figure C-1.

Weapons Technical Intelligence (U)

C-5

Figure C-1. (U) Weapons Technical Intelligence Outcomes

Match individual with:

Forensics:

Signatures:

- Place - Device - Paraphernalia
- Event - Weapon

- Latent prints - Tool marks - Trace evidence
- Assembler patterns - Deoxyribonucleic acid

- Electronic - Physical - Event location

- State or transnational sponsorship
- Component tracking/movement
- Identify manufacturing process
- Transnational/regional group involvement

- Direct science and technology
- Design/develop equipment
- Confirmatory trials
- Validate threats for testing
- Understand adversary tactics, techniques,

and procedures

- Train the force
- Alert the force to new tactics/threats

- Distribution of knowledge
- Pattern analysis
- Predictive analysis
- Link analysis
- Network information operations monitoring
- Threat tactics, techniques, and

procedures analysis

- Biometrics intelligence
- Forensic intelligence
- Mapping devices to groups/persons

Weapons

Technical Intelligence

Outcomes

TARGETING

PROSECUTION

FORCE PROTECTION

SOURCING

WEAPONS TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE OUTCOMES

Appendix C

C-6

JP 3-15.1

Intentionally Blank

D-1

APPENDIX D

WEAPONS TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE CONSTRUCT OF

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (U)

1. (U) Levels of Exploitation and Enablers

a. (U) The WTI construct of IEDs is intended to provide a coherent conceptual

framework and an operational vocabulary to address the IED threat worldwide,
encompassing the broad spectrum of IED employment scenarios, the variety of IEDs, and
their critical components. The basic construct is illustrated in Figure D-1.

b. (U) The WTI construct of IEDs is designed to:

(1) (U) Standardize IED reporting and improve database content management.

(2) (U) Enable IED-related education and training.

(3) (U) Support development of WTI IED policy and doctrine.

2. (U) General Terms

a. (U)

As Intended.

An IED that has detonated against the intended target.

Figure D-1. (U) Improvised Explosive Device Construct

Improvised Explosive

Device-Related Incident:









Improvised Explosive
Device
Explosion
Find
Cache
Hoax
False






Pattern Analysis
Event Signature
Development/
Device Profiling
Tactics,
Techniques, and
Procedures
Development

Tactical

Characterization

Tactical Design

Switch

Main Charge

Container

Intended Outcomes

Initiator

Power Source

Enhancements

Technical

Characterization

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE CONSTRUCT

Appendix D

D-2

JP 3-15.1

b. (U)

Associated Components.

Components that are part of an IED or improvised

weapon system, the tools required to produce the components, or precursors to the
manufacture of IED components to include explosives.

c. (U)

Blown in Place.

Actions taken at the discretion of the tactical commander to

clear an IED by detonating it where discovered.

d. (U)

Cache.

An IED incident that involves the discovery and/or recovery of unarmed

devices, IED components, and IED paraphernalia, or explosive ordnance that involves long-
term storage in a permanent, fixed location.

e. (U)

Event Signature Development and Device Profiling.

The process of analyzing

the tactical and technical identifiers of an IED incident to support force protection, targeting,
prosecution, and sourcing.

f. (U)

Explosion.

Occurs when gaseous products are rapidly produced from a single

substance (high explosives or low explosives with a fuel and oxidant).

g. (U)

Explosive Train.

A train of combustible and explosive elements arranged in

order of decreasing sensitivity. Its function is to accomplish the controlled augmentation of
a small impulse into one of suitable energy to cause the main charge to function.

h. (U)

False.

An incident incorrectly identified though reported in good faith as an IED

that is subsequently categorized as a false alarm after positive EOD action.

i. (U)

Find.

An IED incident that involves the discovery or turning in of devices or IED

components in a temporary and/or transitory location.

j. (U)

Force Protection.

Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against

DOD personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information.

k. (U)

Found and Cleared.

An IED incident that involves an armed and emplaced IED

that has been discovered and rendered safe by EOD personnel or has been discovered and
blown in place.

l. (U)

Hoax.

An IED incident that involves a device fabricated to look like an IED and

is intended to purposely simulate one in order to elicit a response.

m. (U)

IED.

A device placed or fabricated in a creative manner incorporating

destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy,
incapacitate, harass, deny mobility, gather intelligence, or distract. It may incorporate
military stores, but is normally devised from nonmilitary components. Refers to a complete
functioning device.

n. (U)

IED-Related Incident.

An event that involves one or more of the following

types of IED-related actions/activities: IED, explosion, find, cache, false, hoax.

Weapons Technical Intelligence Construct of Improvised Explosive Devices (U)

D-3

o. (U)

Improvised Weapons.

A nonexplosive device placed in an improvised manner

designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. It may incorporate military stores, but
is normally devised from nonmilitary parts.

p. (U)

Other Weapons Systems.

Military weapons associated with a terrorist or

insurgent group’s method of operations that involve IEDs or improvised weapons.

q. (U)

Pattern Analysis.

Using prior actions and activities to identify trends in

activities or behaviors. Once identified, these patterns can be used to predict future enemy
actions and plan ISR activities.

r. (U)

Premature Detonation.

An IED that has denoted unintentionally during the

emplacement or construction of the device. Does not refer to an IED incident involving an
ineffective detonation against an intended target due to inaccurate timing or placement.

s. (U)

Prosecution.

The process of associating IED-related people, places, devices, or

equipment to an individual for evidentiary purposes in a recognized court of law.

t. (U)

Render Safe Procedure.

The portion of the EOD procedures involving the

application of special EOD methods and tools to provide for the interruption of functions or
separation of essential components of UXO to prevent an unacceptable detonation.

u. (U)

Sourcing.

The process of determining the origination point (such as a

production facility or person, a geographic location, or a specific country of origin) for IED
components.

v. (U)

Tactical Characterization.

A characterization of how an IED incident was

conducted or planned to be conducted (the tactical design) and/or how an IED incident was
used or intended to be used (the intended outcome).

w. (U)

TTP Development.

Using the lessons learned from an IED attack to refine and

improve the tools and methods used during all missions in which an IED may occur (e.g.,
convoys, tactical suppression efforts, ISR, C-IED missions). The authority to change or
modify friendly C-IED TTP within an operation should be vested in a single authority that
will also be responsible for disseminating the approved changes.

x. (U)

Technical Categorization.

A description of an IED using a hierarchical

construct to identify its key components. The components identified in this categorization
are the elements from which technical and forensic information is recovered and exploited.

y. (U)

Weapons Technical Intelligence.

A category of intelligence and process

derived from the forensic and technical collection and exploitation of IEDs, associated
components, improvised weapons, and other weapon systems.

3. (U) Tactical Characterization—Tactical Design

a. (U)

Tactical Design.

The specific design of an IED attack, including but not limited

to, position of the IED, type of IED, method of actuation, intended target, type of road

Appendix D

D-4

JP 3-15.1

segment used, concealment technique, use of secondary devices, and time of day. Tactical
design addresses the questions of why here, why now, and why in this way. Terms used to
describe a specific type of device or component of a device (e.g., VBIED) are often used to
describe all or part of the tactical design. See Figure D-2.

b. (U)

Airborne.

An IED held aloft by aerodynamic means or buoyancy that serves as

concealment means for explosives with an initiating device. Also known as ABIED.

c. (U)

Attack Geography.

A description of the geography surrounding the IED

incident, such as road segment, buildings, foliage, etc. Understanding the geography
indicates enemy use of landscape to channel tactical response, slow friendly movement, and
prevent pursuit of enemy forces.

d. (U)

Blast Crater Characteristics.

Observations and measurements of the blast

crater, to include depth, diameter, debris field size, and surface description (soil, sand,
concrete, etc).

e. (U)

Elevated.

IED emplaced above the surface: hanging from an overpass, on a roof,

etc.

f. (U)

Estimated Size of Main Charge.

A reference to the estimated weight of the

main charge derived from observation of the blast effects and crater characteristics.

g. (U)

Incident Atmospherics.

A description of the demeanor of the civilian

population at an IED event, to include mood, absence or presence, changes in previously
experienced interactions, etc.

h. (U)

Incident

Environmental Conditions.

A description of the ambient surrounding

conditions, to include weather conditions, such as temperature, precipitation, fog, dust, etc.

i. (U)

Large VBIED.

An IED built into any large ground-based vehicle (e.g., dump

truck, panel truck, bongo truck, commercial bus, tanker) that serves as the concealment
means for explosives with an initiating device.

j. (U)

Low-Metal Content IED.

An IED designed with few or no metallic parts.

k. (U)

Magnetic Attachment.

A type of IED employment in which the device is

attached to the target with magnets.

l. (U)

Method of Device Emplacement.

A description of how the device was

delivered to the target.

m. (U//FOUO)

Nonmagnetic Attachment.

A type of IED employment in which the

device is attached to the target using nonmagnetic means.

Weapons Technical Intelligence Construct of Improvised Explosive Devices (U)

D-5

-2.

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Appendix D

D-6

JP 3-15.1

n. (U)

Non-Suicide.

An IED in which the insurgent/terrorist does not intentionally kill

himself or herself as part of an attack.

o. (U)

Overhead.

IED emplaced above the intended target (e.g., hanging from an

overpass, on a roof, etc.).

p. (U)

Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (PBIED).

An IED worn by a

person either willing or unwillingly, such as a vest, belt, backpack, etc., in which the person
houses the whole IED or principal IED components and/or serves as the delivery or
concealment means for explosives with an initiating device. It is often initiated by the
person wearing the IED (suicide). However, not all PBIEDs are triggered by the person
wearing the IED (proxy).

q. (U)

Postal.

An IED introduced or delivered through a postal system.

r. (U)

Primary Device.

An IED emplaced to attack an initial target.

s. (U)

Projected.

An improvised weapons system that delivers the main charge through

the air to its target.

t. (U)

Secondary Device.

An additional device emplaced in the target area to attack

individuals or vehicles after the initial event. This device would normally be placed in an
obvious or pre-employed incident control point or first responder/EOD team location.

u. (U)

Surface.

IED emplaced directly on the ground.

v. (U)

Subsurface.

IED emplaced under the surface or below the intended target (e.g.,

buried, in a culvert, underwater).

w. (U)

Suicide.

An IED initiated by an insurgent or terrorist at a time of his or her

choosing in which the operator intentionally kills himself or herself as part of the attack or to
deny his or her capture.

x. (U)

Tertiary Device.

An additional IED emplaced in the target area to attack

individuals or vehicles after the initial and secondary attacks.

y. (U)

Underbelly.

A type of IED employment in which the device targets the

underside of a vehicle, using large amounts of explosives buried to deliberately defeat armor
(can include conventional land mines).

z. (U)

Under Vehicle IED.

An IED that is placed on the underside of a vehicle (using

string, tape, magnet, etc. as a form of attachment). Also known as a UVIED.

aa. (U)

VBIED.

An IED delivered by any small ground-based vehicle (e.g., passenger

vehicle, motorcycle, moped, bicycle); the vehicle serves as the concealment means for
explosives with an initiating device. It will also become the main source of fragmentation.

Weapons Technical Intelligence Construct of Improvised Explosive Devices (U)

D-7

bb. (U)

WBIED.

An IED delivered by floating, drifting, anchored, or propelled on or

below the water.

4. (U) Tactical Characterization—Intended Outcomes (Figure D-3)

(U) Longer-term strategic and immediate or direct tactical intentions of the IED incident

include the making of political statements at the strategic level and/or more immediate
objectives such as disruption of normal activities, anti-material, antipersonnel, criminal, TTP
identification, experimentation, and obstacle creation at the tactical level. IEDs can have
multiple intended outcomes.

a. (U)

Antiaircraft.

An IED primarily intended to damage or destroy aircraft and/or

their payload as well as to kill or wound individuals inside the aircraft.

b. (U)

Anti-Armor.

An IED primarily intended to penetrate armored vehicles and/or to

kill or wound individuals inside armored vehicles.

c. (U)

Anti-EOD.

An IED primarily intended to kill or wound EOD personnel, or to

impede render safe procedures.

d. (U)

Anti-First Responder.

An IED primarily intended to kill or wound first

responders, such medics, firefighters, etc.

Figure D-3. (U) Intended Outcomes

Harass

Disrupt

Extort

Anti-First Responder

Anti-Explosive Ordnance Disposal

Anti-Armor

Anti-Vehicle

Antiaircraft

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Identification

Antipersonnel

Anti-Infrastructure

Criminal

Anti-Watercraft

Obstacle Creation

Strategic

Tactical

Political

INTENDED OUTCOMES

Appendix D

D-8

JP 3-15.1

e. (U)

Anti-Infrastructure.

IED primarily intended to damage or destroy physical

infrastructure such as pipelines, communications towers, bridges, buildings, utility lines,
and/or facilities such as electrical transformers or water pump houses.

f. (U)

Antipersonnel.

An IED primarily intended to kill or wound people.

g. (U)

Anti-Vehicle.

An IED primarily intended to damage or destroy vehicles,

excluding armored vehicles and/or their cargo, as well as to kill or wound individuals inside
such vehicles.

h. (U)

Anti-Watercraft.

An IED primarily intended to damage or destroy watercraft

and/or their payload, as well as to kill or wound individuals inside the watercraft.

i. (U)

Criminal.

An IED primarily intended to harass, disrupt, or extort as part of

criminal activity.

j. (U)

Experimental.

An IED primarily intended to increase the effectiveness of a

subsequent device with respect to its intended outcome.

k. (U)

Obstacle Creation.

An IED primarily intended to create an obstacle to impede

movement or channel movement into a desired location, possibly as part of a complex attack
or ambush.

l. (U)

Political.

An IED primarily intended to make a political statement in addition to

the more immediate tactical outcome.

m. (U)

TTP Identification.

An IED primarily intended to cause a reaction by forces in

an effort to learn and understand employed tactics. This knowledge is then used by the
attacker to plan new attacks incorporating the lessons learned to inflict additional casualties
or to avoid countermeasures. The IED need not function to serve this purpose. A hoax IED
can have TTP identification as its intended outcome.

5. (U) Technical Categorization—Switches (Figures D-4 and D-5)

(U) A device for making, breaking, or changing a connection in an IED is a switch. A

single switch can have multiple functions (e.g., safe-to-arm and firing). IEDs are classified
by their firing switches.

a. (U)

Active Infrared Sensor Switch.

A sensor that emits an infrared beam to a

receiver forming an invisible link that, when broken, acts as a trigger to initiate the IED.
These sensors act like an electronic version of the trip wire.

b. (U)

Anti-Tamper Switch.

A victim-operated switch designed to initiate an IED

when it is tampered with or disturbed in a particular manner. Sometimes referred to as an
anti-handling or anti-disturbance switch

c. (U)

Chemical Switch.

A timing switch using the reaction of chemical compounds as

a switch to provide a delay before starting the initiation train.

Weapons Technical Intelligence Construct of Improvised Explosive Devices (U)

D-9

d. (U)

Command Switch.

A type of switch that is activated by the attacker in which

the attacker controls the device.

e. (U)

Command Projectile Switch.

The use of a small arms bullet to close the circuit

by penetrating two metal plates. This provides standoff between firing point and contact
point.

f. (U)

Command Wire Switch.

An IED where the firing point and contact point are

separate but joined together by a length of wire.

g. (U)

Electronic Time Switch.

A timing switch using a commercial or improvised

electronic timer or integrated circuit to start the initiation train.

h. (U)

Firing Switch.

Component that initiates the firing train.

Figure D-4. (U) Command Switches

COMMAND SWITCHES

Doorbell

Telemetry Device

Personal Mobile

Radio

Remote Controller

(Toy)

Custom Built

Circuitry

Pager

Long-Range Cordless

Telephone

Car Alarm

Electric Appliance

Controller

Command

Switches

Safe-to-Arm

Firing

Command

Projectile

Other

Electromagnetic

Frequency Switches

Radio-Controlled

Low-

Powered

Radar

Command Wire

High-

Powered

Light

Appendix D

D-10

JP 3-15.1

i. (U)

High-Power Transmitter.

An RCIED transmitter with an output power greater

than or equal to 0.35 watt.

j. (U)

Light-Sensitive Switch.

A type of proximity trigger that senses changes in the

amount of light in the environment near the sensor. When this happens, the sensor causes a
circuit to be completed, firing the device.

k. (U)

Low-Power Transmitter.

An RCIED transmitter with an output power less than

0.35 watt.

l. (U)

Magnetic Switch.

A type of proximity trigger that senses magnetic alterations in

the area around the sensor. When this happens, the sensor causes a circuit to be completed,
firing the device.

m. (U)

Mechanical Time Switch.

A timing switch (e.g., clock, timer, drip timer)

constructed or modified so that physical contact between two parts of the timing device
complete an electrical circuit, initiating the device.

Figure D-5. (U) Time and Victim-Operated Switches

TIME AND VICTIM-OPERATED SWITCHES

Tension

Pull

Pressure

Release

Active

Infrared

Magnetic

Light-

Sensitive

Trembler

Passive

Infrared

Tension

Release

Tilt

Timer

Chemical

Watch

Mechanical

Clock

Electronic

Switches

Safe-to-Arm

Firing

Time

Victim-

Operated

Weapons Technical Intelligence Construct of Improvised Explosive Devices (U)

D-11

n. (U)

Other Electromagnetic Frequency (Non-Radio Frequency) Switches.

Electromagnetically operated command switches that do not operate in the radio frequency
band.

o. (U)

Passive Infrared Sensor Switch.

A sensor that detects movement of a heat

source. When the change in ambient temperature is detected, the sensor acts as a trigger to
initiate the IED.

p. (U)

Pull Switch.

An IED initiated by a person using a “command pull” action.

q. (U)

Pressure Switch.

A method for activating a device that occurs when an object is

used to complete a circuit when pressure is applied in a predetermined direction. Many
pressure initiated IEDs explode when pressure plates are compressed under the weight of
passing vehicles or foot soldiers.

r. (U)

Pressure Release Switch.

A method for activating a device that occurs as a

result of reductions in pressure. Such devices may employ mechanical, pneumatic, or
hydraulic systems to signal a detonator that a vehicle or individual has released pressure to a
pressure plate or similar mechanism. Pressure release triggers are often used in the design of
military booby traps or victim-operated IEDs.

s. (U)

RCIED.

An IED initiated electronically in a wireless method consisting of a

transmitter and receiver (e.g., personal mobile radio, cell phone, cordless phone, pager).

t. (U)

Safe-to-Arm Switch.

A device used to arm the IED to ensure that the emplacer

can safely employ or emplace the IED.

u. (U)

Target Selection Switch.

A victim-operated switch used to select a particular

target based on its particular characteristics such as weight, place in a convoy, etc.

v. (U)

Tension/Pull Switch.

A victim-operated device that triggers an explosion when

tension is applied to a firing mechanism—such as pulling a trip wire. The tension causes an
action that releases a firing pin or activates an electrical or electronic switch.

w. (U)

Tension Release Switch.

A victim-operated trigger that, when tension is

released, such as when a taut wire or cord is cut or broken, releases a spring-loaded firing pin
or closes electrical contacts, initiating the device.

x. (U)

Tilt Switch.

A device that allows voltage to flow to the output wires after a

conductive material (e.g., mercury or a ball bearing) is moved enough (up/down, left/right)
to flow onto the switch contacts, completing the circuit.

y. (U)

Time Switch.

A type of switch that functions after a set time. Used widely

against infrastructure targets.

z. (U)

Trembler Switch.

A device that allows current to flow to output wires after

movement causes two metal parts to make contact, completing the circuit.

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