Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 1)

Electronic Warfare Fundamentals

(5)

interface with the land integrated support

station (LISS) to enable 2nd level collation

of new signals;

(6)

interaction with standard electronic

parameter databases such as the Canadian

Forces EW Database (CFEWDB) and the

NATO Emitter Database (NEDB);

(7)

recording; and

(8)

interface directly with the EW analysis

component.

ECM Capability. The ECM component consists of

a number of dedicated detachments and modular

equipment, which may be integrated with ESM

detachments for attacking both communication and

non-communications targets, either in a deliberate or

a surgical fashion. ECM detachments require the

following capabilities:

(1)

platform independence to the greatest

extent possible;

(2)

the ability to attack both communications

and radar frequency bands;

(3)

upgradeable; and

(4)

capable of performing a range of ECM

tasks, including but not limited to electronic

masking, spoofing, deception and jamming.

Analysis Capability. The analysis component of an

EW unit converts the data and information collected

by the EW sensors into a “single source” product,

EW summaries (EWSUMs) or tactical reports

(TACREPs). This component consists of specially

trained personnel and specialized equipment. It can

be as simple as an analyst working along side a

search/intercept operator. Analysis is usually

conducted in a distributed fashion, with various

baseline detachments, the SIGINT EW operations

centre (SEWOC) and the EW coordination cell

(EWCC) each adding layers of analytical refinement

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to the end product. The component has the

following capabilities:

(1)

the capability to receive sensor data;

(2)

tools to assist the analyst to process the

data;

(3)

EW trained analytical personnel;

(4)

the ability to create, hold and secure highly

classified materials and databases;

(5)

access to other intelligence databases;

(6)

the ability to interface directly with ESM

and ECM components; and

(7)

the ability to interface directly with

national-level SIGINT databases.

EW C2IS Capability. EWCC, EWOC and EW

liaison officer (EWLO) staffs at supported formation

headquarters (as required) provide for the command

and control of EW assets. The EW control and

analysis centre (EWCAC) component is an EW

specific C2IS consisting of personnel, information

systems and physical facilities that provide the

means to exercise command and control in forming

the EWCC and EWOC. This component is

supported by an integral signal organization of

appropriate size. The EW C2IS capability must

support the following:

(1)

dispersed deployment of EW assets

throughout the AO;

(2)

interoperability with the Land Force

Command and Control Information System

(LFC2IS);

(3)

the capability of handling highly classified

information; and

(4)

the capability of supporting timely

transmission of data from the sensor to the

end-product customer without requiring

either hard-copy or “air gapping.”

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Combat Service Support Capability. The combat

service support (CSS) component provides the CSS

necessary for EW operations. Electronic warfare

organization are supported as other units of a

formation are and in accordance with sustainment

doctrine.²⁷ Electronic warfare organizations have

specialist maintenance capabilities to support

specialized fleets of EW equipment. Some

equipment provided by the national/strategic level

authorities will be maintained by those agencies and

not through the integral LF EW unit CSS

component.

SECTION 8

EW SUPPORT

14.

In order to provide the best support to operational

commanders, deployed EW units must take advantage of national and

international capabilities to augment limited resources. A deployed

LF commander will receive EW support from three areas:

organic EW resources;

resources from other nations in theatre (force level

EW capabilities); and

Canadian national/strategic resources.

15.

Organic EW resources provide the access to the national

signal intelligence system. With limited resources, it is unlikely that

LF organic resources will be able to provide all the EW information

necessary for operations. EW units cannot provide their full potential

combat effect without access to national signal intelligence systems.

16.

Theatre EW units, depending on their tasks, may be able to

provide both ESM and ECM support. This support will be

coordinated by the EWCC. There may be national limitations on the

provision of this support.

17.

Canadian Forces Information Operations Group is to provide

a CF level signal intelligence capability for the provision of databases,

²⁷ For more information see B-GL-300-004/FP-000 Sustainment and

supporting sustainment system manuals.

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specialized equipment, specialist operators and sanctuary operations.²⁸

Also, CFIOG will provide access, through the Canadian Security

Establishment (CSE), to resources and information from allied nations

and, via the land integrated support station (LISS), to the Canadian

Forces EW Database (CFEWDB). Lastly, CFIOG will force generate

a signals intelligence satellite support element (SSE) to augment

deployed LF EW assets on an as required basis.

Figure 2-2: National to Tactical EW Op Support

18.

It is important to note that augmentation of a SSE results in

the creation of either a SEWOC and/or a SEWCC capability as an SSE

will locate with either the EWCC or EWOC.

²⁸ Sanctuary (or split based) operations is a term used to describe operations

that are being conducted from a safe area (normally out of theatre in Canada)

to directly support operations in theatre.

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Figure 2-4: SEWCC

19.

At the LF level, the LISS provides a Land EW operational

support (LEWOS) capability to deployed LF EW systems. An

example of this is the provision of a start state radar database for

ELINT ESM ops during pre-deployment preparations.

SECTION 9

ORGANIZATION: FORCE GENERATION

20.

The 2 EW Squadron is organized along mission-oriented

lines and is capable of deploying in a scalable fashion. Troops within

the squadron are tailored to respond to tasks across the spectrum of

conflict, with one troop specializing in View 1 tasks and those View 2

tasks requiring armoured protection and a second troop specializing in

View 2 tasks and/or View 1 tasks requiring additional mobility, low

profile or deployability. While the EW Squadron complete can

provide effective EW support for up to a division or two brigade group

sized deployments simultaneously,²⁹ deployments are based on case-

by-case assessment of mission requirements and the EW target

environment.

21.

There are two broad organizational paradigms for EW

employment:

light EW, and

²⁹ Simultaneous deployment of both troops must take into consideration issues

such as sustainment.

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heavy EW.

LIGHT EW

22.

Light EW assets have the full spectrum of operational

capability and are mounted in wheeled soft-skinned vehicles thus

having the ability to operate dismounted to a limited degree.

Logistical limitations of the platforms employed may dictate a slightly

degraded capability that is offset by increased mobility and reduced

logistical support requirements.

HEAVY EW

23.

Heavy EW assets are equipped with wheeled armoured

sensor platforms. Heavy EW may have an increased technical

capability due to the increased load-carrying capacity of the platform

and provide increased operator protection. Heavy EW has increased

logistic support requirements.

SECTION 10

ORGANIZATION: FORCE EMPLOYMENT

24.

For all deployments, subject to resource constraints and based

on the assigned mission, the EW team/detachment/troop/squadron will

be formed on a grouping of the fol building block functions/entities:

EWCC or SEWCC;

EWOC or SEWOC;

EWLO;

mobile EW team (MEWT);

ECM; and

CSS.

A MEWT is a grouping of EW capability, usually ESM, at the lowest

level, formed to meet a mission requirement. It can be an existing

ESM detachment, an ESM detachment augmented with intelligence

analysis capability or a grouping of both an ESM and ECM

detachment together. A MEWT grouping is mission dependant.

25.

The EW Squadron complete would normally deploy the

following:

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a main and alternate SEWCC—this depends if there

is an alternate formation headquarters;

one or more EWLO detachments;

a main and alternate operation centre (SEWOC) to

provide a firm base for continuous search, intercept,

analysis and communications DF tasking;

two light and/or heavy ESM baselines of normally

four detachments each, including a mobile

detachment specializing in EW/spectrum

reconnaissance;

four ECM/jamming detachments; and

a CSS echelon.

Figure 2-5: EW Squadron Deployment Order of Battle

26.

As deployments can be scaled to specific mission

requirements, the total number of options is extensive. The following

list of examples is not exhaustive:

EWLO. Small-scale short-term deployments, such

as a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO),

might be provided with a single vehicle (or man-

pack) detachment, which is capable of providing

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EW liaison, advice, connectivity to national or allied

assets and a limited capability to perform ESM.³⁰

Figure 2-6: NEO EW Team

EWCC/MEWT. A two- or three-vehicle grouping

capable of providing EW liaison, advice and

connectivity to national or allied assets, a full-time

presence at the ISTAR table if required, and a team

capable of mobile ESM operations, either vehicle-

mounted or foot borne, to carry out EM spectrum

reconnaissance and provide target situational

awareness and threat warning to the supported

commander.

Figure 2-7: EWCC/MEWT

Rapid Deployment Troop. EWCC, EWOC, one

EWLO team (capable of acting as EWOC alternate),

a wheeled vehicle baseline capable of full spectrum

³⁰ The level of ESM that can be provided by a single detachment is limited to

essential force protection and short-term warning.

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CHAPTER 3

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE

SECTION 1

GENERAL

When speaking of command and control of electronic warfare

(EW), this normally refers to specialist EW units/detachments within

formations. Electronic warfare units provide formation commanders

with capabilities to conduct EW support measures (ESM) and

electronic countermeasures (ECM) operations. All units and

formations conduct electronic protective measures (EPM) with EW

units providing specialist advice. Electronic warfare must be

coordinated centrally at each level of command. This does not prevent

the allocation of EW capabilities to subordinate formations and units.

Internal to an EW unit, command and control is exercised via two

distinct entities—the EW coordination cell (EWCC), which exercises

command on behalf of the EW unit commander, and the EW

operations centre (EWOC), which exercises operational control of the

EW assets in accordance with command direction.

SECTION 2

COMMAND OF EW

Electronic warfare unit commanders exercise command over

their organic EW assets and, depending on the command

relationship,³¹ exercise control (on behalf of the commander) of

additional EW assets assigned. The EW commander is also the arms

adviser to the commander on EW matters.

The EWCC is located at the tactical headquarters and acts as

the EW unit commander’s ops staff. This coordination is primarily in

the form of direction with regard to movement and allocation of EW

assets in support of specific units during different phases of formation

operations.

³¹ B-GL-300-003/FP-000 Land Force Command provides details of various

command relationship under which forces can be assigned.

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SECTION 3

ELECTRONIC WARFARE COORDINATION CELL

The EWCC is the focal point for all EW activities within a

given level of command. The supporting EW unit normally provides

the EWCC. Each level of command that has EW assets allocated will

have an EWCC. The EWCC performs the following functions:

develop the EW plans to support the commander’s

operation and intelligence, surveillance, target

acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) plan;

coordinate ESM and ECM activities with other

combat capabilities within the formation;

coordinate ESM and ECM activities with higher and

flanking formations;

provide specialist EW advice to the commander and

other staff, including EPM;

direct ESM and ECM activities on behalf of the EW

commander;

control ECM operations on behalf of the EW

commander;

provide ESM results in support of the ISTAR

system; and

provide EW operational support (EWOS³²) through

liaison with higher and national level organizations.

Coordination of EW activities across various levels of

command is critical. This prevents the duplication of effort and

enhances the sharing of EW information. The chain of command

takes precedence over any EW technical control. The senior

formation EWCC has technical control of all EW activities. Figure

3-1 illustrates the parallel chain of command and control within a

solely national context.

³² EWOS consists of the provision and maintenance of EW databases in

support of EW operations undertaken by the Land Integrated Support Station

(LISS).

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Command & Control of EW

Figure 3-1: EW Coordination

In the context of joint and multinational operations, the same

technical control relationship would occur. The joint EWCC would

exercise technical control over the Land component EWCC (as well as

those of the Air and Maritime elements). Canadian LF formations will

normally be allocated to an allied formation for operations. The allied

formation EWCC is responsible for the coordination of all EW

activities within the formation. Technical control and passage for EW

information to other nations will be based on national agreements and

policies. Figure 3-2 is illustrative of this arrangement from a NATO

context.

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Figure 3-2: JFC EWCC Integration and Relationships

ELECTRONIC WARFARE OPERATIONS CENTRE

As previously stated, the EWOC exercises operational real

time control of the formation EW capability specifically with regard to

ESM in accordance with the EW unit commander’s direction. The

primary function of the EWOC is to control the ESM system as it

executes search, intercept and direction-finding tasks. It should be

noted that an EWOC could vary both in location and manning. In the

traditional sense the analysis function is centrally collocated with an

intercept capability to form a large EWOC complex separate from

both ESM baselines and the EWCC. With the formation of mobile

EW teams (MEWTs) with analysts pushed forward into ESM location

and exercising first level analysis of forward search, intercept and DF,

the paradigm of the EWOC as a centralized physical entity needs to be

reconsidered. With the deployment of MEWTs, the EWOC is more a

dispersed function then a centrally located detachment. As a physical

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Figure 3-4: Dispersed SEWOC Deployment with Fwd Search,

Intercept, DF and Analysis

ELECTRONIC WARFARE LIAISON OFFICERS

Electronic warfare liaison officers (EWLOs) are normally

allocated from the formation EW unit to subordinate formations that

do not have an organic EW unit. The purpose is to allow subordinate

formations and units access to the capabilities of the EW system, in

particular, ESM information and ECM. If a subordinate formation is

allocated EW resources, an EWCC is provided to support that

formation headquarters.

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CHAPTER 4

THE OPP, IPB, TARGETING, ISTAR AND EW PROCESSES

SECTION 1

THE OPERATIONAL PLANNING PROCESS

Formation headquarters (HQs) use the operational planning

process (OPP) to produce a plan based on the mission, concept and

intent of the higher commander. The intelligence preparation of the

battlefield (IPB) process and the targeting process support the OPP.

The OPP is a six-step process:

Receipt of Tasks. The formation HQ normally

receives its tasks as a warning order, operations

order or fragmentary order from the higher

formation. The receipt of the tasks initiates a new

planning cycle.

Orientation. In this step the commander conducts

his mission analysis and prepares his guidance. The

commander's guidance will include commander's

critical information requirements (CCIRs). Priority

intelligence requirements (PIRs) are the component

of CCIRs that provides guidance to the overall

intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and

reconnaissance (ISTAR) effort and by extension the

electronic warfare support measures (ESM) effort.

Develop Courses of Action. The staff develops

courses of action (COA) based on the information.

The IPB process develops possible adversary COA

and questions for the ISTAR system. The staff then

compares COA by means of a war game. The

electronic warfare coordination cell (EWCC) would

support the ISTAR system in helping to answer

questions from IPB by directing ESM activities and

obtaining any available signals intelligence

(SIGINT) from other sources.

Decision. The staff presents the results of COA war

game to the commander for a decision on which

COA to develop into a plan.

Plan Development. Another war game is

conducted to refine the selected COA and develop

the decision support template (DST), the

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synchronization matrix and high payoff target list

(HPTL). The targeting process produces the attack

guidance matrix (AGM). The EWCC supports the

targeting process with coordination of electronic

countermeasures (ECM). The result of this step is

the production of an order.

Plan Review. The coordination of the details of the

plan with subordinate units is conducted during this

step. The EWCC coordinates the electronic warfare

(EW) plan with higher and lower formations as

necessary.

SECTION 2

ELECTRONIC WARFARE AND THE INTELLIGENCE

PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD PROCESS

The IPB process provides a continuous analysis of the

adversary, weather and terrain. The result of the process is the

information collection plan (ICP). The process has four steps:

Define the Battlefield. The staff refines the area of

operations (AO) and defines the area of intelligence

responsibility (AIR) based on the higher formation

orders and the commander's initial planning

guidance.

Describe the Battlefield Effects. The G2 collects

information about the battlefield or updates

information provided by other sources. The effects

of terrain and weather on the AO are also evaluated.

Evaluate the Threat. The G2 assembles all

available information on the adversary and prepares

doctrinal and event templates.

Determine Threat COA. The G2 prepares threat

COA based upon the available information.

The EWCC does not normally participate in IPB, however,

the IPB product, the ICP, provides direction to the EWCC for ESM

through the ISTAR CC. If required, the EWCC would provide advice

on the employment of ESM assets to support the ICP. The IPB

process is a useful tool for the EWCC in preparation for ESM

operations.

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SECTION 3

ELECTRONIC WARFARE AND THE TARGETING PROCESS

Targeting is defined as “the process of selecting targets and

matching the appropriate response to them taking account of

operational requirements and capabilities.”³³ The targeting process

assists the commander by determining which targets are to be acquired

and attacked, when they are to be attacked, and what is required to

defeat the target. A target is an adversary function, formation or

equipment, facility or terrain planned for destruction, neutralization or

suppression in order to delay, disrupt, divert, limit or destroy the

adversary.³⁴ Targeting links the commander, the sensors and the

engagement systems. The targeting process has four functions:

Decide. Decide is the cornerstone of the targeting

process and requires close coordination between the

commander and the intelligence, plans, operations

and targeting team elements. The process begins

with receipt of a mission, whether assigned by

higher headquarters or deduced by the commander.

The commander, with input from his staff, analyses

the mission and considers the tasks that must be

performed. Targeting priorities must be addressed

for each phase or critical event of an operation.

Detect. Detect is the next critical step in the

targeting process. The G2 is the main figure in this

step as he coordinates the effort to detect high

payoff targets (HPTs) identified in the decide

function. To ensure there is no duplication of effort,

specific direction is given to target acquisition

systems capable of detecting high priority targets.

Information needs are expressed as priority

intelligence requirements (PIRs) and information

requirements (IRs). The detect function is carried

out through the execution of the ICP.

Deliver. The deliver function of the targeting

process executes the AGM and supports the

commander’s battle plan once the HPTs have been

³³ AAP 6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.

³⁴ B-GL-300-007/FP-001 Firepower Chapter 3.

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located and identified. During the detect function, it

is the target acquisition (TA) assets that have to be

managed. The deliver function provides the

framework for the efficient employment of firing

assets. The attack of targets must satisfy the attack

guidance developed during the decide function.

Assess. Combat assessment is the determination of

the effectiveness of force employment during

military operations. It is composed of three

elements as follows:

(1)

Battlefield Damage Assessment (BDA).

BDA is the timely and accurate assessment

of damage resulting from the application of

military force, either lethal or non-lethal,

against a target. It provides commanders

with an estimate of the adversary’s combat

effectiveness, capabilities and intentions.

(2)

Munitions Effect Assessment (MEA).

This is used as the basis for

recommendations for changes to increase

the effectiveness of tactics, methodology,

weapon system selection, munitions and

weapon delivery patterns.

(3)

Recommendations for Re-attack. This

aspect considers the requirement for

another attack if the desired effect on the

target has not been achieved.

The EW system is involved in the targeting process in two

ways. Firstly, ECM is integrated as an “engagement system” with all

of the other engagement systems at the commander’s disposal. The

EWCC, which is a member of the targeting team, is responsible for the

integration, tasking and control of ECM based on the targeting

priorities. The second way that the EW system is involved in the

targeting process is that the entire EW system is required to conduct its

own targeting process for effective ECM support.

The EWCC with the targeting team conducts the decide

function for ECM. The targeting team will recommend the use of

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ECM and the control measure³⁵ to be in effect. The ESM provides the

detection function for ECM. This involves the collection of

information (in effect target acquisition) in sufficient detail to allow

for effective ECM. For example, determination that a specific

frequency is an artillery net and its general direction is sufficient

information to allow the EWCC to target that particular net. The

deliver function is conducted by the ECM detachments as directed and

coordinated by the EWCC. The ESM then provides the assess

function by determining if the ECM has been effective and

recommends new targets to the EWCC to ensure the ECM remains

effective.

Figure 4-1: EW in the Targeting Process

SECTION 4

THE ISTAR PLANNING PROCESS

GUIDANCE

The ISTAR planning process within the formation is a

continuous process much like IPB and targeting. A cycle begins with

the receipt of the commander’s guidance on completion of his mission

³⁵ See chapter 6 for ECM control measure measures.

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analysis. The guidance contains the PIRs that are of concern to

ISTAR.

PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

At this stage in the process, PIRs should be considered to be

of two types. Some PIRs are things that the commander will need to

know for the execution of the mission. For example, the commander

may want to know if the adversary will delay or defend. As a result,

during execution, ISTAR will look for indications that the adversary is

thinning out in preparation for a withdrawal. Other PIRs will be for

planning. For example, the commander may want to know the extent

to which the adversary’s defences have been prepared. These latter

PIRs are immediately translated into tasks in the ISTAR coordination

centre (ISTAR CC) and issued out to sensors. The EWCC converts

tasks from the ISTAR CC into ESM tasks.

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and

reconnaissance provides the terrain and environment information that

allows the G2 to describe the battlefield effects. The ISTAR CC also

contributes to the evaluation of the threat by providing intelligence

from existing databases and from the results of the collection efforts

resulting from the PIRs issued for planning.

OPERATIONS PLAN DEVELOPMENT

10.

As the formation operations staff develops the COA, ISTAR

planners contribute to the development by advising on the ISTAR

contribution to each COA. The ISTAR planners participate in the

COA war game and the plan war game in order to ensure that ISTAR

tasks are fully synchronized with the remainder of the plan.

11.

During plan development, the ISTAR CC continues to

contribute to the common operational picture, as it collects

information based upon the PIRs issued for planning. The updated

common operational picture allows the COA to be adjusted to a

change in adversary disposition or in increase in our knowledge of the

adversary disposition.

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SECTION 5

ISTAR PLAN

12.

The ISTAR plan is included as an annex to the formation

operation order. Like the Fire Support annex, the ISTAR plan is

prepared by the ISTAR CC and is issued as part of the formation

operation order. The ISTAR plan describes how the assets of the

ISTAR system will be used to collect the information required in the

ICP.

13.

The ISTAR CC will coordinate unit ISTAR plans on behalf

of the G3 ISTAR. This will identify gaps in the ISTAR coverage and

allow action to be taken to cover the gaps if possible. It will also

identify to the ISTAR CC, the ISTAR priorities of subordinate

commanders, so that information that is collected that is particularly

relevant to their battles can be processed on their behalf. The EWCC

will assist in this coordination by evaluating the ESM coverage of a

subordinate formation.

14.

ISTAR Overlay. The ISTAR overlay links the ISTAR plan,

IPB and the targeting process. The overlay details the named area of

interest (NAI) and target area of interest (TAI) that are developed

during the formation OPP. Collection tasks within these NAI and TAI

will be detailed in the ISTAR annex and the ISTAR matrix.

15.

ISTAR Matrix. The ISTAR matrix is an appendix to the

ISTAR annex. It is based upon the ICP produced by the G2. The

ISTAR matrix relates the ICP to the ISTAR system sources and

agencies. It identifies collection tasks to ISTAR sensors and is

prepared by the ISTAR CC. The EWCC will be represented on the

ISTAR matrix and is the main tasking document for ESM. It also

allocates tasks to other formation units since it forms part of the

formation operation order.

16.

Information Collection Plan.³⁶ The ICP identifies the PIRs,

the IRs and the combat indicators necessary to evaluate the

adversary’s COA and to predict the adversary’s future activities. It is

an appendix to the Intelligence annex to the formation operation order.

It allows all units to understand the information required to draw the

appropriate conclusions about the adversary. This is a very important

³⁶ Examples of the ISTAR overlay, ISTAR matrix and the ICP can be found in

B-GL-352-001/FP-001 Land Force Information Operations—Intelligence,

Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance Chapter 3.

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document for the EWCC and the EW analyst. It allows the EWCC to

focus its analytical efforts. Conclusions drawn by the analysts must

support PIRs and IRs.

SECTION 6

THE EW PROCESSES

17.

There is not one EW Process. The EW system conducts

two processes: ESM and ECM processes. The EWCC is the focal

point of both of these processes.

18.

The ESM Process. The ESM process is a sub-process of the

ISTAR and intelligence processes. The ESM process mirrors the

intelligence cycle in that it consists of direction, collection, processing

and dissemination. The process begins with direction from collection

management on the areas to be covered. This consists of the ICP,

ISTAR overlay and ISTAR matrix. The EWCC converts these

documents into specific targets such as networks (C2, artillery,

reconnaissance nets), critical nodes (command posts, communication

centres) and activities (radar, movements) that will satisfy the

collection tasks. The targets are passed to the EWOC for additional

analysis, refinement and tasking to the sensor systems. The sensors,

both COMINT and ELINT, conduct the collection phase of search,

intercept and direction finding (DF). The search systems continuously

look for targets and pass those of interest to intercept for further

detailed collection. Direction finding is conducted to determine

locations, and this information is fused with the intercept information.

The EWOC analysis detachment then processes the information into a

“single source” intelligence product (SIGINT) disseminated in the

form of TACREPs or EWSUMs. The EWOC can also re-task the

sensors as necessary. The products are then disseminated to the

EWCC who provides the results to the all-source centre. The ASC

may ask for additional information from the EWCC or request

additional ESM tasks through the collection managers to the EWCC.

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The OPP, IPB, Targeting, ISTAR & EW Processes

Figure 4-2: ESM Process

19.

The ECM Process. The ECM process is a sub-process of the

targeting process. The EWCC receives ECM tasks through the attack

guidance matrix (AGM), which is developed by the targeting team and

approved by the commander. This process also provides additional

ESM collection tasks that the EWCC must direct to the EW system.

The ESM provides the detection (target acquisition) system for ECM.

The ESM system must provide detailed information to allow ECM to

be effective. The results of detection are provided to the EWCC to

allow for the integration of ECM into the fire support plan. The G3,

through the fire support coordination centre (FSCC), then authorizes

ECM. The EWCC then tasks ECM elements to conducts attacks. The

ESM then monitors and provides an assessment of ECM effectiveness

to the EWCC. This ECM assessment is provided to the targeting team

who start the process again.

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Figure 4-3: ECM process

20.

The conduct of ECM will have a direct effect on the ESM

collection. The ESM resources normally dedicated to ESM tasks will

be required to monitor the effects of ECM and will thus cause some

degradation of the ESM effort. Normally, many of the ECM targets

have been well developed and, therefore, the ESM effort will not be

completely degraded to support ECM. Electronic warfare support

measures should continue during ECM activities. If necessary, the G3

ISTAR will make the decision on the priority of effort based on advice

from the EWCC and the G2.

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CHAPTER 5

ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT MEASURES

SECTION 1

GENERAL

Essentially electronic warfare support measures (ESM) are

the exploitation of adversary transmissions for the purpose of

providing immediate threat warning, signals intelligence (SIGINT)

about the area of interest and targeting information for electronic

countermeasures (ECM). Electronic warfare support measures are

composed of search and intercept, direction finding (DF) and analysis

functions applied against communication and non-communication

targets. The ESM process is described in chapter 4 and mirrors the

intelligence cycle. Electronic warfare support measures can be carried

out from ground-based equipment in the forward area and at greatly

extended ranges from airborne platforms. All electromagnetic (EM)

radiation has a distinct characteristic or signature, ranging from a

single radio frequency to the unique signature of an air defence

radar/weapon system. Electronic warfare (EW) units deploy

electronic sensors so they can listen to, locate and identify adversary

transmissions.

Electronic warfare support measures (except for organic

communications systems) employ passive sensing. In general, ESM

can collect information throughout a commander’s area of interest and

they are an all weather capability. Ranges and accuracy (DF) of ESM

are greatly increased with the use of elevated platforms. It is unlikely

that the land forces would obtain dedicated platforms such as

helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) dedicated to EW

use. However, ESM equipment needs to be modular and compatible

to allow for deployment in these platforms. Electronic warfare

support measures require special equipment, well trained soldiers and

clear direction from the intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition

and reconnaissance (ISTAR) process on priorities, the types of targets

sought and the kind of information desired so wasted effort is

prevented.

To exploit the adversary's transmissions, EW elements search

the spectrum to find which frequencies the adversary is using. When

they find a target frequency, or set of frequencies in the case of

frequency agile systems, they then intercept the transmissions, use DF

equipment to locate the transmitters and then analyse the message

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content or emission types to gain information and disseminate the

information to anyone who requires it.

SECTION 2

SEARCH AND INTERCEPT FUNCTION

Search and intercept should be considered electronic

reconnaissance and electronic surveillance. In general these two

functions cannot be separated as the same equipment and operators do

both functions. In the past, search was viewed as the start of the EW

process, however, it is unlikely that deployed land forces will arrive in

a theatre without some national SIGINT database support allowing for

immediate commencement of intercept tasks.

Search. The search function based on SIGINT already

available conducts a reconnaissance of the EM spectrum for

exploitable activity. Search must be conducted continuously, and

some resources will always need to be dedicated to it. Analysis of the

results of the search function is very useful in determining adversary

activity even if the internal information of the communications cannot

be immediately exploited.

In the early stages of an operation, search operations are vital

to providing the information necessary for development of the overall

ESM capability. The results of search provide detailed information on

the portions of the EM spectrum employed by an adversary and from

this allow the ESM package to be task-tailored to exploit the particular

theatre. This is particularly important in operations other than war

(OOTW), where the size of the EW force will be limited by the overall

contingent size.

Search operators are required to exploit as much of the EM

spectrum as possible. This will include HF, VHF, UHF, SHF and

EHF bands for communications and radar activity. The general search

operator, who has some knowledge of the target language, records all

voice transmissions heard. The operator notes the frequency, the type

of modulation and the mode of transmission. If the net is operating in

plain language, the operator can log the call signs, the type of net and

an outline of the traffic. If the operator recognizes it as an important

net, the operator calls for another operator to look specifically at that

particular frequency. In the case of non-communication transmissions,

general search operators are looking for emissions with unique signal

characteristics before conducting follow on direction finding and

analysis.

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The operator involved in a specific search carries out the task

in the same way as the general search operator. The operator will be

assigned to specific frequencies and looks for specified nets.

Following a frequency change, the operator will be busy trying to

rediscover the net on its new frequency. Details of priority nets and

those which show promise of providing useful information are then

passed to an intercept operator. Modern search equipment

incorporates microprocessors, which can be programmed to

automatically scan a portion of the band, ignoring friendly or restricted

frequencies.

Intercept. While the search function conducts a

reconnaissance of the EM spectrum, the intercept function conducts

surveillance of specific target frequencies. The aim of intercept is to

exploit the specifics of adversary transmissions, primarily by

transcribing unencrypted voice transmissions, facsimile and data.

These activities require very specialized operator skills such as

linguistics. Once an important radio net is identified by search, it is

handed off to an intercept operator who records the information passed

on that net. The intercept operator exploits the information on the net

to the extent possible and then passes the results to analysts for further

exploitation, fusion and reporting. The intercept operator passes the

tapes and log to the analyst in the form of data files. The same process

is conducted with regard to intercept of non-communication emitters.

10.

Many signals will not be immediately exploitable. These

signals will be recorded, logged, databases updated and passed to other

EW assets for exploitation. In certain instances, the support of

coalition national agencies will be necessary to exploit these signals.

The process of exploitation in this case must be as fast as possible to

ensure the commander is supported with timely strategic SIGINT.

However, when an immediate threat is identified, a warning in the

form of a tactical report (TACREP) is reported directly to the

electronic warfare coordination cell (EWCC) / all-source cell (ASC)

for furtherance to the targeted unit.

11.

Intercept can be conducted against secure and insecure nets,

but the information obtained will vary. Secure targets yield valuable

information in the form of emission characteristics (e.g., frequency

and modulation), and some inference can be drawn about the relative

importance of the net based on traffic patterns and location of stations.

Secure stations are still subject to DF, as are stations working insecure.

12.

From intercept the analysts receive information about

frequency, message content, traffic flow, activity patterns and

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transmission types. This information is enhanced by locations and

movement provided by DF. In conjunction with other sources of

intelligence, the analyst will try to determine the adversary order of

battle, strengths, intentions, unit identities and deployment.

13.

Search and Intercept Equipment. The fundamental

equipment in any search and intercept system is the receiver and

associated antenna. Intercept receivers are very sensitive with a high

degree of frequency accuracy and stability. With a high gain antenna

and good siting, receivers are capable of exploiting signals at a greater

range than normal communication receivers. Intercept receivers

usually incorporate a digital frequency meter, which gives the operator

a precise frequency read-out for use by direction-finding stations.

They also have a panoramic display that can detect all transmissions

within a certain range even if these transmissions are infrequent or

short.

SECTION 3

DIRECTION FINDING

14.

Direction finding is an ESM function that provides location

information on target emitters. This information when fused with

other search and intercept information is invaluable. Direction-finding

equipment is a receiver with a specialized antenna system that is

capable of providing a line of bearing (LOB) to where the emitter is

located. The quality of the DF system, terrain, signal strength and

reflection determines the accuracy of the LOB. The accuracy of

current systems is in the range of one to three degrees. Current

systems determine the location of an emitter by triangulation. Three

or more direction-finding stations are used along a baseline, each

taking a LOB on the target station transmission simultaneously. At a

regular operating range of a DF baseline—15 km or 20 km—this

equates to an accuracy or circular error probability (CEP) of

approximately 1000 m. It is for this reason that DF alone cannot yet

be regarded as a target acquisition system for fire support. However,

ESM data including DF provides excellent cueing for other sensors to

detect targets with sufficient accuracy to target. Increasing the number

of bearings obtained and using elevated DF platforms can improve DF

accuracy. Additionally, DF accuracy tends to improve when targeting

higher frequencies. As technology advances, we can expect in the

future that locating emitters will improve significantly. Current

electronic intelligence (ELINT) DF systems have an accuracy of 1/10^th

of a degree. It is expected that this will provide targets within 100 m

at ranges of up to 20 km.

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15.

Emitter Density Location. A number of secure and insecure

transmissions on different frequencies all emanating from the same

area may indicate the location of an important headquarters. In any

formation, each type of unit or level of headquarters will have its own

distinctive electronic signature, which, if identified and located, will

obviously provide vital intelligence. The interrelationship between

stations on a net and their locations is an important element in

establishing the adversary's electronic order of battle.

16.

In the near future it can be expected that search, intercept and

DF functions will be conducted from the same platform. Integration

of intercept and DF information will thus be greatly improved, and a

large analytical effort to fuse this information will be reduced. This

will result in combined ESM detachments for search, intercept and

DF. Current ELINT systems already have an integrated search,

intercept and DF capability.

17.

In the HF frequency band, “single station location” can be

done. In effect the target emitter is located by a single ground station

and not by triangulation with a deployed baseline. Again, it is

expected that in the near future, this type of locating capability will be

available in other bands a well. In essence, the need to deploy a

baseline to obtain accurate DF information will be reduced. This will

have particular application in OOTW, where a limited number of EW

systems can be deployed, and in situations where it is not practical to

deploy baselines.

18.

Ground-based detachments must be located in forward areas

and sited to obtain a good electronic view of the adversary emitters

(usually line of sight). As with search and intercept equipment, DF

equipment benefits from elevated platforms via UAV and aviation

assets. This greatly improves the accuracy and range over

ground-mounted systems but is limited by the availability of platforms

and weather. Direction finding via elevated platforms should augment

a ground-based capability.

SECTION 4

ANALYSIS

19.

Analysis is a process of taking sensor data and converting it

into information that is useful. It is important to understand that

analysis occurs throughout the ESM process and not just as a final

step. The key principles in analysis that apply to ESM are accuracy

and speed. The outputs from analysis are SIGINT, immediate threat

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warnings, ECM targets and assessments of the effectiveness of ECM

and other IO measures such as PSYOPS or deception.

20.

Specially trained SIGINT analysts primarily carry out the

analysis function. The analyst takes direction (priority intelligence

requirement) from the EWCC and converts this into tasks for the ESM

sensors. The ESM sensors then collect the necessary data and

information and provide them to the analysts. The analysts then take

the sensor results, use various databases and produce their products.

The analyst must integrate information from search, intercept, and DF

of communication and non-communication emitters and produce a

SIGINT view of the battle. From an all-source cell perspective,

SIGINT is considered a “single source” that must be integrated with

other sensor information (recce, UAV, HUMINT) to produce Red

situational awareness (SA) for the commander.

21.

Accuracy of the products is critical. The ESM process must

produce reliable information and be able to indicate to the ASC how

accurate the information is. Inaccurate information can have a

detrimental effect on the entire process of producing Red SA. Speed

of reporting requires the ESM process to produce accurate results as

quickly as possible. This allows the commander to have Red SA

faster and hence enables him to quicken his decision-action cycle

relative to the adversary’s.

22.

With software and databases being part of ESM systems,

software can compare ESM results to known databases and provide

instantaneous analysis of a signal. This is particularly true in ELINT.

Radars are detected, characterized, located, identified and reported

without necessarily having a human interface. This level of analysis

converts signal data into useful information. Search and intercept

operators conduct analysis based on knowledge of the adversary

systems. In principle, the analysis should be done as quickly as

possible using integral software and operator knowledge. As analysis

and data fusion software develops, ESM equipment and operators will

conduct more analysis. Analysis is a time consuming process. The

adversary uses many means to ensure that it takes considerable time to

produce results.

23.

From intercept, the analysts receive information about

frequencies, call signs, types of net, message content, traffic flow,

activity patterns and transmission types. For both radio and radar,

intercept can identify the equipment by its technical characteristics

(electronic fingerprinting). When fused with locations and tracks from

DF, this information enables the EW analyst to build up the adversary

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Electronic Warfare Support Measures

electronic order of battle. The result of their efforts will be

intelligence concerning the adversary order of battle, strengths,

intentions, unit identities and equipment developments. Some

information cannot be held by the analyst while developing SIGINT

since it is time perishable and therefore must be passed immediately to

the EWCC/ASC for action. The analyst is a detective and quickly

seizes upon any errors or breaches of security. The building up of an

overall SIGINT picture by analysis is a lengthy process. If the

adversary EPM is effective, SIGINT obtained by intercept is

fragmentary at first and gains coherence only as a result of close

observation over a period of time.

24.

Location of Analysis. Many factors dictate the location of

the analysts. Factors that would determine the location of the analysis

function are:

Continuity. ESM analysis needs to be continuous.

When there is a period of time that analysis is not

being conducted, gaps in knowledge are created that

will directly affect the accuracy and speed of

reporting. The analysis function needs to be as

stationary as possible, have redundant capabilities or

a split based capability.

Access to Databases. The analysis function

requires access to databases both for SIGINT and

other intelligence information. The databases

provide quick references to previously conducted

activities and greatly speed the analysis process.

Communications. Limitations in the size of

communications links may require analysts to

deploy directly with the sensors. In other cases, the

communication may allow for the analyst to be

physically separated from the sensors but in virtual

contact. The analysis function must have reliable

communication with the ESM sensors. The

commander must always have some analysis

capability in theatre to allow for time of

communications disruptions.

25.

Traditionally the analysis function has been co-located with

the search and intercept functions. Tactical communications has

normally been conducted with low bandwidth tactical radios. The

analyst had to reduce the amount of information passed to a size that

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Electronic Warfare

could be routinely transmitted by that means. The arrangement also

allowed for a close relationship between intercept and analysis.

Current communications technology will soon allow a far more

flexible deployment of the analysis function. In recent operations,

both sensor and analysis functions have been conducted in separate

locations over strategic distances. Additionally, the analysis function

has been integrated with ESM sensors into a single vehicle detachment

on occasion. This demonstrates that the location of the analysis

function is flexible and mission dependant.

26.

Within the ISTAR CC there will likely be a need to have

SIGINT analysis capabilities. This will create a synergy with the ASC

and the other sensors. As well, national level communications links

will be readily available to the analysts.

27.

Analysis Security. Many SIGINT databases and analytical

methods are highly classified and specially protected. This creates a

requirement for a special compartmented information facility (SCIF).

Access to the information and many SIGINT products require special

security clearances. Commanders, designated staff and the ISTAR CC

will require regular access to this information and will need to be

cleared appropriately.

28.

Dissemination of Analysis Products. Analysis derived

products will be disseminated on a need to know basis. In general, the

products will be sanitized to allow them to be passed on the Land

Force command and control information system (C2IS) systems. The

sanitation procedure will be in accordance with nationally set

guidelines and the source protection necessary. The normal products

of the EW process are:

Tactical Reports and Summaries. These reports

are produced in an approved text format that allows

for quick dissemination, database updates and

display on maps as necessary.

Overlays. Overlays allow for a pictorial

representation of various ESM results. For example,

all air defence radars, and all or selected DF results.

29.

Enemy Electronic Deception verses Analysis. Analysts

must be aware that an adversary may attempt deception. A properly

conceived deception plan is aimed at the commander not the ESM

system. An electronic deception is normally planned as part of an

overall deception plan. In some instances, however, it is possible for

only an electronic deception to be attempted. In this case, the aim is to

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deceive the ESM system into reporting false information that will be

reported to our commander. Analysts must be aware that deception is

possible and question results that appear unusual. When this occurs,

the ISTAR system may be able to confirm or deny the adversaries use

of deception with other sensors. Analysts should not be over cautious

and not report for fear of deception.

30.

Conclusion. As discussed before, automated tools will

significantly speed up the analysis process. Analysts must still be

highly skilled in order to quickly make sense of a myriad of data.

Although progress in the areas of artificial intelligence and automated

tools is constantly being made, the main tool remains a highly skilled

analyst.

SECTION 5

ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE ELECTRONIC WARFARE

SUPPORT MEASURES

31.

ELINT ESM. The previous paragraphs describe the ESM

process—consisting of intercept, search, DF and analysis—and the

application of these sub-processes against communication-based

emitters. It should be re-emphasized that the same ESM process is

applied against non communication-based emitters and results in an

ELINT product. Each radar has a characteristic frequency, power,

pulse length, pulse repetition frequency, beam width, antenna scan rate

and polarization. These properties determine the function and

operating parameters of radar and may be used to classify and identify

it. The characteristics are compared to a database, and the specific

radar can be identified. ELINT systems require a large database of

previously collected signals to be most effective. The database must

be theatre specific.

32.

LISS Support to ELINT ESM. Land integrated support

station (LISS) provides the necessary databases for ELINT systems.

The databases are built from the CF EW Database (CFEWDB). New

ELINT signals are normally beyond the deployed EW system to

exploit. The ELINT system provides the characteristics of the emitter

to the LISS, which, in coordination with other agencies, identifies the

emitter and updates the database. Therefore, new databases are

required constantly to ensure ELINT systems identify signals

correctly. Most radars may be associated with a particular gun or

missile fire control system or a missile guidance/homing system. In

these cases, analysis of the interception usually reveals the state of

activation of the whole weapon system and the type of system the

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CHAPTER 6

ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES

SECTION 1

GENERAL

Electronic countermeasures (ECM) are the offensive arm of

electronic warfare (EW). Electronic countermeasures are coordinated

through the targeting process as described in Chapter 3. The

electronic warfare support measures (ESM) process is the target

acquisition (TA) system for ECM. Electronic countermeasures are

subdivided into three categories: electronic jamming, electronic

deception and electronic neutralization.

SECTION 2

ELECTRONIC JAMMING

Electronic jamming is the deliberate radiation, re-radiation or

reflection of electromagnetic (EM) energy with the object of impairing

the effectiveness of electronic devices, equipment or systems being

used by an adversary. Jamming used at the right time on the right

targets (e.g., on command links during an assault) can greatly reduce

the adversary’s effectiveness by denying him critical information and

communications. If jamming is poorly coordinated, it will alert the

adversary and can compromise our own capability and intentions. If

jamming is conducted too early, it will allow the adversary time to

react and restore communications and therefore have limited effect. A

jamming signal can affect both friend and foe, and its effects can be

widespread. Adversary transmissions are often a source of

intelligence, and if they are jammed, the information they provide is

lost. Jamming, therefore, is an activity that must be closely directed

and coordinated by the G3 staff.

Within the Land Force, EW units conduct electronic

jamming. The responsibility for jamming rests with the G3/COS, and

jamming is coordinated by the FSCC and electronic warfare

coordination cell (EWCC). The EWCC is responsible for the

execution of jamming based on targets determined by the targeting

process. Coordination with other staffs, in particular the G2 and G6, is

critical.

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CONTROL OF JAMMING

Jamming operations are most successful when they are

permitted the greatest possible latitude to attack both planned and

opportunity targets. Coordination of jamming operations should

commence early in the planning cycle and continue through all

operational phases. The measures for controlling jamming are

normally contained in the operations order. Control is exercised in

one of four ways:

Positive Control. Positive control is the issuance of

specific orders to jam and/or deceive a given target

or blanket authority to neutralize by jamming and/or

deception a category of target (for example, an

adversary fire control net or ground surveillance

radars). Frequencies and times are not specified.

Negative Control. Negative control is the denial of

permission to conduct jamming (for example, no

jamming before H-hour).

On/Off Control. On/off control is the direct control

of a jamming operation from moment to moment.

Restricted Frequency Control. Restricted

frequency lists (RFLs) are a mechanism to prevent

jamming from effecting friendly operations. Annex

A to this chapter provides a process and procedures

for developing and maintaining RFLs. There are

three categories of frequencies:

(1)

Taboo. A “friendly” frequency on which

jamming or other intentional interference is

prohibited.³⁷

(2)

Guarded. An adversary frequency used as

a source of information.³⁸

(3)

Protected. A “friendly” frequency on

which interference must be minimized.³⁹

³⁷ ATP 51(A) Chapter 4.

³⁸ ATP 51(A) Chapter 4.

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These four methods of controlling jamming are applied in a

manner that permits maximum flexibility and minimum delay in

obtaining authority to conduct jamming operations without

compromising limitations imposed by superior headquarters. Unless

forbidden by a higher commander or established rules of engagement,

any formation commander can authorize jamming. Commanders at all

levels must be fully conversant with the orders governing the use of

jamming and be aware of the possible adverse effects on intelligence

collection, command and control and weapon systems.

Jamming is a technique that is used to “capture” an

adversary’s communication device (radio) by radiating enough energy

that the intended receiver only receives the jamming signal and only

the intended one. Jamming effectiveness is determined by several

factors:

Jammer Power. In general, the higher the power

the more effective the jamming.

Range to the target Receiver. The closer the

target, the more effective the jamming.

The Link Distance. The link distance is the

distance between the transmitter and receiver. The

longer this distance, the more effective the jamming

is (less jamming power is required).

Ground. For ground-based jammers, the ground

itself can mask the target or necessitate greater

power to produce effective jamming.

Power of the Adversary Transmitter. Depending

on the power output of the adversary transmitter,

more jammer power may be required to effect

jamming. Normally, the power output is known and

can be factored into the equation to determine the

required jammer power output.

Jammers can use a variety of modulations. It is important to

tailor the jamming modulation to the target. The most successful

jammer is one that is perceived as anything but a jammer. For

example, the jammer can use a random Morse signal against a net

³⁹ ATP 51(A) Chapter 4.

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operating on Morse code or use a random data signal against a data

net.

Types of Jamming. The types of jamming that may be

employed are as follows:

Spot Jamming. Spot jamming occurs when a

jammer attacks one frequency or narrow band of

frequencies in specific use by the victim. It is

normally tuneable over a range of frequencies. Spot

jamming causes minimum interference with friendly

systems and permits maximum use of available

jamming power. A spot jammer requires very

accurate knowledge of adversary frequencies.

Barrage Jamming. Barrage jamming occurs when

a jammer attacks over a wide band of frequencies

simultaneously. The power available will be spread

over the entire bandwidth; this results in less power

on any particular frequency than occurs with spot

jamming. Barrage jamming is likely to harass the

victim over a number of frequency options rather

than totally deprive the victim of using any

particular frequency. Less detailed steerage is

necessary for barrage jamming. Also, the chance of

interference with friendly nets is greater than with

spot jamming.

Sweep Jamming. Sweep jamming attempts to

compromise between the advantages of spot

jamming and barrage jamming. The frequency of

the jamming signal is continuously varied within a

specific bandwidth. All available power is used for

one frequency or a narrow band at any instant, but

the tuning is swept back and forth across a whole

band of frequencies. Higher sweep rates can achieve

more effective results.

Automatic Search Jamming. More sophisticated

jammers use advanced technology to maximize their

effectiveness yet reduces their vulnerability. The

automatic search jammer (also known as a

responsive jammer) incorporates an intercept

receiver, which automatically searches a selected

band of frequencies to find frequencies of interest

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for which the system has been programmed. The

jamming transmitter is then automatically tuned and

activated on the target frequency. For the victim

station, the jamming appears to be continuous.

Sometimes a capability is incorporated into the

system to look through the jamming transmissions

and follow any changes in frequency made by the

victim. Complex systems will include a computer

management function, which allocates power

resources to simultaneous targets.

JAMMER PLATFORMS

To be effective, a ground-based jammer has to be sited close

to the FLOT (forward line of own troops) so it can take advantage of

the high power output (which is typically between 1 kW and 2 kW).

This siting allows the jammer to be effective against targets that are in

depth (for example, artillery nets), but it makes the jammer vulnerable.

Thus the jammer should be mounted in an armoured vehicle.

Mounting the jammer on an elevated platform such as an UAV can

eliminate the loss of power of a jamming signal caused by intervening

terrain (attenuation). This technique provides a line of sight path from

the jammer to the target receiver, thus enabling a lower power jammer

to be used. An airborne jammer of as little as 200 watts output at a

distance of 40 km can be as effective as a ground-based jammer of

2 kW output at 15 km.

EXPENDABLE JAMMERS

10.

Expendable jamming involves placing a low power jammer

within a few hundred metres of a target receiver. This can have the

same disruptive effect as a high power jammer 15 to 20 km away.

Expendable jammers can be hand-placed, airdropped or artillery

delivered. They can be programmed to lock on to strong local signals,

or they can be programmed to switch on to a certain frequency at a

predetermined time. If expendable jammers are delivered as a mix

with explosive ordnance, they could seriously degrade the adversary's

efforts to restore order out of chaos. Special forces, reconnaissance

and forward troops may be tasked to place expendable jammers. Their

use would be coordinated, as with other jamming, through the

targeting process.

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ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES AS ELECTRONIC

PROTECTIVE MEASURES:

JAMMING IN NON-ELECTRONIC WARFARE UNITS

11.

Systems are now available that can provide protection for

Land Forces by using jammers against electronic artillery fuses such

as variable-time or proximity fuses. The jammer causes the artillery

round to detonate prematurely. The system detects the signal from the

artillery round and automatically sends a signal, which detonates the

round. The system is, in fact, a combination of ESM and ECM that

provides electronic protective measures (EPM).

SECTION 3

ELECTRONIC DECEPTION

“All warfare is based on deception.”

-Sun Tzu, The Art of War, c. 500 BC, tr. Griffith.

12.

Electronic deception (ED) is the deliberate radiation, re-

radiation, alteration, absorption or reflection of EM energy in a

manner intended to confuse, distract or seduce an adversary or his

electronic systems. Electronic deception is a component of the

commander’s overall deception plan,⁴⁰ which, in turn, is part of the

commander’s overall information operation plan.

13.

The aim of deception is to mislead the adversary commander

and induce him into doing something counter to his interests. The EM

spectrum is an ideal medium to employ deceptive techniques because

it is shared with the adversary. His ESM system is a means to provide

him false information. Electronic deception is employed as part of an

overall tactical deception plan and cannot be practiced

indiscriminately. Careful scripting and control at the highest possible

level are required as well as highly skilled operators who must be well

briefed. On the other hand, low-level imitative deception can be

attempted by EW elements if the aim is limited to delaying adversary

traffic from a few minutes to a few hours or if there is an opportunity

to temporarily confuse adversary commanders at formation or unit

level. Electronic deception is a potent weapon with few of the

disadvantages of jamming, but it can be very expensive in manpower

and equipment.

⁴⁰ More information on deception can be found in B-GL-352-001/FP 000

Land Force Deception.

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14.

Electronic deception must be considered during the planning

phase of any deception plan. The G3 has responsibility for developing

the overall deception plan. The planning of ED is the responsibility of

the EWCC on behalf of the G3 (via a designated G3 IO). Many other

staffs are involved with the development of deception plans. Annex B

to this chapter provides a guide for the EWCC to plan and coordinate

ED. Electronic deception is particularly effective in the following

circumstances:

When the adversary relies heavily on a

communications and information systems (CIS)

using the EM spectrum. Electronic deception may

cause the adversary—by the manipulation, distortion

or falsification of electronic transmissions—to react

in a manner prejudicial to his interests.

When the adversary ISTAR system is dependent on

the ESM (tactical and national level).

When it is skilfully conducted and fully integrated

into the overall deception plan.

At a critical time in the adversary’s operations.

15.

Electronic deception is divided into three categories:

Manipulative Electronic Deception. This type of

ED puts out false information over our own emitters

so it can be intercepted by the adversary and treated

as real information (for example, dummy radio

traffic).

Simulative Electronic Deception. This type of ED

is the creation of electronic signatures (for example,

false radio net).

Imitative Electronic Deception. This type of ED

emits signals designed to convince the adversary

these signals belong to the adversary (for example,

intruding on an adversary net).

16.

All units in a formation could be involved in ED. Electronic

warfare units can provide imitative ED but little more.

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SECTION 4

ELECTRONIC NEUTRALIZATION

17.

Electronic neutralization (EN) is the deliberate use of EM

energy to either temporarily or permanently damage adversary devices

that rely exclusively on the EM spectrum. Electronic neutralization is

usually brought about as a result of a directed energy (DE) or particle

beam (PB) weapon depositing sufficient EM energy on a target so as

to render useless the target, its electronics or both. The use of lasers to

destroy sensitive optical viewing devices is one such example.

Electronic neutralization is characterized by the requirement for line of

sight (LOS) and the near instantaneous time of flight (approaching or

at the speed of light).

18.

Electronic neutralization carries with it a risk to our own

troops. As a consequence, great care and safety must be used when

employing certain types of DE weapons. Directed energy weapons

will have applications in close combat, LOS engagements. The

doctrine for employing these weapons will be contained in the

manuals of those arms that employ the weapons. EW units are not

involved directly with EN. Land EW operational support (LEWOS)

may be involved in the reprogramming of systems to detect the use of

EN.

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ANNEX A

RESTRICTED FREQUENCY LISTS

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this annex is to outline procedures for

producing and maintaining restricted frequency lists (RFLs). An RFL

is defined as a list of taboo, guarded and protected frequency lists.

The terms taboo, guarded and protected are defined as follows:

TABOO. A “friendly” frequency on which

jamming or other intentional interference is

prohibited.

GUARDED. An enemy frequency used as a source

of information.

PROTECTED. A “friendly” frequency on which

interference must be minimized.

The G3 staff is responsible for the compilation, maintenance

and distribution of the RFL, however, the EWCC will provide the staff

effort to assist.

This annex is organized as follows:

RFL production and dissemination;

RFL maintenance procedures; and

RFL format.

SECTION 2

RFL PRODUCTION AND DISSEMINATION

The formation structure and associated CIS must be known in

order to produce a standard RFL. The procedure for the production of

the RFL is as follows:

Produce standard formation taboo and protected list;

produce guarded list;

G6 staff input frequencies to taboo and protected

list;

G3 (EWCC) compile list; and

G3 issues RFL.

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STANDARD FORMATION TABOO AND PROTECTED LIST

The purpose of this list is to produce a standard (SOP) list of

activities (for example, AD, surveillance nets, etc) that are to be given

the status of taboo and protected. These lists will facilitate the quick

production of the RFL, which could readily change. Each formation,

from brigade to corps, must undertake this process.

To produce the taboo and protected lists, the following

agencies will need input:

G6 staff;

EWCC;

G2 staff;

G4 staff;

Arty, Avn, Engr staffs; and

subordinate formations.

G3 staff would then approve the taboo and protected lists.

Once this process has been completed, the G6 staff can routinely add

frequencies to the approved lists. G2 staff, with input from EWCC,

produces the guarded frequency list. The G3 staff, with assistance

from the EWCC and with the superior formation’s RFL, produces the

RFL. G3 then approves the list and disseminates to subordinate

formations and EW units. Figure A-1 depicts this process.

Figure 6A-1: The RFL Process

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Annex A to Chapter 6

RFL MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES

Maintenance of the RFL is critical. The RFL shall be

updated at the following times:

When a new operation order is being prepared. This

will require a complete review of taboo and

protected lists.

Routinely updated every 24 hours (or as necessary to

conform to CEOI changes).

Attachments and detachments from the formation.

Periodic updating as minor changes occur (for

example, single taboo frequency change or updates

to guarded frequencies).

Subordinate formations, the G6 staff and the G2 staff are

responsible to advise the G3 staff when changes to the RFL are

required. The EWCC will ensure that EW units are immediately

advised of any change to the RFL.

RFL FORMAT

10.

The format and an example of an RFL are contained in

Appendix 1.

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ANNEX B

ELECTRONIC DECEPTION

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this annex is to provide guidance for planning

and coordinating electronic deception (ED). Electronic deception is

“the deliberate radiation, re-radiation, alteration, absorption or

reflection of electromagnetic energy in a manner intended to confuse,

distract or seduce an enemy or his electronic systems.” Electronic

deception is but one component of an overall deception plan that will

be an integral part of the information operations (IO) plan.

Electronic deception is normally conducted as a part of a

commander's deception plan and must be full planned and coordinated

with it. The G3 staff has general responsibilities for planning and

coordination of the commander’s deception plan. The EWCC is

responsible through the G3 for the planning and coordination of the

ED plan in support of the overall deception plan.

This annex concentrates on the EWCC activities necessary to

plan and coordinate ED. A checklist is provided at Appendix 1 to

assist EWCC staffs in planning ED. The organization of this annex is

as follows:

ED planning; and

EWCC checklist for ED.

ED PLANNING

The deception plan has its beginning in the commander’s

concept of operations in which he identifies the need for a coordinated

deception plan in order to successfully conduct his operation. The G3

staff, specifically a designated G3 IO, must then plan the deception in

conjunction with all staff branches. The EWCC, G2 and G6 staffs will

provide the advice necessary in conducting an ED as part of the

overall deception plan. In some cases, the commander’s entire

deception plan may be based on an electronic deception depending on

the enemy's intelligence gathering capabilities.

From an EW point of view, two aspects are critical to

successful conduct of ED:

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Comprehensive Database. A comprehensive

database is essential to the development of ED plan

in order to determine what aspects of an adversary

can be deceived. The database will provide the

necessary information on which adversary systems

are dependent on the electromagnetic spectrum and

therefore can be deceived.

ESM. Electronic warfare support measures (ESM)

are critical in monitoring the success of any

deception plan. ESM will likely be the first

indicator of the success or failure of the overall

deception plan and will provide what the adversary’s

reaction to our deception is. Electronic warfare

support measures provide critical input into the

overall database and will directly influence the ED

plan.

The electronic deception plan will need to create a misleading

picture to the enemy tactical ESM and national signal intelligence

systems to the point that their reports to the appropriate commander

cause him to react (or not react) in a way favourable to our

commander’s aim. As a result, a realistic emitter picture must be

“painted.” This will require significant planning and coordination to

execute and will likely require emitters from various elements not just

signal and EW elements.

The commander must set out the aim of the deception plan.

The G3 IO staff then work on options for the deception plan. The

EWCC will be required to do an estimate to produce options for an

electronic deception plan to support the commander’s deception plan.

The result of this estimate will be an annex (or possibly a separate

operation order) to the deception plan operation order.

In order to conduct the estimate, the EWCC will need to

coordinate with the following:

G3 IO;

G2 Staff;

G6 staff;

higher and lower EWCCs; and

other arms (provision of resources).

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Annex B to Chapter 6

It is likely that the most significant factor will be the

availability of resources (emitters) to conduct the plan. The significant

use of equipment could jeopardize the CIS and surveillance plans.

Every effort must be made to keep the resources to the minimum

necessary to successfully conduct the electronic deception.

10.

The result of the estimate will produce a plan and the critical

contents of the ED annex to the deception plan. The annex will

contain the tasks and coordination necessary to conduct the ED.

Appendix 1 contains a checklist guide to contents of the ED annex.

11.

The ED annex will provide the detailed coordination

necessary to execute the plan. After the issue of appropriate orders,

the EWCC will need to monitor and coordinate changes necessary.

Electronic warfare support measures assets will need to be tasked to

monitor the enemy's reaction to the deception to confirm the success

of the deception. EWCC is responsible to advise the G3 IO of the

results.

Figure 6B-1: The ED Process

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B

ED PLANNING CHECKLIST

G3/G3 IO

Commanders IO/deception concept of ops

Timings

Resources available

Additional resources from higher

Adversary surveillance capability

Confirming results

ESM (tactical, coalition, strategic) capabilities required to

monitor deception

Comprehensive database

Resources available

Special CEOI required

Nets required

Spectral use

G4/Other Arms

Resources available

Nets for simulation

ESM tasks

Monitor deception

Database input/updates

ECM TASKS

Subordinate Formations

Execute tasks

Provide resources

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CHAPTER 7

ELECTRONIC PROTECTIVE MEASURES

SECTION 1

GENERAL

An often neglected, but most important division of electronic

warfare (EW), is electronic protective measures (EPM). These are the

defensive EW measures that all units must practice and use.

Electronic protective measures are an all-arms responsibility.

Electronic protective measures features included in the design of

command and control information system (C2IS) equipment and

weapon systems must be combined with EPM procedures and tactics

to reduce the effect of the adversary’s electronic warfare support

measures (ESM) and electronic countermeasures (ECM) effort.

Commanders are responsible for assessing the potential vulnerabilities

of their electronic equipment, uncovering weaknesses that may be

exploited by hostile EW activities, and developing appropriate

defensive EW procedures. Electronic protective measures tactics must

be considered in light of the tactical situation and must be included in

commander’s operations plans to preclude reacting hastily during the

heat of battle.

To develop a sound EPM, commanders and staff at all levels

must:

Acknowledge the extent of our own military reliance

upon electronic systems and the vulnerability of

those systems to ESM and ECM.

Understand that the adversary has the capability to

exploit and disrupt all our electronic systems. This

capability, if exploited to its full extent, will give the

adversary a significant tactical advantage.

Take steps to ensure the adversary does not gain

such a military advantage by protecting our

electronic systems through well-practiced EPM

procedures and tactics.

The aim of EPM is to defeat the adversary’s ESM and

national signal intelligence systems and his ECM. It is important to

remember that defence against EW attack applies both in peacetime

and in war. It must be assumed that the potential adversary is always

listening and intercepting even though the he may reserve jamming

and deception for war. The ability to survive an electronic attack

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depends on our knowledge of the adversary’s capability and our

standard of EW training. Electronic protective measures take the form

of a two-phased defence: defeat ESM and defeat ECM.

Some measures are both anti-ESM and anti-ECM in their

effect. It is significant that ECM relies heavily upon effective ESM

steerage. Therefore, most of the EPM which effectively deny the

adversary an opportunity to conduct ESM prevent or reduce his ECM

at the same time. Therefore, the first phase of EPM is anti-ESM.

SECTION 2

SUB-DIVISIONS OF ELECTRONIC PROTECTIVE

MEASURES

Electronic protective measures can be technical, procedural

or tactical as illustrated in Figure 7-1. The consolidated result of

effective EPM is a good signals security (SIGSEC) posture, which is

an important part in our overall operational security. To achieve an

acceptable level of SIGSEC, the most important ingredient is realistic

operator training that will enable the operator to continue to function

in a hostile EW environment.

Figure 7-1: Electronic Counter-Countermeasures

SECTION 3

TECHNICAL MEASURES

Design. Electronic protective measures are becoming

increasingly important in the technical design of all radio and radar

equipment. New transmission, encryption and antenna techniques are

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Electronic Protective Measures

being developed to reduce electronic visibility, deny the adversary

information or enable the operator to work through an electronic

attack. Even the current generation of electronic equipment has some

built-in EPM features. Most combat radios have variable power that

can be kept low to avoid detection or can be increased to work through

jamming. The gain control, which adjusts brilliance and contrast on a

radar screen, may sufficiently remove the effects of chaff to reveal the

wanted target.

Frequency Diversity. The development of our entire family

of tactical radios also reflects a form of EPM by providing diversity

across all frequency bands. For example, HF (AM) is usually used for

guard communications to back up VHF (FM) radio. Similarly, UHF

radio and radio relay, with their better line of sight characteristics, are

used for other command and control links.

On-Line Encryption. This method will deny the adversary

knowledge of the content of message traffic; however, the presence of

a signal can still be detected, enabling the adversary to conduct

direction finding. On-line encryption devices are used on most tactical

radio circuits including voice, teletype, data and facsimile. The

advanced generations of equipment enable the net control station to

electronically key or exclude stations (if required).

Off-Line Encryption. This method, including machine and

non-machine ciphers, can give protection to message content equal to

that of on-line encryption. A variety of other lower level codes and

devices can give limited protection to all or selected parts of messages.

Technology has reached the point where traditional paper codes will

be replaced or supplemented by a hand held calculator-type device,

which can provide immediate encryption and decryption.

10.

Directional Antennae. A more specialized method of

achieving minimum power in the adversary's direction is by using

directional antennae (see Figure 7-2 (a)). These are usually used for

VHF and UHF radio relay systems, but can also be used for point-to-

point HF and VHF radio links. Directional antennae can be used on

long rebroadcast nets whereby the rebroadcast station splits and works

to the forward units on low power and works rearward using a

directional antenna on high power. Ideally, circuits using directional

antennae should be oriented parallel to the forward edge of the battle

area (FEBA) to reduce the radiation in the adversary's direction. Side

and back lobes are still subject to adversary intercept but to a lesser

degree.

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11.

Steerable Null Antennae. Figure 7-2 (b) shows the polar

diagram of a vertical omni directional antenna or standard whip

antenna. Research is being carried out on steerable null antennae

(Figure 7-2 (c)), which will radiate normally in all directions.

However, efficiency will be greatly reduced in the direction of the

adversary antenna. As the antenna will have the same properties for

both transmission and reception, radiation to or from the adversary is

minimized; this will reduce the likelihood of intercept and will reduce

the effect of jamming. A processor that is connected drives steerable

null antennae to the radio inside the vehicle.

12.

Burst Transmission. Digital message devices are now being

developed that enable short formatted messages to be entered into a

small memory then transmitted in a short burst. These devices can be

used over most normal voice radios and obviously reduce transmission

time for lengthy messages. Typical applications for these devices are

on fire control and administrative nets and by special forces inserted

into adversary territory.

Figure 7-2: Antenna Techniques

13.

Spread Spectrum. A new generation of frequency agile

radios is being developed that automatically switch or hop the signal

over a large number of frequencies instead of transmitting on a single

frequency. This technique reduces the possibility of adversary

intercept and jamming; however, mutual interference among numerous

frequency hopping nets may also create communication problems.

Another spread spectrum technique involves transmitting the signal

over a wide band of frequencies simultaneously. It is similar to

frequency hopping because it provides the same EPM capability;

however, it also has the problem of mutual interference.

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Electronic Protective Measures

SECTION 4

NON-COMMUNICATIONS TECHNIQUES

14.

Infra-red Suppression. As a counter to adversary infra-red

(IR) seeking systems, IR signature suppression techniques can be

employed. The use of water-cooling, special fuels, shielding hot

engines, and reducing exhaust temperatures are all examples of vehicle

and aircraft IR suppression techniques. The use of our present

camouflage net, along with other IR absorbent material, greatly

reduces the IR signature of any headquarters or friendly position. This

is particularly important in view of the adversary's airborne IR sensor

capability.

15.

Radar. A radar concentrates great power in its transmission

so reflected energy from a long-range target may be received. Due to

attenuation and reflection losses, only a small fraction of the

transmitted energy is returned to the radar. A sensor in the target can

therefore detect the transmitted energy at ranges considerably greater

than the detection range of the radar itself. This provides a significant

advantage to vehicles and aircraft that are equipped with radar warning

receivers. The sensors will alert the operator that the vehicle (or

aircraft) is in an adversary radar path and therefore may be detected,

tracked or fired upon. The operating parameters of a particular radar

may also be used to identify it and possibly associate it with a unit or

headquarters. Numerous signal-processing techniques are now being

incorporated in modern radar equipment that vary these parameters

and thus mask the identity of the equipment. Still other signal

processing techniques are being developed that will enable a radar to

counter adversary jamming or deception.

16.

Laser. Similarly, as an increasing number of electronic

systems on the battlefield are using laser technology, laser warning

and countermeasure techniques are also being developed. For

example, reconnaissance vehicles and helicopters already possess laser

and radar warning receivers to detect when they are being targeted.

These suites fundamentally follow the ESM process as an EPM,

leading to information being provided very quickly to a crew

commander who must take action. Some of these suites will require

database support from a LISS. As new equipment is procured more

and more vehicles will be fitted with these suites.

17.

Electromagnetic Pulse. Commanders must develop plans

for the best use of their critical communication and electronic

equipment which satisfy operational requirements but also recognize

that essential electronic equipment can be severely damaged by

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electromagnetic pulse (EMP). Hardened equipment should be placed

in support of the most critical task. Unhardened equipment should be

used in less sensitive and routine applications to preserve the readiness

of hardened equipment as much as possible.

SECTION 5

PROCEDURAL MEASURES

18.

The primary defence against EW attack is to avoid detection.

In many instances, this will not be possible, but the electronic

battlefield will be very crowded, and the weaker a signal, the more

difficult it will be to intercept and locate. It then becomes essential to

conceal the level and identity of the net or type of equipment and to

encode sensitive message content. The adversary must be forced to

commit disproportionate resources for any intelligence gained from

our electronic systems.

19.

Jamming and deception require strict control and will be

applied only after careful planning. If the function and identity of a

net or type of equipment can be concealed, the adversary may not

consider it to be worth exploiting. Before jamming and deception can

take place, the adversary must go through the process of search,

intercept and direction finding. If the net is thought to be important or

if a critical stage of the battle has been reached, jamming or deception

will be considered as an attack option. The adversary has to decide

whether it is going to gain more from intercept or from disruption.

20.

The procedures used to operate all our electronic equipment

must be well practised by all users. These procedures are aimed at

denying the adversary EW effort any advantage. Procedural EPM can

be summarized as follows:

avoid detection;

avoid identification of equipment/net;

maintain security;

defend against deception;

defend against jamming; and

report any ECM activity.

21.

The principal aim of every operator must be to avoid

detection. If the adversary is unable to detect our electronic emissions,

he cannot follow up with any form of attack. It is difficult to remain

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concealed all the time, but the longer it takes the adversary to detect

our communications and radars, the longer the communications and

radars will survive. The following procedures, which every operator

and user can practise, will greatly reduce the chance of being

electronically detected on the battlefield:

minimize power output;

use terrain to provide screening;

reduce antenna efficiency;

minimize emitter use;

keep transmissions short; and

use alternate means of communications.

22.

Minimum Power. Siting, distance and power output will

affect the electronic visibility of a target transmitter to an adversary

intercept operator. The first two factors are tactical considerations and

are discussed further in Section 6 of this chapter. However, minimum

use of power is a procedure that should be second nature to all

operators. It is important not to use more power than is necessary to

provide communications. Reduction in power, and therefore

electronic visibility to the adversary, is achieved by switching to low

power or reducing antenna efficiency. For example, most emitters

have two power levels; used wisely, the chances of being intercepted

are greatly reduced.

23.

Reducing Antenna Efficiency. On certain sets there may be

no power setting options. Using a less efficient antenna can reduce

radiated power. It is not necessary to use an elevated ground-plane

antenna if a vehicle-mounted whip will suffice. Also, an antenna must

be sited with the adversary in mind and, where possible, a directional

antenna used (see Section 3 Tactical Measures).

24.

Minimum Use of Electronic Emitters. The adversary can

detect any transmission in any frequency band. Speech security

devices will protect only the message content. In all other respects,

secure systems are as vulnerable as insecure systems; they also

highlight the more important nets. Use short transmissions on

minimum power, and transmit only when necessary. Although short

transmissions will not stop intercept and direction-finding activity,

they will make the adversary operators' task more difficult. The use of

formatted messages and brevity codes will also reduce the

transmission time for longer messages. A common fault is the lack of

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confidence that some operators and users have in their radio

equipment, which leads to unnecessary radio checks.

25.

Alternate Means. Various means of communications are

provided to reduce our reliance on electronic systems. This not only

reduces the number of transmissions (a preventive measure) but also

provides a back up at the onset of jamming. When the situation

allows, formation, unit, and detachment commanders must always

consider passing messages by alternate means such as:

line;

runners;

civilian or commercial telephone;

liaison officers;

dispatch riders; and

visual signals.

26.

These alternate means are vulnerable to intercept or capture,

so sensitive messages must still be encoded. The civilian telephone

system is particularly vulnerable, so standard procedures and codes

should always be used.

27.

Avoiding Detection. Despite our efforts to reduce the

electronic visibility of our transmitters, it must be assumed that the

adversary will still be able to intercept and locate some of our

communication and electronic equipment. The next level of defence

then relies on commonality. The adversary must identify important

nets/equipment to select targets for further electronic or physical

attack. Measures that can be used to avoid identification are:

employment of standard radio procedures;

utilization of authorized codes only;

adherence to communications-electronics operating

instructions (CEOI);

implementation of frequency changes (when

operating in single channel non hop mode); and

changing electronic signature.

28.

Standard Procedures. Strict adherence to basic voice and

telegraph procedures is the foundation of good EPM. Any departure

from these procedures allows adversary intercept to label the operator

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and operator idiosyncrasies and to use them to identify units.

Procedures are a mixture of common sense and easily understood

phrases and abbreviations, which help to hide the level of a net,

disguise the identity of the unit and speed up radio conversations.

Standard procedures apply to both secure and clear nets: reduce

transmission time and avoid breaches of security as an operator/user

goes from a secure net to a clear net. The responsibility rests with

control stations to maintain good net discipline.

29.

Authorized Codes. Authorized codes only must be used.

Unauthorized local unit codes (for example, reference points) will

enable the adversary to identify the unit using them. Any trained

crypto-analyst can break unauthorized local unit codes easily.

30.

Communications-Electronics Operating Instructions. The

material included in CEOI is not only designed to maintain order in

our entire communication system but also to confuse adversary ESM

by periodically changing station/net identifiers.

Communications-electronics operating instructions material includes:

station call signs;

net identification signs;

address groups; and

frequency allocation.

31.

Frequency Changes. When the frequency assignment

allows, change frequency at irregular intervals. This will make the

adversary search and intercept operator's task more difficult and will

destroy the continuity of their intelligence gathering effort. If it is

possible, change operators and call sign indicators at the same time

you change frequency. This tactic is very effective. Try to reserve at

least one frequency so the net can evade effective jamming.

32.

Changing Electronic Signature. During frequency changes,

using different antennae and changing radios will make identification

based on electronic signature more difficult.

33.

Breaches of Security. The adversary will always seize any

breaches of security; they offer the adversary real-time intelligence

which can be acted upon almost immediately. If a breach of security

occurs, it must be reported. Commanders will then be able to assess

the seriousness of the breach and take steps to counter any resulting

adversary action. Codes must be used to conceal the sensitive content

of a message if the net is operating in clear. It is vital that:

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formations and units are never referred to in clear;

locations of our troops are never revealed;

no mention is made of personalities;

place names are always encoded; and

grid references, including adversary locations, are

always encoded.

34.

Bad Habits. Most operator errors that assist adversary

analysts are obvious, but bad habits also provide a means of

identifying a specific individual, unit or net. Individual operator/user

idiosyncrasies provide unique signatures that can easily be tracked

across the frequency spectrum and can be used to locate an individual

and identify a unit or net on the battlefield.

35.

Defeat Deception. Once the adversary has identified an

important net and decided that it no longer has intelligence value, the

adversary may attack the net using imitative deception (intrusion into a

net). Friendly EW units must also be aware of adversary attempts at

simulative and manipulative deception aimed at misleading EW

analysts. Deception will usually occur at a critical stage in the battle,

when the adversary feels he has the best opportunity to disrupt or

confuse our command and control.

36.

Intrusion. The adversary's ability to intrude by imitative

deception will be greatly reduced if correct procedures are used and if

operators remain alert on well-disciplined nets. The reaction to

suspect intrusion is simple—authenticate. If the challenged station

cannot authenticate or takes a suspiciously long time to authenticate,

deception can be confirmed. Once the intruder has been identified,

control must warn all stations on the net, which must then ignore the

intruder. If the intruder persists and is causing an unacceptable

amount of disruption, the net should change frequency. It is important

not to let the adversary know what degree of success he is achieving;

therefore, codewords should be used to warn the net or to order the

frequency change.

37.

Defeat Jamming. As operators or users of electronic

equipment, the first indication that a radio net or radar is under attack

by jamming could be an increase in interference. At first this may

have little effect, but as the jammer power is increased, it will become

progressively more difficult to communicate or to operate the radar.

Subtle disruption of the net may continue for a considerable period

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before jamming is even recognized. Recognition of jamming depends

largely on an operator's experience and training.

38.

Anti-Jamming Drill. Reaction to jamming should follow a

logical sequence. As soon as jamming interference on a net is

suspected, the operator must react to it and report it. The operator

checks are:

First, remove the antenna or coaxial cable from the

set. If the interference disappears, the set is working

and the operator can assume that the adversary is

jamming. If the interference does not disappear, the

operator can suspect a fault or local interference, for

example, from a generator.

Once jamming is established, check the tuning of the

set and try to work through it.

If jamming persists, re-site the antenna or move to

put a screen between the set and the jammer.

Relay through another station if possible.

Temporarily increase power.

As a last resort, change frequency in accordance

with SOPs. If possible, one or two stations should

remain on the jammed frequency to simulate an

unaffected net. Remember that the jammer is likely

to have a look-through capability and it is vital that

the adversary thinks his jamming is not successful.

If the operator is working voice on an HF net, the

operator can change to Morse Code (CW) or reduce

transmission speed. Although radar jamming is

more difficult to defend against, most of these

anti-jamming drills may still apply to radar

operators. Similar drills should be established for

each type of electronic equipment.

39.

Operator Training. Jamming can be beaten. Success

depends on the skill and experience of the operators concerned. Clear,

simple instructions on anti-jamming drills and loss of communication

procedures will help, but most important is the training of all operators

and users against real jamming. This implies that some degree of

jamming must be incorporated in all field exercises.

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40.

Reporting. Every station which suspects intrusion or

jamming must report it. Intrusion and jamming can be selective, and

other stations on the net may not be aware of the adversary activity.

The intrusion or jamming will be verified by signals to confirm

whether it is adversary ECM or just mutual interference with another

friendly net. If it is the latter, new frequencies may then be assigned.

If it is, in fact, adversary deception or jamming, EW elements can be

tasked to locate the adversary ECM station. With sufficient target

accuracy, G3 may decide to physically attack an adversary jammer. In

addition, meaconing is reported to warn the air and aviation staff of

adversary meaconing activity.

41.

At unit level, a report must be submitted to the detachment

commander or the signal officer. At formation level, jamming and

deception is reported to the duty signal officer, who can initiate

affected frequency monitoring and provide frequency reassignment.

The EW staff at formation level also receives these reports so it can

start ESM to identify and locate the source of the interference (see

Chapter 5, Section 3 for more details). The report should be passed on

secure means and as fast as possible.

42.

Meaconing, Intrusion, Jamming and Interference Report.

The complete report format for all possible adversary meaconing,

intrusion, jamming and interference (MIJI) is included as Annex A

and will be used for all reporting at formation level. The MIJI report

format is an extract of STANAG 6004, which Canada has ratified and

will use for reporting at the command/national level and when

working with other NATO nations.

43.

Short Report. At the unit level, the emphasis must be on

speedy reporting rather than detail to achieve the desired results. A

short deception/jamming report should include, as a minimum, the

following information and should be submitted immediately upon

recognizing jamming or deception

jamming report:

(1)

the grid reference and call sign of the

victim;

(2)

the frequency or net affected;

(3)

the type of jamming (e.g., noise, Morse

Code, music); and

(4)

any other information available such as:

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(a)

time of jamming;

(b)

effectiveness of jamming; and

(c)

duration of jamming (if it does not

delay the report); and

deception/meaconing report:

(1)

the grid reference and call sign of the

victim;

(2)

the frequency or net affected;

(3)

the type of deception (e.g., voice, Morse

code, previously recorded traffic); and

(4)

any other information available such as:

(a)

the call sign used by the intruder;

(b)

the time and duration of intrusion;

and

(c)

the accent of the intruder.

SECTION 6

TACTICAL MEASURES

44.

In addition to the technical EPM features of our electronic

equipment and the procedures that operators/users must follow to

defend against adversary EW, there are also several tactical measures

that commanders at all levels can adopt to protect our command and

control information system (CCIS). These tactical measures include:

a well-planned emission control (EMCON) policy;

wise siting of headquarters, communication facilities

and radars;

good communication planning; and

offensive action as a form of EPM.

45.

Emission Control. Emission control comprises all measures

intended to ensure friendly electromagnetic emissions do not yield

valuable information to the adversary. When EMCON is applied to

operational planning, there are two terms used to restrict the use of

electronic systems:

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Electronic Silence. This applies to all transmitters,

including radio, radio relay, radar, beacons, active

IR, laser range finders and any other electronic

system that radiates.

Radio Silence. This applies to only combat net

radio and radio relay (although radio relay is

sometimes exempt due to its directional features).

46.

Factors. The imposition of electronic or radio silence is the

most effective form of EW defence; however, this may not always be

possible. The length of time that commanders can operate without

radio communications or radar will depend on the battle situation and

also on alternative means of passing and receiving information.

Electronic or radio silence duration will also depend on the degree of

vulnerability commanders are willing to accept due to the temporary

loss of certain electronic systems such as battlefield surveillance and

air defence.

47.

Control. Emission control is controlled at the highest

practical level to avoid subordinate formations issuing completely

different policies, which would enable adversary ESM to rapidly

determine formation boundaries. There are times when electronic or

radio silence should be mandatory (for example, when units are in

reserve), but care should be taken when applying these measures. The

imposition of radio silence may indicate to the adversary that a move

is in progress or important operations are about to commence—the

very thing that radio silence was intended to conceal. In these

circumstances, the aim must be to maintain normal radio

activity—neither a sudden increase in traffic nor a cessation in activity

that will attract the adversary's attention.

48.

Siting. Using minimum power can reduce the electronic

visibility of a transmitter to adversary intercept. Good tactical siting is

another method of reducing transmitted and received power in the

adversary's direction. There is no doubt that operators tend to select

sites that give maximum communication efficiency but offer little

electronic security. There is little use in excellent physical camouflage

if your transmissions give away your location. Instead of sitting on

top of a hill radiating in all directions, it would be electronically more

secure to move down the hill, be screened from the adversary and still

communicate. If your task demands that you occupy a vantage point

overlooking the adversary, use the remote facility to site your radio on

the reverse slope.

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49.

Screening. Careful siting may reduce the quality of

communications, but this is more acceptable than being detected by

the adversary. Terrain is not the only form of screening that can be

used: woods, buildings, and vehicles will all offer some degree of

protection. Every commander and radio operator should automatically

take the adversary's position into consideration when they choose the

location for an antenna.

50.

Headquarters Layout. Proper tactical deployment of a

headquarters will provide good camouflage and concealment in an

electronic sense as well as a physical sense. When the tactical

situation dictates, operators should make best use of radio remote

equipment to provide improved security for the main command

elements and improved siting for the communication facilities. Wise

use of remotes will also assist in disrupting or dispersing the unique

electronic signature of a headquarters. Even with radios working

directly from command vehicles, the headquarters layout should take

into consideration all siting factors that will reduce the electronic

visibility. This also includes IR suppression, so buildings and IR

reflective camouflage nets should be used to reduce the IR signature.

51.

Defence by Frequent Moves. The best defences for most

headquarters and communication facilities are concealment and to

move as often as possible. Despite good EPM, the adversary will

eventually be able to locate important command and control elements.

Frequent moves will not only disrupt the adversary's direction-finding

effort, but will also confuse analysts as they attempt to construct our

electronic order of battle. Upon arrival in a new location, new call

signs and frequencies should be used (if possible). Radio rebroadcast

and relay stations are also particularity vulnerable, and back up

detachments should be deployed separately to enable frequent

movement yet provide continuous communications.

52.

Nap-of-the-Earth Flying. Nap-of-the-earth (NOE) flying is

also a form of tactical EPM that aircraft, particularly helicopters, use

as a tactic to avoid adversary radar.

53.

Communication Planning: Net Dispersion. With combat

net radio, there is a temptation to use the increased range to disperse

nets more widely. Greater dispersion of nets will usually lead to using

higher power levels and will, in turn, cause greater vulnerability to

jamming. Tight deployment will greatly enhance a net's ability to

avoid detection and work through jamming.

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54.

Communication Planning: Radio Rebroadcast. Care must

be exercised when deploying and using radio rebroadcast (RRB)

stations. The very fact that RRB is being used on a particular net will

identify the net as important and draw the attention of an adversary

intercept operator. To function, RRB stations transmit on two or more

frequencies (often from high ground), which renders them extremely

vulnerable to adversary intercept, direction finding and jamming.

Communication planners must be cautious when employing and siting

RRB stations.

55.

Communication Planning: Radio Relay. As for all radio

systems, use care when you site radio relay terminals and repeaters.

Due to the directional nature of radio relay antennae, circuits should be

planned parallel to the FEBA as much as possible to avoid “shooting”

straight across into adversary intercept.

56.

Communication Planning: Communication Diversity.

This is achieved by deploying different kinds of systems. For

example, if the adversary has a profusion of VHF jammers, HF radio

may be employed in lieu. Although satellite communication and tropo

scatter systems are vulnerable to ECM, an adversary may not have the

necessary sophisticated resources to attack these systems. Line, signal

dispatch service and liaison officers offer highly reliable, although

slower, means for passing messages. They may, on occasion, prove to

be the only available means of communication.

57.

Defence by Physical Attack. As an extreme form of EPM,

adversary EW elements could be destroyed by physical means

(artillery, anti-radiation missiles, rockets, bombing, fighting patrol,

etc.). Although a high priority target, adversary ESM elements will

likely be difficult to detect or locate. Electronic countermeasures

detachments, on the other hand, offer a lucrative target when operating

against our communications and should be located and destroyed as a

matter of priority.

58.

Defence by Electronic Attack. One example of employing

jamming as tactical EPM is using expendable unattended jammers set

to friendly frequencies and placed forward of withdrawing troops. This

electronic screen would be strong enough to interfere with adversary

intercept, denying them knowledge of the withdrawal, yet are far

enough away not to interfere with the friendly radios. Simulative and

manipulative deception employed in a similar fashion could also be

considered a form of tactical EPM.

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SECTION 7

SIGNALS SECURITY

59.

Definition. Signals security (SIGSEC) is a generic term that

includes both communication security (COMSEC) and electronic

security (ELSEC), which are defined as follows:

COMSEC is the protection resulting from measures

taken to deny unauthorized persons valuable

information which might be derived from

intercepting and studying our communications and

related material; and

ELSEC is the protection resulting from measures

taken to deny unauthorized persons valuable

information, which might be derived from

intercepting and studying non-communications

electromagnetic radiations (e.g., radar).

60.

Responsibility. Signals security is the result of good EPM.

As a component of our overall operational security posture, SIGSEC is

the responsibility of commanders at every level. Although SIGSEC

officers will be appointed to implement detailed instructions and to

provide advice, commanders remain ultimately responsible for the

integrity of their information. Users at every level, however, also have

an individual responsibility to maintain SIGSEC at the highest

possible level.

61.

Divisions of SIGSEC. The following divisions of SIGSEC

are applicable to both COMSEC and ELSEC:

transmission security;

cryptographic security;

physical security;

electronic emission security (TEMPEST); and

personnel security.

SECTION 8

TRAINING

62.

Training all operators/users is at the heart of the entire

defensive EW posture. Lack of training will largely negate all the

technical, procedural and tactical measures of which EPM consists. It

is important that personnel concerned with the control, use or

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CHAPTER 8

OFFENSIVE, DEFENSIVE AND DELAYING OPERATIONS

AND TRANSITIONAL PHASES

SECTION 1

GENERAL⁴¹

Whether employed in view one or view two operations,

electronic warfare (EW) assets may be either light or heavy, dependent

on the threat environment, logistics limitations and the commander’s

courses of action (COAs). When selecting assets to be employed, the

potential for a change in posture or type of operation must be

considered. Notwithstanding this, transition from light to medium,

vice versa or augmentation of the initial deployment (a mix of light

and medium assets) is limited only by logistical considerations.

Transition can take place as a relief in place with no interruption in the

support provided to the commander. In either mode and at all

scales—whether single detachment or full Main Contingency Force

(MCF) deployment—EW assets will be deployed with integral

rear-link capability to national elements in order to provide the

supported commander at whatever level with the full capability of

strategic and coalition EW assets

SECTION 2

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

General. The principal purpose of offensive operations is to

defeat the adversary, imposing our will on him by the application of

focused violence against his weaknesses not only on his forward

elements but also throughout his depth. Offensive operations defeat

the adversary either by breaking his cohesion, by physical destruction

or both. Destroying the coherence of his operations and fragmenting

and isolating his combat power causes real damage to the adversary’s

will. By so doing, the adversary's capability to resist is destroyed.

Other subsidiary purposes of offensive action are to:

gain information;

deprive the adversary of resources;

deceive or divert the adversary from the main effort;

⁴¹ All operations are addressed in more detail in B-GL-300-002/FP-000 Land

Force Vol 2, Land Force Tactical Doctrine.

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fix the adversary to prevent him from regrouping or

repositioning his forces;

pre-empt to gain the initiative;

disrupt adversary offensive action; and

seize ground.

Types of Offensive Action. There are a number of offensive

actions, which may flow from one to another, but all either lead to, or

stem from, the actual attack. Some can even do both. An attack may

lead to exploitation, which may take the form of a continuation of the

attack or become a pursuit. It is also possible for a pursuit to be

followed by an attack. There are a number of different types of

offensive actions with specific purposes:

Hasty Attack. “A hasty attack is an attack in which

preparation time is traded for speed in order to

exploit an opportunity” (AAP-6). It seeks to take

advantage of the adversary's lack of preparedness,

and involves boldness, surprise and speed in order to

achieve success before the adversary has had time to

improve his defence posture.

Deliberate Attack. “A deliberate attack is a type of

offensive action characterized by planned and

coordinated employment of firepower and

manoeuvre to close with and destroy or capture the

adversary” (AAP-6). When a well-prepared

adversary defence must be defeated, a deliberate

attack may be required. The emphasis is on

preparation, at the expense of speed and time,

therefore methods other than speed will be required

in order to achieve surprise.

Counter-attack. The purpose of a counter-attack is

to defeat an adversary who becomes vulnerable by

his own offensive action, by revealing his main

effort or creating an assailable flank. It is likely to

be conducted as part of a defensive operation by a

reserve or lightly committed forward elements, and

it affords the defender the opportunity to create

favourable conditions for the commitment of combat

power and a switch to offensive action.

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Spoiling Attack. The spoiling attack is similarly

directed at adversary offensive operations but with

the limited aim of disruption. It attempts to strike

the adversary while he is most vulnerable or while

he is on the move prior to crossing his line of

departure. A spoiling attack is pre-emptive in nature

as it attacks the adversary's plans and hence his

cohesion. When the situation permits, however,

commanders can exploit a spoiling attack like any

other attack.

Reconnaissance in Force. The purpose of a

reconnaissance in force is to compel the adversary to

disclose the location, size, strength, disposition or

intentions of his force by making him respond to

offensive action.

Raid. The wider purpose of a raid is to disrupt the

adversary. More specifically, a raid is carried out to

destroy or capture a vital adversary asset.

Feint. The purpose of a feint is to deceive. It aims

to fix the adversary by distracting him and, if

necessary, engaging him in combat in order to

support the development of the main effort

elsewhere on the battlefield.

Demonstration. The purpose of a demonstration, in

contrast to that of a feint, is to distract the

adversary's attention without seeking combat.

Demonstration forces use firepower, manoeuvre and

command and control warfare to support a deception

plan. It should also be aimed at a vital sector of the

adversary's defences if he is to be successfully

misled.

Tasks. EW tasks in offensive operations are related to the

acquisition of information. The tasks do not differ greatly depending

on the type of offensive operation conducted. Intelligence,

surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) tasks in

the offence include:

locating the adversary’s main defensive area;

identifying gaps where the adversary weakness can

be exploited for the break-in battle;

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locating the adversary counter-attack forces and

reserves;

identifying command relationships between units in

the main defence in order to exploit unit boundaries;

identifying key command and control

communications networks to assist the information

operations (IO) battle;

locating minefields, obstacles and gaps in them;

identifying forces in depth (specifically artillery) and

detecting movement that might threaten the

attacking forces; and

evaluating the effectiveness of a feint or

demonstration.

Exploitation. Normally the EW squadron moves forward

one tactical bound behind the manoeuvre units in offensive operations.

As the attack turns to exploitation, a decision must be made either to

pass the EW squadron through the objective to maintain electronic

contact with the adversary or to remain in location. The key decision

to be made during exploitation is not “if” to move forward to maintain

electronic contact but “when” to move forward.

Coordination. Many ISTAR assets, including EW assets,

need to be located close to the manoeuvre troops in order to achieve

their missions. As a result, there is a requirement to coordinate terrain

management and road movement with the manoeuvre units to ensure

that adequate space is allocated to ensure that support can be

maintained throughout the attack.

SECTION 3

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

General. Defensive operations are normally undertaken

when the adversary has the initiative to prevent him from seizing

terrain or breaking through into a defended area. The aim is to break

the adversary attack, destroy his forces and stop him from

accomplishing his aim and, in so doing, to establish the conditions for

maintaining the initiative through offensive action. A defensive

operation may be required to:

destroy the adversary's offensive capability and

cause his attack to fail;

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fix the adversary in order to allow friendly forces to

strike elsewhere;

gain time in order to complete the preparation for a

counter-offensive; or

retain terrain and prevent the adversary from

breaking through.

Although defensive operations may take a wide variety of

forms, they can essentially be divided into two broad categories:

Mobile Defence. Mobile defence focuses on the

destruction of the attacking force by permitting it to

advance to a position that exposes it to

counter-attack and envelopment. The emphasis is

on defeating the adversary rather than retaining or

retaking ground. Mobile defences employ a

combination of offensive, defensive and delaying

action necessitating the forward deployment of

relatively small forces and the use of manoeuvre

supported by fire and obstacles to seize the initiative

from the attacker after he has entered the defended

area.

Area Defence. Area defence focuses on the

retention of terrain by absorbing the adversary into

an interlocked series of positions from which he can

largely be destroyed by fire. The emphasis here is

on retention of terrain or its denial to the adversary.

Stages of the Defensive Battle. The defence is a single

battle fought in two stages. These stages are:

covering force battle; and

the main defensive battle, including countermoves

(reinforcing, blocking and counter-attacking).

10.

Tasks. The tasks of the EW squadron in the defence are:

identify the adversary main effort and avenues of

approach;

identify weakness in the adversary formation,

thereby providing opportunities to attack the

adversary’s cohesion.

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identify the location and avenues of approach of the

second echelon forces;

support deep operations by detecting targets in

accordance with the attack guidance matrix (AGM);

provide flank security through surveillance and

liaison with flank formations; and

provide surveillance in the rear area.

11.

Coordination. In the covering force stage, ISTAR assets,

inclusive of EW sensors, are usually deployed in the covering force

area. Terrain must be allocated in the covering force and the main

defensive areas for EW sensors. Passage of lines for withdrawing of

all sensors must be coordinated. Since many ISTAR sensors are

dispersed across the battlefield, liaison may need to be conducted on

their behalf by the electronic warfare coordination cell (EWCC) or the

ISTAR coordination centre (ISTAR CC).

SECTION 4

DELAYING OPERATIONS

12.

General. A delaying operation is “an operation in which a

force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the

adversary's momentum and inflicting maximum damage without, in

principle, becoming decisively engaged” (AAP-6). It is likely to be

carried out in less than ideal conditions: the air situation may well be

unfavourable and the initiative will tend to be with the adversary.

Nevertheless, in order to enhance the chances of success, every

opportunity should be taken to initiate aggressive action, to seize the

initiative from the adversary and to force him to adopt a defensive

posture. This type of operation is arguably the most difficult to

conduct and needs, therefore, to be thoroughly understood by all

involved. A delaying operation is likely to be conducted in one of the

following circumstances:

by a covering force for defending or withdrawing

main bodies;

by the advance guard or covering forces when

encountering superior forces;

as an economy of force operation conducted to hold

an adversary attack on a less critical avenue of

approach;

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as a deception measure to set up a counter-attack;

and

as part of a mobile defence.

13.

Conduct. The delay cannot be broken down into a series of

distinct phases. It is a fluid battle that is characterized by certain key

events.

14.

Disengagement. Troops withdrawing from a position must

attempt to break contact with the adversary. This can be achieved by

withdrawing through a position occupied by another unit or suddenly

breaking off the engagement when the adversary is unable to follow

up immediately. Electronic warfare assets (as part of an overall

ISTAR capability) can assist in the disengagement by identifying

adversary forces before friendly forces are fully engaged. This will

allow fire support assets to be brought to bear in order to assist the

disengagement of the delaying force.

15.

Breaking Contact. The move of the delaying force into an

area where another force takes over responsibility is a critical

operation, especially if the force has been unable to disengage. The

overall commander will specify a handover line. The EW assets

support this event through the provision of accurate information on

dispositions of the adversary. This provides the commander with a

better idea of when to break contact and the resources that are required

to be allocated to assist in the breaking of contact.

16.

Employment of Reserves. Reserves are important for the

maintenance of the cohesion and continuity of delaying operations,

particularly where the adversary has been able to outflank or to

penetrate through gaps between delaying force elements. Electronic

warfare provides the Red situational awareness (SA), which gives

commanders the information they need to make good decisions on

when and how best to employ reserves. Reserves can be given the

following tasks:

Blocking. Containing the adversary in the area

where insufficient forces have previously been

deployed.

Counter-attacks. Normally, these will have limited

objectives. It may be necessary to use reserves to

counter-attack into gaps or in order to achieve

disengagement of heavily committed forces.

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Covering Actions. Reserves may also be used in

prepared positions to cover withdrawing forces in

order to enable them to continue the engagement.

17.

Control Measures. The following control measures may be

employed in delay operations:

boundaries and control lines such as handover lines

and phase lines;

fire support coordination measures;

air space coordination measures;

movement control measures such as routes and

check points;

barrier coordination measures;

battle positions;

blocking positions and assembly areas for reserves;

objectives;

timings;

liaison measures; and

denial measures.

18.

EW in the Delay. A delaying force is usually expected to

engage in combat in order to achieve its mission. As a result it is not a

mission normally assigned to an EW unit. There are several ways in

which EW can contribute to the delay:

Brigade as a Delaying Force. If the brigade has

been assigned the mission to delay, all resources of

the brigade will be committed to the conduct of the

delay. The EW unit will be integral to this effort;

Support to Brigade Delay. If the brigade has

tasked a manoeuvre unit to delay, the EW unit will

likely be required to support the delay in its

information collection capacity.

EW Squadron as a Delay Force. While very

unlikely, the EW squadron could be reinforced with

manoeuvre and fire support assets in order to

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conduct a delay. This may be tasked as a guard

force.

19.

Coordination. Electronic warfare assets will normally

withdraw in concert with the delaying force. They may be deployed to

screen the movement of the delaying force as it hands responsibility

over to another force. Alternately, EW assets may be supporting the

delaying force but withdrawing in advance. Care must be taken not to

interfere with the operations of the delaying force, but EW assets

should not be sacrificed in an effort to preserve the combat power of

the delaying force.

SECTION 5

TRANSITIONAL PHASES

20.

General. The offence, defence and delay are the principal

operations in war fighting. The linkage between these different

operations is usually achieved by executing a transitional operation.

The successful execution of a transitional phase will lead to:

the ability to make a transition between phases

without a loss in tempo;

the forces taking over the battle having the most up

to date information;

fluid movement;

fire control so as to use all weapons to further the

aim and to avoid fratricide; and

quick regrouping.

21.

There are five transitional phases:

advance to contact;

meeting engagement;

link-up;

withdrawal; and

relief.

22.

Advance to Contact. In the advance to contact, the

commander seeks to gain or re-establish contact with the adversary

under the most favourable conditions for the main force. The advance

to contact is always executed in preparation for a subsequent

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operation, such as an attack, and is terminated when the main body is

positioned in accordance with the commander's plan. Subsequent

operations will be determined by the mission assigned to the main

force. This may also be determined from the posture of the main body

when contact is made with the adversary.

23.

The principal role of the EW system in the advance is to

locate and identify the adversary as quickly as possible so that

transition to the offence can occur. This is mainly achieved by

screening with the reconnaissance squadron. Since the adversary is in

defence, he is more likely to be employing emission control

(EMCON) procedures on electronic equipment and thus imagery

intelligence (IMINT) is likely to be more useful. The advance would

normally be conducted under conditions of air superiority and thus

airborne IMINT systems can be employed.

24.

Meeting Engagement. The meeting engagement is a combat

action that may occur when both sides seek to fulfil their mission by

offensive action. It will often occur during an advance to contact and

can easily lead to a hasty attack. In offensive, defensive or delaying

operations, it will often mark a moment of transition in that the

outcome may well decide the nature of subsequent operations. This is

why a meeting engagement is described as a transitional phase. Even

when the main part of a force is attacking, defending or delaying,

individual elements may find themselves in situations that have the

characteristics of a meeting engagement. The meeting engagement

differs from the advance to contact in that it occurs unexpectedly,

whereas in the advance to contact, the commander is deliberately

seeking to establish contact with the adversary.

25.

Electronic warfare seeks to avoid the meeting engagement by

achieving information superiority and thus identifying the adversary’s

movement and providing enough warning to the force in order to

transition quickly to the offence. Friendly forces will use their

superior combat power and mobility to press the attack through

precision manoeuvre at the time and place of their own choosing. The

adversary will be faced with the uncertainty and confusion that

normally accompanies the meeting engagement. Upon contact with

the adversary, EW will monitor the adversary’s actions in order to

sustain the information superiority and keep the adversary off balance.

26.

Link-Up. Link-up is conducted to join two friendly forces in

adversary-controlled territory. It may therefore be necessary to

destroy the adversary between these forces before a link-up is

established. Both forces may be moving towards one another, or one

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may be stationary or encircled. They may have the same or differing

missions. A link-up operation could occur under the following

circumstances:

A link-up between two forces engaged in

converging attacks may take place when each force

captures adjacent objectives, thus completing

encirclement.

A link-up with encircled or cut-off forces may take

place on the perimeter of the defensive position

established by that force. When the link-up is

combined with a breakout action, it may take place

at another designated objective. The encircled force

should try to break out or at least mount some form

of diversionary action in order to ease the task of the

relieving force by diverting adversary attention.

A link-up operation with an air delivered or

infiltrated force may take place on the perimeter of

its defensive position. In this case, the link-up is

normally followed by a passage of lines or by a

relief of the forces involved.

27.

The link-up presents a great challenge to an EW element. In

addition to identifying and locating the adversary, EW will also be

required to identify friendly forces as well. When the other force is

encircled or of another nation, Blue SA tools may not identify the

forces as precisely as our own forces. As a result, EW will need to

separate adversary from friendly at the point of link-up.

28.

Withdrawal. A withdrawal occurs when a force disengages

from an adversary force in accordance with the will of its commander.

It seeks to disengage its combat forces from the adversary although

contact may be maintained through other means such as indirect fire,

reconnaissance or surveillance. The order to withdraw will not

normally be given by the commander without the agreement or

direction of his superior commander. A withdrawal may be

undertaken for the following reasons:

if the object of the operation cannot be achieved and

the force is threatened by defeat;

the objective is achieved and there is no further

requirement to maintain contact;

to avoid battle in unfavourable tactical conditions;

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to draw the adversary into an unfavourable posture,

for example, to extend his lines of communication;

to conform to the movements of adjacent friendly

forces;

to allow for the use of the force or parts of the force

elsewhere; and

for combat service support reasons, i.e., the force

can no longer be sustained.

29.

Electronic warfare units perform in the withdrawal in much

the same way as during the covering force battle in the defence or as

they would in the delay.

30.

Relief. When combat activities are taken over by one force

from another, this is referred to as the conduct of relief operations.

Relief operations are undertaken when forces:

are unable to continue with their mission;

are required for operations in another area;

have accomplished their mission;

are due for rotation to avoid exhaustion; and/or

are not suitable to accomplish the new task.

31.

Electronic warfare assets must be rotated in much the same

way as manoeuvre units. During a relief in place, security is gained by

concealing the fact that the relief is taking place or by concealing the

time or progress of the relief. Frequencies and emissions must be

controlled so that the adversary does not detect a sudden increase in

activity. This is of particular concern when the relief is conducted

with a force of another nation that may have equipment that operates

on different frequencies.

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CHAPTER 9

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

SECTION 1

GENERAL

In operations other than war (OOTW), information collection

takes on an even greater significance. At times, the information

operations (IO) plan might even be considered to be the main effort.

As a result, all of the assets of the formation may be dedicated to the

IO effort to a certain extent. As an integral element of IO, electronic

warfare (EW) assets will almost exclusively be dedicated to the

information acquisition effort.

If this is the case, the commander himself may take a more

active role in directing the IO effort. This is in direct proportion to the

level of the threat of physical violence that might erupt during the

mission. The higher the likelihood of physical violence, the faster the

operational tempo, the less likely the commander and G3 are to be

involved in the IO effort.

SECTION 2

PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS⁴²

General. Peace support operations (PSOs) can involve a

wide range of operations from small forces of observers monitoring

compliance with a peace agreement to large-scale peace enforcement

operations. While EW can play a role across this broad range, the

former is likely to be too small to have sufficient assets to constitute a

well-developed EW capability. The latter would have an intelligence,

surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) system,

inclusive of EW assets, but it is likely to perform the same tasks in the

same way as they would be performed in a war-fighting situation. As

a result, this section will focus on the traditional peacekeeping force

where a brigade or a battalion is deployed in accordance with an

international agreement to prevent or deter the recourse to armed

conflict. It should be noted that EW is likely to deploy as a “declared”

asset, meaning all parties agree to deployment of the capability.

⁴² B-GL-322-001/FP-001 Unique Operations—Peace Support Operations

provides more detail on the conduct of PSO.

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The environment of this type of mission is typically

characterized by extended lines of communications and dispersed

deployments. All units are likely to be involved in ISTAR tasks.

While the direct threat to the force or to the mission remains low, there

is likely to be more involvement in the ISTAR process by the G3 and

the commander.

The PSO ISTAR system will be more reliant on human

intelligence (HUMINT) cross-cueing in comparison to other types of

operations. Human intelligence will often provide the early detection

that will be used to initiate a specific EW collection effort against a

target in an effort to collect specific evidence of illegal activity or in

the case of a force protection role, provide early warning as to the

possible intent of an adversary.

Typical tasks for the EW element in support of a PSO are as

follows:

electronic surveillance from static base camp

location;

electronic reconnaissance patrol of a specific area;

electronic surveillance patrol in support of a specific

PSO; and

electronic surveillance patrol against a specific

target.

All of the above tasks are tactical variations of a standing task of

information acquisition.

Coordination. Coordination will be required at lower levels

in PSO. In addition to the ISTAR CC at formation, ISTAR CCs,

including an electronic warfare coordination cell (EWCC) element,

will be required at unit level. Centralized coordination is still possible

due to the slower pace of operations during PSO. When the

commanding officer is involved in the ISTAR effort at unit level, it

can be assumed that the formation commander is likewise involved.

ISTAR/EW at Unit Level. When a unit is conducting PSO

independent of a Canadian formation, it is likely to be reinforced by

ISTAR/EW assets in order to accomplish its mission. The

reinforcement must include the analytical capability and the

communications and information systems (CIS) necessary to

accomplish the task. An ISTAR CC will be required to manage the

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Operations Other Than War

process and to maintain the links to national sources and to the higher

formation intelligence network.

SECTION 3

DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

General. The role of EW in domestic operations is similar to

the role in PSO. There is a similar range in the nature of the

operations in domestic operations. The range is less related to the size

of the force, but rather it is related to the degree of force that the Army

is authorized to employ. Canadian Forces policy on domestic

operations is currently embodied in DCDS Instruction 2/98.

10.

Types of Domestic Operations. DCDS Instruction 2/98

defines five broad categories of domestic operations:

Provision of Services. Provision of services occurs

when military resources are loaned to municipal

government or other agencies. Costs may be borne

by the department or may be charged back to the

requester. It is unlikely that EW assets would be

used in this role.

Humanitarian Assistance. Humanitarian

assistance is any action taken to save lives, prevent

human suffering or mitigate property damage due to

a man-made disaster, natural disaster or some other

reason. EW assets can be of great value, particularly

for monitoring activity in inaccessible or restricted

areas.

Assistance to Law Enforcement Agencies. The

CF does not have a standing mandate to enforce the

laws of Canada. On occasion, CF resources will be

used to support the law enforcement activities of a

municipality, region, territory or province or to

assist the RCMP. The assistance is usually in the

form of a particular skill or asset, e.g. EW.

Electronic warfare units have capabilities that may

be of value in this type of assistance.

Aid of the Civil Power—National Defence Act

Part XI. The Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) may

respond to requests from a provincial attorney

general to use the CF in aid of the civil power.

Electronic warfare assets may be employed

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separately or in support of an armed force providing

aid of the civil power.

The Emergencies Act. The federal government

may assume special powers under the Emergencies

Act for a critical situation of a temporary nature.

This is an extreme action and would only take place

in exceptional circumstances such as a massive

disaster that overwhelms provincial ability to cope

or a disturbance of the peace beyond the capability

of provincial and federal law enforcement agencies.

11.

Constraints. There is greater sensitivity to the use of EW in

domestic operations. Electronic warfare assets are constrained by

domestic legal considerations that may not apply to PSO. Canadian

Forces personnel are prohibited from gathering intelligence on

Canadian citizens, including the exploitation of the electromagnetic

(EM) spectrum aimed at fulfilling intelligence requirements, without a

specific legal mandate and direction issued by the CDS. Even when

authorized, exploitation of the EM spectrum should be conducted in

close cooperation with law enforcement agencies. This is to ensure

that the rules of evidence are not violated, if there is any reason to

believe that the information gathered or activity resulting from the

information gathering is likely to become evidence in subsequent legal

proceedings.

12.

The Canadian Forces National Counter Intelligence Unit

(CFNCIU) has the responsibility for collection of domestic security

intelligence. The CF National Investigation Service (CFNIS) and the

CFNCIU are the only agencies authorized to liaise with civil law

enforcement agencies for police intelligence.

13.

Media. In domestic operations, there will be a greater

presence of domestic media organizations. If the operation demands

the employment of military force, it will certainly be a story of great

interest to the Canadian media. There are also fewer restrictions on

the freedom of movement of the media during domestic operations

than there would be on foreign deployments. As a result surreptitious

surveillance may be more difficult to achieve than in other operations.

In fact, EW may be employed in a discrete open operation.

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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

This glossary contains abbreviations and acronyms

commonly used in the EW environment of joint and multinational

operations.

AAP

Allied Administrative Publication

AAW

Anti-Air Warfare

AAWC

Anti-Air Warfare Commander

ACC

Air Component Commander

ACCS

Air Command and Control System

Air Defence

ADP

Automatic Data Processing

AEWWG

Air Electronic Warfare Working Group

AIR

Area of Intelligence Responsibility

AJP

Allied Joint Publication

Area of Operations

AOC

Air Operations Centre

AOI

Area of Interest

Allied Publication

APP

Allied Procedural Publication

ARFA

Allied Radio Frequency Agency

ARM

Anti-Radiation Missile

ASC

All Source Cell

ASMD

Anti-Ship Missile Defence

ASOC

Air Support Operations Centre

ASW

Anti-Submarine Warfare

ASWC

Anti-Submarine Warfare Commander

ASuW

Anti-Surface Warfare

ASuWC

Anti-Surface Warfare Commander

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ATF

Amphibious Task Force

ATO

Air Tasking Order

ATP

Allied Tactical Publication

BSM

Battlespace Spectrum Management

C-E

Communications-Electronics

Command and Control

C2IS (also CCIS)

Command and Control Information

System

C2W

Command and Control Warfare

Command, Control and Communications

C3I

Command, Control, Communications and

Intelligence

CAOC

Combined Air Operations Centre

CATF

Commander Amphibious Task Force

Component Commander

CCIS (also C2IS)

Command and Control Information

System

CEOI

Communications Electronics Operating

Instructions

Counter-Intelligence

CIMIC

Civil-Military Cooperation

CIS

Communications and Information

Systems

CJTF

Combined Joint Task Force

CLF

Commander Landing Force

COMCJTF

Commander Combined Joint Task Force

COMINT

Communications Intelligence

CONOPS

Concept of Operations

CRC

Control and Reporting Centre

CWC

Composite Warfare Commander

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Glossary of Abbreviations

Directed Energy

DEW

Defensive Electronic Warfare

DPC

Defence Planning Committee

ECM

Electronic Countermeasures

Electronic Deception

EEI

Essential Elements of Information

EFIDE

Enemy Forces - Information Data

Elements

ELINT

Electronic Intelligence

Electromagnetic

EMCON

Emission Control

EMI

Electromagnetic Interference

EMS

Electromagnetic Spectrum

Electronic Neutralisation

EOB

Electronic Order of Battle

Emission Policy

Electro-Optical

EPM

Electronic Protective Measures

ESM

Electronic Warfare Support Measures

Electronic Warfare

EWAM

Electronic Warfare Approved Message

EWC

Electronic Warfare Coordinator

EWCC

Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell

EWEM

Electronic Warfare Employment Message

EWMS

Electronic Warfare Mutual Support

EWMS

Electronic Warfare Mission Summary

EWO

Electronic Warfare Officer

EWRTM

Electronic Warfare Request/Tasking

Message

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FFIDE

Friendly Forces—Information Data

Elements

FMS

Foreign Military Sales

GIE

Global Information Environment

HOJ

Home-on-Jam

HPT

High Payoff Target

Headquarters

IADS

Integrated Air Defence System

IMS

International Military Staff

INFO OPS (also IO)

Information Operations

IO (also INFO OPS)

Information Operations

Infra-Red

ISTAR

Intelligence, Surveillance, Target

Acquisition and Reconnaissance

Information Warfare

Joint Intelligence Staff

Joint Operations Staff

Joint Communications and Information

Staff

Joint Force

JFC

Joint Force Commander

JFACC

Joint Force Air Component Commander

JFHQ

Joint Force HQ

JFLCC

Joint Force Land Component Commander

JFMCC

Joint Force Maritime Component

Commander

JAOC

Joint Air Operations Centre

JOA

Joint Operations Area

JPTL

Joint Prioritized Target List

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Glossary of Abbreviations

JRFL

Joint Restricted Frequency List

JRSRR

Joint Remote Sensor Report/Request

JSMO

Joint Spectrum Management Office

JTF

Joint Task Force

LEWOS

Land EW Operational Support

LEWWG

Land Electronic Warfare Working Group

LCC

Land Component Commander

LISS

Land Integrated Support Station

MASINT

Measurement and Signature Intelligence

MASTR

Multiple Asset Status Report

Military Committee

MCC

Maritime Component Commander

Military Deception

MIE

Military Information Environment

MIJIWARNREP

Meaconing, Intrusion, Jamming and

Interference Warning Report

MNMF

Multinational Maritime Force

MOA

Memorandum of Agreement

MOU

Memorandum of Understanding

MPA

Maritime Patrol Aircraft

MSC

Major Subordinate Command

MTWWG

Maritime Warfare Working Group

NAC

North Atlantic Council

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCC

National Contingent Commander

NEDB

NATO Emitter Data Base

NEDBAG

NATO Emitter Data Base Advisory

Group

NEO

Non-combatant Evacuation Operation

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NEWAC

NATO Electronic Warfare Advisory

Committee

NEWCCG

NATO Electronic Warfare Course

Coordination Group

NEWC and SO

NATO Electronic Warfare Coordinator

and Support Officer

NEWWG

NATO Electronic Warfare Working

Group

NIC

National Intelligence Centre

NPS

NATO Precautionary System

NSA

NATO Standardization Agency

NSIF

NATO Special Intelligence Facility

NTINADS

NATO Integrated Air Defence System

OIR

Other Intelligence Requirements (US)

OPCON

Operational Control

OPDEC

Operational Deception

OPLAN

Operation Plan

OPSEC

Operations Security

OTC

Officer in Tactical Command

Public Affairs

Particle Beam

PfP

Partnership for Peace

PIR

Priority Intelligence Requirement

POC

Point of Contact

PSC

Principle Subordinate Command

PSO

Peace Support Operation

PSYOP(S)

Psychological Operation(s)

PWC

Principal Warfare Commander

Regional Commander

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Glossary of Abbreviations

RFI

Request for Information

RFL

Restricted Frequency List

ROE

Rules of Engagement

RRI

Response to Request for Information

RWR

Radar Warning Receiver

Situational Awareness

Strategic Commander

SEAD

Suppression of Enemy Air Defences

SIGINT

Signals Intelligence

SIGSEC

Signals Security

SIO

Special Information Operation

SMO

Spectrum Management Office

SOF

Special Operations Forces

SPIN

Special Information

STANAG

NATO Standardization Agreement

STOPJAM

Stop Jamming Message

TACNONCOMREP

Tactical Non-Communication Report

TACP

Tactical Air Control Party

TACREP

Tactical Report

WARM

War Reserve Modes

WOC

Wing Operations Centre

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