Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 1)

(1) Obtain threat information. Threat information on adversary air-to-air and

surface-to-air capabilities is essential for employing appropriate tactics and planning

support assets for SUW force protection.

(2) Obtain target description, locating data, and self-defense weapon systems

information.

(3) Obtain the common operational picture (COP) or PICTURE/LOWDOWN to

include friendly and enemy surface contacts and CSG/ESG operational areas.

d. Local Air Superiority. Theater-wide air superiority or supremacy is not required to

conduct AOMSW operations; however, local air superiority is a key enabler. Air

superiority may range from local or temporary control to control over the entire

theater. Multi-role aircraft with the capability to conduct self-escort into the target

area by carrying both air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons may be necessary in the

absence of local air superiority. Range limitations, aircraft loading, or tactics may

degrade the effectiveness of aircraft in completing their mission.

e. Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD). The SEAD level of effort is

determined by the threat level and the acceptable level of risk (ALR). It may be

necessary to destroy or disrupt all or parts of an enemy’s integrated air defense

system prior to or during AOMSW execution.

f. Effective Communications. Communication nets between C2 and AOMSW

assets must be clearly established with dedicated AOMSW frequencies considered

in the development of the communications plan. Ideally, a frequency will be

associated with each mission to enable asset coordination.

g. Weather. Weather conditions may complicate the AOMSW mission. Poor

weather conditions affect target search/ID, targeting, and post mission assessment.

See table 2.

Table 2. Weather Planning Rules of Thumb

>8000ft ceiling - 3 statute mile (sm)

visibility (vis) in most cases provides

Good Weather

adequate target acquisition for EO-IR

weapons

<8000ft ceiling - 3sm vis

Poor Weather

but > 300ft ceiling - 1sm vis may limit

search and targeting capabilities

<300ft ceiling - 1sm vis limited to

Adverse Weather

nonvisual or stand-off attacks

(fixed wing)

(1) Winds. Strong surface winds can generate rough seas that complicate low-

altitude acquisition of surface targets. Sea spray can reduce/negate the capabilities

of the electro-optical-infrared (EO-IR) systems for low-altitude operation.

(2) Sea State. Ships in heavy seas can pitch vertically as much as 30’ or more

in addition to having a roll component. Large vessel pitch and roll during heavy sea

states can have a significant impact on a weapon’s effectiveness against ships.

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Decreased impact angle and moving laser spot are potential factors that must be

considered.

(3) Ceiling and Visibility Criteria. For general planning considerations in this

MTTP, the rules of thumb (ROT) for weather categories are listed in table 1.

(4) Water Temperature. Radical changes in water temperature (shallow versus

deep water, gulf stream, etc.) will affect thermal imaging systems.

h. Aircraft Capabilities. SUW missions must be able to effectively locate, positively

identify, and engage target vessels in all environmental conditions. In almost all

cases, target engagement will be against moving targets and standoff capability

(detection, identification, and targeting) is essential against a defended target.

Often, aircraft must be able to conduct AOMSW missions at significant distances

where fuel limits time on station. Typically, one type aircraft cannot conduct all of

these mission requirements simultaneously. Clear, concise communication

capability - both voice and tactical data link - is essential to mission success.

Current Air Force and Naval aircraft mission capabilities can be found in AFTTP 3-

1.2, Tactical Threat Reference Guide and Countertactics, or NTTP 3-03.4, Naval

Strike and Air Warfare.

P-3C LSRS is a new intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and

targeting system not currently listed in NTTP 3-03.4. P-3C LSRS

has the capability to search and locate maritime contacts at

extended stand-off ranges using maritime moving target indicator

radar. It has the ability to classify designated tracks at extended

stand-off ranges using inverse synthetic aperture radar.

Aircrew Skill Set Requirements. Aircrew proficiency will have a major impact on

mission success. The unit tasked with the SUW mission should consider the

following skill sets when selecting aircrew:

(1) Ability to create and execute complex plans integrating airborne and surface

assets.

(2) Knowledge of other platforms, weapons, sensors, and capabilities.

(3) Knowledge of surface forces, including likely dispositions and formations.

(4) Surface vessel recognition.

(5) Knowledge of potential threats.

Commander’s Intent. Commander’s intent shall be detailed in a separate SUW

section of special instructions (SPINS) or conveyed in the daily intentions message

(DIM). This section should include:

(1) Objective (mobility kill, functional kill, command directed).

(2) Acceptable level of risk (ALR).

(3) Rules of engagement (ROE) and SPINS.

(4) Target priorities and restricted targets.

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(5) Positive identification (PID) requirements (and method to disseminate target

identification).

k. Additional Considerations:

(1) Altitude requirement for effective threat reaction and mission performance.

(2) Airspace requirement based on number of aircraft in the area of operations.

(3) Weapons type and load.

(a) Targeting pods—laser target designator, laser spot tracker, infrared (IR)

pointers.

(b) Target marks; e.g., rockets, gun, flares.

(4) Lack of terrain, ground references, navigational aids, and refueling/divert

points.

(5) C2 line of sight limitations and/or long range missions.

(6) Surface traffic density.

(7) Air-to-air refueling.

(8) Coordinated tactics.

(9) Threat contingencies.

(10) Airborne battlespace command and control contingencies.

(11) Communications:

(a) Secure communication capabilities.

(b) Marine band capable very high frequency (VHF) - 156 MHz to 174 MHz.

ships are required to monitor this frequency.

(d) Maritime channels can be found on the US Coast Guard (USCG)

website: http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/marcomms/vhf.htm

(e) Data link.

4. Maritime Weaponeering Considerations

a. For optimal planning, use the Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manuals (JMEMs) or

the Ship Targeting Analysis Tool in JMEM Weaponeering System (JWS) or Ship

Weaponeering Effectiveness Tool in JWS to achieve the desired weapons effect

against the target. When timelines do not allow for pre-planned weaponeering, the

following rules of thumb are listed in order of preference:

(1) Plan weapon impact at the water line near the engine room.

(a) For combatant ships, aim for the center of mass (beneath the stack)

located at center of the ship.

(b) For cargo ships, engine room is generally located at the stern.

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(2) If unable to hit the water line at the center of the ship, deliver the weapon

with a steep impact angle down the stack (70º to 90º).

(3) Use 15-30 millisecond delay fusing. Longer than 30 millisecond fusing may

result in the weapon functioning outside the intended target.

(4) For air-cushioned vessels:

(a) Aim for center of mass.

(b) Use instantaneous-5 millisecond delay fusing.

b. Based on the commander’s intent, aircrews may receive instructions to achieve

the following:

(1) "Mobility kill" refers to disabling a ship’s ability to maneuver, e.g., propulsion,

steering mechanism, personnel.

(2) "Firepower kill" refers to damage inflicted on a ship that destroys the ships

weapon systems or substantially reduces its ability to deliver weapons effectively.

(3) "Catastrophic kill" (K-KILL) refers to damage inflicted on a ship that renders it

both unusable and irreparable.

c. During maritime combat operations, US Naval surface combatants will operate in

a three layered zone defense: a short-range ship engagement zone (SEZ); a

medium-range dual engagement zone (DEZ); and a long-range air engagement

zone (AEZ). Each zone will employ weapon systems tailored for optimal

performance based upon range. Additionally, shipboard weapon systems exist that

possess dual anti-surface and anti-air capabilities. In order to eliminate fratricide,

aircrew operating in the vicinity of surface combatants must understand that surface

ships may operate in a self-defense mode during maritime operations. Refer to

figure 6 for a basic illustration of the three defensive zones. Further information is

posted at the following SIPRNet link: http://www.fleetforces.navy.smil.mil/swdg

Figure 6. US Naval Surface Combatant Defensive Zones

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Chapter IV

EXECUTION

1. Overview

a. This chapter provides specific guidance and checklists/procedures for engaging

maritime targets in support of SUW. Considerations for C2 platforms/agencies and

for aircraft tactics/weapons employment are presented. The generic execution/

employment checklists and tools in this publication should be effective across the

spectrum of missions, time constraints, and available assets. To the maximum

extent practicable, the goal is to enable simple and executable ―plug and play‖

employment by joint, interagency, and coalition forces to meet commander

objectives.

b. The three basic missions specific to SUW are: SSC, MAS, and AIMT. Within

each mission area the assumptions, considerations, and tactics are discussed

relative to F2T2EA. It is important to note the respective steps of the targeting

process are situation dependent for each mission area.

2. Surface Surveillance Coordination

a. SSC in maritime SUW provides reconnaissance and surveillance in support of

the maritime commander’s objectives. The SSC mission plays a critical role in

establishing/maintaining the common operational picture (COP) or PICTURE/

LOWDOWN. Although SSC may encompass all steps of the targeting process, SSC

focuses on find, fix, and track. Assets may be tasked via the ATO, CVN air plan,

ESG air plan, or re-rolled from another mission area. Typical SSC assets include

E-2, E-3, P-3, MH-60R, and tactical air wing aircraft.

b. SSC Considerations. For preplanned SSC missions, detailed unit-to-unit

coordination is critical and specific remarks should be included in the air support

request and listed on the ATO as needed. For dynamically re-tasked SSC assets,

in-flight briefings should be conducted by the controlling unit. The following

information should be briefed as a minimum:

(1) Search area.

(2) Position, course, speed, and description of contact (type, class, name, flag) if

known.

(3) Amplifying remarks (known hazards, friendly/neutral forces, and threats).

c. Command and Control. Aircraft control units (ACUs) must efficiently utilize

assets to maximize search volume and maintain deconfliction for controlled assets.

In most cases, SSC assets will be controlled by a designated ACU. Typical ACUs

include airborne platforms (E-2, E-3) and surface ships.

(1) SSC flight leads will check in to the ACU using the check-in format shown in

appendix A, ―Briefing Formats.‖

(2) Assigned search areas may be provided in any of the following formats:

(a) Sector search (bearing/range from a GEOREF/BULLSEYE).

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(b) Directed (ACU will give specific coordinates or bearings to contact).

(d) Grid/common geographic reference system (CGRS) / global area

reference system (GARS) box.

(3) SSC assets must be prepared to transition to a MAS mission or maintain

SHADOW (follow indicated target). SSC assets will report contacts via a surface

contact report contained in appendix A, ―Briefing Formats.‖

(4) AO Deconfliction

(a) SSC assets should consult current ROE/SPINS/intelligence reports for

published standoff distances. Additionally, SSC assets should assume that all

surface contacts have a man-portable air defense system with small arms and

should honor the threat by providing a sufficient standoff distance to the maximum

extent possible.

(b) Aircraft should pay particular attention to other possible manned and

unmanned aircraft in the area which may be on Link-16 but not on the same

frequency.

(d) Maintain a 10 nm minimum standoff from a CVN unless explicitly

authorized. CVNs are generally referred to as ―MOTHER‖. The onboard TACAN

(referred to as ―FATHER‖) is the primary method of locating the ship; however, the

airspace controller will provide CVN location information upon request.

(e) Method of friendly ID is thru IFF Mode 4 or Link 16 precise participant

location and identification.

(f)

SSC assets will not approach closer than 500 feet or as directed in

SPINS/ROE from any surface contact. SSC assets will avoid crossing the bow of

any surface vessel, a threatening posture, to the maximum extent possible.

(g) Friendly aircraft operating in the vicinity of Blue naval forces equipped

with the Phalanx Close-in Weapon System (CIWS) should know that certain aircraft

flight profiles may cause the CIWS to engage. Also, allied/coalition ships’ self-

defense systems may differ from those of the USN. More information on CIWS is

contained in the classified SWDG Tactical Memorandum (TM) TM SWDG 3-20.305

and available at SIPRNet link: http://www.fleetforces.navy.smil.mil/swdg

(5) Assets. SSC assets should consider flying with digital cameras and

binoculars to maximize search volume, accuracy, and documentation of surface

contacts. This consideration does not supersede command or Service guidance

which may restrict the use of digital cameras and binoculars in aircraft.

d. SSC Aircraft Tactics.

(1) SSC Search Techniques. Air-to-surface visual search techniques are similar

to air-to-air search techniques. Both require a continuous scan while avoiding

fixation. Based upon assigned search areas, SSC assets should optimize their

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search techniques based on platform capabilities and limitations. Figures IV-1

through IV-3 depict three different techniques that aircraft can employ to search for

surface contacts.

(a) Bar Scan Search Technique. The visual detection range, given the

prevailing weather conditions at the time of the search operation, forms the basis for

calculating search pattern spacing requirements in a bar scan search. The visual

detection range must also be adjusted to account for the physical size of the search

object. For example, if the prevailing visibility is estimated at 6 nautical miles (nm),

and this distance is deemed an acceptable range for identifying the search object,

then search aircraft should establish 12 nm spacing (or twice the visual detection

range) between search pattern legs. See figure 7.

Figure 7. Bar Scan Search Technique

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that the LKP of the search object is overflown during each leg of the pattern. Each

turn to a subsequent leg in the search pattern will be flown in the same direction

(i.e., right) and the new heading will be 120 degrees from previous. Following three

passes over the LKP, the pattern is shifted 30 degrees and flown in the same

manner as the first. See figure 9. A designation on the Link-16 situation display can

be used to assist in station keeping.

Figure 9. Sector Search Technique

(2) Classification and Identification of Surface Contacts.

(a) Classification of a surface contact includes the two categories (merchant

or combatant), type (e.g., patrol craft, destroyer), and class (e.g., Houdong, Houbei)

as provided in the theater ship recognition guide.

(b) Identification of a surface contact includes hull number, name, and flag.

The identification is typically derived from electro-optical systems or rigging. In order

to assist visual identification/reporting appendix B contains US surface ship types

and classes while appendix C contains a merchant surface vessel classification

guide.

(3) Rigging of Surface Contacts. Rigging is a close approach overt procedure

dependant on: time available, threat conditions, and commander’s intent (CCOI,

COI, or VOI requirements). Rigging procedures allow SSC aircraft to obtain critical

ID of contacts in a non-threatening manner (i.e., not crossing the contact’s bow).

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(a) Full Rig: This is the preferred procedure for CCOI, COI, or VOI in a low

threat, time permissive environment. Ideally, the aircraft will take multiple pictures

from various angles, concentrating on quartering, beam, and stern to provide

maximum detail of the surface contact. Figure 10 depicts two possible approaches

for obtaining details about a surface contact.

Figure 10. Full Rig Technique

(b) Quick Rig: This is the preferred procedure in a time restrictive

environment. As a minimum, the aircraft should take at least two pictures that

capture the stern and beam of the surface contact and if able, a third picture should

be taken from a quartering aspect. Figure 11 depicts a possible quick rig approach

to a surface contact.

Figure 11. Quick Rig Technique

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(4) Maritime Interception Operations Support. During boarding operations, SSC

assets may be requested to provide support. Two primary support roles for boarding

parties include reconnaissance and show of force. In the reconnaissance role,

aircraft can provide awareness and force disposition to the boarding party. In the

show of force role, aircraft may orbit in the vicinity of the vessel to be boarded.

(5) SLEDGEHAMMER Tactic. The SLEDGEHAMMER tactic is designed as a

rapid response in defense of friendly/neutral forces under attack or as a method to

identify the intention of an unknown contact. Any aircraft regardless of pre-assigned

mission may be instructed to conduct a SLEDGEHAMMER. The term

―SLEDGEHAMMER‖ is only used in an actual scenario. The term ―GANGPLANK‖ is

used for training only.

(a) Rapid Response in Defense of Forces. When SLEDGEHAMMER is

called in response to an attack, the concept is very similar to a troops in contact

(TIC) scenario. The defended unit , C2, or on-scene commander may call a

SLEDGEHAMMER. Available assets (including non-SSC assets) can be re-rolled to

provide defense for units under attack. It is imperative that the C2 or on-scene

commander deconflict the airspace and provide a complete situation report

(SITREP) to all assets.

(b) Identify Intention of an Unknown Contact. When a contact approaches

friendly forces, the intent of the approaching vessel may not be known. In order to

ascertain the vessel’s intent, SLEDGEHAMMER will consist of an escalation of

aggressive acts conducted by an aircraft as listed in table 3. The entire series of

events do not have to be conducted during a single encounter with an unknown

contact; the situation will dictate required actions.

Table 3. SLEDGEHAMMER Threat Intentions

ORBIT

Aircraft will hold at medium altitude above contact.

Aircraft will conduct a low altitude pass abeam or over the

FLY-BY

vessel. Do not cross the bow.^1,2

Aircraft will conduct a low altitude, high speed pass over or

abeam the vessel. Do not cross the bow. Supersonic

THUMP

airspeed is authorized as long as damage to the vessel does

not occur.^1,2

PEPPER

Aircraft will strafe 1,000 ft ahead of the bow of the vessel.

ROE, PID, coordination of forces, and commander’s

guidance requirements on the referenced target/track have

TARGET

been satisfied. Target/track correlation and collateral

damage estimation (CDE) must be accomplished prior to

employing ordnance/fires.

Notes:

1. As a naval custom while performing the FLY-BY or THUMP, aircraft should not cross the

bow of a vessel inside of 4 nautical miles unless more stringent restrictions are published in

theater.

2. The only difference between FLY-BY and THUMP is airspeed.

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the vessel is no longer hostile to the force or the vessel location/status is not a factor

to the force.

(6) Lethal, Nonlethal, and Nonkinetic Target Considerations. In certain

scenarios (i.e., Homeland Defense) the commander’s intent may be to deter/stop

merchant/civilian vessels using gradual force escalation as needed. Specific actions

in these scenarios will be dictated locally (e.g., DIMS) but may include any or all of

the steps shown in table 4.

Table 4. Escalation of Force

Radio queries to contact crew on maritime ship-to-ship VHF

Step 1

or other frequencies.

Radio instructions for target vessel to alter course or stop

Step 2

engines.

Step 3

Dispense flares.

Step 4

Be clearly visible to the vessel’s bridge.

Disabling fire to create a mobility kill but not sink the vessel

Step 5

(aiming at stern or bridge).

(7) Responding to Queries from Surface Contacts. Refer to theater SPINS for

specific responses to queries from a surface contact when operating in international

airspace.

3. Maritime Air Support

a. MAS is air action against hostile surface targets at sea that require detailed

integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of maritime forces.

b. MAS Considerations.

(1) To conduct effective MAS, the following conditions are desired:

Local air superiority (implies effective SEAD).

Weather conditions acceptable for target acquisition and weapons

employment.

Appropriate ordnance.

(2) Mission Requests. The requesting commander identifies situations where

combat force may be employed to accomplish the mission and submits either a

preplanned or immediate request. The method employed should be based on the

tactical situation and priority of threat. Much like SSC, all requests should be as

detailed as possible.

(a) Preplanned Requests. If sufficient time allows, preplanned requests

should be dedicated missions and annotated as ―MAS‖ on air plans or ATOs when

appropriate. Depending on the scenario, the mission may become an on-call MAS

or dedicated strike sortie.

(b) Immediate Requests (mission retaskings). If assets are needed for

same-day operations, naval, joint, or coalition assets may be retasked prior to

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launch or while airborne to support the requesting commander. In an emergency

situation with a vessel under attack, the order ―SLEDGEHAMMER‖ will be issued for

immediate support to the vessel.

c. Command and Control. Authority for control of MAS assets is derived from the

JFMCC. In most cases, the sea combat commander (SCC) or the SUWC will be

authorized to designate surface contacts as hostile within the link. Link combat ID

characterization does not automatically authorize engagement. The SUWC will

also typically exercise engagement authority consistent with OTC/CWC guidance

and ROE. Note that once the decision is made to engage a target, the MAC

and MAS aircrew will then use the brevity code HOSTILE which does represent

clearance to engage. The meaning of the link combat ID symbology ―hostile‖

differs from that of the brevity code ―HOSTILE‖ as spoken over tactical voice circuits

between trained controllers and strike aircrew.

(1) Maritime Air Controller (MAC). A MAC performs the role of channeling strike

assets to targets and is responsible for the tactical command and control of MAS

missions. The MAC shall coordinate and optimize all arrivals, engagements,

departures, and post-engagement assessments. MAC primary duties include:

(a) Know the location of enemy threats.

(b) Locate, identify, and track targets.

(d) Relay bomb hit assessment (BHA) or battle damage assessment (BDA)

with recommendations for follow-on strikes.

(2) MAC Assignment. The SUWC or SCC will assign a single MAC (or multiple

MACs) based on the surface or airborne platform(s) with the highest level of tactical

awareness. The SCC will clearly communicate the MAC assignment to the

appropriate ship or aircraft commander and provide all available target information,

threat indications, and friendly order of battle. If multiple MACs are assigned,

specific sectors/lanes/geographic zones will be designated for each MAC.

Considerations for MAC selection include:

(a) Airborne C2 MAC. An E-2, E-3, and in some cases an E-8 and a P-3

LSRS may act as a MAC. Airborne C2 aircraft have the ability to deconflict aircraft,

generate target coordinates, and provide the tactical air (TACAIR) picture to SUW

aircraft.

(b) Marine Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft (MPRA) MAC. MPRA

sensor suites (such as the P-3’s) are typically well suited and optimized to the

maritime mission and are capable of maintaining and accurately tracking a

substantial surface plot. However, MPRA MAC’s will rely on procedural control and

deconfliction as they lack airborne radars and/or tactical data links.

may be able to provide lasing capability or add FAC(A) qualified aircrew.

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(d) Rotary-wing MAC. Forward-looking infrared (FLIR)-equipped

helicopters may be able to laze for target marking or laser-weapon guidance.

Helicopter crews may also be FAC(A) qualified.

(e) Shipboard MAC. A watchstander representing the SUWC or SCC

aboard the CVN or other naval vessel will be designated as a shipboard MAC.

Unless supplemented with a common data link picture, the shipboard MAC’s

sensors are limited to the horizon. However, a shipboard MAC may have better

access to the air picture and UAS data than a tactical aircraft or helicopter MAC.

(f)

MAC Assistance. In cases where P-3, MH-60R, or other MAC asset

does not have a good air picture, an ACU (E-2 or E-3) can help to coordinate

deconfliction of MAS assets and hand them off to the MAC as needed in order to

deconflict the air picture.

d. MAS Execution.

(1) Check In. On initial check in MAS assets will pass call sign, mission number,

and position with the appropriate air defense C2 (REDCROWN, GREENCROWN)

before proceeding on the mission. Table 5 provides an example of a check in brief

between an aircraft and the ADC.

Table 5. MAS Asset Check-in Example

“REDCROWN, Blade 21, mission number 1151,

MAS Asset

MARKING* MOTHER's 150/20, Angels 20.“

“Blade 21, REDCROWN radar contact, SWEET

REDCROWN

SWEET. Proceed to XXX, contact YYY.”

*“MARKING” as used in this context is a naval term to describe an aircraft’s position relative to

a vessel’s location/navigational aide.

(2) Flight leads will check in with the MAC using the check-in format shown in

appendix A. If not under positive control and transiting within 50 nm of any CVN,

contact STRIKE for deconfliction. Additionally, STRIKE is a good source of

information for location and frequencies of other assets (MAC, tanker, CSG, or

ESG).

(3) Airspace Considerations. There are numerous techniques to deconflict

arriving aircraft using vertical, lateral, timing, or a combination of the three. The

MAC should establish a deconfliction method that efficiently utilizes the available

MAS asset’s sensor/weapon capabilities and PLAYTIME while in transit, holding,

and during execution. Specific platform ROT are:

(a) Fighters: MAC should plan a minimum of a 1,000’ (2,000’ night/

degraded visibility) vertical separation and deconfliction block for a section (two

aircraft) of fighters.

2,000’ (3,000’ night/degraded visibility) vertical separation is

desired for a division (4 aircraft). A typical altitude block is 15-25K MSL with a 15

nm x 8 nm holding area.

(b) Bombers: B-52s, B-2s and B-1s have a large turn radius. Plan a

holding area of 20 nm x 10 nm. Bombers will typically hold at a higher altitude than

fighter aircraft.

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consideration when performing MAS with helicopter assets is their repositioning

time. Additionally, since helicopters often operate at low altitude, the MAC must

consider the fragmentation envelope in relation to the helicopter position. As a rule

of thumb use land based risk estimate distances found in FM 3-09.32; MCRP 3-

16.6A; NTTP 3-09.2; AFTTP(I) 3-2.6 Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower.

(d) AC-130s: AC-130s will typically hold between 8,000’-12,000’ AGL, and

require a 5 nm x 5 nm area or larger.

(e) MPRA: MPRA, such as the P-3, typically hold below FL 200 and can

hold below 10,000’ AGL Due to their larger size, MPRA may require holding areas

10 nm x 10 nm or larger. When MPRAs act as a MAS asset, consideration should

be given to weapon and sensor performance before assigning holding altitudes.

Many MPRA lack Link-16 and rely heavily on procedural control. When feasible the

MAC should provide at least 2000’ vertical and several miles horizontal separation

from MPRA.

(f) UAS: UAS capability to execute MAS missions varies greatly among

UAS types and assigned UAS missions. UAS typically lack the ability to see and

avoid manned aircraft, but they may contain other onboard systems (radio, tactical

data links, IFF) which allow the MAC to use standard deconfliction (altitude, lateral,

timing) measures during MAS. Due to the limited performance of UAS, it may take

minutes to have a UAS laterally deconflict to a specific sector or change altitude.

MACs should consider deconflicting UAS early during MAS missions to prevent

slowing MAC execution later. Another major consideration when working with UAS

is the lost link plan. The lost link plan is a pre-programmed route the UAS will fly if it

loses contact with its control station. The MAC and UA operator must develop the

lost link plan to ensure proper deconfliction.

(4) Target Area Tactics. The MAC holding and deconfliction plan should take

into consideration enemy capabilities, target orientation, weather, threats, aircraft

sensors, and MAS asset capabilities. Aircraft will report ―established‖ upon arrival at

the assigned position and hold as required. Hold points may be established as fixed

points (i.e., lat/long), points referenced from Bullseye locations, or moving points

(i.e., CVN TACAN or range/bearing from a surface contact of interest); regardless,

aircrew should adjust the holding pattern to maintain station and keep their sensors

in a position to search. Two deconfliction techniques are: keyhole and sectored.

(a) Keyhole Technique. The keyhole technique is an efficient and flexible

method for designating a holding pattern or an initial point (IP). When MAS assets

are handed off to a MAC, the MAC should immediately pass target coordinates to

the MAS assets and then anchor their hold point off the target with direction and

distance. Figure IV-6 depicts cardinal directions with letters of the alphabet: A -

North, B - East, C - South, D - West, and E - Overhead Target. See figure 12.

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Figure 12. Keyhole Technique

Example 1. If an IP is designated North of the target, example

holding instructions provided to MAS assets could be: MAC—“Stang

11, Dome 601, proceed Alpha 20, Angels 16. Report established.”

Example 2. The MAC may also use the keyhole technique for

deconfliction post target attack. For example, “Blade 11, Dome 601.

Egress east to B8, then south to C10, back to the 240 at 8.”

(b) Sectored Technique. A grid/CGRS/GARS box is another option for

holding and deconfliction. A GARS description is provided in the AIMT section.

MAC—“Stang 11, Dome 601. Hold at 006AB, Angels 16. Report established.”

(5) Find/Fix/Track. Typically, units who request a MAS asset or mission must

accomplish the Find/Fix/Track phases of the joint targeting process. Once the MAC

has updated the target location/information they will provide this data to the attacking

aircraft via the MAS 9-Line format as depicted in appendix A, ―Briefing Formats.‖

(6) Target. Once the MAC has updated the target location information they will

provide this data to the flight leads using the MAS 9-line brief as shown in appendix

A. Mandatory read back items are lines 5, 6, 8, and remarks. Although similar to a

CAS 9-Line, for aircrew familiarity, the MAS 9-Line is intended to focus aircrew onto

mobile targets. An abbreviated MAS 9-Line may also be used, in which the MAC will

only relay target and friendly/neutral vessel location with remarks, allowing the

aircrew freedom of action relative to those omitted items (i.e., IP, target bearing). In

the case of an abbreviated 9-Line, the MAS asset will be ―targeted‖ with read back of

lines 6 and 8 plus any remarks. The MAS asset will also be responsible for creating

the desired IP and ingress headings. While the 9-line (and perhaps data link tracks)

will provide initial target cueing for attacking aircraft, the dynamic nature of surface

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17 November 2008

vessels will require additional refinement for weapons employment. All contacts

(friendly, neutral, or threat) located within 20 nm of the target will be reported using

the target as the reference point, regardless of the full brief or abbreviated 9-Line

format. Table 6 is an example of a modified MAS 9-Line.

Table 6. Abbreviated MAS 9-Line

Dome 11

“Blade 11,TARGET”

“Group 3 Oil Tanker, Liberian Registry named Cape

Antwerp, Blue with white stripe. Track 270/15 Knots”

“N 31 22.400, W128 63.333”

“White shipping North 10 nm track 010/10 Knots”

“Egress to Charlie 20, Angels 19”

“Dome 11, Blade 11, N 31 22.400, W128 63.333, White

Blade 11

shipping North 10 nm track 010/10 Knots, Egress Charlie

20, Angels 19”

(a) IP Selection. The MAC should consider the aircraft type and weapons

loadout when assigning an IP for the target. If the MAC does not designate an IP,

the MAS asset can employ the weapon as appropriate for platform/weapon TTP.

(b) Asset Deconfliction. The MAC should use lateral, vertical, and/or time

separation to ensure the safe flow of assets and deconfliction from surface fires.

(7) Engage. Release authority will be transmitted to the weapons platform via

the MAC. MAS operations can cover large areas of open water and the environment

(nighttime, weather, sea state) or standoff distances may preclude the MAC from

maintaining visual contact on the target and/or strikers. Therefore, a MAC shall

never clear a MAS asset ―hot‖ or verify that they are attacking the correct target. A

directive call (as defined in the special instructions [SPINS]/daily intentions message

[DIM]) from the MAC in conjunction with a MAS 9-line briefing authorizes the strikers

to attack (e.g., ENGAGE, TARGET). Target correlation remains the responsibility of

the strikers to ensure they are attacking the same target specified in the MAS 9-line.

Ingress and egress flow must be carefully planned and executed to minimize risk of

fratricide. Depending upon various factors the MAC may direct a single attack or

multiple sequential attacks to accomplish the commander’s intent.

(8) Assess. MAS assets will provide the MAC with timely mission reports (see

INFLTREP format in appendix A) to include any re-strike recommendations.

4. Air Interdiction of Maritime Targets

a. AIMT in maritime SUW differs from MAS in that detailed tactical integration with

surface forces is not required. This mission shares many common similarities with

traditional air interdiction and strike coordination and reconnaissance (SCAR)

missions.

b. AIMT Considerations. Maritime surface targets are considered dynamic targets

due to their inherent mobility. Since AIMT missions do not require detailed tactical

integration with maritime surface forces, strike coordination and reconnaissance

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(SCAR) missions can be tasked in the maritime domain. SCAR in the maritime

environment could be directed by a strike coordination and reconnaissance

coordinator (SCARC) or as specified by the SUWC in the SPINS/DIM. The SCARC

is responsible for directing all aircraft in the specified area for the associated SCAR

mission. A SCARC does not have to be a forward air controller (airborne) (FAC[A]).

Detailed SCAR procedures are outlined in FM 3-60.2, MCRP 3-23C, NTTP 3-03.4.3,

AFTTP(I) 3-2.72 Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Strike

Coordination and Reconnaissance.

c. Command and Control.

(1) Airborne C2 Responsibilities. Airborne C2 will build the SCARC/mission

commander’s situational awareness by providing the air/surface picture, AIMT

surface targeting information, and coordinating flow of forces. In the AIMT role,

airborne C2 will be provided by an E-2, E-3, E-8, or P-3 LSRS. In some scenarios,

airborne C2 will take charge of the overall AIMT effort and assign AIMT aircraft to

the area. Airborne C2 is also responsible for assigning target sets and

collecting/evaluating mission reports (MISREPs). Airborne C2 should pass the

surface picture via Link, BULLSEYE format, or lat/long.

(2) Tactical Aircraft C2. In permissive scenarios, a SCARC may be established

to facilitate the execution of the AIMT mission. The SCARC role can be performed

by any aircraft (including UAS) that has the ability to find/fix targets and

communicate the coordinates and description to other strike assets or C2. In a

nonpermissive scenario, a package/mission commander may be designated.

(3) Check In. AIMT assets will check in using the format in appendix A.

Airborne C2 will pass PICTURE/LOWDOWN following initial check-in and will also

check aircraft squawks and accomplish BULLSEYE checks.

(4) Airspace Coordination/Deconfliction. Following check-in, aircraft will be

directed to a holding point, initial point, control point, or a kill box/lane. If another

asset is already in the area, the asset’s frequency and call sign will passed by C2 for

situational awareness. This step may be combined with the picture/lowdown

transmission

d. Mission Type. AIMT missions are classified as permissive or nonpermissive and

can be executed using pre-planned or dynamic taskings. The degree of aircrew

familiarity and Service interoperability should be considered when flexing to more

dynamic taskings.

(1) Permissive AIMT.

(a) Assumptions.

1. Local air superiority established.

2. Standoff not required.

3. ID can be provided by own ship or off-board sensors.

(b) AIMT missions utilize the dynamic targeting process of F2T2EA.

Permissive AIMT targeting considerations include:

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1. Find. Because AIMT may follow a traditional SCAR at sea role, it is

imperative that AIMT assets understand the commander’s intent and are familiar

with the joint integrated priority target list due to potential limited playtime and

ordnance.

2. Fix. Identification in the AIMT mission will generally take longer to

solve than in MAS or SSC due to an increased area and potentially greater standoff

requirements. Refinement of target location is a key factor in the use of stand-off

weapons. Refer to platform specific TTP for discussion on search and weapon

pairing.

3. Track. The AIMT asset or C2 asset will use all available sensors to

continuously track the target. The AIMT asset maintains situational awareness by

recording the target location, assigning another AIMT asset to monitor, or handing

the track off to a C2 agency. Throughout the tracking process, the target’s window

of vulnerability must constantly be evaluated. Destruction of all targets may not be

necessary or required. However, accurate and timely reporting of all targets will help

build a more accurate COP.

4. Target. Due to the range from friendly surface forces, engagement

authority should be delegated to the lowest level practical.

5. Engage. To facilitate rapid engagement of targets, the SCARC will

direct AIMT assets using INVESTIGATE, TARGET, and SMACK or as delegated by

the supported commander and stipulated in the SPINS/ROE or in real time via C2.

Smack authority is not implicit in the SCAR mission.

INVESTIGATE: Verify specified element(s) of ROE, PID, CDE, and/or

coordination of forces on the referenced target/track. This implies that neither PID

nor CDE has been accomplished by the SCARC. The AIMT asset should

investigate the target in order to satisfy these requirements. The AIMT asset reports

results of the investigation back to the SCARC.

TARGET: ROE, PID, coordination of forces, and commander’s guidance

requirements on the referenced target/track have been satisfied. Target/track

correlation and CDE must be accomplished prior to employing ordnance/fires.

Authorization to drop ordnance is granted once these conditions have been met.

SMACK: Clearance to employ ordnance/fires on surface target coordinates.

ROE, PID, CDE, coordination of forces, and commander’s guidance requirements

on the referenced target/track have been satisfied.

6. Assess. There are no significant variations in the assess phase for

permissive AIMT.

(2) Nonpermissive AIMT.

(a) Assumptions.

1. Acceptable level of risk is appropriate to support mission objectives.

2. Appropriate ordnance is available.

3. ID can be provided by own ship or off-board sensors.

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(b) In a nonpermissive scenario an overall strike lead or mission

commander should be designated who will coordinate a detailed strike package for

prosecuting targets. However, if a strike lead/mission commander is not assigned,

standoff AIMT will be coordinated by airborne C2. Typical standoff weapons

employed against enemy surface vessels include AGM-84 (HARPOON and SLAM-

ER), joint stand-off weapon (JSOW), AGM-130, and the Laser Joint Direct Attack

Munition (LJDAM). In the event the threat is degraded, the strike lead or other

capable aircraft should assume the role of a SCARC and conduct permissive AIMT.

Nonpermissive AIMT targeting considerations are:

1. Find/Fix. When executing stand-off AIMT missions, the surface

picture will generally be built by off-board sensors since AIMT aircraft may not have

on-board detection of the target prior to weapons release. The picture is generally

fused in the command and control agency by an E-2, E-3, E-8, or R-3 LSRS.

Integrating platform data link capabilities will be critical to building a usable picture.

2. Track. Continuous tracking must be maintained to ensure consistent

ID. Once the contact is lost, the find/fix phases must be reinitiated to re-establish ID.

3. Target. Free fire zones, kill boxes, or exclusion zones may be used

but kill boxes are the preferred fire support coordination measure for SCAR

missions. Prior to weapons employment, operators will ensure ROE is met and their

sensors do not detect ID conflicts.

4. Engage. Prior to weapon release when employing long-range

weapons, airspace deconfliction and waterspace management tasks must be

accomplished. To the maximum extent possible, weapon and aircraft overflight of

neutral shipping and friendly forces will be avoided. If over flight is unavoidable, the

AIMT asset should request approval authority via C2 prior to weapon release or as

stipulated in the SPINS/DIM. Reference theater specific guidance/ROE for more

detail.

5. Assess. Due to employment and standoff considerations BDA/BHA

may be more difficult to collect.

e. AIMT Target Area Tactics. Examples of a lane structure and a kill box are

outlined in the following paragraphs.

(1) Lane Structure. In a lane structure scenario, the theater SPINS or ACO will

define the lane coordinates structure, control points, lane entry and exit points, and

any other applicable airspace coordination measures. Figure 13 depicts an example

lane structure positioned between the threat country/axis and a carrier strike group

with one refueling aircraft assigned to serve the strike aircraft located in each lane.

All lanes and tanker tracks are active except lane 3N and tanker track 4. The points

numbered one through five in the lanes are control points which have multiple uses

including aircraft holding pattern waypoints and lane entry/exit points.

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17 November 2008

Figure 13. Lane Structure Example

(b) Kill Box. Figure 14 depicts a sample kill box format employing GARS.

When using GARS, each 30 x 30 minute area defines one kill box. The kill box is

further divided into 4 quadrants (labeled 1-4), with 5 min x 5 min keypads within

each quadrant. If attacking a target in quadrant 1, then quadrants 2, 3, and 4 may

be assigned to specific flights for geographic deconfliction. Using the kill box

example, a sample deconfliction plan employing a SCARC (Viper 1) could sound

like, “Python 35, Viper 1, hold block 16-19, 006AB, quadrant 3. Hornet 21, working

targets quadrant 1 keypad 8.” This provides an area of 15 nm by 15 nm for

deconfliction but may not be optimum for sensor coverage. For bomber aircraft, the

SCARC should assign two quadrants. SCAR assets should avoid the borders of

their assigned quadrant by enough distance to ensure deconfliction from assets

working in adjacent quadrants.

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Figure 14. GARS Enabled Kill Box

array/area, the SCARC should assign time on targets (TOTs) for each element to

ensure the attacks are safely deconflicted. The SCARC should attempt to assign a

2-minute TOT window to each element and separate those elements by 1 minute

minimum. Consider using 2 minutes for deconfliction if SCAR assets have

dramatically different groundspeeds. This approach serves to prevent timing

mistakes and target obscuration from impacting SCAR asset effectiveness. If slower

tempos are acceptable the SCAR may decide to employ SCAR assets one at a time

with each element working until they are WINCHESTER. If an element of the SCAR

flight is taking too long the SCARC should direct them to egress if this will allow

more capable assets to engage the target array.

(3) Target Assignment. Targets will be passed by airborne C2 or by tactical

aircraft C2.

(a) Airborne C2 only (no SCARC): Targets will be passed by airborne C2

directly to AIMT assets.

(b) Airborne C2 with Tactical Aircraft C2 (SCARC): Targets should be

passed by airborne C2 to the SCARC. The SCARC will coordinate prosecution with

AIMT assets.

(4) Engagement authority from the JFMCC may be provided by the SUWC via

the MAC, even in cases where the aircrew is beyond visual range of the target.

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17 November 2008

Engagement instructions will be passed using the MAS 9-line or modified 9-line.

Table 5 depicts engagement instructions using a modified 9-line for permissive

AIMT. Do not transmit line numbers.

(5) Employment: Aircrew will reply to the 9-line with mandatory read back items

[lines 5, 6, 8, and remarks] and communicate the appropriate brevity code (e.g.

RIFLE, LONGRIFLE, BRUISER, etc.) post weapon release.

(6) MISREPs: Table 7 lists an example MISREP. It is critical to pass BDA/BHA

in order to optimize re-attacks if required. Do not transmit line numbers.

Table 7. Mission Report Example

Blade 11

“Dome 11, Blade 11, MISREP to follow”

“Blade 11”

“Mission Number 1151”

“Request number 1152 Oil Tanker”

“N 31 22.400 W128 63.3331”

“TOT: 1315Z”

“K-KILL”

Remarks

“1 GBU-12 and 400 rounds 20mm expended, no re-strike

required, 1 GBU-12 remaining”

Dome 11

“Copy, switch to REDCROWN”

(7) Checkout: Check out when directed by C2 or when munitions/fuel/

vulnerability time expires.

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Appendix A:

BRIEFING FORMATS

1. Check-in Brief

The check-in brief is used to identify AOMSW assets and capabilities to airspace

controlling authorities. Do not transmit line numbers.

Table 8. Check-in Brief (aircraft transmits to controller)

Aircraft: ―________________, _______________________‖

(Airspace Controller Call Sign)

(AOMSW Asset Call Sign)

1. Identification / Authentication ―_______________________‖

2. Number and Type of Aircraft ―________________________‖

3. Position and Altitude ―_____________________________‖

4. Ordnance ―______________________________________‖

5. On-station Time ―__________________________________‖

6. Abort Code ―_____________________________________‖

Remarks (as appropriate): ―____________________________‖

Note: Abort code may be N/A. The AOMSW asset should expect to receive

holding and deconfliction instructions from the airspace controller.

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2. Surface Contact Report

The Surface Contact Report is used when reporting standardized information on

vessel or tracks of interest. Do not transmit line numbers.

Table 9. Surface Contact Report

1. Contact/Track #: ―________________________________‖

2. Position: ―______________________________‖ (Lat/Long)

3. Course/Speed: ―_________________________________‖

4: Ship Type: ―____________________________________‖

*5. Ship Name/Hull#: ―______________________________‖

6. Ship Flag: ―_____________________________________‖

7. Time: ―___________________________________‖ (Zulu)

Remarks: ―________________________________________‖

(Ship or Deck Activity/Cargo/Homeport)

*In the absence of ship name/hull #, provide a description, example hull,

waterline, superstructure, color, distinctive features, etc.

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3. MAS 9-Line

The MAS 9-line is modeled after the CAS 9-line format and has been modified for

the AOMSW mission to streamline passing target information to an AOMSW asset.

The MAS 9-Line format should be read in groups of three without transmitting line

numbers. Bold denotes read back items when requested.

Table 10. MAS Briefing Form (9 Line)

Airspace Controller: ―_________________‖, ―__________________―

(aircraft call sign)

(airspace controller call sign)

1. IP: ―___________________________________‖ (Lat/Long, GEOREF)

2. Heading (bearing): ―______________________________‖ (magnetic)

Offset: ―_____________________________________‖ (left/right)

3. Distance (range): ―__________________________‖ (IP to target in nm)

4. Target Elevation: ―________________________________‖ (feet MSL)

(usually zero in MAS scenario)

5. Target Description: ―__________________‖ (include course and speed)

6. Target Location: ―________________________________________‖

(latitude/longitude or grid coordinates or offsets or visual)

7. Type Mark: ―___________________‖, Code: ―___________‖ (laser, IR)

8. Location of friendlies or neutrals: ―_________________________‖

Position marked by: ―____________________________________‖

9. Egress: ―________________________________________________‖

Remarks (as appropriate): ‖____________________________________‖

Line 6: If attacking multiple ships in close proximity to each other, describe

each ship in line 6. (Multiple targets not in close proximity will require multiple

9-lines). Close proximity is defined as 1 nm spacing or less.

Line 7: Laser and code, or other means of marking (IR pointer, fires, etc.)

Line 8. Magnetic bearing and range in nautical miles to any friendlies and

neutrals in close proximity to target. Referenced from target location given in

line 6.

Line 9: Egress direction in magnetic heading.

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Appendix B:

US SURFACE VESSEL IDENTIFICATION

1. US Surface Vessel Identification

The following pictures and descriptions are intended to provide the user a visual

reference to commonly encountered US surface vessels. Proper recognition of

friendly assets is useful in preventing fratricide during surface vessel engagements.

2. Aircraft Carriers

Nimitz Class Aircraft carriers are deployed worldwide in support of US interests and

commitments. They can respond to global crises in ways ranging from peacetime

presence to full-scale war. Together with their on-board air wings, the aircraft

carriers play vital roles across the full spectrum of conflict.

General Characteristics:

10 of 10 remaining in active service

1,040 feet in length, 134 feet wide

Missile and gun air defense systems

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4. Destroyers

Arleigh Burke Class Guided-Missile Destroyers. The Arleigh Burke class destroyer

employs the same Aegis weapons system developed for the CG-47 class and

employs an array of weapons and sensors into a multi-mission warship. The Aegis

combat system integrates air, surface, anti-submarine warfare sensors and

engagement systems. It is capable of firing Standard SM-2 Block III/IV surface-to-air

missiles.

General Characteristics:

All 52 Arleigh Burke Destroyers are active

505 feet long, 59 feet wide

Armament

1 x 5 inch (127 mm/54 or 62) Mk-45 lightweight gun

2 x 20mm Phalanx CIWS

2 x SH-60 Seahawk LAMPS III helicopters

Note: Flight IIA (DDG-79 Oscar Austin and higher) Arleigh burke class

DDGs have one or two helicopters onboard. Flight I and II Arleigh Burke DDGs do

not have helicopters on board.

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6. Amphibious Assault Ships

Amphibious assault ships are designed to land forces on hostile shores. While they

may resemble an aircraft carrier, their primary role may not be to operate fixed wing

aircraft. This class usually has a large air wing of helicopters which are dedicated to

ferrying troops and equipment ashore from the ships.

a. The Wasp class vessels are the largest amphibious ships in the world. WASP

class ships are the first to be specifically designed to accommodate the AV-8B

Harrier jump jet and the LCAC hovercraft, along with the full range of Navy and

Marine helicopters, conventional landing craft, and amphibious assault vehicles to

support a Marine Expeditionary Unit of 2,000 Marines.

General Characteristics:

All 7 Wasp class ships are active

844 feet long, 106 feet wide

Armament:

Rolling Airframe Missile

Sea Sparrow Missiles

2 x Phalanx CIWS

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7. Amphibious Transport Docks

The amphibious transport dock is a warship that embarks, transports, and lands

elements of a landing force for expeditionary warfare missions. The ships primary

use is as a landing craft, although they have a limited airborne capability.

a. San Antonio Class. The San Antonio class is a multi-mission ship designed to

accommodate all elements of the Marine Corps landing capability. It is designed to

support embarking, transporting, and landing elements of a Marine landing force in

an assault by helicopters, landing craft, and amphibious vehicles.

General Characteristics:

3 of 9 San Antonio class LPD ships are active (6 have yet to be

commissioned)

684 feet long, 105 feet wide

Armament:

Bushmaster II 30mm guns

Rolling Airframe Missiles

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Appendix C:

MERCHANT SURFACE VESSEL CLASSIFICATION GUIDE

Aircrews need to be familiar with the basic visual recognition guide for groups one,

two, and three merchant ships. The recognition process is broken down into three

phases: appearance group, hull profile, and upright sequence. Additionally, general

comments about the contact of interest are provided. The three group classifications

are as follows:

Group 1: Large superstructure—superstructure exceeds one-third of the overall

length of the ship.

Group 2: Composite (block) superstructure, funnel amidships—superstructure

amidships less than one-third of the overall length of the ship. These ships generally

have a small block-like superstructure with deck space devoted to cargo-handling

equipment and hatches.

Group 3: Funnel aft—funnel is located on the aft third of the ship; however, if the

superstructure exceeds one-third of the overall length, the ship remains in group

one.

Auxiliary: Those that do not fall into the categories listed above.

Figure 17. Merchant Vessel Groups

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REFERENCES

Joint

JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction, 9 November 2006

JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, 13 October 2006

JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support,

2 September 2005

JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, 5 June 2003

JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations, 08 August 2006

JP 3-52, Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in a Combat Zone, 30 August 2004

JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, 13 April 2007

JMEM Weaponeering System (JWS) 1.2, Ship Targeting Analysis Tool,

October 2007

JMEM Weaponeering System (JWS) 2.0, Ship Weaponeering Effectiveness Tool,

November 2007

Air Force

AFTTP 3-1.1, General Planning and Employment Considerations, 17 June 2007

AFTTP 3-1.2, Tactical Threat Reference Guide and Countertactics,

25 December 2006

AFDDEC, Air and Space Commander’s Handbook for the JFACC, 16 January 2003

AFDD 2-1.4, Countersea Operations, 15 September 2005

AFTTP(I) 3-2.5, Multi-Service Brevity Codes, October 2007

Navy

NTTP 3-02.1.3 Amphibious/Expeditionary Operations Air Control, May 2005

NTTP 3-03.4, Naval Strike and Air Warfare (Rev. A), August 2000

NTTP 3-07.11, Maritime Interception Operations, November 2003

NTTP 6-02.1, Multi-Service Brevity Codes, October 2007

NWP 3-20.6, Surface Ship Tactical Employment in Naval Warfare, October 2003

NWP 3-56, Composite Warfare Commander’s Manual, October 2003

NDP 1, Naval Warfare, 28 March 1994

NWP 1-14M, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations,

July 2007

NTRP 1-02, Navy Supplement to the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated

Terms, August 2006

NTTP 6-02.1, Multi-Service Brevity Codes, October 2007

TB SUW-06-01, Simultaneous Aircraft and Gunnery Engagements in the Dual

Engagement Zone, January 2006

TM SWDG 3-20.305, CIWS Block 1B Tactical Employment, March 2005

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GLOSSARY

PART I - ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACO

airspace control order

ACU

aircraft control unit

ADC

air defense commander

AFDD

Air Force Doctrine Document

AFI

Air Force Instruction

AFTTP

Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures

AIMT

air interdiction of maritime target

ALR

acceptable level of risk

ALSA

Air Land Sea Application Center

area of operations

AOMSW

air operations in maritime surface warfare

ATO

air tasking order

BHA

bomb hit assessment

command and control

CAS

close air support

CDE

collateral damage estimation

CGRS

common geographic reference system

CIEA

classification, identification, and engagement area

CIWS

Close-in Weapon System

COI

contacts of interest

CCOI

critical contacts of interest

CONOPS

concept of operations

CONPLAN

concept plan

COP

common operational picture

CSG

carrier strike group

CVN

aircraft carrier, nuclear

CVW

carrier air wing

CWC

composite warfare commander

DEZ

Dual Engagement Zone

DIM

daily intentions message

DOD

Department of Defense

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EO-IR

electro-optical-infrared

ESG

expeditionary strike group

F2T2EA

find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess

FAC(A)

forward air controller (airborne)

FLIR

forward-looking infrared

GARS

Global Area Reference System

GEOREF

geographic reference

identification

IFF

identification friend or foe

INFLTREP

inflight report

IMC

instrument meteorological conditions

initial point

infrared

ISR

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

J-K

JDAM

Joint Direct Attack Munition

JFC

joint force commander

JFMCC

joint force maritime component commander

JMEM

Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual

joint publication

JSOW

joint stand-off weapon

JWS

JMEM weaponeering system

K-KILL

catastrophic kill

LAT

latitude

LHA

amphibious assault ship (general purpose) (multi-purpose)

LHD

amphibious assault ship (dock)

LKP

last known position

LONG

longitude

LSRS

littoral surveillance radar system

MAC

maritime air controller

MAS

maritime air support

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MILSTRIP

military standard requisitioning and issue procedure

MISREP

mission report

MPRA

maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft

MSL

mean sea level

MTTP

multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures

NDP

Naval Doctrine Publication

nautical mile

NTRP

Navy tactical reference publication

NTTP

Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures

NWDC

Navy Warfare Development Center

NWP

Naval Warfare Publication

O-P-Q

OPLAN

operation plan

OPTASK

operation task

OTC

officer in tactical command

PID

positive identification

POC

point of contact

PWC

principle warfare commander

ROE

rules of engagement

ROT

rules of thumb

surveillance area

SAG

surface action group

SCAR

strike coordination and reconnaissance

SCARC

strike coordination and reconnaissance coordinator

SCC

sea combat commander

SEAD

suppression of enemy air defenses

SIPRNet

SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network

SITREP

situation report

statute mile

SPINS

special instructions

SSC

surface surveillance coordination

SUW

Surface Warfare

SWDG

Surface Warfare Development Group

TACAIR

tactical air

TACAN

tactical air navigation

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TACC

tactical air command center

TIC

troops in contact

TOT

time on target

TTP

tactics, techniques, and procedures

U-Z

UAS

unmanned aircraft system

United States

USAF

United States Air Force

USCG

United States Coast Guard

USN

United States Navy

vital area

VHF

very high frequency

VOI

vessel of interest

PART II - TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

aircraft carrier—A warship designed to support and operate aircraft, engage in attacks on

targets afloat or ashore, and engage in sustained operations in

support of other forces. Designated as CV or CVN. CVN is nuclear

powered. (JP 1-02)

airspace control order—An order implementing the airspace control plan that provides the

details of the approved requests for airspace coordinating measures.

It is published either as part of the air tasking order or as a separate

document. Also called ACO. (JP 3-52)

air superiority—That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another that

permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land,

sea, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive

interference by the opposing force. (JP 3-30)

air tasking order—A method used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate

units, and command and control agencies projected sorties,

capabilities and/or forces to targets and specific missions. Normally

provides specific instructions to include call signs, targets, controlling

agencies, etc., as well as general instructions. Also called ATO. (JP

3-30)

area of operations—An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and

maritime forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the

entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be

large enough for component commanders to accomplish their

missions and protect their forces. Also called AO. (JP 1-02)

BULLSEYE—An established reference point from which the position of an object can be

referenced by bearing (Magnetic) and range (NM) from this point.

(Multi-Service Brevity Codes)

carrier airwing air plan—A graphical representation of flight operations which lists call

signs, tactical frequencies, launch/recovery times, flight composition,

and fuel/ordnance loads.

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close air support—Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that

are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed

integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those

forces. Also called CAS. (JP 3-0)

command and control—The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated

commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment

of the mission. Command and control functions are performed

through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications,

facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning,

directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the

accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (JP 3-0)

common operational picture—A single identical display of relevant information shared by

more than one command. A common operational picture facilitates

collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational

awareness. Also called COP. (JP 3-0)

composite warfare commander—The officer in tactical command is normally the

composite warfare commander. However the composite warfare

commander concept allows an officer in tactical command to delegate

tactical command to the composite warfare commander. The

composite warfare commander wages combat operations to counter

threats to the force and to maintain tactical sea control with assets

assigned; while the officer in tactical command retains close control of

power projection and strategic sea control operations. Also called

CWC. (JP 3-02)

due regard—Military operational situations may not lend themselves to ICAO flight

procedures; e.g., military contingencies, classified missions, politically

sensitive missions, routine aircraft carrier operations, and some

training activities. Operations not conducted under ICAO flight

procedures are conducted under the ―due regard‖ or ―operational‖

prerogative of military aircraft are subject to one or more of the

following conditions:

1. Aircraft shall be operated in visual meteorological conditions.

2. Aircraft shall be operated within surveillance and radio/satellite

communications of a surface and/or airborne facility.

3. Aircraft shall be equipped with airborne radar that is sufficient to

provide separation between themselves, aircraft they may be

controlling, and other aircraft.

4. Aircraft shall be operated outside controlled airspace.

(Department of Defense Instruction 4540.01)

dynamic targeting—Targeting that prosecutes targets identified too late, or not selected for

action in time to be included in deliberate targeting.

(JP 3-0)

expeditionary strike group air plan—A graphical representation of flight operations which

lists call signs, tactical frequencies, launch/recovery times, flight

composition, and fuel/ordnance loads.

forward air controller (airborne)—A specifically trained and qualified aviation officer who

exercises control from the air of aircraft engaged in close air support

of ground troops. The forward air controller (airborne) is normally an

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airborne extension of the tactical air control party. Also called

FAC(A). (JP 3-09.3)

forward-looking infrared—An airborne, electro-optical thermal imaging device that detects

far-infrared energy, converts the energy into an electronic signal, and

provides a visible image for day or night viewing. Also called FLIR.

(JP 3-09.3)

HOSTILE—A contact identified as enemy upon which clearance to fire is authorized in

accordance with theater rules of engagement. (Multi-Service Brevity

Codes)

identification—1. The process of determining the friendly or hostile character of an

unknown detected contact. 2. In arms control, the process of

determining which nation is responsible for the detected violations of

any arms control measure. 3. In ground combat operations,

discrimination between recognizable objects as being friendly or

enemy, or the name that belongs to the object as a member of a

class. Also called ID.

(JP 1-02)

identification, friend or foe—A device that emits a signal positively identifying it as a

friendly. Also called IFF.

(JP 1-02)

initial point (IP)—1. The first point at which a moving target is located on a plotting board.

2. A well-defined point, easily distinguishable visually and/or

electronically, used as a starting point for the bomb run to the target.

3. airborne--A point close to the landing area where serials (troop

carrier air formations) make final alterations in course to pass over

individual drop or landing zones. 4. helicopter--An air control point in

the vicinity of the landing zone from which individual flights of

helicopters are directed to their prescribed landing sites.

5. Any

designated place at which a column or element thereof is formed by

the successive arrival of its various subdivisions, and comes under

the control of the commander ordering the move. Also called IP. (JP

3-09.1)

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance—An activity that synchronizes and

integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and

processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support

of current and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and

operations function. Also called ISR. (JP 2-01)

joint force maritime component commander—The commander within a unified

command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force

responsible to the establishing commander for making

recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached,

and/or made available for tasking maritime forces and assets;

planning and coordinating maritime operations; or accomplishing such

operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force maritime

component commander is given the authority necessary to

accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing

commander. Also called JFMCC. (JP 3-0)

kill box—A three-dimensional area used to facilitate the integration of joint fires. (JP 3-09)

LOWDOWN—A request to provide tactical ground information pertinent to the mission in a

digital bullseye format.

(Multi-Service Brevity Codes)

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PICTURE—A request to provide air information pertinent to the mission in a digital bullseye

format unless briefed otherwise. (Multi-Service Brevity Codes)

positive identification—Identification criteria established in the rules of engagement that

requires a potential target to be identified as a valid target prior to

engagement. Positive identification criteria may vary from operation

to operation because the joint force commander and subordinate

commanders will establish requirements for positive identification prior

to combat operations, in order to achieve the required confidence of

target identification for engagement. Also called PID.

principle warfare commander—Under the composite warfare commander (CWC) concept

and subordinate to the officer in tactical command and CWC are six

principal warfare commanders: Air Defense Commander (ADC),

Antisubmarine Commander (ASWC), Information Warfare

Commander (IWC), Strike Warfare Commander (STWC), Sea

Combat Commander (SCC), and Surface Warfare Commander

(SUWC). The SUWC and SCC are sometimes combined under one

warfare commander. Also called PWC. (NTRP 1-02)

rules of engagement—Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the

circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will

initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces

encountered. Also called ROE. (JP 1-02)

SHADOW—Follow indicated target. (Multi-Service Brevity Codes)

SOUR—Invalid/no response to an administrative IFF/SIF check.

(Multi-Service Brevity Codes)

strike coordination and reconnaissance—A mission flown for the purpose of detecting

targets and coordinating or performing attack or reconnaissance on

those targets. Strike coordination and reconnaissance missions are

flown in a specific geographic area and are an element of the

command and control interface to coordinate multiple flights, detect

and attack targets, neutralize enemy air defenses, and provide battle

damage assessment. Also called SCAR. (JP3-03)

strike coordination and reconnaissance coordinator—The individual that is responsible

for directing all aircraft in the specified area for that associated SCAR

mission. The SCARC does not have to be a FAC(A). Also called

SCARC.

SWEET—Valid response to an administrative IFF/SIF check request. (Multi-Service Brevity

Codes)

suppression of enemy air defenses—Activity that neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily

degrades surface-based enemy air defenses by destructive and/or

disruptive means. Also called SEAD. (JP 3-01)

time on target—1. Time at which aircraft are scheduled to attack/photograph the target. 2.

The actual time at which aircraft attack/photograph the target. 3. The

time at which a nuclear detonation as planned at a specified desired

ground zero. Also called TOT. (JP 3-09.3)

unmanned aircraft system—That system, whose components include the necessary

equipment, network, and personnel to control an unmanned aircraft.

Also called UAS. (JP 3-03)

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By Order of the Secretary of the Air Force

STEPHEN J. MILLER

Major General, USAF

Commander

Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education

ACCESSIBILITY: Publications and forms are available on the e-Publishing website

at www.e-publishing.af.mil for downloading or ordering.

RELEASABILITY: Distribution authorized to DOD and DOD contractors only to

protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the

International Exchange Program or by other means. This protection applies to

publications required solely for official use and to those containing valuable technical

or operational information. This determination was made on 22 Feb 2008.

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LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT

FORCE INVESTIGATION TEAM REPORT

CONTINUATION

Event: 171001-3519

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

II.

INCIDENT DETAILS

III.

VICTIMS

Deceased

Living Victims

IV.

SUSPECT

WITNESS INTERVIEWS

VI.

SCENE DESCRIPTIONS

Route 91 Venue

Mandalay Bay 32^nd Floor

100-Wing Hallway

Room 32-135

Foyer Inside Room 32-135

West Bedroom (Master Bedroom)

Sitting Area

Decedent Stephen Paddock

Bar/Kitchenette

Living Room

Room 32-134

VII.

EVIDENCE RECOVERY

Physical Evidence

DNA

Digital

VIII.

SUSPECT AUTOPSY

IX.

INVESTIGATION

Mandalay Bay Hotel Room

Paddock's Vehicle

Paddock's Mesquite Residence

Paddock's Reno Residence

Search Warrants and Legal Notices

Law Enforcement Tips and Leads

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM THE 1 OCTOBER INVESTIGATION

Appendix A

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INTRODUCTION

On October 1, 2017, over 22,000 people came together to enjoy a country music festival in Las

Vegas, Nevada. On the third and final night of the festival, a lone gunman opened fire into the

crowd from the 32^nd floor of the Mandalay Bay Resort and Casino. The gunfire continued for

over ten minutes, resulting in the deaths of 58 innocent concert goers and injuring more than

700. With law enforcement closing in, the suspect took his own life.

It is not standard practice for the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) to issue

an investigative overview related to an open case. Due to the magnitude of this investigative

response and the number of victims associated with this incident, Sheriff Joseph Lombardo felt

it was important to author an overview of all investigative work accomplished in the aftermath of

1 October. This report is not intended to be a comprehensive and final account of the facts and

evidence gathered but rather an overview of the investigation. The investigation into this incident

is on-going and a full comprehensive report will be released upon its completion.

This report will reflect the number and identities of victims known to the Las Vegas Metropolitan

Police Department to date. This information is vital in order to grant assistance, properly

categorize the level of crime and most importantly, honor those who fell prey to this horrific act

of violence.

The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department would like to recognize and thank all our local,

state and federal law enforcement partners for their assistance with this investigation.

II.

INCIDENT DETAILS

On October 1, 2017 Stephen Paddock began shooting into the crowd attending the Route 91

Music Festival from his hotel room on the 32^nd floor of the Mandalay Bay. As a result, 58 people

died and over 700 were injured. An extensive, joint investigation involving the LVMPD and the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began immediately after the incident. Every facet of

Paddock’s life was explored.

At the time of the incident Paddock was 64 years old. He owned residences in Mesquite and

Reno, Nevada and lived with his girlfriend, Marilou Danley. Paddock had limited law enforcement

contact and no criminal history.

Paddock embarked on numerous international trips beginning in 2012, these included trips to

Europe, Asia and South America. Most of Paddock’s international travel was unaccompanied.

Paddock also took multiple cruises with destinations in the Bahamas, Alaska and Mexico.

Through interviews with Paddock’s relatives and acquaintances investigators learned Paddock

lived a seemingly normal life. He was married at least once and divorced. He worked as an

accountant and in the family real estate business.

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From 1982 through September of 2016, Paddock purchased 29 firearms. These purchases

consisted of handguns, shotguns and one rifle. From October 2016 through September 2017,

Paddock purchased over 55 firearms. Most of the firearms purchased from 2016 through 2017

were rifles in various calibers along with over 100 firearm related items through numerous

retailers. The firearm related items included scopes, cases, bump stocks and ammunition.

The Ogden

On September 17, 2017, Paddock checked into The Ogden where he was booked through

September 28, 2017 which overlapped his reservation at Mandalay Bay. The Ogden is a

condominium complex located in downtown Las Vegas, Nevada. Paddock stayed in three

different units during this time.

Paddock’s stay at The Ogden coincided with the Life is Beautiful music festival. Similar to the

Route 91 Music Festival, the Life is Beautiful event was held in an open air venue from

September 22, 2017, through September 24, 2017.

While staying at The Ogden, Paddock exhibited behavior which was similar to his time spent at

Mandalay Bay. Paddock left for long periods of time, returning to Mesquite, Nevada, flying to

Reno, Nevada and traveling to Arizona. Paddock was observed numerous times gambling at

downtown Las Vegas casinos. Paddock was also observed moving numerous suitcases from

his vehicle to the various units he rented.

Mandalay Bay Hotel & Casino

On Monday, September 25, 2017, Paddock checked into room 32-135 of the Mandalay Bay

Hotel and Casino with a scheduled check-out date of October 2, 2017. On Friday September 29,

2017, Paddock checked into room 32-134 which connected with room 32-135 via connecting

doors.

From September 25, 2017, through October 1, 2017, Paddock transported multiple suitcases to

his room on several occasions. Paddock also left the Mandalay Bay on multiple occasions for

long periods of time, often returning to Mesquite, Nevada.

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Route 91 Harvest Festival

October 1, 2017, was the final day of the Route 91 Harvest Festival held at the Las Vegas Village

concert venue located at 3901 S. Las Vegas Boulevard. The site is an open air concert venue

approximately 15 acres in size. It is bordered by Las Vegas Boulevard to the west, Reno Avenue

to the north, Giles Street to the east and Mandalay Bay Road to the south.

The festival was a three day country music concert with multiple entertainers. On October 1,

2017, the concert began at 1500 hours. Jason Aldean, the last performer, was scheduled to take

the main stage at 2140 hours. Over 22,000 people were attending the final day of the festival.

Incident

On October 1, 2017, at approximately 2118 hours, Mandalay Bay Security Officer Jesus Campos

was assigned to check several Hotel Service Optimization System (HotSOS)¹ alarms from

various rooms inside the hotel. Room 32-129 was the last of the rooms Security Officer Campos

was assigned to check.

Security Officer Campos was on the 30^th floor and responded to the 32^ndfloor via the stairwell in

the north end of the 100 wing. Security Officer Campos attempted to enter the hallway to the

100 wing but the door would not open. He took the stairs to the 33^rd floor and used the guest

¹ A HotSOS Alarm is triggered by a guest room door that is left ajar for a predetermined amount of time.

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elevator to access the 32^nd floor. Once on the 32^nd floor, Security Officer Campos entered the

foyer leading to the stairwell. He discovered an “L” bracket screwed into the door and door frame

which prevented it from opening. Security Officer Campos called his dispatch center with the

house phone located in the foyer to report the discovery. The security dispatch center then called

the engineering section to have the door checked.

Security Officer Campos heard what he described as a rapid drilling sound coming from room

32-135 after he hung up the phone. As he walked down the 100 wing hallway, Campos heard

what he described as automatic gunfire coming from the area of room 32-135 and realized he

had been shot in the left calf. He took cover in the alcove of rooms 32-122 and 32-124 and

utilized both his cellular phone and radio to notify his dispatch he was shot. Security Officer

Campos advised he was shot with a BB or pellet gun. While waiting for other security personnel

to arrive Security Officer Campos continued to hear gunfire coming from the room.

Engineer Stephen Schuck finished fixing a leak in room 62-207 when he was directed to respond

to the 32^nd floor reference the bracket preventing the stairwell door from opening. Engineer

Schuck used the service elevator in the 200 wing to access the 32^nd floor. When he arrived on

the 32^nd floor, he gathered his tools and equipment and walked from the 200 wing to the 100

wing.

As Engineer Schuck walked up the hallway of the 100 wing, he observed Security Officer

Campos poke his head out of an alcove. Engineer Schuck then heard rapid gunfire coming from

the end of the 100 hallway which lasted approximately 10 seconds. When the gunfire stopped,

he heard Security Officer Campos tell him to take cover. Engineer Schuck stepped into an alcove

and gunfire again erupted down the hallway coming from room 32-135. The gunfire lasted a few

seconds then stopped. The gunfire started again after a brief pause but Engineer Schuck

believed it was directed outside and not down the hallway.

Inside the Las Vegas Village over fifty LVMPD personnel were on overtime assignments for the

Route 91 Harvest Festival. The initial gunshots were heard on an officer’s Body Worn Camera

(BWC). Officers and concertgoers initially believed the gunfire to be fireworks. As Paddock

targeted the concertgoers with gunfire, officers quickly determined they were dealing with an

active shooter and broadcast the information over the radio.

The crowd inside the Las Vegas Village started reacting to the gunfire and Jason Aldean ran off

the stage. Officers and concertgoers began treating victims who were struck by gunfire. They

also tried to get concertgoers out of the venue in a safe manner. Officers determined the gunfire

was coming from an elevated position, possibly from the Mandalay Bay Hotel. Medical personnel

were requested for multiple people struck by gunfire.

As the active shooter incident was occurring, two LVMPD officers were in the security office of

the Mandalay Bay handling a call for service reference two females who were in custody for

trespassing. The officers heard the radio broadcast of gunfire at the Route 91 Harvest Festival.

Both officers, along with security personnel, exited the security office and responded towards

the Las Vegas Village. As they were making their way through the casino, security personnel

advised the officers of an active shooter on the 32^nd floor of the hotel.² The officers then directed

²Information obtained from LVMPD BWC.

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security to escort them to that location. The officers and security personnel entered the Center

Core guest elevators and were again advised the shooter was on the 32^nd floor. The officers

made a tactical deciscion to respond to the 31^st floor and take the stairwell to the 32^nd floor.

LVMPD officers converged on the Las Vegas Village and Mandalay Bay. Officers formed

multiple Strike Teams and entered the Mandalay Bay from various entrance points. A team of

officers including a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operator reached the 32^nd floor via

the stairwell in the 100 wing. Officers did not hear gunfire coming from room 32-135. Officers

were able to manually breach the “L” bracket on the stairwell door and gain access to the

hallway. Officers immediately observed a food service cart which had wires running from it to

room 32-134 and prepared themselves for the possibility of an Improvised Explosive Device

(IED). The decision was made to use an explosive breach to make entry into room 32-135.

After a successful breach of the doors to room 32-135, officers entered the room and found

Paddock deceased on the floor. Paddock appeared to have a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the

head. Officers cleared the remainder of the room and observed multiple rifles in various locations

throughout the room as well as hundreds of expended casings. A second explosive breach was

utilized to gain access to room 32-134 through the connecting doors. Immediately after the

breach a SWAT officer negligently discharged his rifle. Officers cleared room 32-134 finding

several rifles in the room.

Officers, medical personnel, and concertgoers continued the evacuation of victims in the Las

Vegas Village venue. Several triage sites were established in the venue and surrounding area.

Injuries ranged from being minor in nature to fatal. Hundreds of wounded were transported to

area hospitals by ambulance and privately owned citizen vehicles.

Sequence of Events

The details listed below were gathered from several different sources³. For the purpose of this

section, the sequence of events will begin on September 25^th when Paddock checked into the

Mandalay Bay and end with the LVMPD officers making entry into Paddock’s room. All times

in this section are approximates based upon different time sources and different time

stamps which were all utilized to document this section of the report. All dates and times

listed below occurred in the year 2017.

On or around September 9^th Paddock made his room reservation for a Vista Suite ending in 235

but not a specific floor. On September 20^th Paddock was internally⁴ assigned to room 33-235.

On September 21^st Paddock was internally changed to room 32-235. On September 24^th

Paddock was assigned to room 32-135.

³ LVMPD Officer Body Worn Cameras; UBER Video; Interviews to include officers, civilians & Mandalay Bay

Employees; Mandalay Bay Video Surveillance; Lock Interrogation Documents; Cell Phone Videos & Records.

⁴ All internal changes to Paddock’s rooms were done by a Mandalay Bay computer without Paddock’s

knowledge.

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September 25^th through October 1^st

September 25^th

Overview:

At approximately 1533 hours, Paddock checked into room 32-135 of the Mandalay Bay under

his name. Paddock booked the connecting room (32-134) for September 29^th through October

2^nd. When Paddock checked into room 32-134 on September 29^th, he did so under his girlfriend,

Danley’s, name. Paddock was set to check out of both rooms on October

2^nd. From

approximately 1603 to 1656 hours, Paddock was seen at Mizuya Sushi (inside the Mandalay

Bay), he then drove his vehicle from self-park to valet⁵, and returned to the front desk with five

suitcase bags.

 At approximately 1656 hours, a bellman met Paddock and escorted him to room 32-135.

Paddock requested to go through the service elevators and not through the guest

elevators. According to interviews, this request is not uncommon for guests of the hotel.

Paddock rolled one bag and a bellman used a luggage cart for the other four bags.

 From approximately 2137 to 2140 hours, Paddock had his vehicle removed from valet

and Paddock left the Mandalay Bay.

 At approximately 2300 hours, Paddock arrived in Mesquite, Nevada.

September 26^th

Overview:

Paddock spent time at his home in Mesquite, Nevada, Downtown Las Vegas and Mandalay Bay.

 From approximately 1012 to 1455 hours, according to cell phone records, Paddock’s cell

phone showed in Mesquite, Nevada.

 At approximately 1535 hours, Paddock completed a wire transfer in Mesquite, Nevada of

$50,000 from his Wells Fargo account to an account in the Philippines.

 From approximately 2012 to 2100 hours, Paddock drove from Mesquite, Nevada to The

Ogden.

 From approximately 2102 to 2216 hours, Paddock walked around and gambled at the El

Cortez Hotel.

 At approximately 2223 hours, Paddock returned to The Ogden.

 At approximately 2234 hours, Paddock departed The Ogden and drove to Mandalay Bay.

 From approximately 2245 to 2252 hours, Paddock valeted his vehicle at Mandalay Bay

and took six suitcases (located on a luggage cart) and one rolling suitcase (Paddock

rolled the suitcase himself) up to room 32-135 by way of the service elevator with help of

a bellman. (The bellman who escorted Paddock on the September 25^th was different than

the bellman who escorted Paddock on the September 26^th.)

 At approximately 2218 hours, Paddock began gambling at Mandalay Bay and continued

gambling into the next morning.

⁵ Confirmed by valet ticket #275263147

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September 27^th

Overview:

Paddock spent several hours gambling at Mandalay Bay. Paddock spoke with his VIP host

reference wanting the “Vista Suite” at the end of the hall with the double doors. Paddock was

insistent on the suite and connecting room. Paddock wanted to be in the 200 wing as it had a

better view, according to him. Paddock was upset about the room, but was not angry. Paddock

never mentioned the reason why he wanted a connecting room.

 At approximately

0713 hours, Paddock stopped gambling, which he was doing

continuously since the previous night.

 At approximately 1556 hours, Paddock placed a room service order for two entrees

totaling $94.33.

 At approximately 1632 hours, room 32-135 was cleaned by hotel staff. Paddock remained

in the room as it was cleaned.

 At approximately 2003 hours, Paddock was seen in the valet area of Mandalay Bay with

two rolling suitcases. Paddock had his vehicle removed from valet and left the Mandalay

Bay at approximately 2015 hours.

 At approximately 2029 hours, Paddock arrived at The Ogden and entered a room at

approximately 2031 hours.

 From approximately 2045 to 2200 hours, Paddock left The Ogden and drove to Mesquite,

Nevada, where he arrived at approximately 2200 hours.

 At approximately 2300 hours, Paddock arrived at the Walmart in Mesquite, Nevada. He

purchased luggage, razor blades, fake flowers, a vase, and a styrofoam ball.

September 28^th

Overview:

In Mesquite, Nevada, Paddock purchased a .308 bolt action rifle, deposited $14,000 into a Wells

Fargo account, and wire transferred $50,000 to an account in the Philippines. Paddock visited a

gun range in Mesquite, Nevada, before traveling back to the Mandalay Bay.

 From approximately 0227 to 1420 hours, Paddock’s cell phone was located in Mesquite,

Nevada according to cell phone records.

 From approximately 1444 to 1501 hours, Paddock made a $14,000 deposit at Wells

Fargo and transferred $50,000 to a bank in the Philippines.

 At approximately 1523 hours, Paddock purchased a .308 bolt action rifle from a gun store

in Mesquite, Nevada.

 From approximately 1723 to 1803 hours, Paddock was seen driving in the area of the City

of Mesquite Landfill / gun range located at 3200 Mesquite Heights Road, in a rural area

of Mesquite, Nevada.

 From approximately 2042 to 2146 hours, Paddock traveled from Mesquite, Nevada to the

Mandalay Bay and parked in valet. Paddock was seen entering the Mandalay Bay with

two rolling suitcases and a laptop bag.

 At approximately 2218 hours, Paddock began gambling at Mandalay Bay and continued

gambling into the next morning.

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Event: 171001-3519

September 29^th

Overview:

A second refrigerator was delivered to Paddock’s room (32-135). Staff was asked to only change

linen’s and take out the trash in room 32-135. A staff member was told by Paddock not to vacuum

32-135 and not to remove the food service cart from the room. Staff was asked specifically to

change sheets and towels in room 32-134 and inform Paddock when room 32-134 was

completed. Paddock remained in room 32-135 and used his laptop as the rooms were being

cleaned.

 At approximately

0543 hours, Paddock stopped gambling, which he was doing

continuously since the previous night.

 From approximately 1228 to 1314 hours, Paddock ate at Mizuya Sushi Sake and then

returned to room 32-135.

 At approximately 1400 hours, rooms 32-135 and 32-134 were cleaned by hotel staff.

 At approximately 1506 hours, Paddock checked into room 32-134 (under Danley’s name)

from the VIP check in counter at the Mandalay Bay.

 At approximately 1508 hours, Paddock took the guest elevator to the 32^nd floor.

 At approximately 1509 hours, Paddock entered room 32-134.

 From approximately 1509 to 0100 (September 30^th) hours, Paddock remained inside

rooms 32-134 and 32-135.

 At approximately 2311 hours, a room service ticket totaling $102.99 was charged to room

32-134.

September 30^th

Overview:

Paddock traveled to Mesquite, Nevada twice from Mandalay Bay. Paddock placed “Do Not

Disturb” signs on both 32-135 and 32-134. Paddock gambled for a couple of hours and brought

more suitcases up to his room.

 At approximately 0100 hours, Paddock drove to Mesquite, Nevada.

 At approximately 0556 hours, Paddock returned to the Mandalay Bay with four suitcases.

 From approximately 1204 to 1215 hours hotel staff serviced the private mini bar of room

32-134. (Paddock placed the “Do Not Disturb” signs on the room doors sometime after

1215 hours.)

 Between approximately 1300 to 1400 hours, Paddock was asked if he would like rooms

32-135 and 32-134 cleaned. Paddock declined.

 From approximately 1452 hours to 1508 hours, Paddock removed his vehicle from valet

and parked in the self-parking garage.

 At approximately 1512 hours, Paddock was observed exiting the parking garage elevator

with two suitcase rolling bags.

 At approximately 1520 hours, Paddock was seen in a guest elevator with the two rolling

suitcases and took them to his room.

 At approximately 1952 hours, Paddock drove from Mandalay Bay to Mesquite, Nevada

and arrived at approximately 2057 hours.

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CONTINUATION

Event: 171001-3519

October 1^st

Overview:

From approximately 0206 to 2040 hours, Paddock departed Mesquite, Nevada and returned to

Mandalay Bay. He spent several hours gambling, brought more suitcases to his room, and

ordered room service.

 At approximately 0206 hours, Paddock left Mesquite, Nevada.

 At approximately 0305 hours, Paddock arrived at the self-parking garage at the Mandalay

Bay.

 From approximately 0324 to 0734 hours, Paddock walked around the casino and

gambled. Paddock used both his own and Danley’s players cards.

 At approximately 0737 hours, Paddock returned to his room.

 From approximately 1222 to 1226 hours, Paddock moved his vehicle from the self-park

garage to valet⁶. This valet transaction was the only parking transaction during his stay

at Mandalay Bay that was completed in Danley’s name.

 At approximately 1229 hours, Paddock was observed waiting for an elevator with two

rolling suitcases. There was also a third bag hanging from one of the rolling suitcases.

 At approximately 1233 hours, a room service ticket was opened for room 32-134.

 At approximately 1317 hours, Mandalay Bay valet parked Paddock’s vehicle in “Garage

East”, space #317.⁷

 At approximately 1337 hours, the room service ticket⁸ was closed out for room 32-134 in

Danley’s name. The check totaled $67.60 and included two entrees.

 From 1423 to 1940 hours, the doors for rooms 32-134 and 32-135 were manipulated

multiple times. For example, the doors were opened, closed and the dead bolt locks were

engaged and disengaged several times.

From approximately 2040 to 2205 hours, a series of events led up to the mass shooting

conducted by Paddock:

 At approximately 2040 hours, a HotSOS alarm was generated for room 32-129.

 At approximately 2118 hours, the HotSOS call was assigned to Security Officer Campos

via his cellphone. Security Officer Campos was assigned five HotSOS calls during the

2118 hours cellphone call. According to interviews of hotel staff, it is common practice to

assign HotSOS calls to security officers and then immediately close out the HotSOS

tickets prior to a security officers actually checking out the room. Security Officer Campos

handled the HotSOS call for room 32-129 last.

 At approximately 2136 hours, the dead bolt to room 32-135 was engaged.

 At approximately 2140 hours, Jason Alden started his performance at the Route 91

Festival.

 At approximately 2146 hours, the dead bolt to room 32-134 was engaged.

⁶ Valet ticket #275274484

⁷ This is the same space detectives located the vehicle in after the shooting

⁸ Room service ticket #51592684

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Event: 171001-3519

Approximately 2146 to 2204 hours

 Security Officer Campos entered the service elevator at approximately 2146 hours and

got off on the 30^th floor at approximately 2147 hours.

 Security Officer Campos walked to the stairwell in the 100 wing of the 30^th floor and

walked up to the 32^nd floor.

 Security Officer Campos could not gain entry to the 32^nd floor due to the door being

barricaded.⁹

 Security Officer Campos walked up the stairs to the 33^rd floor. Security Officer Campos

walked down the 100-Wing of the 33^rd floor to Center Core. He took a guest elevator to

the 32^nd floor.

 At approximately 2200 hours, Security Officer Campos exited the guest elevator and

walked up the 100 Wing toward room 32-129. Security Officer Campos checked room 32-

129 and found it was secure. Security Officer Campos walked into the foyer leading to

the stairwell and observed the “L” bracket screwed into the door and frame.

 At approximately 2204 hours, Security Officer Campos picked up a house phone located

inside the small foyer leading to the stairwell and called security dispatch to report the “L”

bracket on the door to the stairs. Security dispatch transferred the call to maintenance

dispatch. The maintenance dispatcher then transferred Security Officer Campos to the

maintenance supervisor’s cell phone.

From approximately 2205 to 2216 hours, Paddock committed a mass shooting that left 58 people

dead and over 700 hundred injured:

Approximately 2205 hours

 Engineer Schuck was contacted by the maintenance dispatcher via his radio.

 Paddock fired two single gunshots into the Las Vegas Village area.

 Paddock fired an undetermined amount of gunshots into the Las Vegas Village area.

Approximately 2206 hours

 Security Officer Campos ended the phone call and hung up the house phone. After

hanging up the phone, Security Officer Campos heard what he described as rapid drilling

noises.

 Paddock fired approximately 100 rounds into the Las Vegas Village area.

 Security Officer Campos began walking down the 100-wing toward Center Core.

 Engineer Schuck was told by his supervisor to go to the 32^nd floor.

 LVMPD unit 169SE broadcast over the Convention Center Area Command (CCAC) radio

channel, “169SE, we got shots fired, 415A at the Route 91. Sounded like an automatic

firearm.”

 Paddock fired rounds down the hallway at Security Officer Campos. Security Officer

Campos was struck in the left calf with a bullet fragment. He took cover in the alcove

between rooms 32-124 and 32-122.

⁹ The investigation would reveal the door leading from the stairwell to the 32^nd floor was barricaded by an “L”

bracket screwed into the door and the door frame.

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Event: 171001-3519

 Security Officer Campos told his dispatcher via his radio, “Hey there’s shots fired in, uh,

32-135.”

 Engineer Schuck’s dispatcher told him specifically where to go on the 32^nd floor. Engineer

Schuck left room 62-207 and walked to the service elevators with his equipment cart. The

service elevators are located in the 200-wing of the hotel.

Approximately 2207 hours,

 Paddock fired approximately 95 rounds into the Las Vegas Village area.

 LVMPD Officers Varsin and Hendrex left the Mandalay Bay Security Office with two

armed Mandalay Bay Security Officers.

 Paddock fired approximately 100 rounds into the Las Vegas Village area.

 Paddock fired approximately 94 rounds into the Las Vegas Village area.

Approximately 2208 hours

 Paddock fired the 1^st round at the fuel tank. (Missed tank)

 LVMPD CAD event# 171001-3519 was generated for the shooting incident.

Approximately 2209 hours

 Paddock fired the 2^nd round at the fuel tank. (Missed tank)

 Paddock fired the 3^rd round at the fuel tank. (Missed tank)

 Paddock fired the 4^th round at the fuel tank. (Missed tank)

 Paddock fired the 5^th round at the fuel tank. 1^st strike into the fuel tank. (Top strike)

 Paddock fired the 6^th round at the fuel tank. 2^nd strike into fuel tank. (Lower strike) The

investigation was unable to determine when the 7^th and 8^th rounds were fired at the fuel

tank.¹⁰

 Paddock fired an undetermined number of rounds into the Las Vegas Village area.

Approximately 2210 hours

 Engineer Schuck arrived at the Center Core of the 32^nd floor and walked up the 100-wing

toward room 32-135. As he walked, Engineer Schuck heard what he believed to be a jack

hammer sound in the distance. Engineer Schuck quickly realized it was automatic

gunfire.¹¹ After the gunshots stopped, Security Officer Campos yelled at Engineer Schuck

to take cover.

 Engineer Schuck turned and took cover in the alcove between rooms 32-119 and 32-117.

Paddock fired rounds down the hallway at Engineer Schuck. He was not struck by gunfire.

Engineer Shuck attempted to open room 32-117 with his master key card however the

dead bolt lock was engaged and he was unable to gain entry into the room.

 Engineer Schuck stated over his radio, “Shannon, call the police. Someone’s firing a rifle

on the 32^nd floor down the hallway.”

¹⁰ There were eight .308 casings located inside of room 32-134

¹¹ The investigation determined at the time Engineer Schuck heard the gunfire, Paddock fired the

approximately 21 rounds, referred to above, at the Las Vegas Village area.

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Event: 171001-3519

Approximately 2211 hours

 LVMPD Officers Varsin and Hendrex arrived at the Center Core area of the 31^st floor and

began walking up the 100-wing along with armed security officers from Mandalay Bay.

 Paddock fired approximately 80-100 rounds into the Las Vegas Village area.

 Paddock fired approximately 95 rounds into the Las Vegas Village area.

Approximately 2212 hours

 Two armed Mandalay Bay security officers exited the guest elevator on the 32^nd floor and

went to the Center Core.

 Paddock fired approximately 80-90 rounds into the Las Vegas Village area.

 Paddock fired an unknown number of rounds into the Las Vegas Village area. LVMPD

Officers Clarkson and Cook were struck by gunfire during this volley.

 A Mandalay Bay security officer who was with LVMPD Officers Varsin and Hendrex

advised over his radio, “We can hear rapid fire above us. We are on the 31^st floor. We

can hear it above us.”

Approximately 2213 hours

 Paddock fired an unknown number of rounds into the Las Vegas Village area.

Approximately 2215 hours

 Paddock fired two seperate volleys of an unknown number of rounds into the Las Vegas

Village area.

Approximately 2216 hours

 LVMPD Officers Varsin and Hendrex along with Mandalay Bay security officers made

entry into the stairwell on the 31^st floor.

Approximately 2218 hours

 The heat detection indicator from inside room 32-135 detected no further readings from

inside of the room.

Approximately 2241 hours

 A Strike Team which included K9 Sergeant Bitsko, K9 Officer Newton, SWAT Officer

Hancock and Detective Walford ascended the stairs from the 30^th floor. The Strike Team

made entry and cleared the 31^st floor.

Approximately 2256 hours

 The Strike Team reentered the stairwell from the 31^st floor and walked up to the 32^nd floor.

Approximately 2257 hours

 K9 Sergeant Bitsko and SWAT Officer Hancock manually breached the door barricaded

with the “L” bracket.

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Event: 171001-3519

Approximately 2320 hours

 The Strike Team conducted an explosive breach into room 32-135 and made entry. The

Strike Team reported Paddock was down from an apparent self-inflected gunshot wound

to the head.

Approximately 2326 hours

 The Strike Team made a second explosive breach from inside of room 32-135 into room

32-134 through the connecting doors. Immediately after the explosive breach an LVMPD

SWAT Officer negligently fired a three round burst from his rifle. The rounds fired from

the SWAT officer’s rifle struck a chair, an entertainment center/cabinet and a wall.

After the Strike Team finished rendering rooms 32-134 and 32-135 safe, the scene was secured

until investigative personnel arrived and assumed control of the 32^nd floor.

III.

VICTIMS

Deceased

Victims 1-31 were pronounced deceased by the coroner investigator who responded to the Las

Vegas Village venue and surrounding areas. The remaining victims were pronounced by the

attending physician at the corresponding medical facility they were transported to. After all

autopsies were performed, the Clark County Office of the Coroner Medical Examiner (CCOCME)

ruled the cause and manner of death for all deceased victims to be gunshot wound(s) and

homicide.

1. Jack Reginald Beaton

Age 54

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10060

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 727327

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0545 hours

2. Christopher Louis Roybal

Age 28

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10061

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 727302

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0545 hours

3. Lisa Marie Patterson

Age 46

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10062

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 732484

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0545 hours

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Event: 171001-3519

Adrian Allan Murfitt

Age 35

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10063

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 737364

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0545 hours

Hannah Lassette Ahlers

Age 34

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10065

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 732473

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0545 hours

Austin William Davis

Age 29

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10066

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 727385

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0545 hours

Stephen Richard Berger

Age 44

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10067

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 732488

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0545 hours

Stacee Ann Etcheber

Age 50

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10068

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 727388

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0545 hours

Christiana Duarte

Age 22

Clark County Coroner’s Case Number: 17-10069

Clark County Coroner’s Seal Number: 732404

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0545 hours

10. Lisa Romero-Muniz

Age 48

Clark County Coroner’s Case Number: 17-10070

Clark County Coroner’s Seal Number: 732458

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0545 hours

11. Heather Lorraine Alvarado

Age 35

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10071

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 732423

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0545 hours

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Event: 171001-3519

12. Denise Cohen

Age 58

Clark County Coroner’s Case Number: 17-10072

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 732474

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0545 hours

13. Kurt Allen Von Tillow

Age 55

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10073

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 732489

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0545 hours

14. Brennan Lee Stewart

Age 30

Clark County Coroner’s Case Number: 17-10074

Clark County Coroner’s Seal Number: 732414

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0545 hours

15. Derrick Dean Taylor

Age 56

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10075

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 732445

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0545 hours

16. Kelsey Breanne Meadows

Age 28

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10076

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 732486

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0545 hours

17. Jennifer Topaz Irvine

Age 42

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10077

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 727384

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0545 hours

18. William W. Wolfe Jr.

Age 42

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10078

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 732415

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0545 hours

19. Carly Anne Kreibaum

Age 33

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10079

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 732478

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0545 hours

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Event: 171001-3519

20. Laura Anne Shipp

Age 50

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10080

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 732451

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0545 hours

21. Carrie Rae Barnette

Age 34

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10085

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 727391

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0545 hours

22. Jordyn Nicole Rivera

Age 21

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10101

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 732469

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0545 hours

23. Victor Loyd Link

Age 55

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10102

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 732497

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0545 hours

24. Candice Ryan Bowers

Age 40

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10103

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 732417

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0545 hours

25. Jordon Alan McIldoon

Age 23

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10053

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 732487

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0545 hours

26. Keri Lynn Galvan

Age 31

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10054

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 732499

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0545 hours

27. Dorene Anderson

Age 49

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10057

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 727313

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0545 hours

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Event: 171001-3519

28. Neysa C. Tonks

Age 46

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10058

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 727306

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0545 hours

29. Melissa V. Ramirez

Age 26

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10059

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 732407

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0545 hours

30. Brian Scott Fraser

Age 39

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10056

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 732408

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0545 hours

31. Tara Ann Roe

Age 34

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10055

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 732441

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0545 hours

32. Bailey Schweitzer

Age 20

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10051

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 732420

Time of Death: 10-01-2017 at 2307 hours

33. Patricia Mestas

Age 67

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10049

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 727390

Time of Death: 10-01-2017 at 2250 hours

34. Jennifer Parks

Age 36

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10052

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 727359

Time of Death: 10-01-2017 at 2300 hours

35. Angela Gomez

Age 20

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10050

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 732413

Time of Death: 10-01-2017 at 2253 hours

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Event: 171001-3519

36. Denise Burditus

Age 50

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10082

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 731590

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0047 hours

37. Cameron Robinson

Age 28

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10083

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 732437

Time of Death: 10-01-2017 at 2301 hours

38. James Melton

Age 29

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10084

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 727311

Time of Death: 10-01-2017 at 2320 hours

39. Quinton Robbins

Age 20

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10046

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 731535

Time of Death: 10-01-2017 at 2315 hours

40. Charleston Hartfield

Age 34

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10086

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 727353

Time of Death: 10-01-2017 at 2230 hours

41. Erick Silva

Age 21

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10087

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 725563

Time of Death: 10-01-2017 at 2230 hours

42. Teresa Nicol Kimura

Age 38

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10088

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 725567

Time of Death: 10-01-2017 at 2230 hours

43. Susan Smith

Age 53

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10089

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 725552

Time of Death: 10-01-2017 at 2230 hours

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Event: 171001-3519

44. Dana Leann Gardner

Age 52

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10090

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 725569

Time of Death: 10-01-2017 at 2250 hours

45. Thomas Day Jr.

Age 54

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10091

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 725591

Time of Death: 10-01-2017 at 2341 hours

46. John Joseph Phippen

Age 56

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10092

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 725568

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0244 hours

47. Rachel Kathleen Parker

Age 33

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10093

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 725561

Time of Death: 10-01-2017 at 2230 hours

48. Sandra Casey

Age 34

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10094

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 725550

Time of Death: 10-01-2017 at 2230 hours

49. Jessica Klymchuk

Age 34

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10095

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 727322

Time of Death: 10-01-2017 at 2230

50. Andrea Lee Anna Castilla

Age 28

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10096

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 727381

Time of Death: 10-01-2017 at 2301 hours

51. Carolyn Lee Parsons

Age 31

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10097

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 727382

Time of Death: 10-01-2017 at 2300 hours

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Event: 171001-3519

52. Michelle Vo

Age 32

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10098

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 727355

Time of Death: 10-01-2017 at 2244 hours

53. Rocio Guillen

Age 40

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10099

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 732409

Time of Death: 10-01-2017 at 2318 hours

54. Christopher Hazencomb

Age 44

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10105

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 732444

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 1044 hours

55. Brett Schwanbeck

Age 61

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10081

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 732471

Time of Death: 10-03-2017 at 1328 hours

56. Rhonda M. LeRocque

Age 42

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10045

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 542385

Time of Death: 10-02-2017 at 0023 hours

57. Austin Cooper Meyer

Age 24

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10047

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 540045

Time of Death: 10-01-2017 at 2257 hours

58. Calla-Marie Medig

Age 28

Clark County Coroner’s Office Case Number: 17-10048

Clark County Coroner’s Office Seal Number: 539069

Time of Death: 10-01-2017 at 2246 hours

LVMPD Internal Oversight & Constitutional Policing

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Force Investigation Team

LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT

FORCE INVESTIGATION TEAM REPORT

CONTINUATION

Event: 171001-3519

Living Victims

Documenting the living victims in this case has been a work in progress since October 1^st. Source

material poured into the LVMPD’s Force Investigation Team (FIT) office post October 1^st and is

still being received.¹²

LVMPD recognizes that the approximate 22,000 people who attended the Route 91 festival are

all victims. That number does not take into consideration the hundreds and possibly thousands

that were walking along the Las Vegas Strip at the time of the shooting outside the Las Vegas

Village venue. The goal of the FIT team was to document those who actually sustained any type

of physical injury, no matter the degree. As previously stated in the introduction to this report,

this information is vital in order to grant assistance, properly categorize the level of crime and

most importantly, honor those who fell prey to this horrific act of violence..

IV.

SUSPECT

An extensive joint investigation involving the LVMPD and the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI) began immediately after the incident into the life of Paddock. Every facet of Paddock’s life

was explored.

At the time of the incident Paddock was 64 years old. He owned residences in Mesquite and

Reno, Nevada and lived with his girlfriend Marilou Danley. Danley was in the Philippines at the

time of the incident. She left the country on September 14, 2017, and returned on October 3,

2017. Upon arriving in the United States, Danley was interviewed by investigators several times.

Interviews were also conducted with other relatives and acquaintances reference Paddock’s

backg2round.

Danley stated Paddock’s demeanor changed over the course of the last year. According to her,

Paddock had become “distant” and their relationship was no longer intimate. Paddock was

described as “germaphobic” and had strong reactions to smells. Over the course of the last year

Paddock began to buy firearms and Danley believed it was a hobby of his.

During a stay at the Mandalay Bay in the beginning of September 2017, Danley recalled Paddock

behaving strangely. The two were staying in room 60-235 and she observed Paddock constantly

looking out the windows of the room which overlooked the Las Vegas Village venue. Paddock

would move from window to window looking at the site from different angles.

Paddock’s ex-wife, Peggy Reiko Paddock, described Paddock as intelligent and great with

numbers. She further stated he worked as an Internal Revenue Service Agent. Paddock later

worked as an auditor for Lockheed Martin and Boeing. According to her, Paddock began

purchasing real estate properties with his mother and renovating them. Paddock bought and

sold numerous properties throughout the years and, as far as she knew, sold the last property

in 2010.

¹² Source material consisted of information from local area hospitals, notes taken by Crime Scene Analysts

who responded to local area hospitals to document the injured, voluntary statements from actual victims and

witnesses, and lastly, incident crime reports filed by hundreds of victims who sustained injury but waited to

travel home to receive medical care. Also included was a separate listing of victims provided by the FBI.

LVMPD Internal Oversight & Constitutional Policing

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Force Investigation Team

LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT

FORCE INVESTIGATION TEAM REPORT

CONTINUATION

Event: 171001-3519

Paddock made numerous claims to friends and family that he consistently felt ill, in pain or

fatigued. An interview was conducted with a physician in Las Vegas who identified himself as

Paddock’s primary care physician since 2009. He last saw Paddock as a patient on or around

October 2016 for an annual checkup. He recalled the only major ailment Paddock had was a

slip and fall accident at a casino approximately 3 years earlier, which caused a muscle tear.

The physician described Paddock as “odd" in behavior with “little emotion” shown. He believed

Paddock may have had bipolar disorder however, Paddock did not want to discuss that topic

further with him. Paddock also refused anti-depressant medication but accepted prescriptions

for anxiety. He noted Paddock seemed fearful of medications, often refusing to take them. He

did not believe Paddock was abusing any medications.

Most of the people interviewed acknowledged Paddock’s gambling habits. Paddock was known

to gamble tens of thousands of dollars at a time and played at numerous casinos. Paddock was

often given complimentary rooms and meals at the casinos he frequented due to the amount of

money he gambled.

From 1982 through September of 2016, Paddock purchased approximately 29 firearms. These

purchases consisted of handguns, shotguns and one rifle. From October

2016 through

September 2017, Paddock purchased over 55 firearms along with firearm related accessories.

Most of the firearms were rifles of various calibers. With the exception of the revolver, every

firearm recovered in the Mandalay Bay was bought after September 2016.

During the course of the investigation it was learned Paddock had very limited contact with law

enforcement. Paddock was stopped by police on occasion for traffic related offenses receiving

only traffic citations. No arrest history was found for Paddock.

WITNESS INTERVIEWS

The following information was taken from witness statements and compiled into a chronological

description of the events.

On 10-01-2017, LVMPD had 51 personnel assigned to work special events overtime for the

Route 91 Festival. The personnel staffing consisted of one lieutenant, five sergeants, forty-four

officers and one civilian. The event had officers staffed from 1300-0100 hours with officers

arriving and securing at various times.

The specific assignments for the event were West Traffic (1 sergeant, 10 officers), East Traffic

(1 sergeant, 10 officers), Interior Entry / Gates (1 sergeant, 6 officers), Interior Early Squad (1

sergeant, 8 officers), Interior Late Squad (1 sergeant, 8 officers), Event Coordinator (1 officer)

and Command Post (1 officer, 1 civilian). The assignments were supervised by Lieutenant

Spencer who was designated as the Incident Commander for the festival.¹³

¹³ Specific officers and assigned locations can be found on the Assignment List, ICS Form 204 for the event.

LVMPD Internal Oversight & Constitutional Policing

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Force Investigation Team

LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT

FORCE INVESTIGATION TEAM REPORT

CONTINUATION

Event: 171001-3519

At approximately 2118 hours, Mandalay Bay Security Officer Campos was working his normal

duties when he was notified of several HotSOS calls in the 100 Wing tower that he was assigned

to monitor. The standard operating procedure for the Mandalay Bay security staff once an alarm

is received is to call the room and attempt to contact the guest. If there is no answer, a security

officer will be sent to check the door. These HotSOS calls are common and occur numerous

times throughout the day. The security dispatcher will typically close the alarm out once a

security officer is assigned. Security Dispatcher Brett Buck notified Security Officer Campos to

check several HotSOS calls. Room 32-129 was last on his list to check.

Security Officer Campos was on the 30^th floor and en-route to room 32-129 via the stairwell

located at the north end of the 100 wing. Security Officer Campos attempted to enter the hallway

of the 32^nd floor through the small foyer and discovered the door was locked. The doors are

always open due the stairwell being a fire escape and county codes require they remain

unlocked at all times. The door has a handle but no locking mechanism.

Security Officer Campos stated he walked down the stairwell to the 31^st floor, entered the hallway

and walked to the Center Core. He used the guest elevator to go to the 32^nd floor. Video

surveillance showed Security Officer Campos actually went to the 33^rd floor, then took a guest

elevator down to the 32^nd floor.

Security Officer Campos proceeded directly to the end of the 100 wing hallway, opened the inner

door of the foyer entrance to the stairwell and observed the “L” bracket screwed into the door

frame and door that opens into the stairwell. He realized this is what kept the door secured.

Security Officer Campos utilized the house phone mounted inside the foyer to notify the security

dispatcher of the bracket. The security dispatcher passed the call to the engineering section.

Security Officer Campos hung up the phone, heard what he described as a loud rapid drilling

sound coming from room 32-135. He recalled the drilling sounded like it was coming from deep

inside the room.

While walking toward the Center Core, Security Officer Campos heard gunfire coming from room

32-135 and ran down the hallway. Security Officer Campos realized he was shot in his left calf

as he took cover in the alcove of rooms 32-122 and 32-124. Using both his radio and cell phone,

Security Officer Campos advised the security dispatcher he had been shot in the leg with a BB

/ Pellet gun and was injured. He stayed in this position on the phone with the dispatcher while

waiting for help. Security Officer Campos heard more gunshots coming from inside 32-135, but

no rounds were coming down the hallway.

As country music singer Jason Aldean performed on stage, LVMPD officers working the interior

of the event heard what they described as fireworks going off. Officer Hutchason and Special

Events Coordinator Rodriquez, who were in the Command Post with security personnel, used

the video monitors to look for the source of the noise. Upon recognizing the source of the noise

to be gunfire, Coordinator Rodriguez directed all officers to change their radios to the CCAC

radio channel. Coordinator Rodriguez monitored both the Events radio channel and CCAC radio

channel throughout the incident.

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Force Investigation Team

Military reference books and manuals (2009-2023, Volume 1) - page 18